“140A Unfair relationships between creditors and debtors (1) The court may make an order under section 140B in connection with a credit agreement if it determines that the relationship between the creditor and the debtor arising out of the agreement (or the agreement taken with any related agreement) is unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following — (a) any of the terms of the agreement or of any related agreement; (b) the way in which the creditor has exercised or enforced any of his rights under the agreement or any related agreement; (c) any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement). (2) In deciding whether to make a determination under this section the court shall have regard to all matters it thinks relevant (including matters relating to the creditor and matters relating to the debtor). (3) For the purposes of this section the court shall (except to the extent that it is not appropriate to do so) treat anything done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, an associate or a former associate of the creditor as if done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, the creditor. (4) A determination may be made under this section in relation to a relationship notwithstanding that the relationship may have ended. (5) …”
“32. Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake. (1) Subject to …, where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either — (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or (b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. References in this subsection to the defendant include references to the defendant’s agent and to any person through whom the defendant claims and his agent. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.”
“19. The next question is whether that state of affairs arose from something done or not done by or on behalf of Paragon [i.e. for the purposes of s.140A(1)(c)]. For this purpose it is enough to consider the acts or omissions of Paragon itself, without exploring the conduct of others acting on its behalf. Paragon owed no legal duty to Mrs Plevin under the ICOB rules to disclose the commissions and, not being her agent or adviser, they owed no such duty under the general law either. However, as I have already pointed out, the question which arises under section 140A(1)(c) is not whether there was a legal duty to disclose the commissions. It is whether the unfairness arising from their non-disclosure was due to something done or not done by Paragon. Where the creditor has done a positive act which makes the relationship unfair, this gives rise to no particular conceptual difficulty. But the concept of causing a relationship to be unfair by not doing something is more problematical. It necessarily implies that the Act treats the creditor as being responsible for the unfairness which results from his inaction, even if that responsibility falls short of a legal duty. What is it that engages that responsibility? Bearing in mind the breadth of section 140A and the incidence of the burden of proof according to section 140B(9), the creditor must normally be regarded as responsible for an omission making his relationship with the debtor unfair if he fails to take such steps as (i) it would be reasonable to expect the creditor or someone acting on his behalf to take in the interests of fairness, and (ii) would have removed the source of that unfairness or mitigated its consequences so that the relationship as a whole can no longer be regarded as unfair. 20. On that footing, I think it clear that the unfairness which arose from the non-disclosure of the amount of the commissions was the responsibility of Paragon. Paragon were the only party who must necessarily have known the size of both commissions. They could have disclosed them to Mrs Plevin. Given its significance for her decision, I consider that in the interests of fairness it would have been reasonable to expect them to do so. Had they done so this particular source of unfairness would have been removed because Mrs Plevin would then have been able to make a properly informed judgment about the value of the PPI policy. This is sufficiently demonstrated by her evidence that she would have questioned the commissions if she had known about them, even if the evidence does not establish what decision she would ultimately have made.”
“24. It is obvious that the Claimant’s [sic] non-disclosure of its PPI commissions – which were 45.24% more than the FCA’s so-called “tipping point” of 50% - to the Claimant was deliberate. … … 27. Moreover, it involved a “breach of duty” on the part of the Defendant in the wider sense applicable to section 32 of the 1980 Act. As at and from26 July 2006 the Defendant must have known and did know that it was acting unfairly in the sense explained in Plevin: that it was reasonable to expect disclosure of the existence and extent of the commissions in the interests of fairness and that the Claimant was unlikely to discover the payment of excessive commissions unless informed of it by the Defendant and/or on enquiry through lawyers. 28. The Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are in my judgment specious. I do not read Lord Sumption’s comments in Plevin, comparing breach of duty under the ICOB Rules with an unfair relationship under section 140A as excluding a breach of duty on the part of the creditor in causing such a relationship: on the contrary, the creditor’s “responsibility” for the latter, as later held by Lord Sumption, connotes a breach of duty for the purpose of section 32 of the 1980 Act, consistent with Giles v Rhind and The Kriti Palm.”
“A claimant who proposes to invoke section 32(1)(b) in order to defeat a Limitation Act defence must prove the facts necessary to bring the case within the paragraph. He can do so if he can show that some fact relevant to his right of action has been concealed from him either by a positive act of concealment or by a withholding of relevant information, but, in either case, with the intention of concealing the fact or facts in question.”
“… section 423 has to be seen in the context of a debtor’s responsibilities to his creditors generally. It actualises those responsibilities in particular circumstances. Any argument that section 423 does not involve a breach of duty has therefore a somewhat counter-intuitive ring to it.”
“The Defendant knew the relevant facts throughout. It must stretch the credulity of any judge, let alone a consumer, for it to claim that it never considered whether or not to disclose such significant information. If it did not disclose its commissions on inception of the loan in July 2006 (which in my judgment it was bound in fairness to do), it should at least have done so when section 140A-D came into force and thereafter, whatever the fluxes in judge-stated law and all the more so when that was settled in Plevin.”
“… section 32 deprives a defendant of a limitation defence in two situations: (i) …; and (ii) where he is guilty of deliberate wrongdoing and conceals or fails to disclose it in circumstances where it is unlikely to be discovered for some time. But it does not deprive a defendant of a limitation defence where he is charged with negligence if, being unaware of his error or that he has failed to take proper care, there has been nothing for him to disclose [para 25] … The maxim that ignorance of the law is no defence does not operate to convert a lawyer’s inadvertent want of care into an intentional tort. [para 29]”
“Morritt LJ said, in a passage I have cited, that in general a person is assumed to know the legal consequences of his actions and that, therefore, if an act has been done intentionally, the actor's unawareness of its legal consequences would be immaterial and no defence. The premise is, in my opinion, much too wide to constitute a satisfactory approach to construction of a statutory provision such as section 32(2). A person may or may not know that an act of his or an omission to do or say something or other constitutes a breach of tortious or contractual duty. His knowledge or lack of it may well be immaterial to the question whether a cause of action for which he is liable has accrued to the person injured by the act or omission. But that is no reason at all why Parliament, in prescribing the circumstances in which the person injured by the act or omission can escape from a Limitation Act defence, should not distinguish between the case where the actor knows he is committing a breach of duty and the case where he does not. The clear words of section 32(2)— "deliberate commission of a breach of duty"— show that Parliament has made that distinction.”
“Cave’s case decided that the wording of section 32(2) – “deliberate commission of a breach of duty” – requires a defendant not merely to have intended to do an act which constituted a breach of duty, but also to realise that the act involved a breach of duty.”
“The word "fraud" here is not used in the common law sense. It is used in the equitable sense to denote conduct by the defendant or his agent such that it would be 'against conscience' for him to avail himself of the lapse of time. The cases show that, if a man knowingly commits a wrong (such as digging underground another man's coal); or a breach of contract (such as putting in bad foundations to a house), in such circumstances that it is unlikely to be found out for many a long day, he cannot rely on the Statute of Limitations as a bar to the claim: see Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osborne[1899] AC 351 and Applegate v Moss[1971] 1 QB 406 . In order to show that he 'concealed' the right of action 'by fraud', it is not necessary to show that he took active steps to conceal his wrongdoing or breach of contract. It is sufficient that he knowingly committed it and did not tell the owner anything about it. He did the wrong or committed the breach secretly. By saying nothing he keeps it secret. He conceals the right of action. He conceals it by 'fraud' as those words have been interpreted in the cases. To this word 'knowingly' there must be added 'recklessly': see Beaman v ARTS Ltd[1949] 1 KB 550 , 565-566. Like the man who turns a blind eye, he is aware that what he is doing may well be a wrong, or a breach of contract, but he takes the risk of it being so. He refrains from further inquiry lest it should prove to be correct: and says nothing about it. The court will not allow him to get away with conduct of that kind. It may be that he has no dishonest motive: but that does not matter. He has kept the plaintiff out of the knowledge of his right of action: and that is enough: see Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association[1958] 1 WLR 563 . If the defendant was, however, quite unaware that he was committing a wrong or a breach of contract, it would be different. So if by an honest blunder he unwittingly commits a wrong (by digging another man's coal), or a breach of contract (by putting in an insufficient foundation) then he could avail himself of the Statute of Limitations.”