“Subject: East Surrey Hospital – Theatre Refurbishment 724 – Account Meeting21st September 2016 Attachments: ESH 724 – Logan Interim Payment Notice – Valuation No 24 – 20092016.xlsx Importance: High Dear Richard, I hope you had a good break. Please see the attached ahead of our meeting tomorrow. I look forward to seeing you then. Kind regards, Richard.”
“INTERIM PAYMENT NOTICE (Clause 4.10) … Due Date24 August 2016 Valuation No. 24 Project No. 0724 Re: East Surrey Hospital – Theatres 5-10 remodelling SERVICE DESCRIPTION To collection:£5,961,465.46 Less Retention @ 0% (completion of 12 months DLP)£ 0.00 Balance£5,961,465,46 Less Previously Paid (as BWA Interim Certificate Nr 23) - main works -£4,887,073.27 Less Previously Paid (as BWA Interim Certificate) – asbestos works -£48,834.24 Less Previously Paid (as BWA Interim Certificate) - Design Co-ordination and Planning for one Phase -£10,000.00 Balance£1,105,557.95 ”
“Subject: Theatre Refurbishment Logan Construction Final Certificate Attachments: Logan Payment Certificate No24 pdf; Theatre Refurbishment Contract Sum Adjustment xlsx Chris, In accordance with Clause 4.14.1 of the Intermediate Building Contract with contractor’s design 2011, I attach the Final Certificate for works undertaken by Logan Construction in connection with the Theatre Refurbishment project. For ease of reference, I also attach a copy of the Adjustment of Contract Sum which was issued on25 May 2016 . Please note that on20 September 2016 I received an Interim Payment Notice dated24 August 2016 from Logan Construction. The last due date for an Interim Payment Notice under Clause 4.7.1.4 of the Building Contract was 24 August and as such the application issued by Logan Construction yesterday is out of date and void. In any event, the details stated in the Final Certificate are the same as would have been stated in any final Interim Certificate which may have been issued. … Regards Richard Stone”
“34. Accordingly, in all three documents where the claimant had the opportunity to say clearly that these documents were what they now say they were, namely a new application for an interim payment and/or a payee's notice, the claimant failed to do so. I consider that this omission is significant. It suggests that the claimant's case now, that the documents were in fact a fresh claim, is something of an afterthought. The only other alternative is that the claimant believed that it was in its best interests to be studiedly vague about the nature of the documents, so as to set up precisely the argument they advanced successfully in the adjudication. On any view, if they intended to serve a valid payee's notice on 13 February, they could and should have said that that was what they were doing. They were even asked a question which, if that had indeed been their intention, required only that simple answer. It was not provided. 35. It is also important to remember that the claimant's alleged entitlement to be paid£1.5 million odd as a result of the second adjudication does not stem from the underlying merits of their claim. Those have not been considered by the adjudicator. The alleged entitlement only arises because, if the documents of13 February 2015 were indeed a fresh claim, no payless notice was issued in time, so the sum falls due automatically. 36. One of the more baleful effects of the amendments to the 1996 Act has been a large increase in the number of cases before adjudicators (and thus before the TCC), in which the claimant contractor argues that the employer failed to serve its notices on time, and that therefore there was an automatic right to payment in full of the sum claimed. Although similar provisions existed in the 1996 Act, it is only since the amendments, with their emphasis on the sum being notified as the sum now due, that this point has become such a bone of contention. 37. In the UK (unlike other jurisdictions with mandatory construction adjudication, such as Malaysia) the employer's failure to serve a payless notice within a short period challenging the payee's notice can have draconian consequences. A failure to serve a notice in time will usually mean a full liability to pay. That is what the run of recent TCC cases on this topic, including ISG v Seevic College[2014] EWHC 4007 (TCC) and Galliford Try Building Ltd v Estura Ltd[2015] EWHC 412 (TCC) , are all about. But it seems to me that, if contractors want the benefit of these provisions, they are obliged, in return, to set out their interim payment claims with proper clarity. If the employer is to be put at risk that a failure to serve a payless notice at the appropriate time during the payment period will render him liable in full for the amount claimed, he must be given reasonable notice that the payment period has been triggered in the first place.”
“There is some very real importance in being able to ascertain whether a document filed by the Contractor is an Interim Application under Clause 4.11.1: it stands as an Interim Payment Notice (Clause 4.11.2.1) if no Interim Certificate is issued in accordance with Clause 4.10.1 (for instance, issued more than 5 days after the payment due date), and the "sum to be paid by the Employer shall, subject to any Pay Less Notice under clause 4.12.5, be the sum stated as due" in that Interim Application (Clause 4.12.3). That could be way over what the CA would otherwise have certified or what is actually due to the Contractor. Although fraud would probably unravel a fraudulently prepared Interim Application, no fraud is alleged here and there is often room for sometimes widely differing assessments of value and proportions of work completed. Although it is not apt to talk in terms of conditions precedent, I consider that the document relied upon as an Interim Application under Clause 4.11.1 must be in substance, form and intent an Interim Application stating the sum considered by the Contractor as due at the relevant due date and it must be free from ambiguity. In this context, the Interim Application should be considered in the same light as a certificate. If there are to be potentially serious consequences flowing from it being an Interim Application, it must be clear that it is what it purports to be so that the parties know what to do about it and when.”
“The requirement for "form", "substance" and "intent" has often been repeated in the authorities (see for example Token Construction v Charlton Estates[1973] BLR 48 ). In construing the document or documents relied upon, the exercise is to assess it against its contextual setting how it would have informed a reasonable recipient - see Mannai Ltd v Eagle Star Ass. Co. Ltd[1997] AC 749 (per Lord Steyn at 772H).”
“Whether or not this conclusion can be said to lead to a harsh result for TIG, this is an area where, as the authorities make clear, there is little scope for latitude. If a contractor wishes to have the benefit of the interim payment regime such as that contained in the Contract, then its application for interim payment must be in substance, form and intent an interim application stating the sum considered by the contractor as due at the relevant due date and it must be free from ambiguity.”
“The courts will take a common sense, practical view of the contents of a payless notice and will not adopt an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of such a notice…It is thought that, provided that the notice makes tolerably clear what is being held and why, the court will not strive to intervene or endeavour to find reasons that would render such a notice invalid or ineffective.”
“Whatever arguments there may be about the appropriateness of fine textual analysis to such a notice (see Thomas Vale Construction v Brookside Syston Ltd [2009] 25 Const LJ (at paragraph 43)), it is, as set out above, an essential requirement for the service of a contractual notice that the sender has the requisite intention to serve it. The senders' intention is a matter to be assessed objectively taking into account the context.”
“The Pay Less Notice of17 June 2015 (clearly served within time for the 29 May payment due date and the final payment date 28 days later) would have provided an adequate agenda for an adjudication as to the true value of the Works and the validity of the alleged entitlement to liquidated damages for delay.”