“Network Rail will select the Supplier using the high-level weighting outlined below: Award Criteria % Weighting Technical Requirements 65% Commercial Requirements 35% For further detail please see the Weighted Scoring Matrix.”
“We are most surprised and very disappointed at your decision not to award the contract to us, which is contrary to expectations we have received regarding the quality and price of our bid. We wish to fully understand the basis of the scoring of not only our bid but also the bid you consider to have been successful ("the Omnicom Bid"). We note that under regulation 33 (1) of the Utilities Contracts Regulations…[as amended] you are required to notify us of: 1. the criteria for the award; 2. the reasons for the decision, which will include the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender; 3. the score (if any obtain by the economic operator which is to receive the notice and also the economic operator to be awarded the contract You are also required to provide anything required by paragraph 33 (10) which states that any reasons are to be provided as to why an economic operator may have been unsuccessful under the requirements of regulation 12(6) and 12(7). Your Award Decision Notice merely sets out the criteria together with its relative weight and score. The reasons for the score do, however, contain many subjective comments and do not demonstrate an objective analysis of the relative characteristics of each tender. For example… Accordingly, we consider that your Award Decision Notices is defective and does not include all of the information you are legally obliged to provide… We wish to hold a meeting with you to discuss the detail of our scoring and evaluation when compared to the tender you consider successful, as we fully believe that our bid fully meets your requirements. We are able to meet to discuss the requests… In the meantime, we reserve our right to start proceedings under regulation 45F of the Regulations in relation to a breach of duty under regulation 45A. Please indicate your address for the service of such proceedings.”
“…NR insisted that our Price was very high as compared to competition. Our final evaluation through scoring analysis and NR intelligence indicates that for the whole life costs of the pilot project we were about£250,000 more expensive than Omnicom and for the national rollout double Omnicom-£4m higher. We reviewed the scoring numbers with NR and made many comments as laid out in our notes document…We were ably supported by Mr Shaun Whitlock…both at the meeting and during preparation. It was fairly obvious that NR made significant efforts to "arrange" the technical scoring so that we could not win the bid. We stress the fact that the [Mermec] bid was only for bogey mount and not body mount as Omnicom proposed. We were criticised for not supplying a detailed quote for body mounting. They considered it an omission on our part. We stressed that they [had] not replied to our specific bogey/body mounting questions prior to our submission of the BAFO. They also made several comments regarding the inferior quality of our bid as compared to Omnicom. It was clear that NR had no intention of changing their decision and felt very comfortable in their position. After 90 minutes of meeting we considered no further progress could be made. We did however request the detailed scoring matrix as per the scoring scheme communicated with the ITT. They will review with their management to determine if they will supply-Systech to follow up. Our legal position will be supplied by Systech-my view is that any further legal action will jeopardise our long-term position with regard to being able to supply NR with any products...”
“4. (3) A utility shall (in accordance with Article 10 of the Utilities Directive)— (a) treat economic operators equally and in a non-discriminatory way; and (b) act in a transparent way. 13. —(1) Where a utility intends to award a contract on the basis of the offer which is the most economically advantageous in accordance with regulation 30(1) (a), it shall indicate in the contract notice whether or not it authorises economic operators to submit offers which contain variants on the requirements specified in the contract documents and a utility shall not accept an offer which contains a variant without that indication. (2) Where a utility authorises a variation in accordance with paragraph (1), it shall state in the contract notice the minimum requirements to be met by the variants and any specific requirements for the presentation of an offer which contains variants. (3) A utility shall only consider variants which meet its minimum requirements as stated in the contract documents in accordance with paragraph (2). (4) A utility shall not reject an offer which contains variants on the requirements specified in the contract documents on the ground that— (a) where it intends to award a services contract, the offer would lead to the award of a supply contract; or (b) where it intends to award a supply contract, the offer would lead to the award of a services contract… 30. —(1) Subject to regulation 31 and paragraphs (6) and (9) of this regulation, a utility shall award a contract on the basis of the offer which— (a) is the most economically advantageous from the point of view of the utility; or (b) offers the lowest price. (2) A utility shall use criteria linked to the subject matter of the contract to determine that an offer is the most economically advantageous including delivery date or period for completion, running costs, cost-effectiveness, quality, aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental characteristics, technical merit, after sales service and technical assistance, commitments with regard to parts, security of supply and price or otherwise. (3) Where a utility intends to award a contract on the basis of the offer which is the most economically advantageous, it shall state the weighting which it gives to each of the criteria chosen in the contract notice or in the contract documents. (4) When stating the weightings referred to in paragraph (3), a utility may give the weighting a range and specify a minimum and maximum weighting where it considers it appropriate in view of the subject matter of the contract…. 33 (1) Subject to paragraph (13), a utility shall, as soon as possible after the decision has been made, inform the tenderers and candidates of its decision to award the contract, and shall do so by notice in writing by the most rapid means of communication practicable. (2) Where it is to be sent to a tenderer, the notice referred to in paragraph (1) shall include— (a) the criteria for the award of the contract; (b) the reasons for the decision, including the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender, the score (if any) obtained by— (i) the economic operator which is to receive the notice; and (ii) the economic operator to be awarded the contract, and anything required by paragraph (10); (c) the name of the economic operator to be awarded the contract; and (d) a precise statement of either— (i) when, in accordance with regulation 33A, the standstill period is expected to end and, if relevant, how the timing of its ending might be affected by any and, if so what, contingencies; or (ii) the date before which the utility will not, in conformity with regulation 33A, enter into the contract. 45.—(1) In this Part, except where the context otherwise requires— “claim form” includes, in Northern Ireland, the originating process by which the proceedings are commenced… 45D.—(1) This regulation limits the time within which proceedings may be started where the proceedings do not seek a declaration of ineffectiveness. (2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), such proceedings must be started promptly and in any event within 3 months beginning with the date when grounds for starting the proceedings first arose. (3) Paragraph (2) does not require proceedings to be started before the end of any of the following periods— (a) where the proceedings relate to a decision which is sent to the economic operator by facsimile or electronic means, 10 days beginning with— (i) the day after the date on which the decision is sent, if the decision is accompanied by a summary of the reasons for the decision; (ii) if the decision is not so accompanied, the day after the date on which the economic operator is informed of a summary of those reasons… (4) The Court may extend the time limits imposed by this regulation (but not the limits imposed by regulation 45E) where the Court considers that there is a good reason for doing so. (5) For the purposes of this regulation, proceedings are to be regarded as started only when the claim form is served in compliance with regulation 45F(1). 45F.—(1) Where proceedings are to be started, the economic operator must, after filing the claim form, serve it on the utility… (5) In this regulation, “serve” means serve in accordance with rules of court, and for the purposes of this regulation a claim form is deemed to be served on the day on which it is deemed by rules of court to be served.”
“33…Although the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is not a universal truth, it should not in my view be lightly brushed aside. Regulation 32(4) specifies a short limitation period. That is no doubt for the good policy reason that it is in the public interest that challenges to the tender process of a public service contract should be made promptly so as to cause as little disruption and delay as possible. It is not merely because the interests of all those who have participated in the tender process have to be taken into account. It is also because there is a wider public interest in ensuring that tenders which public authorities have invited for a public project should be processed as quickly as possible. A balance has to be struck between two competing interests: the need to allow challenges to be made to an unlawful tender process, and the need to ensure that any such challenges are made expeditiously. Regulation 32(4)(b) is the result of that balancing exercise. It may often be the case that a service provider is not aware of the intricacies of regulations such as the 1992 regulations, and has little or no understanding of how they should be interpreted. If ignorance of such matters were routinely to be regarded as a good reason for extending the time for starting proceedings, the clear intent of regulation 32(4)(b), that proceedings should normally be started promptly and in any event not later than three months after the right of action first arose, would be frustrated.”
“34. Mr Coppel's primary submission was that the subject matters of the Return Schedules were criteria for the award of the contracts, and that the Council therefore had to identify them, or those that were criteria, as such, together with the weightings the Council proposed to attach to them, as required by regulation 30(3). In the circumstances referred to in regulation 30(5) it would be unnecessary to give weightings, but those circumstances did not apply in the present case. Even if the Return Schedules were sub-criteria, it was necessary for tenderers to be informed of the weightings attached to each of them. In this connection, he relied on the judgment in Letting International v Newham LBC[2008] EWHC 1583 (QB) ;[2008] LGR 908 , in which Silber J cited and applied the definition of "criterion" in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as meaning "principle, standard, or test by which a thing is judged, assessed or identified". If that definition is appropriate, it would mean that regulation 30 requires every standard by which a bid is to be evaluated, no matter how minor or subsidiary, to be disclosed as such with its proposed weighting. That would seem to me to be impracticable, and I do not think it is what Community law requires.”