“whether, assuming the breach of procurement law alleged by the Claimants, the facts of the claim are capable of giving rise to grounds for a declaration of ineffectiveness (in the light of the arguments pleaded in summary at paragraph 4 (5) of the Defence)”
“Whether, assuming the breach of procurement law alleged by the Claimants (namely that the Development Agreement departs from the contract sought by the tender process to such an extent that it is a materially varied contract which was not actually the subject of the previous tender process and would have required a fresh process in accordance with the applicable regulations), the facts of the claim are capable of giving rise to grounds for a declaration of ineffectiveness (in the light of the arguments pleaded in summary at paragraph 4(5) of the Defence).”
“it may be that Alstom was different because the qualification notice was more generic. But that is the heart of the issue – the comparison between the Notice and the contract”
“18 (1) Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. 26 (1) When awarding public contracts, contracting authorities shall apply procedures that conform to this Part. (2) Such contracts may be awarded only if a call for competition has been published in accordance with this Part and the Public Contracts Directive… (4) Contracting authorities may apply a competitive procedure with negotiation or a competitive dialogue in the following situations… (8) Subject to paragraph (9) the call for competition shall be made by means of a contract notice in accordance with regulation 49… 29 (1) In competitive procedures with negotiation, any economic operator may submit a request to participate in response to a call for competition by providing the information for qualitative selection that is requested by the contracting authority. (2) In the procurement documents, contracting authorities shall- (a) identify the subject-matter of the procurement by providing a description of their needs and the characteristics required of the supplies, works or services to be procured… (11) Only those economic operators invited by the contracting authority following its assessment of the information provided may submit an initial tender which shall be the basis for the subsequent negotiations… (14) The minimum requirements and the award criteria shall not be subject to negotiation… (16) During the negotiations, contracting authorities shall ensure equal treatment of all tenderers and, to that end – …(b) they shall inform all tenderers, whose tenders have not been eliminated under paragraph (19), in writing, of any changes to the technical specifications or other procurement documents, other than those setting out the minimum requirements; and (c) following any such changes, they shall provide sufficient time for tenderers to modify and re-submit amended tenders, as appropriate… (19) Competitive procedures with negotiation may take place in successive stages in order to reduce the number of tenders to be negotiated by applying the award criteria specified in the contract notice, in the invitation to confirm interest or in another procurement document. 49. Contract notices shall contain the information set out in Part C of Annex 5 to the Public Contracts Directive and shall be sent for publication in accordance with regulation 51. 72 (1) Contracts…may be modified without a new procurement procedure in accordance with this Part in any of the following cases… (9) A new procurement procedure in accordance with this Part shall be required for modifications of the provisions of a public contract…during its term other than those provided for in this regulation. 98 (1) Paragraph (2) applies if - (a) the Court is satisfied that a decision or action taken by a contracting authority was in breach of the duty owed in accordance with regulation 89 or 90; and (b) the contract has already been entered into. (2) in those circumstances, the Court – (a) must, if it is satisfied that any of the grounds for ineffectiveness applies, make a declaration of ineffectiveness in respect of the contract unless regulation 100 requires the Court not to do so; (b) must, where required by regulation 102, impose penalties in accordance with that regulation … 99 (1) There are three grounds for ineffectiveness. (2) The first ground Subject to paragraph (3), the first ground applies where the contract has been awarded without prior publication of the contract notice in any case in which Part 2 required the prior publication of a contract notice… 100 (1) Where the Court is satisfied that any of the grounds for ineffectiveness applies, the Court must not make a declaration of ineffectiveness if – (a) the contracting authority or another party to the proceedings raises an issue under this regulation; and (b) the Court is satisfied that overriding reasons relating to a general interest require that the effects of the contract should be maintained. (2) For that purpose, economic interests in the effectiveness of the contract may be considered as overriding reasons only if in exceptional circumstances ineffectiveness would lead to disproportionate consequences… 101 (1) Where a declaration of ineffectiveness is made, the contract is to be considered to be prospectively but not retrospectively, ineffective as from the time when the declaration is made and, accordingly, those obligations under the contract which at that time have yet to be performed are not to be performed. 102 (1) Where the Court makes a declaration of ineffectiveness, it must also order that the contracting authority pay a civil financial penalty of the amount specified in the order.”
“(1) Subject to regulation 17, for the purposes of seeking offers in relation to a proposed contract a utility shall make a call for competition. (2) The requirement under paragraph (1) to make a call for competition is satisfied – (a) in the case of a contract to be awarded using the restricted procedure or the negotiated procedure- …(ii) if a notice indicating the existence of a qualification system for economic operators has been sent to the Official Journal in accordance with regulation 25(17) and the requirement referred to in paragraph (5) is satisfied…”
“Because of the assumptions on which this application proceeds, I have to consider this matter on the footing that the differences between the final form of contract and the tender conditions were such as to make the contract sufficiently materially different as to require a new tender process. The defendants accept the factual assumption within that, and Eurostar accepts the underlying legal principle in its defence. It is clear to me that a notice of the qualification scheme is capable of being a notice required to be given for the purposes of the first ground [meaning the first ground for making a declaration of ineffectiveness] and no one disputes that such a notice was given in this case. So the central question in this case is whether it is right (or sufficiently arguably right to prevent striking out) that the alteration of the contract makes that notice irrelevant, with the effect that the relevant notice was in fact not given.”
“38. It seems to me that this argument does not give sufficient weight to the mechanism that Parliament has adopted in the Regulations, and also Directive 2007/66/EC, which also spoke in terms of the giving of a notice. Reg 45K does not speak in terms of a failure of the competitive process generally. It specifically ties itself down to the failure to give a prior notice. In the present case a contract notice was not required. It was open to Eurostar to adopt the qualification procedure instead. It did so. The first step in that (for present purposes) is the publishing of the notice required by Reg 16(2)(a)(ii). Such a notice was published. It preceded the competition between Alstom and Siemens. It is not said that no such notice was given; indeed it is implicit in the Particulars of Claim that such a notice was given, because paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Particulars in the first action, adopted in this action, plead that Eurostar used a qualification system. Nor is it said that the notice was in terms incapable of applying to the final contract. Qualification notices are in such general terms that that would be a difficult thing to say in this case. No complaint is made about the notice. The pleading goes on to refer to an invitation to negotiate, and the essence of the complaint about the final contract is that it is said to demonstrate that Eurostar's requirements had materially changed. But that does not affect the force and effect of the notice, or its applicability. So the complaint is not, and in my view cannot be, that a required notice was not given. It was given. The Regulations required a notice. It could have been in one of the three forms referred to in Reg 16. Eurostar gave a qualification system notice (and then, if it is relevant, selected the potential tenderers from the pool of the qualified, for the purposes of Reg 16(5)). No other notice was required. Any divergence from the proper path which led to an aberrant contract as is assumed in this case is a breach of subsequent procedure, not consequential upon a failure to give the notice. There is therefore no failure under ground 1. 39. Miss Hannaford sought to rely on what she said was the absurdity of approaching this question without requiring a link between the required notice and the final contract (which link, she said, was broken by the material alterations in the final contract). She said that if the situation were as the defendants would say it was, one could have a qualification notice, and then have the utility taking tenderers from outside the pool and escaping ineffectiveness because of what would, on those facts, be a wholly irrelevant notice, albeit a notice which ostensibly covered the contract in question (because of the generality of the description of the activities that is contained in an qualification notice). 40. In my view Miss Hannaford is right about a link, but only to a limited extent. Any notice which is relied on by the utility as being part of its compliance with its duty to economic operators must be a notice which is objectively capable of being a relevant notice. Mr Howell sought to say that any qualification notice would suffice in the present case provided that it was given before the contract was concluded, and referred to an intention to contract within the period of the notice. Thus he relied (so far as he had to) on a qualification system notice which was placed in the Official Journal in May 2010, which was well into the negotiation and tender process. He said he could also, as a matter of analysis, have relied on a notice given one day before the actual contract. The purpose of the notice, he said, was to give notice of the competition, and to that end it did not matter when it was given provided it was adequate in form. 41. Those are unattractive submissions. It cannot realistically have been intended that a utility could rely on a notice which was given at a time when, on the facts, it had nothing whatsoever to do with what had been going on in relation to the contract in question. While the test of the existence or absence of a notice is a mechanistic test, it cannot be taken to be so mechanistic as to produce a test which is pure form and no substance at all. Such a test would be pointless. Mr Howell suggested it would have some point because it would give notice that there is a competition, but that would be a largely pointless indication if the notice were given (as Mr Howell said it could be given) very shortly before the contract. 42. Be that as it may, Mr Howell does not have to go that far. There has, in my view, to be a notice which is capable of being related to the procedure and the contract. Even so, Alstom cannot satisfy this ground because of the earlier qualification notice which is not only objectively capable of being the prior notice for the competition in this case, it was actually the notice which sparked the competition in this case. Even if Miss Hannaford's material alteration case is right, there was still a prior notice. She submitted that in such a case there would be an illegal direct award, and that that should attract the sanction. The trouble with that argument is that that is not how the Regulation operates. It operates by looking to the existence or absence of a notice. That is, as I have observed, a mechanistic test. The benefit of such a test is that it will often be easier to apply, and since the availability or not of the ineffectiveness remedy is something which calls for clarity if the remedy is to operate sensibly in a commercial context, ease of application is important. The detriment is that it is indeed mechanical, and may not catch some instances where, on the merits, it might be thought the remedy should operate. The mechanics of this test rule out the first ground in this case. 43. I therefore find that ground 1 is not available to Alstom.”
“The Council is seeking a development partner to work with the Council and then to implement a long-term strategy plan for the development of Basingstoke Leisure Park. The Council is looking to establish a partnership which will provide the foundations and commercial/financial basis for securing investment to revitalise existing leisure facilities and also provide new ‘destination’ facilities”
“The Council is seeking to enter into a long-term regeneration partnership and it is envisaged that the partnership will last up to 15 years, with long leasehold (s) granted to the developer as development phases are delivered. The value of the contract will be ultimately dependent on the scope of the regeneration. Estimated value excluding VAT: Range: between 50,000,000 and 150,000,000 GBP”
“Basingstoke Leisure Park is a prime leisure led development opportunity, with the 45 acre site offering significant scope for change. The site is occupied by 12 tenants who provide a range of existing leisure facilities but some are now dated and have suffered from enhanced competition from other leisure facilities. To the south there is a further 8 acres (3.2 Ha) of undeveloped land, although it is subject to environmental constraints. The Council is seeking a long term development partner who it can work with to create a regional leisure destination and encourage reinvestment within the existing Park, and will also explore the means by which the development opportunity is best pursued, including whether by co-investment or other joint venture arrangement. This notice is the start of a structured marketing competition to appoint a development partner who will bring forward development and commercial property expertise to help transform the Leisure Park and put it at the forefront of leisure and recreational provision in the region. The project is key to the continued prosperity of Basingstoke and therefore a high priority for the Council. The development partner will be required to carry out the following key roles: -Leading in the repositioning of the profile of the Park. -Pre development activities, to include; securing occupiers, master plan/design evolution, planning, etc. -Undertake a core development role and apply its expertise and resources to support this. -Being proactive in creating development and investment opportunities. -Bringing forward proposals that are deliverable on a phased basis, set against a realistic delivery programme. The Council recognises that the partnership will need to be based on flexible delivery arrangements, founded on sound commercial principles, which encourages and motivates the development partner to apply its expertise and resources, and to actively promote the Park and pe existing and future opportunities which are capable of delivering the Council’s aspirations for the Park. The development partner will have an exclusivity period to work up a scheme for phase 1. Phase 1 is not defined in terms of land take. Land uses will focus primarily on the preferred uses, namely, leisure, restaurants/cafes/bars, retail (A1), hotel and conference facilities uses. Once Phase 1 is delivered, the development partner will have the ability to draw down other land on the site. Project documents can be viewed in the data room via the following link…”
“Executive Summary • Basingstoke Leisure Park is a prime leisure led development opportunity, with the 62 acre site offering significant scope for change… • Opportunity to enhance leisure offer to create a facility of significant regional importance. • Already an established and successful leisure offer present, providing a strong platform for improvement…” “Introduction Basingstoke Leisure Park offers a prime development opportunity. Basingstoke…wish to create a regional leisure destination of significance and encourage reinvestment within the existing leisure park facilities. [Basingstoke] is seeking a long-term development partner to realise this vision.” “Leisure Park Strategy & Its Objectives The objective of the strategy is to encourage regeneration and reinvestment into the Park, and the developer is expected to deliver this. Principles of the strategy are: 1. To seek innovative proposals from parties to create a regional leisure destination within the Council’s landholding at the Leisure Park and encourage reinvestment within existing facilities. 2. To enable the whole of the Leisure Park...to be part of any regeneration proposal. 3. To secure a development partner to bring forward holistic development on the Park and offer that party a long term partnership to incentivise them to deliver. 4. To control and steer the nature of development through retention of the Park’s ownership and through a governance structure to manage the partnership.” “The Developer’s Role The Council is seeking to enter into a long-term regeneration partnership and it is envisaged that the partnership will last 15 years, with long leasehold(s) granted to the developer as development phases are delivered. The Council expects the etc developer to have financial standing, experience, capacity and vision to: • Lead in the repositioning of the profile of the Leisure Park. • Carry out pre development activities: securing occupiers, master plan/design evolution, planning,. • Undertake a core development role and apply its expertise and resources to support this. • Be proactive in creating development and investment opportunities. • Bring forward proposals that are deliverable on a phased basis, set against a realistic delivery programme.” • Lead in the repositioning of the profile of the Leisure Park. • Carry out pre development activities: securing occupiers, master plan/design evolution, planning,. • Undertake a core development role and apply its expertise and resources to support this. • Be proactive in creating development and investment opportunities. • Bring forward proposals that are deliverable on a phased basis, set against a realistic delivery programme.”
“It is also recognised by the Council that in supporting the financial viability of proposals for the park, schemes could include ancillary supporting and compl[e]mentary uses. The scale of development should reflect the size of the opportunity available, and the Council’s ambition to secure a leisure offer of regional significance.”
“1. To create a high quality regional leisure destination at the Site which is market leading for the south of England. 2. To ensure that the design and architectural of a high standard to ensure that the New Leisure Park and the supporting DOC [Designer Outlet Centre] is a leading destination in the south of England…”.Paragraph (3) of Part 2 of the Schedule states that the ratio of floor space of the “leisure uses” to floor space of the DOC “must not be less than 2:1”