"The Secretary of State shall have the general superintendence of prisons, and shall make the contracts and the other acts necessary for the maintenance of prisons and maintenance of prisoners."
"… the maintenance of a prisoner shall include all necessary expenses incurred in respect of the prisoner for food, clothing, custody and removal from one place to another, from the period of his committal to prison until his death or discharge from prison."
“The medical officer of a prison shall have the care of the health, mental and physical, of the prisoners in that prison”
"The Secretary of State must provide throughout England, to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements-.. (c) medical, dental, ophthalmic, nursing and ambulance services. For the purposes of the duty in subsection (1), services provided under- (a) section 83(2) (primary medical services), section 99(2) (primary dental services) or under section 115(4) (primary ophthalmic services), or (b) a general medical services contract, a general dental services contract or a general ophthalmic services contract must be regarded as provided by the Secretary of State."
"Each Primary Care Trust, must to the extent that it considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements, exercise its powers so as to provide primary medical services within its area, or secure their provision within its area. A Primary Care Trust may (in addition to any other power conferred on it)- (a) provide primary medical services itself (whether within or outside its area), (b) make such arrangements for their provision (whether within or outside its area) as it considers appropriate, and may in particular make contractual arrangements with any person ."
“Any rights acquired, or liabilities (including liabilities in tort) incurred, in respect of the exercise by a Primary Care Trust of any function exercisable by it by virtue of section 7 [SSH appointments], 19 [contracting out PCT functions] or 15 [NHS contracts with other health service bodies] are enforceable by or against the Primary Care Trust (and no other body).”
“Patient waiting by choice because the prison has limited times they can let in-mates out. Was offeres (sic) a few appointments”
“ON MEDICAL HOLD PENDING HOSPITAL APPOINTMENT EARLY SEPT, MRI- Priority: High”
"The question depends in each case on whether, having regard to the particular relationship between the parties, the defendant has assumed a responsibility towards the plaintiff, and whether the plaintiff has relied on that assumption of responsibility. ... In the present case I have no difficulty in holding that the police assumed certain responsibilities towards Mr. Kirkham when they took him into custody, and in particular assumed a responsibility to pass on information which might affect his well-being when he was transferred from their custody to the custody of the prison authorities. Nor have I any difficulty in inferring reliance. That is sufficient to impose on the police a duty to speak."
"... when one person is in the lawful custody of another, whether that be voluntarily, as is usually the case in a hospital or involuntarily, as when a person is detained by the police or by prison authorities. ..., there is a duty upon the person having custody of another to take all reasonable steps to avoid acts or omissions which he could reasonably foresee would be likely to harm the person for whom he is responsible."
“The common law develops from case to case in harmony with statute. Its principles are generalisations from detailed rules, not abstract propositions from which those rules are deduced. Still less does it provide a solvent for any difficulties which may exist in the rules enacted by Parliament.”
“This is a step beyond the paradigm of a duty of care in the law of negligence. The paradigm is a duty by which the impleaded party is answerable only for his own acts or omissions. He is obliged to take care himself; not to see that others take care. But what is alleged here is “not merely a duty to take care, but a duty to provide that care is taken”: The Pass of Ballater[1942] P 112 , 117, per Langton J. The duty will thus be violated not only by want of care by the impleaded party, but also by his agents, whether they are his employees or independent contractors.”
“If the highway and hazard cases are put to one side, the remaining cases are characterised by the following defining features: (1) The claimant is a patient or a child, or for some other reason is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant against the risk of injury. Other examples are likely to be prisoners and residents in care homes. (2) There is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and the defendant, independent of the negligent act or omission itself, (i) which places the claimant in the actual custody, charge or care of the defendant, and (ii) from which it is possible to impute to the defendant the assumption of a positive duty to protect the claimant from harm, and not just a duty to refrain from conduct which will foreseeably damage the claimant. It is characteristic of such relationships that they involve an element of control over the claimant, which varies in intensity from one situation to another, but is clearly very substantial in the case of schoolchildren. (3) The claimant has no control over how the defendant chooses to perform those obligations, ie whether personally or through employees or through third parties. (4) The defendant has delegated to a third party some function which is an integral part of the positive duty which he has assumed towards the claimant; and the third party is exercising, for the purpose of the function thus delegated to him, the defendant's custody or care of the claimant and the element of control that goes with it. (5) The third party has been negligent not in some collateral respect but in the performance of the very function assumed by the defendant and delegated by the defendant to him.”
“he is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor in the ordinary way: except he delegates to the contractor the very duty which he himself has to fulfil. If it is his own duty which is not fulfilled, he cannot escape responsibility for negligence by saying that it was delegated to a contractor.”
“There is no difficulty in identifying a number of policy reasons that usually make it fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability on the employer when these criteria are satisfied: (i) the employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability; (ii) the tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of the employer; (iii) the employee's activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer; (iv) the employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity will have created the risk of the tort committed by the employee; (v) the employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the employer.”
“It is today well established that causation is in essence a question of fairness. Lord Justice Laws in his judgment in Rahman v Arearose Ltd[2001] QB 351 , §33, (cited with approval by Lord Bingham in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd[2002] UKHL 22 , §12) explained the issue as one of responsibility. In Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd[2009] EWCA Civ 1404 , §15, I said that a succession of consequences which in fact and in logic is infinite will be halted by the law when it becomes unfair to let it continue.”
"44. It appears to me that this phrase in the rules has to be interpreted purposively and contextually in the light of the context. This is, of course, the determination of whether the claimant is 'deserving', as Jackson LJ put it, of the protection (from the costs liability that would otherwise fall on him) extended, for reasons of social policy, by the QOCS rules. It appears to me that when one looks at the matter in that way, one sees that what the rules are doing is distinguishing between two levels of dishonesty: dishonesty in relation to the claim which is not fundamental so as to expose such a claimant to costs liability, and dishonesty which is fundamental, so as to give rise to costs liability. 45. The corollary term to 'fundamental' would be a word with some such meaning as 'incidental' or 'collateral'. Thus, a claimant should not be exposed to costs liability merely because he is shown to have been dishonest as to some collateral matter or perhaps as to some minor, self-contained head of damage. If, on the other hand, the dishonesty went to the root of either the whole of his claim or a substantial part of his claim, then it appears to me that it would be a fundamentally dishonest claim: a claim which depended as to a substantial or important part of itself upon dishonesty."
“62. In my judgment, a claimant should be found to be fundamentally dishonest within the meaning of s 57(1)(b) if the defendant proves on a balance of probabilities that the claimant has acted dishonestly in relation to the primary claim and/or a related claim (as defined in s 57(8) ), and that he has thus substantially affected the presentation of his case, either in respects of liability or quantum, in a way which potentially adversely affected the defendant in a significant way, judged in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of the litigation. Dishonesty is to be judged according to the test set out by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos Limited (t/a Crockfords Club) , supra. 63. By using the formulation 'substantially affects' I am intending to convey the same idea as the expressions 'going to the root' or 'going to the heart' of the claim. By potentially affecting the defendant's liability in a significant way 'in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of the litigation' I mean (for example) that a dishonest claim for special damages of£9000 in a claim worth£10 000 in its entirety should be judged to significantly affect the defendant's interests, notwithstanding that the defendant may be a multi-billion pound insurer to whom£9000 is a trivial sum.”
“….something more is required than the mere loss of damages to which the claimant is entitled to establish substantial injustice. Parliament has provided that the default position is that a fundamentally dishonest claimant should lose his damages in their entirety, even though ex hypothesi, by s 57(1), he is properly entitled to some damages. It would render superfluous s 57(3) if the mere loss of genuine damages could constitute substantial injustice.”
“6 Acts of public authorities. (1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.…” (1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.…”
“ARTICLE 3: Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
"7(5) Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of— (a )the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place; or (b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances, but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question."
“90 As the Court has held on many occasions,Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victims' behaviour. 91 However, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.”
“46 The Strasbourg cases consistently adopt the following approach in prison cases. Where treatment or conditions in prison generate more humiliation, distress or other suffering than is inherent in a prison sentence, in order to prove a violation of Article 3, it is necessary for a complainant to show that, in all of the circumstances, the treatment or conditions satisfy the minimum severity test. That test has a high threshold; although the fact that the complainant is vulnerable because in state detention will often be a significant factor so that, even if treatment would not be humiliating if endured outside prison, it may well be found to be humiliating and degrading if suffered in a prison context.… 52 In my view, the test with regard to minimum severity is an objective test, to be determined on the basis of all relevant circumstances, including the effects that the treatment or conditions are likely to have upon a person with the attributes of the victim. However, the definition of “degrading treatment” is focused on the effects on the victim; and, as the Strasbourg cases indicate, unless a claimant can show, by direct or inferential evidence, that the ill treatment in fact caused him serious suffering in terms of (e.g.) physical or psychiatric injury, or psychological harm or particularly serious evidenced distress, it will usually be difficult for him in practice to show that that objective test has been satisfied… He may be able to do so if, for example, (i) it can be inferred from the nature of his ill-treatment that he must have suffered distress or anguish of a sufficient level, or (ii) he suffered from a mental condition that meant that he could not fully appreciate his own suffering, or protect himself from it by (e.g.) pursuing a complaints procedure.”