"I would say that my father was dedicated to me and the rest of our family – he was particularly close to my younger sister."
"Albino was at his happiest when sat at our kitchen table, with a glass of wine and preparing barbecue for family and friends."
"In attendance to the above articles, the Permanent Contributory Disability is the situation of the worker who, after having undergone the prescribed medical treatment, present severe anatomical or functional reductions, subject to objective determination and which remain foreseeably [permanent],that decrease his/her work capacity in the minimum of 33% having contributed to the Social Security during at least 800 days for the 10 years preceding the incapacitating event. … I confirm that in accordance with article 200 the beneficiary of the disability pension shall be subject to regular medical reviews, the timing of which will be determined by the Spanish Social Security in its resolution about the disability pension."
"I was not financially dependent on my father at the time of the accident, but he did help me with DIY and other tasks that I would otherwise have paid for. He would also provide me with gifts as any loving parent would."
"A trial is a culmination of a process. That process involves identifying and framing the issues between the parties, and then ensuring that proper disclosure of documentary evidence appropriate to the resolution of those issues takes place. Generally speaking, the issue of a party's failure to produce an original ought to be raised and resolved well-before trial. The English courts have established procedures, taking place well before trial, to flush out the points parties are taking in relation to documents. Thus, for instance, the fact that a party is contending that a certain document is a forgery will not (absent wholly exceptional circumstances) be raised for the first time at the trial itself. There will have been anterior debate about the precise allegation being made, and the mechanism (for instance, the use of handwriting experts) whereby the allegation of forgery is to be resolved. When considering the best evidence rule, a trial judge will, plainly, take into account the interlocutory steps that have, or have not, been taken by the parties in bringing their dispute to trial."
"4.1 The index road traffic accident occurred on the morning of15 February 2015 when a group of 9 workers were travelling in a minibus from their hotel to their place of work. … They had left the hotel between 6:20 and 6:25am. Mr Rodriguez was sitting on the front seat at the right of the vehicle where the driver would sit in a right-hand drive vehicle. 4.2 Mr Rivas states that he was travelling at 60 to 65 kph around a left curve in the road, when he became aware of a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. Mr Rivas states that at this point in the road, there were double solid white lines indicating that vehicles should not cross these lines. Mr Rivas states that Mr Rodriguez shouted something like "be careful, he is coming towards us"
"6.3 … It is conceivable that despite his serious injuries, Mr Rodriguez may have remained conscious for a short period following the head injury but if that was the case, I would have expected the minibus driver to have noticed that there were signs of life: he states that he and the other front seat passenger climbed out through the front windscreen and although not stated, he implies that Mr Rodriguez made no effort to extricate himself from the minibus. On the information provided, and in the absence of a post-mortem report, I would therefore conclude that it is more likely than not that Mr Rodrigues was killed instantly at the point of impact. … 7.2 It is my opinion that Mr Rodriguez would have been aware that a severe collision was inevitable for a period of between one and five seconds before the impact. I believe that this is more likely than not that Mr Rodriguez would have experienced intense fear during this short period prior to the impact. 7.3 I believe that it is more likely than not that Mr Rodrigues died instantly at the point of impact. On the assumption that Mr Rodrigues died instantly, I do not believe that he would have been conscious of any pain for more than a split second."
"1. With regards to Article 26 of the Order FOM/2185/2008 of the 23 July which relates to the amount of time (10 years) a commercial vehicle licence holder needs to wait before being able to sell the commercial vehicles held under the licence(s):- a. I confirm that a single licence is granted to own/operate commercial vehicles. This is not granted in respect of each vehicle. b. I confirm that a licence holder needs to wait 10 years from the date of grant of the licence to be able to sell the commercial vehicles to which this applies."
"1. In paragraph 20.9 & 20.10 of your report you have referred to Article 26 of the Order FOM/2185/2008 of the 23 July which relates to the amount of time (10 years) a commercial vehicle licence holder needs to wait before being able to sell the commercial vehicles held under the licence(s). Please could you clarify whether: a. a single licence is granted to own/operate commercial vehicles or whether a licence is granted in respect of each vehicle? b. a licence holder needs to wait 10 years from the date of grant of the licence (or alternatively the first licence) to be able to sell the commercial vehicles or whether they need to wait 10 years in respect of each vehicle? a. i.e. If one vehicle is bought in 2005 and another in 2010 does the licence holder need to wait until 2015 to sell both vehicles or can the second vehicle only be sold in 2020?"
"20.9 I understand that Mr Albino Otero had decided to keep his own company running instead of accepting an employed role with Andeona Solutions during the time he was required to keep the company and the vehicles owned by it. 20.10 In this sense under Article 26 of the Order FOM/2185/2008 of the 23 rd July, the transferor of the transport licences, which were to be transmitted with the transport vehicles, must be the holder of the licences that he intends to transmit for not less than 10 years."
"I don't know what the future would have held if the deceased had survived but we would have paid whatever it took to keep him on because he was such a valued contributor to the company."
"If an employee, he would still have got€250 a day and we would have paid the tax on top. He was a very good contributor and that is why we would have been willing to pay that amount of money."
"It is difficult to say what an employee is worth, but if you are talking about his professional value, it was worth paying this extra for him."
"I don't know what could happen in the future. The intention was for him to continue to work for us."
"I indicate that Mr Albino Otero's working days per year would be around 270 days/year. Let me explain – when we work outside the locality (outside Galicia) there are 45 days of working and 5 days off, in addition they would have 2 annual breaks of 30 days each."
"I cannot confirm that they are all there because in Spain accounts only have to be retained for 4 years and I don't have access to all the accounts of all the companies of the business group."
"My husband would have worked until age 70, though I imagine he would have wanted to continue to work if he was able to. Both myself and our youngest children would remain financially dependent on him until retirement, and for me, after retirement."
"In the course of time the courts have worked out a simple solution to the similar problem of calculating the net dependency under the Fatal Accidents Acts in cases where the dependence of a wife and children. In times past the calculation called for a tedious enquiry into how much for housekeeping money was paid to the wife, who paid how much for the children's shoes, et cetera. This has all been swept away in the modern practice is to deduct a percentage from the net income figure to represent what the deceased would have spent exclusively on himself. The percentages have become conventional in the sense that they are used unless there are striking evidence to make the conventional figure inappropriate because there is no departure from the principle that each case must be decided upon its own facts. Where the family unit was husband-and-wife the conventional figure is 33% and the rationale for this is that broadly speaking the net income was spent as to 1/3 for the benefit of each and one third for their joint benefit. Clothing is an example of several benefit, rent an example of joint benefit. No deduction is made in respect of the joint portion because one cannot buy or drive half a motorcar. Part of the net income may be spent for the benefit of neither husband nor wife. If the facts be, for example, that out of the net income of£8000 pa the deceased was paying£2000 to a charity the percentage would be applied to£6000 and not£8000 . Where there are children the deduction falls to 25% as was the agreed figure in the Harris case."
"O'Connor LJ did not intend to lay down any rule that in the absence of striking evidence to the contrary two thirds of net income must be regarded as the value of the dependency I have no doubt. If he did he would clearly have been wrong. It is clear that the value of the dependency cannot be taken at such an arbitrary figure and must always depend on facts."
"17. I made several payments, in cash to support the family and before we received the interim payment from the responsible driver's insurers. 18. As these were cash payments, there are no bank records, but we did record this in our family book and I attach relevant extracts to my statement."
"it is paying for stuff in the house – food, clothing."
"I think there was only one car in the house at this time. It is a loan – money is paid when needed."
"there was no thought about getting the money back – it was simply a need at that time."
"I'm not thinking about it like that, I am not thinking of it as a debt."
"47. … I was forced to leave my employment at Deloitte in order to attend to the family business and generally look after the family after this devastating blow. I effectively had to become the head of the household. 48. It was an uphill struggle and a steep learning curve to get a grip with the company, suddenly and with no preparation as well as dealing with my grief and supporting my mother and siblings. I found myself taking over a company without knowing the numbers, the clients, the suppliers, the bank arrangements. 49. I handled absolutely everything from invoicing, dealing with clients, legal aspects, debts, recovery of debts owed to the company, accounting. All this work, on top of dealing with all the house admin and taking my mother to appointments and other tasks, meant that I was effectively working full-time on the company, when I was not otherwise working for Deloitte or undertaking my studies. 50. If my father had not died, I would have expected to continue with my independent career as a financial consultant with Deloitte or similar companies. I would not have expected to have been involved in the company much and, in any event, the intention was to wind the company up as soon as commercially and practically possible."
"19. At the time of the accident, I was not working in the family business, but was studying and doing an internship. I was 20 years old. I was studying to be a heating engineer. However, following my father's death I felt compelled to abandon my studies and internship so that I could assist with Excavaciones. I undertook non-administrative work for the company. In particular I sought and undertook work which the company could invoice for. I would deal with the clients, visit sites to budget for the work, undertake maintenance and other tasks. 20. This was necessary as the company had standing costs which had to be met and which could only be met if the company had an income. In common with my brother David, I received no salary or payment for my work for the company. However it was necessary that I do this work so the company could be kept afloat until 2018, in order that the commercial vehicles, the company's substantial assets could be sold. My brother David was in charge of the administrative details of the company and its winding up …"
"It follows, it seems to me, that the court's task in any case is to examine the particular facts of the case to determine whether or not any loss in money or in monies worth has been occasioned to the dependents and if it determines that it has, it must then use whatever material appears best to fit the facts of the particular case in order to determine the extent of that loss."
"It is, I think, beyond argument that had the wife, as so often happens today, been employed by some independent employer her salary, even though paid into her husband's bank account, would form no part of "the dependency" for it would continue after her husband's death. It would not be a benefit arising out of the relationship of husband and wife which she would lose upon his death. It seems to me to be equally clear that if she were generally employed at the market rate of wages or other services which she performed, whether directly by her husband by a one-man company which he controlled, the position would be no different. Her salary would not arise from the relationship of husband and wife but out of the relationship of employer and employee. If one looks to the future as the Act requires it would not be a benefit which she would lose upon her husband's death, for her earning capacity would remain unimpaired and she could continue to earn similar wages from another employer. If one looks to the past for the purpose of making the common estimate of "the dependency" her wages, although paid to her by her husband, should be ignored. The family income would have been augmented to that extent by her own efforts, not those of her husband, for if she had not been performing the services her husband would have had to pay wages to someone else for the services and the amount available from him for the family expenses would have been correspondingly reduced. It would be the converse of the position in Sykes v North Easter Railway Co. "
"(1) in the action such damages, other than damages for bereavement, may be awarded as are proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to the dependents respectively."
"This is both wide and vague, but the interpretation of the Courts, before the introduction of a separate entitlement of some to a limited recovery for bereavement, restricted recovery to damages for the loss of the pecuniary benefit arising from the relationship which would be derived from the continuance of the life. In short, the measure recoverable by a dependant is what is often called the value of the dependency…"
"25. First, as Diplock LJ explained in Malyon v Plummer[1964] 1 QB 330 : "
"…the dependency is fixed at the moment of death; it is what the dependants would probably have received as benefit from the deceased, had the deceased not died. What decisions people make afterwards is irrelevant."
"In Mehmet v Perry (1977) 2 AER 529, Brian Neill QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) held that it was reasonable on the facts of the case before him for the male plaintiff, now solely responsible for the upbringing of five children, two of whom had a serious medical condition, to give up work to look after them. In such circumstances, the damages for the loss of the deceased's housekeeping services should be assessed by reference to the plaintiff's loss of wages, because: "
"This provision replicates, though not in precisely the same words, the basis upon which damages have been assessed since the passing of theFatal Accidents Act 1846 . The task of the court, in answering this question was originally the province of the jury. Neither successive statutes nor, in my judgment, any decisions of the courts lay down any prescriptive method by which such damage is to be identified, or calculated apart from the principle that it requires that some damage capable of being quantified in money terms must be established."
"13. This principle has been applied time and time again by the court in cases where the claimant has lost the services of a wife or mother. It has also been applied to the loss of a husband's services as handiman, gardener, or any other such service activity as has been lost and has a money value in the sense that it will cost money to replace. I can see no difference in principle between the loss of services of that domestic nature, and the loss of services which have a positive financial value to the family. For example, a husband may be so skilled and successful in dealing with the family's investments that he has no need of a stockbroker or other financial adviser. His death, whatever other loss may result, will mean that the family will have to replace that expertise and advice at the appropriate market cost. That cost is as much a loss to the family as could be the cost of a gardener. And, clearly, the position cannot be different, indeed it is a fortiori, if the family's sole source of support is the investment portfolio managed by such a husband. 14. It follows, it seems to me, that the court's task in any case is to examine the particular facts of the case to determine whether or not any loss in money or in monies worth has been occasioned to the dependants and if it determines that it has, it must then use whatever material appears best to fit the facts of the particular case in order to determine the extent of that loss."
" (2) Nature of the pecuniary loss 2.9 Apart from funeral expenses (which we consider separately below), damages awarded under theFatal Accidents Act 1976 generally compensate the loss of any non-business benefit that the claimant reasonably expected to receive from the deceased had the deceased continued to live (often referred to as "loss of dependency"). Thus, damages under the Act may provide compensation for the loss of money brought into the household by the deceased, for the loss of gratuitous services performed by the deceased (including domestic work) and for the loss of fringe benefits, such as a company car. 2.10 Damages can be claimed for the loss of one-off benefits: it is not necessary that a benefit had previously been enjoyed. The lost benefits for which dependants are able to claim damages under the 1976 Act may also include the loss of greater benefits which they would have received had the deceased continued to live. However, a mere speculative possibility of receipt is insufficient. 2.11 The restriction on the "reasonable expectation" test is that benefits expected as the product of a business relationship with the deceased are not recoverable. For example, in Burgess v Florence Nightingale Hospital for Gentlewomen a husband and wife were dancing partners. Although their earning capacity as a couple was greater than their individual abilities to earn an income, the husband could not recover for the loss of his income as a dancer after her death. 2.12 In addition to damages for the loss of reasonably expected non-business benefits, damages can be recovered for pecuniary expense incurred to replace the loss of reasonably expected non-business benefits. For example, damages are recoverable for the cost incurred in employing someone to do work previously done by the deceased, such as a housekeeper, child-minder or gardener."
"As a result of the deceased's untimely death he did not have the opportunity to put his affairs in order and as such his estate has incurred increased liabilities which would not have been incurred but for the negligence of the 1st Defendant for whom the 2nd Defendant is vicariously liable and who is insured by the 3rd Defendant. Notary costs and mercantile registry costs have been incurred, given the deceased died intestate and given he had not had the opportunity to close Excavaciones Sanxenxo S.L."
"The various items identified in Appendix 1 appear to relate to costs paid to Spanish notaries either in relation to the Deceased's former business, or arising from the fact that the Deceased died intestate or in relation to the administration of his estate. Self-evidently, none of these are "funeral expenses" and none are properly recoverable in this action whether under the 1934 Act or at all."
"Put another way, and this, in my judgment, is the reality of such an arrangement, a husband might say to his wife, "
" The general nature of the remedy under the Fatal Accidents Acts has often been explained. These Acts 'provided a new cause of action and did not merely regulate or enlarge an old one,' as Lord Sumner observed in Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. Amerika [1917] A.C. 38, 52. The claim is, in the words of Bowen L.J. in The Vera Cruz (No. 2) (1884) 9 P.D. 96, 101, for injuriously affecting the family of the deceased. It is not a claim which the deceased could have pursued in his own lifetime, because it is for damages suffered not by himself, but by his family after his death. The Act of 1846, section 2, provides that the action is to be for the benefit of the wife or other member of the family, and the jury (or judge) are to give such damages as may be thought proportioned to the injury resulting to such parties from the death. The damages are to be based on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or benefit reducible to money value. In assessing the damages all circumstances which may be legitimately pleaded in diminution of the damages must be considered: Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Jennings, 13 AppCas 800 , 804. The actual pecuniary loss of each individual entitled to sue can only be ascertained by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to him of the future pecuniary benefit, and, on the other, any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. . . ."
"The general principle is not in doubt. They —that is the family— are entitled to such a sum as will make good to them the financial loss which they have suffered and will suffer as a result of the death."
" DIY and maintenance 26. The deceased was the linchpin of the family and when he was at home he would undertake DIY, maintenance and other tasks for the family/ Dependents. 27. Albino would take care of all the plumbing and electrics at home- we never had the need for professionals - if there was something particularly complex, then someone in the family would perhaps lend a hand - such as my brother who is an electrician and could help with particularly complicated electrical work. 28. Albino would also fix doors and windows, as well as electrical items such as the washing machine, which he fixed on several occasions. Although, I have to say it was not his favourite task, he would also carry our painting and decorating. 29. He would also prepare firewood - he built a machine from spare parts to cut the firewood. 30. Albino was a perfectionist. He cared about our house and land and he would do a much better job than a professional being paid a fixed amount for a job."
"41-105 This head of loss is now firmly established for child claimants and features in nearly every case involving them. It is commonly referred to as the special qualitative factor in Regan v Williamson or even just the Regan v Williamson element. It is most profusely to be found in the cases starting with Spittle v Bunney in 1988 and continuing, where the claim was on behalf of the child or children of the family only. It was subject, wrongly, to an exception in Watson v Willmott because the adoptive mother was now providing the care and in Stanley v Siddique , rightly, because of the indifferent quality of the mother."
" Discounting for Contingencies 142. Next, consider what, if any, discount should be made for contingencies. Avoid double discounting with any assumptions already made when defining the period of loss, other adjustments and the underlying UK-wide mortality predictions that are within Tables 1 to 34. … Calculating the post-trial dependency 143. Applying the above principles, the assessment of the loss for each type of dependency involves the following steps (as further illustrated in the worked examples in Section D (j) below): (1) Calculate the annual loss based on the value at the date of the trial. (2) For earnings and pension (but not services) dependencies, apply the appropriate dependency factor to work out the proportion of the loss which the dependant is entitled to. (3) Work out whether the duration of the dependency in question is limited by the deceased or the dependant, as described in Section D (f) above. (4) Translate that figure into a multiplier by using one of the following at the current discount rate: (i) Life-long losses, using Tables 1 or 2 (according to the gender of the deceased or dependant and using age at the date of the trial) (ii) Losses to retirement age, using Tables 3 to 18 (according to the gender of the deceased and the expected age at retirement). (iii) Losses of earnings or services for a fixed lesser period that the deceased would have provided the dependency, using the most applicable of Tables 3 to 18, adjusting if necessary, following the guidance relating to the analogous scenario of different retirement ages in Section A. (iv) Pension losses post-retirement age, using Tables 19 to 34. This is the same as calculating the multiplier for life-long losses and then deducting the multiplier for losses to retirement age derived from Tables 3 to 18. (v) Using Table 36 for losses for fixed periods which cannot otherwise be derived from Tables 1 to 34 (Footnote 68: Alternatively, it may be possible to calculate such multipliers using a computer programme or the Additional Tables). (5) Make an adjustment applying Table F, if appropriate, for the risk that the deceased might have died anyway before the date of trial. (6) For earnings losses only, apply an appropriate adjustment to the above figure to reflect earnings related contingencies, ordinarily using the adjustment factor contained in Tables. (7) Consider whether there are proven atypical health or mortality risks, and if so, consider applying a contingency factor for this. (8) For pension losses, consider whether a contingency is required. (9) On rare occasions it may be appropriate to make a deduction for factors relating to the dependant's relationship to the deceased. (10) The resulting multiplier is then applied to the multiplicand for the post-trial dependency in question."
"The Respondent suggests, for technical reasons, that in substitution for table 28 of the Ogden tables which concern multipliers for term certain, Mr Daykin should have used Ogden table 2, which would produce approximately 10% difference in the figures. The Appellant and the Intervener disagree, arguing that questions of risk are already accommodated in the application of the relevant tables to produce the life expectancy for the appellant. In my view the Appellant and Intervener are correct on that point for the reasons given by Mr Daykin. The relevant risks and the future life expectancy have already been settled by the judge's findings."
"17. The table 36 multiplier for the full period is 25.95 [in fact, 25.93] but this total multiplier needs to be split and the method recommended in Ogden 8 is set out in the explanatory notes at para 45 to 48. It is this approach which has been adopted by C throughout these proceedings and … provides the following figures: a. For period 1 - the table 36 figure for 10.74 years is 10.88 b. For period 2 - the table 36 figure for 12.32 years (period 1 and 2 summed) is 12.51. 10.88 is subtracted from 12.51 to produce the table 36 period 2 figure of 1.63. c. For period 3 - the table 36 figure for 25.14 years (period 1, 2, and 3 summed) is 25.95. 12.51 is subtracted from 26.91 [clearly a misprint for 25.95] to produce the table 36 period 3 figure of 13.44"
"29. Para. 143(8) of the notes states, "consider whether a contingency is required." 30. Para. 142(4) says that the adjustment for contingencies for the pension loss dependency will often be less than that required for pre-retirement earnings dependency for the reasons set out in Section B under the subheading "(a) Introduction" 31. Para. 58 of the notes (part of the Introduction to Section B) explains: "
"19. Tables A-D are designed to be applied for loss of earnings calculations only. This is demonstrated by reference to a) the title of Table A, "