“Abstract The claimant applied for a post-judgment worldwide freezing order against the defendant, the defendant's sole director and shareholder (J) and three other companies allegedly controlled by J. The claimant had succeeded with claims for breach of collateral warranty and negligent misstatement against the defendant ([2019] EWHC 2892 (QB) ). The judgment sum outstanding was approximately£4.1 million . The claimant made the without notice application following concerns that funds that were available to satisfy the judgment had been, and would continue to be, dissipated. It alleged that J, as the defendant's controlling mind, was acting dishonestly; that he had taken assets out of the defendant; and that he was carrying on business as usual through companies he had set up and which he controlled. To substantiate its allegations against J, the claimant presented photos of him at a recent trade exhibition, and referred to correspondence from his solicitors which claimed that he had sold and transferred the defendant's assets by accident. The claimant submitted that, in order to adequately protect it, it was necessary to grant the injunction against the defendant as well as against J and the other companies. Held Application granted. The court was satisfied that the allegations of dissipation of assets were made out, and that an inference of dishonesty against J could be drawn, which justified the order sought. The idea that assets had been transferred accidentally was negated by the fact that no attempts had been made to undo those actions. The evidence showed that various different entities in almost identical form to the defendant seemed to be carrying on business as normal. The defendant's registered trademarks appeared to have been used by those entities. There were concerns that the entities were not real entities but used to move assets and goodwill away from the defendant. There were therefore attempts to avoid satisfaction of the judgment. It was clear from the decision in TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 W.L.R. 231, [1991] 7 WLUK 69 that the court had jurisdiction to join another party to the action, and to grant a freezing injunction against it, where that was necessary in order to make the freezing order against the defendant effective, Chabra applied. The court also had the power to make such an order underCPR r.3.3 (4) and r.19.2. Accordingly, the court was satisfied that it had jurisdiction to make an order against J and the other entities on the basis that the defendant and J were likely to be the same, J was the controlling mind and the other entities had no separate existence. It was also appropriate to disapply the normal exception allowing a party subject to a freezing order to nevertheless make payments in the ordinary course of business, Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v Emmott[2019] EWCA Civ 219 , [2019] 4 W.L.R. 53, [2019] 2 WLUK 374 followed. Such an order was draconian because it would not enable any of the defendants to continue to operate. However, on the facts of the case, such an order was not excessive. Furthermore, it was open to the defendants to apply to the court to vary the terms of the order.”
“post-judgment Mareva injunctions are granted to facilitate execution, by guarding against a risk of dissipation over the period between judgment and the process of execution taking effect, where the judgment would remain unsatisfied if injunctive relief was refused ... [P]ost-judgment Mareva injunctions can no longer be described as rare . . . Whether preor post-judgment, a Mareva injunction is not intended to confer a preference in insolvency . . . and does not form a part of execution itself.”
“I am of the view that there is a good arguable case that there are assets, apparently vested in the company, which may be beneficially the property of Mr. Chabra and therefore available to satisfy the plaintiff's claims against him if established at trial. I am also of the view that it is arguable that the company was, in fact, at relevant times the alter ego of Mr. Chabra and that its assets, or at least some of its assets, may be available to meet the plaintiff’s claims against him if established.”
“If the court has power to make an order against the company, the available evidence points strongly, in my view, to the need for an injunction against it. There is a good arguable case that some of the assets held in its name are the beneficial assets of Mr. Chabra either on the basis that the company holds them on trust for or as nominee for him, or on the basis that the company is nothing more than a convenient repository for Mr. Chabra's assets. It is, therefore, important that any such assets should be available to the plaintiff to satisfy any judgment it may obtain against Mr. Chabra. If no injunction is made against the company, there is a real risk that it will dispose of assets so as to defeat the plaintiff’s chances of satisfying the judgment that it may obtain. The effect of the company disposing of its assets would also be indirectly to reduce the value of any shareholding which Mr. Chabra had, and may still have, in the company. The disposal would have the direct effect of diminishing the prospects of any assets vested in the company which may be Mr. Chabra's beneficial assets, being available in the United Kingdom to meet the plaintiff’s judgment.”
“the claim to a similar injunction against the company is also ancillary and incidental to the claim against Mr. Chabra and the court has power to grant such an injunction in an appropriate case. It does not follow that, because the court has no jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction against the company, if it were the sole defendant, the court has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction against the company as ancillary to, or incidental, to the cause of action against Mr. Chabra . . . I agree that such a course is an exceptional one, but I do not accept that it is one that the court has no jurisdiction to take.”
“In the ordinary course, creditors should not expect to be able to obtain freezing orders against potential judgment debtors of the company sought to be wound up, save in entirely exceptional cases (and I cannot envisage what they might be) where the ordinary course of the appointment of a provisional liquidator with the duty and power to make those decisions on behalf of the company and all its stakeholders is either impossible or impracticable.”
“48. … The first reason is that generally, the obtaining of a freezing order necessitates a commitment not merely to freeze the assets of a potential wrongdoer, but to proceed diligently with the establishment of a claim against him, and the obtaining of a judgment to be satisfied out of those frozen assets. … 49. Secondly, and closely related to the first point, is the point that it is the officeholder rather than the creditor who as the guardian of the interests of all the company's stakeholders is best placed to make an independent judgment as to the wisdom of bringing proceedings against third parties, and as to the appropriateness of obtaining interim measures including freezing orders pending the conclusion of those proceedings. … 50. Thirdly, there will be an inevitable element of duplication involved in any application for a freezing order by a creditor rather than an officeholder, because of the creditor's inability to bring the substantive proceedings.”
“The freezing injunction must, however, be shaped so that its purpose is to preserve the assets held by or for each of the defendants, for the creditors of that defendant as a whole, and not just for EQ. It must therefore be varied so as to include provisos expressly enabling the Trustee in Bankruptcy to perform his duties for the benefit of the creditors of each defendant as a whole without further reference to this court.”
“The Bank may well have a greater incentive to locate, trace and to bring into account the Defendants' assets than any Trustee in bankruptcy”