“7…ETC accepts the… Extension of Time award against ETC’s first application for an extension (4 weeks and 3 days) and the weekly value for loss and expense. ETC does not give the adjudicator jurisdiction in this adjudication to open up the extension of time award or the agreed weekly value for loss and expense. 8. TLB has not accepted the CA’s or ETC’s assessment of the delays and pursues ETC for liquidated damages. 9. ETC considers that the Final Account for the Contract Works is£1,223,749.53 . ETC has been paid the net sum of£936,000.00 which leaves£287,749.53 plus VAT at the appropriate rate for payment. Matters to be decided 10. ETC requires the following decisions:- Issue 1 11. A decision that ETC’s final account should be valued at£1,223,749.53 . Or such other sum as the adjudicator may decide, plus VAT at the appropriate rate. Details of the various sums that make up the final account will be particularised in the Referral. Final account item Nos. 8, 10, 13, 15, 17, 17a, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34, 39, 41 to 48 inclusive, 52, 54, 59, 62, 66, 71, 82, 95, 96, 98, 100, 108, 109, 116, 117, 121, 142, 143, 149, 151, 152, 159, 164, & 178 are not required to be opened up by the adjudicator as ETC accepts the CA’s values for these items. Item No. 161 is not to [be] opened up for the extension of time already granted and item No. 163 is not to be opened up for the agreed weekly value for loss and expense. Issue 2 12. A decision that TLB shall forthwith pay ETC the balance due on its final account of£287,749.53 or such other sum is the adjudicator may decide plus VAT at the appropriate rate; Issue 3 13….interest Issue 4 14. A decision that TLB shall pay the adjudicator’s reasonable fees and expenses.”
“At first blush, the Notice refers for determination the full value of the ETC final account. However, that this is not so, is demonstrated by the following: 1. Whilst ETC says that the adjudicator is required to decide whether its second application for an extension of time is justified (Notice, paragraph 7), it asserts that it "does not give the adjudicator jurisdiction in this adjudication to open up the extension of time award or the agreed weekly value for loss and expense". (TLB denies that it has made any binding agreement on weekly loss and expense and denies that any extension of time has been awarded or that any contractual application for any extension of time has been received); and 2. Further, whilst ETC says that it requires a decision that it is entitled to the full value it claims for the final account (Notice, paragraph 11), it also asserts that the adjudicator must not open up numerous final account items in reaching his decision. There are only 2 possible analysis [sic] of the Notice, as regards the scope of the dispute referred, as follows: 1. As TLB considers to be the case, ETC has referred to questions of: (a) ETC’s entitlement to its alleged second extension of time [in which case the position and merits of the first extension [of] time will need to be considered in this adjudication - for the avoidance of doubt TLB confirm that it considers that no extension of time has been awarded and it considers that no contractual application has been received], (b) ETC’s related claim for loss and expense, and (c) the aspects of the ETC final account claims other than the Final Account items listed at paragraph 11 of the Notice. If that is correct, there will be limits on the declarations and relief that can be sought in relation to such claims, including having regard to the payment and payless notices of20th May 2013 . 2. The merits of the entirety of the ETC’s claims to be paid its full most recently submitted final account value has been referred. In which case, there would need to be considered by you the merits of both parties’ positions on: (a) all aspects of the Final Account items submitted, and (b) each of the heads of claim of TLB that are set out in its payless notice dated20th May 2013 . This is because for you it arrived at a determination that the final account value is in the order of that claimed by ETC you would have to reach the conclusion, for example, that the substantial claims for the defects referenced in that payless notice are without merit. It is to be noted that ETC does not seek declarations that its claims for measured works, variations and loss and expense are at the values it attributed to those items in its final account. Rather, it seeks a declaration that, on a final account basis, it's claims total the aggregate of those submitted claim heads and that it should be decided that it be paid by reference to that value on a final account basis. We would trust that you will agree that the scope of the adjudication is as per above paragraph 1. If, however, you were to consider that the scope is as per above paragraph 2, then we confirm that we would continue to participate in the adjudication and compile our Response accordingly. However, this would need to be on the basis that TLB does so under protest and strictly without prejudice to its position on the jurisdiction that the Notice confers been limited as per paragraph 1. ETC is adopting a "cake and eat it" approach in its notice. On the one hand it wishes to have all claims determined and decisions as to their payment but on the other it seeks that in doing so TLB should be shut out from defending itself to its full availability in relation to those claims (whether by raising for your consideration defences as to the correct quantum of individual claim items and/or defences by way of cross and counter claims). That is not possible as a Responding party has an unfettered ability to elect how to defend itself in response to a notice and ETC "telling" the adjudicator that he must not consider legitimate defences is of no legal effect. Indeed, the decision in Cantillon ltd v Urvasco Ltd[2008] EWHC 282 (TCC) makes clear that "whatever dispute is referred to the Adjudicator, it includes and allows for any ground open to the responding party which would amount in law or in fact to a defence of the claim with which it is dealing". It therefore follows that TLB shall be at liberty to raise such matters as it considers relevant, in law or in fact, to the assessment of whether the final account should be valued at£1,223,749.53 …”
“I am clear that ECS is seeking both the valuation of its final account and the payment of any sums that I find due. In my opinion, my jurisdiction therefore covers valuation of all of the items comprising ECS’ final account and I understand ECS’ position to be that in respect of those items referred to at paragraph 11 of the Notice of Adjudication ECS accepts the CA’s current valuation. It is not for me to comment as to how TLB wishes to respond to the Referral and I now direct that [TLB] provides its Response to the Referral together with a summary of the contentions on which it relies, a statement of the relief or remedy which is sought and any material it wishes me to consider…”
“23. In Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd[2008] BLR 250 , the Court recognised the following: "54. It is, I believe, accepted by both parties, correctly in my view, that whatever dispute is referred to the Adjudicator, it includes and allows for any ground open to the responding party which would amount in law or in fact to a defence of the claim with which it is dealing. Authority for that proposition includes KNS Industrial Services (Birmingham) Ltd -v- Sindall Ltd 75 Con LR 71." 24. In Quartzelec Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd[2009] BLR 328 , HHJ Stephen Davies addressed a case in which the adjudicator refused to consider a particular defence. Materially so far as the current case is concerned, he said, having referred to Paragraphs 54 and 55 of my judgement in the Cantillon case as follows: "30. I respectfully agree with what is said by Akenhead J. Where the dispute referred to adjudication by a claimant is one which involves a claim to be paid money, it is difficult to see why a respondent should not be entitled to raise any defence open to him to defend himself against that claim, regardless of whether or not it was raised as a discrete ground of defence in the run-up to the adjudication, and subject to any considerations of natural justice. The adjudicator has jurisdiction to, and should, consider any such defence. That may result in him accepting or rejecting the defence, in whole or in part. It may be the case that one ground for rejecting a defence not previously raised is that it cannot properly be advanced in the absence of a withholding notice. It may be the case that another ground for rejecting a defence not previously raised is that the failure to raise it at an earlier stage is fatal to the adjudicator's assessment of the genuineness of that defence. But it does not seem to me that a decision to either such effect is a decision by the adjudicator as to his jurisdiction to consider the defence; instead it is a decision within his jurisdiction about the merits of that defence. 31. I consider, therefore, that Ms. McCredie was right to submit that if the adjudicator had considered the defence and decided, even if wrongly, that it could not succeed in the absence of a withholding notice, that would be a decision within his jurisdiction and would not be one which this court could review on an enforcement hearing. This is consistent with the judgment of Lord MacFayden in SL Timber Systems Limited v Carillion Construction Limited[2001] BLR 516 , to which she referred me, at paragraph 23. However the corollary of that, in my judgment, is that since the adjudicator has jurisdiction to consider such defences, he ought to do so, and if he does not do so then he does not properly perform the task which he has been appointed to do. In those circumstances, he also does not in my judgment act in accordance with natural justice, because he has not heard the respondent on all of the defences which he seeks and is entitled to put forward. 32. Ms. McCredie submitted that in paragraph 54 of his judgment Akenhead J. was saying no more than that where a defence was properly open to a respondent, then the adjudicator ought to consider it. I do not accept this. Apart from the objection that such a reading would deprive the paragraph of any meaningful content, it is wholly inconsistent with paragraph 55, where Akenhead J. says in terms that 'it is open to any defendant to raise any defence to the claim when it is referred to adjudication or arbitration' (emphasis added)…” 25. Ms Rawley for the Contractor in this case also argued that it was open to the Court to infer from what was put before the Adjudicator and what was said or not said in the Adjudicator's decision that the Adjudicator had not considered or addressed the defences properly put forward by a defending party. I agree that the Court can so infer; indeed, it may be a rare case (CJP Builders Ltd v William Verry Ltd[2008] BLR 545 being one) that the Adjudicator will admit that he or she has not considered a proper defence. Accordingly, where the breach of natural justice complained of is a failure to consider defences properly put forward, the Court will often have to infer whether there has been such a failure. 26. In the context of this case, I draw the following conclusions: (a) The Adjudicator must consider defences properly put forward by a defending party in adjudication. (b) However, it is within an adjudicator's jurisdiction to decide what evidence is admissible and, indeed, what evidence is helpful and unhelpful in the determination of the dispute or disputes referred to that adjudicator. If, within jurisdiction, the adjudicator decides that certain evidence is inadmissible, that will rarely (if ever) amount to a breach of the rules of natural justice. The position is analogous to a court case in which the Court decides that certain evidence is either inadmissible or of such little weight and value that it can effectively be ignored: it would be difficult for a challenge to such a decision on fairness grounds to be mounted. (c) Even if the adjudicator's decision (within jurisdiction) to disregard evidence as inadmissible or of little or no weight was wrong in fact or in law, that decision is not in consequence impugnable as a breach of the rules of natural justice. (d) One will need in most and possibly all "natural justice" cases to distinguish between a failure by an adjudicator in the decision to consider and address a substantive (factual or legal) defence and an actual or apparent failure or omission to address all aspects of the evidence which go to support that defence. It is necessary to bear in mind that adjudication involves, usually, the exchange of evidence and argument over a short period of time and the production of a decision within a short time span thereafter. It is simply not practicable, usually, for every aspect of the evidence to be meticulously considered, weighed up and rejected or accepted in whole or in part. Primarily, the adjudicator, needs to address the substantive issues, whether factual or legal, but does not need (as a matter of fairness) to address each and every aspect of the evidence. The adjudicator should not be considered to be in breach of the rules of natural justice if the decision does not address each aspect of the evidence adduced by the parties.” "54. It is, I believe, accepted by both parties, correctly in my view, that whatever dispute is referred to the Adjudicator, it includes and allows for any ground open to the responding party which would amount in law or in fact to a defence of the claim with which it is dealing. Authority for that proposition includes KNS Industrial Services (Birmingham) Ltd -v- Sindall Ltd 75 Con LR 71." "30. I respectfully agree with what is said by Akenhead J. Where the dispute referred to adjudication by a claimant is one which involves a claim to be paid money, it is difficult to see why a respondent should not be entitled to raise any defence open to him to defend himself against that claim, regardless of whether or not it was raised as a discrete ground of defence in the run-up to the adjudication, and subject to any considerations of natural justice. The adjudicator has jurisdiction to, and should, consider any such defence. That may result in him accepting or rejecting the defence, in whole or in part. It may be the case that one ground for rejecting a defence not previously raised is that it cannot properly be advanced in the absence of a withholding notice. It may be the case that another ground for rejecting a defence not previously raised is that the failure to raise it at an earlier stage is fatal to the adjudicator's assessment of the genuineness of that defence. But it does not seem to me that a decision to either such effect is a decision by the adjudicator as to his jurisdiction to consider the defence; instead it is a decision within his jurisdiction about the merits of that defence. 31. I consider, therefore, that Ms. McCredie was right to submit that if the adjudicator had considered the defence and decided, even if wrongly, that it could not succeed in the absence of a withholding notice, that would be a decision within his jurisdiction and would not be one which this court could review on an enforcement hearing. This is consistent with the judgment of Lord MacFayden in SL Timber Systems Limited v Carillion Construction Limited[2001] BLR 516 , to which she referred me, at paragraph 23. However the corollary of that, in my judgment, is that since the adjudicator has jurisdiction to consider such defences, he ought to do so, and if he does not do so then he does not properly perform the task which he has been appointed to do. In those circumstances, he also does not in my judgment act in accordance with natural justice, because he has not heard the respondent on all of the defences which he seeks and is entitled to put forward. 32. Ms. McCredie submitted that in paragraph 54 of his judgment Akenhead J. was saying no more than that where a defence was properly open to a respondent, then the adjudicator ought to consider it. I do not accept this. Apart from the objection that such a reading would deprive the paragraph of any meaningful content, it is wholly inconsistent with paragraph 55, where Akenhead J. says in terms that 'it is open to any defendant to raise any defence to the claim when it is referred to adjudication or arbitration' (emphasis added)…”