"(2) If the court decides to make an order about costs – (a) the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party; but (b) the court may make a different order."
"(4) In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court must have regard to all the circumstances, including – (a) the conduct of all the parties; (b) whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if that party has not been wholly successful; and (c) any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the court's attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply."
“[43] In short, therefore, taking the CPR and these authorities together, the position is that, in contrast to the position of a claimant, a defendant (such as the appellant in the present case) who beats his or her own Part 36 offer, is not automatically entitled to indemnity costs. But a defendant can seek an order for indemnity costs if he or she can show that, in all the circumstances of the case, the claimant's refusal to accept that offer was unreasonable such as to be "out of the norm". Moreover, if the claimant's refusal to accept the offer comes against the background of a speculative, weak, opportunistic or thin claim, then an order for indemnity costs may very well be made. That is what happened in Excelsior.”
“[80] When a defendant beats its own Part 36 offer, the court should always consider whether, in consequence, the claimant's conduct in refusing that offer took the case out of the norm. Sometimes it will; sometimes it won't. Mr Cohen articulated the question that had to be asked in these terms: 'At any stage from the date of the offer to the date of the outcome, was there a point when the reasonable claimant would have concluded that the offer represented a better outcome than the likely outcome at trial?' Mr Oram agreed with that formulation orally. So, respectfully, do I. Although in his post-hearing note Mr Oram sought to qualify his agreement by reference to the offeree's prospects of success, I consider that such a qualification is unnecessary. The important point for present purposes is that (as Mr Oram accepted at paragraph 11 of the same note), the judge was not asked to consider this question, or anything like it, and so did not do so. That was an error of law. Accordingly, I consider that this court must address the question on appeal.”
“[31] In the context of that case I see that those paragraphs set out the need for there to be something more than merely a non-acceptance of a payment into court, or an offer of payment, by a defendant before it is appropriate to make an indemnity order for costs. Insofar as that is the intent of those paragraphs, I have no difficulty with them. However, I would point out the obvious fact that the circumstances with which the courts may be concerned where there is a payment into court may vary considerably. An indemnity order may be justified not only because of the conduct of the parties, but also because of other particular circumstances of the litigation. I give as an example a situation where a party is involved in proceedings as a test case although, so far as that party is concerned, he has no other interest than the issue that arises in that case, but is drawn into expensive litigation. If he is successful, a court may well say that an indemnity order was appropriate, although it could not be suggested that anyone's conduct in the case had been unreasonable. Equally there may be situations where the nature of the litigation means that the parties could not be expected to conduct the litigation in a proportionate manner. Again the conduct would not be unreasonable and it seems to me that the court would be entitled to take into account that sort of situation in deciding that an indemnity order was appropriate. [32] I take those two examples only for the purpose of illustrating the fact that there is an infinite variety of situations which can come before the courts and which justify the making of an indemnity order. It is because of that that I do not respond to Mr Davidson's submission that this court should give assistance to lower courts as to the circumstances where indemnity orders should be made and circumstances when they should not. In my judgment it is dangerous for the court to try and add to the requirements of the CPR which are not spelt out in the relevant parts of the CPR. This court can do no more than draw attention to the width of the discretion of the trial judge and re-emphasise the point that has already been made that, before an indemnity order can be made, there must be some conduct or some circumstance which takes the case out of the norm. That is the critical requirement.”
“[44] From this review of authority I draw the following conclusions. First, where one party makes a Part 36 offer and then achieves a more advantageous result than that proposed in his offer, the provisions of rule 36.14 modify the court's general discretion in respect of costs. This is important because parties who choose to use the Part 36 mechanism in their settlement negotiations need to have a clear understanding of the legal effects of making, accepting and rejecting offers under Part 36. [45] Secondly, parties are quite entitled to make Calderbank offers outside the framework of Part 36. Where a party makes such an offer and then achieves a more advantageous result, the court's discretion is wider. Nevertheless it may well be appropriate to order the party which has optimistically rejected the Calderbank offer to pay all costs since the date when that offer expired. This was what the court ordered in Stokes. [46] A not uncommon scenario is that both parties turn out to have been overoptimistic in their Part 36 offers. The claimant recovers more than the defendant has previously offered to pay, but less than the claimant has previously offered to accept. In such a case the claimant should normally be regarded as "the successful party" within rule 44.3 (2). The claimant has been forced to bring proceedings in order to recover the sum awarded. He has done so and his claim has been vindicated to that extent. [47] In that situation the starting point is that the successful party should recover its costs from the other side: see rule 44.3 (2) (a). The next stage is to consider whether any adjustment should be made to reflect issues on which the successful party has lost or other circumstances. An adjustment may be required to reflect the costs referable to a discrete issue which the successful party has lost. An adjustment may also be required to compensate the unsuccessful party for costs which it was caused to incur by reason of unreasonable conduct on the part of the successful party. [48] In a personal injury action the fact that the claimant has won on some issues and lost on other issues along the way is not normally a reason for depriving the claimant of part of his costs: see Goodwin v Bennett UK Limited[2008] EWCA Civ 1658 . For example, the claimant may succeed on some of the pleaded particulars of negligence, but not on others. Indeed the fact that the claimant has deliberately exaggerated his claim may in certain instances not be a good reason for depriving him of part of his costs: see Morgan v UPS. A defendant who has obtained video surveillance evidence is perfectly well able to protect his position on costs by making a modest offer under Part 36. [49] Nevertheless in other cases (as stated above) the fact that the successful party has failed on certain issues may constitute a good reason for modifying the costs order in his favour. This is commonly achieved by awarding the successful party a specified proportion of its costs. In Widlake the facts were so extreme that the successful party was ordered to bear all of its own costs.”
“[5] In the Three Rivers[2006] EWHC 816 (Comm) case Tomlinson J as he then was pointed out that if a claimant chooses to pursue speculative, weak, opportunistic or thin claims, he takes a high risk and can expect to pay indemnity costs if he fails. He gave examples of circumstances which took the case out of the norm as being where a claimant: "(a) advances and aggressively pursues serious and wide-ranging allegations of dishonesty or impropriety over an extended period of time. (b) advances and aggressively pursues such allegations despite the lack of any foundation in the documentary evidence for those allegations and maintains the allegations without apology to the bitter end. (c) actively seeks to court publicity for its serious allegations both before and during the trial. (d) turns a case into an unprecedented factual inquiry by the pursuit of an unjustified case. (e) pursues a claim which is to put it most charitably thin, and in some respects farfetched. (f) pursues a claim which is irreconcilable with the contemporaneous documents. (g) commences and pursues large scale and expensive litigation in circumstances calculated to exert commercial pressure on a defendant and during the course of the trial of the action the claimant resorts to advancing a constantly changing case in order to justify the allegations which it had made, only then to suffer a resounding defeat." That seems to me to a considerable extent a summary of the present case. [6] In European Strategic Fund Limited v Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB[2012] EWHC 749 (Comm) , Gloster J, as she then was, awarded indemnity costs in circumstances where the claim was: "(i) speculative involving a high risk of failure; (ii) grossly exaggerated in quantum; (ii) opportunistic; (iv) conducted in a manner that has paid very little regard to proportionality or reasonableness giving rise to the incurring of substantial costs on both sides; (v) pursued on all issues at full length to the end of the trial." That too seems to me a pretty fair summary of the present case. [7] The fact that a claimant loses a massive claim and does so badly is not of itself a reason for ordering indemnity costs. Cases involving very large sums which founder on sharp juridical rocks are not automatically outwith the norms of this court. But all depends on the circumstances. This case was in my judgment out of the norm for a considerable number of reasons. [8] The claim was essentially speculative and opportunistic. It has been advanced at great length and by the assertion of a plethora of causes of action, all of which have been maintained to the last possible moment, no doubt upon instructions. Gulf, and to a lesser degree Texas, have been put to enormous expense in terms of legal costs and Mr Kozel has borne a heavy personal burden in dealing with it. [9] The litigation has been gargantuan in scope, involving a five month trial and 373 trial bundles. But it was based on no sound foundation in fact or law and it has met with a resounding, indeed catastrophic, defeat. The fact that it has done so arises in large measure as a result of facts and matters which were known to the Wempens before the case started. As Gloster J put it in JP Morgan Chase v Springwell[2008] EWHC 2848 (Comm) : "A party who chooses to litigate on such a wide and extravagant canvass takes the risk that if unsuccessful it may have to pay costs on an indemnity basis." [10] That the claim merits the description I have given to it is apparent for a number of reasons. Excalibur is and always has been nothing but a nameplate for the Wempen brothers, who lacked experience of the oil industry or oil finance and had no technical expertise whatever. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, Excalibur sought what would have been an enormous reward in the shape of an indirect interest in, inter alia, 30 per cent of the Shaikan oil field for what was essentially no more than the introduction of Texas and Gulf to the KRG, important though that was. It did so in circumstances where it had agreed to a bid going forward without Excalibur being a bidder, where it lacked the ability to finance its share, if it had one, and was inherently unlikely to be an acceptable partner for any financial institution, or acceptable to the Kurdistan Regional Government. [11] The claim was opportunistic.”
“The clear assertion is made [in the Defence] that the foundations were not constructed as designed by Canham. That point was actually known by each of those directors, based on what they had been told in emails in 2016 into which they were copied, to be true. Yet it was swerved in the Reply, which stated that it was "unparticularised". It plainly should have been admitted.”
“Yes, as far as the details in the design could be discerned.”
“2.1 Expert evidence should be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced by the pressures of litigation. 2.2 Experts should assist the court by providing objective, unbiased opinions on matters within their expertise, and should not assume the role of an advocate.”
“The duties of an independent expert are set out in the well-known passages of the judgment in The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyds LR 68. For the reasons set out above, Mr Vosser did not comply with those duties and I was not confident that he was aware of them or had had them explained. For him, it might be said that The Ikarian Reefer was a ship that passed in the night.”
“The legal consequence of proceedings being issued without authority is also well established. The proceedings are defective and liable to be struck out on that account, but they are not devoid of legal effect until they are struck out. Moreover, the court is not bound to strike them out if at the time of the strike out application the client on whose behalf the action was commenced wishes it to continue and to accept responsibility for it.”