“2. Work Covered. The goal of this project is a commercial deal by which (through your assignment of licensing of rights in relation to the Medics group of inventions) a medical products company is permitted to manufacture or sell products incorporating any Medics inventions. I am prepared to commit that all work which we do to that end is covered by this fee arrangement, and will be billed only on the contingency basis. … 3. Fees and Expenses. Save for disbursements (as described on the card, see below) we would only charge fees in the following circumstances (when, however, fees will be due immediately on invoice, not after a further 30 days as normal). The main circumstance is, naturally, your achievement (by whatever means and however long it takes) of the goal defined in the first paragraph of section 2 above. The only other circumstance is if for any reason you cease instructing us on the project prematurely. That might be through your choice or through your death or incapacity. In these circumstances we would lose contact with the project but, since your IP rights would still be of commercial value and no doubt would be commercialised in time, it would be unrealistic and unfair for us simply to forego our fee. If that circumstance arises we will be entitled to charge all work to date, at the contingency rate or, such be the case, at a rate scaled down from that to reflect immediate payment. That rate would however be at our discretion. Our profit fee would not be payable in any other circumstances. In recognition of our risk in commitment we will charge on the basis that my hourly rate is scaled up to£300 per hour, and the rate chargeable by other fee earners will be scaled up in the same proportion…”
“Under our fee agreement the success fee would then become due. Obviously that would put you in an impossible position since the agreement puts no funds in your hands at once, and quite possibly nothing for a year. In practice, you would, rather than put your head in that noose, simply refuse to sign the five year license agreement. I have long indicated that in this type of situation I would not expect Ford & Warren’s fee to fall due, and that when the time came I would need to write to you confirming that the agreement in question would not be regarded as a billable event. This is not that letter – just yet! Before I write to you in those terms I need to make arrangements with you which secure Ford & Warren’s position better in the long term. These arrangements we have already discussed in principle, but at a time when they were complicated by applying to Des as well, then further complicated by David Wilson’s input.”
“He was looking, as you know, to give some fairly substantial help towards the fee due from Medics to Ford & Warren anyway, so the premium would cover that contribution…we then have a chicken and egg problem, since we all want the license agreement signed up urgently, but until the funding is in place LNT Heartsmart Limited cannot usefully or meaningfully commit to the premium.”
“The present position is that you are personally liable for our legal fees on the project to date, on a success only basis. The creation of the proposed license agreement with LNT Heartsmart Limited would constitute “success” in the relevant sense, so triggering the entire fee. The amount of that fee is rising every day, of course. See below for more detail, but it will be over£250,000 excluding VAT. You cannot meet a fee demand of that scale immediately on the LNT Heartsmart Limited license being entered into, because the project will not by then have generated the wherewithal. In addition it is Medics Limited (as patent applicant) which is going to benefit from this license and it is right, in your own interest, that our primary client for billing purposes is now recognised as being Medics Limited, not yourself. Basically Ford & Warren is offering to meet both these requirements subject to its position being fully secured. That security starts with a debenture over the assets of Medics Limited, in other words basically the patent application. It also encompasses a promise that payment streams from LNT Heartsmart Limited will come through our client account, because fundamental to this whole arrangement is that Des Collett has sought to create a feasible situation from Ford & Warren’s point of view by incorporating a front end premium payment in the license agreement (provisionally to be£150,000 +VAT) the sole purpose of which is to enable Medics Limited to meet a proportion of our legal fee entitlement as soon as possible.”
“I am hopeful that Des might be available for signing of the option deed on 14 August but he has not yet confirmed. From your point of view, Ford & Warren’s fee entitlement must be squared off by then at the latest.”
“Given the circumstances are now different it seems not unreasonable to me that you should take a view on accepting that the payment of your Success Fees beyond the initial£150,000 will be dependant on the income generated by commercialisation. Ken [the claimant] should not have any risk that he can be left with both a failed commercialisation and an ongoing liability to you for the unpaid element of the Success Fees.”
“All parties agree to proceed on this basis and the documents were signed to be held over by Ford & Warren pending the signature of the documentation relating to Medics Limited taking over responsibility for Ford & Warren’s fee costs. This documentation would be signed once approval had been received from the managing partner at Ford & Warren that the documentation was acceptable.”
“I will not be signing the agreement between Medics Limited and Ford & Warren until I have taken further advice from Lee and Priestley.”
“…if they [LNT] want to throw ‘out the baby with the bath water’ then that is up to them. I will make sure with or without LNT HeartSmart will come to the marketplace, it will just take a little while longer.”
“My gut feeling is something went very wrong here of which I do not know of, but I will now find out why Ford & Warren and LNT Heartsmart did not complete that venture at some considerable cost to me I guess.”
“You raise some implication of underhand dealing in relation to the agreement with Mr. Collett. I do not follow the inference in connection with our signature of any deal. If by this you refer to it being necessary for us to waive our fees before the deal could go ahead then I would begin to understand. If that is your point, then my answer is simply that we had no obligation to waive our fees.”
“Succinctly, Mr. Hearn, you put your own and Ford & Warren’s interest before that of the client thereby sabotaging those agreements and a domino effect upon the contingency agreement I have with Ford & Warren.”
“You do need to remember, Ken, that I advised you right the way through the negotiation with Des that anything you negotiated would need clearance by Keith Hearn so as not to trigger an immediate large fee due to Ford & Warren, and that he was perfectly entitled to refuse that clearance if he saw fit.”
“You are entirely right to recall that the negotiation over the cash flow for payment of Ford & Warren’s fees was effectively with the new joint venture company which Des was setting up for the purpose, not with you. It could hardly have been otherwise: Des was where that cash had to come from. I negotiated the best deal for Ford & Warren that I could with Des, and to be fair I believe Des helped me as much as he could knowing that he only had a deal if Ford & Warren’s position could be squared off satisfactorily. I then took the deal to Keith Hearn, managing partner of Ford & Warren, for approval and made clear that I recommended it as the best outcome for the form in the circumstances. Keith Hearn turned it down, as he had a perfect right to do. My impression is that his mood was one of assuming that, whatever I had achieved for the firm, I could and should have tried harder. He was wrong in that, as subsequent events demonstrated – but I do think that was his privilege as managing partner. The deal with Des then collapsed as a direct result of Ford & Warren’s non approval…”
“32 Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake. (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4A) below, where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either – (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or (b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it… (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.” (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4A) below, where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either – (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or (b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it… (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.”
“In the absence of any intentional wrongdoing on his part, it is neither just nor consistent with the policy of the Limitation Acts to expose a professional man to a claim for negligence long after he has retired from practice and has ceased to be covered by indemnity insurance.”
“I agree that deliberate concealment for section 32(1)(b) purposes may be brought about by an act or an omission and that in, either case, the result of the act or omission i.e. the concealment, must be an intended result. But I do not agree that that renders subsection (2) otiose. A claimant who proposes to invoke section 32(1)(b) in order to defeat a Limitation Act defence must prove the facts necessary to bring the case within the paragraph. He can do so if he can show that some fact relevant to his right of action has been concealed from him either by a positive act of concealment or by a withholding of relevant information, but, in either case, with the intention of concealing the fact or facts in question. In many cases the requisite proof of intention might be quite difficult to provide. The standard of proof would be the usual balance of probabilities standard and inferences could of course be drawn from suitable primary facts but, nonetheless, proof of intention, particularly where an omission rather than a positive act is relied on, is often very difficult. Subsection (2), however, provides an alternative route. The claimant need not concentrate on the allegedly concealed facts but can instead concentrate on the commission of the breach of duty. If the claimant can show that the defendant knew he was committing a breach of duty, or intended to commit the breach of duty - I can discern no difference between the two formulations; each would constitute, in my opinion, a deliberate commission of the breach - then, if the circumstances are such that the claimant is unlikely to discover for some time that the breach of duty has been committed, the facts involved in the breach are taken to have been deliberately concealed for subsection (1)(b) purposes.”
“The question is not whether the plaintiffs should have discovered the fraud sooner; but whether they could with reasonable diligence have done so. The burden of proof is on them. They must establish that they could not have discovered the fraud without exceptional measures which they could not reasonably have been expected to take. In this context the length of the applicable period of limitation is irrelevant. In the course of argument May LJ observed that reasonable diligence must be measured against some standard, but that the six year limitation period did not provide the relevant standard. He suggested that the test was how a person carrying on a business of the relevant kind would act if he had adequate but not unlimited staff and resources and were motivated by a reasonable but not excessive sense of urgency. I respectfully agree.”
“18. The claimant’s instructions to the defendant (from which Mr. Jennings did not dissent) were to conclude the transaction by dating the Option and he understood from Mr. Jennings that all that remained for this to happen was for the defendant’s Managing Partner to approve the documentation substituting the second claimant [Medics Ltd] for the claimant and the Option would be dated and come into immediate effect. 19. Contrary to the claimant’s instructions to complete the transaction and date the Option, the Defendant failed to approve the documentation and failed to date the Option and complete the transaction. Moreover, the defendant failed to inform either claimant or LNTH that this was the case and the reasons therefore, which led to Mr. Collett to believe that the claimant had delayed completion of the transaction and the claimant to believe that delay was caused by LNTH. 20. As a result the Option was never dated, the transaction did not proceed and was lost. 21. The Option was not dated and the transaction was lost owing to the negligence and breaches of duty of the defendant.”
“If and to the extent that the defendant contends that any cause of action claimed in this claim is barred by reason of the provisions of theLimitation Act 1980 , the claimants will contend that (1) The facts relevant to the claimant’s right of action were deliberately concealed from the claimants until receipt of an email from Mr. Jennings on or about9 January 2009 , alternatively (2) That the ‘starting date’ for the purposes ofsection 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 is the date of receipt of the said email from Mr. Jennings on or about9 January 2009 .” (1) The facts relevant to the claimant’s right of action were deliberately concealed from the claimants until receipt of an email from Mr. Jennings on or about9 January 2009 , alternatively (2) That the ‘starting date’ for the purposes ofsection 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 is the date of receipt of the said email from Mr. Jennings on or about9 January 2009 .”