“8.5 COLLECTION Collection £ Assessment by YS associates accepted by the Adjudicator 3,409,330.71 Adjustment [at para 8.2.6 above] 90,455.33 Loss & Expense [at para. 8.3.11 above] (Loss of Chance) 32,845.77 Adjustment [at para 8.4 above] 38,117.00 Total£3,570,748.81 “8.6 Net Cash Due Total Gross Due£3,570,748.81 Retention £Nil Less previous Cash£2,900,191.09 Balance£670,557.72 Plus VAT [at para 8.2.6 above]£86,801.22 Total£757,358.94 ”
“ The basic scheme whereby an unsecured creditor's claims may only be pursued by way of proof and participation in a pari passu distribution of any available surplus after discharge of prior claims, whereas the liquidator may pursue the company's claims in full, and with every available tool for enforcement, risks causing a real injustice where there are cross-claims between the company and one of its creditors arising from their mutual dealings. Leaving aside the special position of fiduciaries, there is no fairness in a creditor having to accept only a proportion of the debt due, while the company can recover on its cross-claim against the same creditor in full.”
“… the general position relating to a CVA may, depending on the facts, be very different to the situation where the claimant company is in insolvent liquidation. In the latter case, claims being made by the company are part of what might be called a damage limitation exercise, whereby the liquidators endeavour as best they can to pay dividends to creditors. A CVA is, or can be, conceptually different. It is designed to try and allow the company to trade its way out of trouble. In those circumstances, the quick and cost-neutral mechanism of adjudication may be an extremely useful tool to permit the CVA to work. In those circumstances, courts should be wary of reaching any conclusions which prevent the company from endeavouring to use adjudication to trade out of its difficulties. On one view, that is what adjudication is there for: to provide a quick and cheap method of improving cashflow.”
“[78] Judge Waksman QC's judgment can be found at[2018] EWHC 2143 (TCC) . One point should be made at the outset. The judge expressly concluded (at [25]) that: 'On any view if Primus was to make all or most of its recovery it will emerge solvent with all debtors paid and something left over, and that was the basis for having the CVA to enable it to do so.’ This is therefore a very different case to the straightforward situation where the claiming company is in insolvent liquidation and the liquidator is engaged in the process of recovering what he can in order to make a distribution to creditors. Here, not only was the CVA designed to allow Primus to trade out of its difficulties but, on the judge's findings if the CVA was allowed run its proposed course, Primus would avoid liquidation altogether. [79] It is clear from the Judgment that the only argument Cannon raised as to why there should not be summary judgment was based on the decision of Akenhead J in Westshield. That was a case about a company in a CVA where summary judgment was not granted. Judge Waksman QC, in his usual way, carefully analysed Westshield and concluded that Akenhead J was not saying that, merely because a company is in a CVA, summary judgment should be refused. The relevant passages in his judgment begin at [91]: '[91] For all of those reasons it cannot be said, adopting the observations of Chadwick LJ, as echoed by Akenhead J, that summary judgment is always to no advantage to a party because inevitably there will be a netting-off exercise taking account of the counterclaim. Where both parties are already in litigation, where the claims and counterclaims have already been advanced or will be advanced, where the supervisor has already taken the view and considered that Cannon is no longer a creditor, a different situation applies ….”
“Our review has confirmed there was a fundamental change in the financial position of FTH from the time the company entered the contract with VDL. In 2018 FTH was a relatively small but growing business and the VDL contract was a substantial contract for FTH. The financial difficulties and subsequent CVA of FTH, can be traced to the period during which VDL began reducing and eventually ceased making payments to FTH. In our opinion, in the event VDL is ordered to make payment of£757,359 , FTH would be in a position to make a distribution to the CVA creditors and consequently CVA would be terminated having applied the provisions of the agreement. Furthermore, our view is that should the CVA be terminated then FTH will be financially sound with positive net assets and cash flow. In addition, we can confirm that FTH recommenced activities this year and the company is currently trading profitably as indicated by the Financial Statements for the year ended30 June 2021 together with the Management Accounts for the four months ended31 October 2021 . For your reference we have also included Financial Statements for the eighteen months ended30 June 2020 . The Financial Statements for the year ended30 June 2021 reflect a very respectable period of trading as the company effectively recommenced trading activities in early 2021 and turnover was£942,949 for the subsequent six month period.”
“(a) there are special reasons which render it inexpedient to enforce the judgment or order;”
“(a) Adjudication (whether pursuant to the 1996 Ace or the consequential amendments to the standard forms of building and engineering contracts) is designed to be a quick and inexpensive method of arriving at a temporary result in a construction dispute. (b) In consequence, adjudicators' decisions are intended to be enforced summarily and the claimant (being the successful party in the adjudication) should not generally be kept out of its money. (c) In an application to stay the execution of summary judgment arising out of an adjudicator's decision, the court must exercise its discretion under Ord 47 with considerations (a) and (b) firmly in mind (see the AWG Construction case). (d) The probable inability of the claimant to repay the judgment sum (awarded by the adjudicator and enforced by way of summary judgment) at the end of the substantive trial, or arbitration hearing, may constitute special circumstances within the meaning of Ord 47, r l(l)(a) rendering it appropriate to grant a stay (see the Herschell Engineering case). (e) If the claimant is in insolvent liquidation, or there is no dispute on the evidence that the claimant is insolvent, then a stay of execution will usually be granted (see the Bouygues and Rainford House cases). (f) Even if the evidence of the claimant's present financial position suggested that it is probable that it would be unable to repay the judgment sum when it fell due, that would not usually justify the grant of a stay if: (i) the claimant's financial position is the same or similar to its financial position at the time that the relevant contract was made (see the Herschell Engineering case); or (ii) the claimant's financial position is due, either wholly, or in significant part, to the defendant's failure to pay those sums which were awarded by the adjudicator (see the Absolute Rentals case [2000] CILL 1637). With those principles in mind I now turn to the evidence in this case concerning the claimant's financial position.”