“The Fourth Defendant is Executive Chairman (formerly Chief Executive Officer and a director) of the First Defendant and a director of each of the Second and Third Defendants. The Fifth Defendant is the Chief Executive Officer (formerly Executive Chairman and a director) of the First Defendant, and a director of each of the Second and Third Defendants.”
“11. The Claimant believes that the founder and ultimate beneficial owner of the corporate Defendants is Mr John Moores. Mr Moores is subject to an injunction dated31 May 2011 granted to IBM by the United States District Court in the Western District of Texas which (amongst other things) prohibits Mr Moores and various other parties from directly or indirectly reverse assembling, reverse compiling or otherwise translating any IBM Program or any portion thereof without prior written consent of IBM. The term ‘IBM Program’ as defined in the injunction captured (amongst other IBM software) all of the IBM Mainframe Software. Accordingly, absent express written authorisation from IBM, the injunction prohibits Mr Moores and other persons from directly or indirectly from reverse assembling, reverse compiling or otherwise translating any of the IBM Mainframe Software. 12. At present the Claimant does not have knowledge of the extent of involvement of Mr Moores and other persons (whether real or corporate) that are subject to the terms of the injunction in the matters of which complaint is made herein. Pending disclosure and/or provision of further information, the Claimant reserves the right to seek to join Mr Moores and/or other persons subject to the injunction to this action.”
“31. Pending disclosure and/or provision of further information, the Claimant relies on the following facts and matters in relation to the First Defendant’s state of knowledge and in relation to the Third Defendant’s state of knowledge: 31.1. The Fourth Defendant, by dint of his role at the First, Second and Third Defendants, knew that the Second Defendant had acquired an IBM mainframe and the IBM Mainframe Software for the purposes of the First Defendant’s development and operation of the SDM and that the Second Defendant intended to reverse assemble, reverse compile or otherwise reverse engineer parts of the IBM Mainframe Software or to allow others (including the Third Defendant) to do so. In circumstances where he is personally enjoined by the US District Court from directly or indirectly reverse assembling, reverse compiling or otherwise translating any IBM Program (as set out in paragraph 10 above), it is inconceivable that he did not review the terms of the ICA carefully and appreciate that the proposed activities amounted or would give rise to breach by the Second Defendant of its obligations thereunder. Alternatively, the Fourth Defendant was reckless in that regard. 31.2 The Fifth Defendant, by dint of his role at the First, Second and Third Defendants, also knew that the Second Defendant had acquired an IBM mainframe and the IBM Mainframe Software for the purposes of developing and operating the SDM and that the Second Defendant intended to reverse assemble, reverse compile or otherwise reverse engineer parts of the IBM Mainframe Software or to allow others (including the Third Defendant) to do so. As signatory to the ICA on behalf of the Second Defendant, it is inconceivable that he did not review the terms of the ICA and appreciate that the proposed activities amounted or would give rise to breach of its obligations thereunder. Alternatively, the Fifth Defendant was reckless in that regard. 31.3 The First Defendant is fixed with the knowledge of the Fourth and Fifth Defendants, who acted at all material times and for all material purposes as its directors and as directors of the Second Defendant.”
“33 Further, pending disclosure and/or provision of further information, each of the Fourth and Fifth Defendants: 33.1. Personally directed, instructed and/or requested the activities of the Second Defendant that amounted to or gave rise to breaches of the ICA or, alternatively, in their capacity as directors and executive officers of the First Defendant and/or of the Second Defendant, approved and/or ratified such directions, instructions and/or requests; 33.2. Knew that the activities of the Second Defendant being directed, instructed and/or requested by the First Defendant amounted or would give rise to breaches of the ICA or, alternatively, they were reckless in that regard (as to which paragraphs 31.1 and 31.2 above are repeated). 34. In light of the aforesaid, it is inconceivable that the Second Defendant carried out the aforesaid activities and that the First Defendant directed, instructed and/or requested it to do so without both the Fourth and Fifth Defendant intending the breaches of the ICA to which those activities amounted or gave rise. Accordingly, the Fourth and Fifth Defendants are each liable to the Claimant for such damage as was caused by the Second Defendant’s breaches of the ICA.”
“(1) there must be a breach of contract by B; (2) A must induce B to break his contract with C by persuading, encouraging or assisting him to do so; (3) A must know of the contract and know his conduct will have that effect; (4) A must intend to procure the breach of contract either as an end in itself or as the means by which he achieves some further end; (5) if A has a lawful justification for inducing B to break his contract with C, that may provide a defence against liability.”
“1. Claim forms and particulars of claim must identify the nature of the claim and the remedies sought. 2. Particulars of claim must contain the basic facts on which the claimant relies to support its claim or claims. 3. The remedies sought must relate to the claim or claims made and the basic facts pleaded by the claimant. 4. Generally at least there should be no half measures taken in the claim or in particulars of claim in terms of pleading matter which is immaterial to the relief or remedies sought. 5. It would be wrong, at least generally, in principle, to plead a matter which does not support or relate to any of the remedies sought. 6. It would be wrong in principle to plead a matter which is immaterial to the claim or claims made or relief sought for the purpose of securing disclosure of documentation relating to such immaterial matter. 7. Whilst infelicities in pleadings will not usually justify striking out, where no cause of action is pleaded then the court must give serious consideration to striking out that part of the pleading, particularly where its presence complicates and confuses the fair conduct of the proceedings. 8. Either through the CPR or through its inherent jurisdiction the court has wide powers to strike out parts of a pleading if it contains immaterial matter, particularly in circumstances when its continued presence will confuse the resolution of the underlying and properly pleaded claims. 9. A party absent agreement has no automatic right to amend its Particulars of Claim.”
“… The correct approach on applications by defendants is, in my judgment, as follows: i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman[2001] 2 All ER 91 ; ii) A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel[2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8] iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”: Swain v Hillman iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10] v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5)[2001] EWCA Civ 550 ; vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd[2007] FSR 63 ; vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd[2007] EWCA Civ 725 .”
“…if a servant acting bona fide within the scope of his authority procures or causes the breach of a contract between his employer and a third person, he does not thereby become liable to an action of tort at the suit of the person whose contract has thereby been broken.”
“11…the general rule that, in circumstances where a director is acting bona fide and within the ambit of his authority, he has no personal liability for procuring his company to commit a breach of contract. … 15. In my judgment, it would be contrary to the principle of limited liability if, in the circumstances postulated in Said v Butt, namely that an employee director is acting within his authority and bona fide in the interests of his company, could be liable in such circumstances for inducing a breach of contract on the part of the company in circumstances absent, additional features, such as conspiracy or dishonesty.”
“119 The nature of the breach of contract is directly relevant to the determination of whether, in a particular case, a director has complied with section 172, as regards his or her duty to the company and the ultimate question whether inducing the breach is actionable against the director. 120 There is, plainly, a world of difference between, on the one hand, a director consciously and deliberately causing a company to breach its contract with a supplier, by not paying the supplier on time because, unusually, the company has encountered cash flow difficulties, and, on the other hand, a director of a restaurant company who decides the company should supply customers of the chain with burgers made of horse meat instead of beef, on the basis that horse meat is cheaper. In the second example, the resulting scandal, when the director’s actions come to light, would be, at the very least, likely to inflict severe reputational damage on the company, from which it might take years to recover, if it recovered at all. 121 In this example, the fact that supplying horse meat is likely to violate food and trading standards legislation is plainly relevant because it is society’s disapproval of acting in this manner that gives rise to the statutory duty and the breach of that duty is therefore indicative of societal disapproval of what the director has caused the company to do and the resulting reputational damage to the company. 122 Accordingly, as a general matter, the fact that the breach of contract has such a statutory element may point to there being a failure on the part of the director to comply with his or her duties to the company and, by extension, to the director’s liability to a third party for inducing the breach of contract. Whether such a breach has these effects will, however, depend on the circumstances of the particular case.”
“127 D2 and D3 did all these things because they were concerned to maximise the profits of D1, which they—and only they—enjoyed. But, just as in the restaurant example, the desire to maximise profits has had catastrophic consequences for D1. When the malpractices finally came to light, D1’s fortunes dramatically declined. Far from having a reputation for high standards for business conduct, D1 stands exposed as a pariah. 128 Before the exposure of D1, D2 and D3’s activities were manifestly not in interests of the company’s employees, so far as the chicken catchers were concerned. Following exposure, their activities can be seen not to have been in the interests of any of the employees, since there are no longer any supervisors or drivers. 129 That is not, in fact, quite right, if one accepts D2’s evidence that D3 drives a minibus under the auspices of D1. This exiguous activity of D1 cannot, however, rationally be said to be in any way comparable with the previous state of the company, which, before the malpractices of D2 and D3 came to light, was the biggest chicken-catching operator in the south of England. 130 In short, D2 and D3 were not acting bona fide vis-à-vis D1. …”