“(1) That, for the purpose of ingratiating himself with Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, the Claimant took extraordinary steps to ensure the attendance of his friend, EU Trade Commissioner Lord Mandelson, at a meeting between Oleg Deripaska and American aluminium executives which he must have known Lord Mandelson had no official reason for attending and which he must or ought to have foreseen would and did bring his friend’s public offices and personal integrity into disrepute and exposed him to accusations of conflict of interest. (2) That there were strong grounds to suspect that the Claimant had facilitated the attendance of EU Trade Commissioner Lord Mandelson at a meeting between Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and American aluminium executives so that Oleg Deripaska could close a£500 million deal by securing corrupt and improper disclosures and commitments concerning EU aluminium tariffs from Lord Mandelson.”
“(1) [Mr Rothschild] facilitated the attendance of Lord Mandelson at a dinner held at a Moscow restaurant for the purpose of closing a multimillion pound aluminium deal (‘the Alcoa deal’) in circumstances which foreseeably exposed Lord Mandelson to accusations of conflict of interest and which were liable to bring Lord Mandelson and his office into disrepute; (2) There are reasonable grounds for believing that Lord Mandelson, when EU Trade Commissioner, discussed aluminium tariffs with Mr Deripaska, in terms which would be open to criticism as inappropriate, before the closure of the Alcoa deal and that the Claimant facilitated that contact.”
“12.16 Sometimes the publication complained of by the claimant will contain a single allegation, which may be a specific allegation (eg ‘X stole a diamond ring last week’), or a general allegation (eg ‘X is a thief’). But in many cases, particularly where the complaint relates to a book or a newspaper article or a television programme, the allegations against the claimant may be numerous, and in these cases it will often be important to determine whether the allegations are separate or distinct or whether they convey a common sting. 12.17 One can therefore identify four categories of publications: (a) A publication containing a single specific allegation. (b) A publication containing a single general allegation. (c) A publication containing more than one allegation, but where the allegations have a common sting. (d) A publication containing more than one allegation, but where the allegations are separate and distinct. It … it will be appreciated that there is a large measure of overlap in the rules relating to the various categories. In every case, the court will be guided by having regard to what is required in the particular case.”
‘In my judgment it is particularly important in an action of this type that both sides should, if at all possible, be allowed to deploy their case as they wish. The Plaintiff seeks to vindicate his reputation. It would be a poor form of vindication if it were only obtained by half muzzling the other side.’
“The Plaintiff brings this action to vindicate his reputation, no doubt hoping that the jury will accept that he has been seriously libelled and award him damages appropriately. There must, I think, be a serious question as to how valuable vindication is if it is one against a Defendant who is not able to advance the defence he would wish.”
'We certainly didn't expect Mandelson at the dinner, and assumed it would just be folks from Rusal and Alcoa. '
“It is hard to believe that tariffs were not discussed”
“6.42.1 On29 January 2005 [Mr Rothschild] had attended a dinner in Davos hosted by Mr Munk. That dinner was also attended by Mr Deripaska, Lord Mandelson as well as … the Chairman of Alcoa. 6.42.2 At this dinner [Mr Rothschild], Mr Deripaska and Mr Munk discussed a potential joint venture into which they were contemplating entering and which was later to culminate in a joint bid made by their respective companies for Polymetal, a leading Russian gold producer. At the relevant time, the issue as to whether foreign owned companies should be allowed to compete for the rights to exploit the country’s strategic natural assets was a matter of considerable political sensitivity in Russia. 6.42.3 At the suggestion of Mr Deripaska, the parties to that joint venture agreed to continue their discussions in Russia the following day with a view to taking a site visit of industrial plants in Siberia which were relevant to that proposed deal. 6.42.4 [Mr Rothschild] invited Lord Mandelson to accompany the joint venture party on that trip. According to [Mr Rothschild]’s pleadings he did so because he knew that Lord Mandelson had not been to Siberia and was keen to see the area. In this regard: a. The decision to travel overnight from Moscow to Abakan in Siberia on30 January 2005 was made at short notice during the course of the Alcoa/Rusal dinner. When [Mr Rothschild] initially made his offer to Lord Mandelson at Davos the previous evening, the intention was for the joint venture party to fly to Siberia on the morning of 31 January. b. Abakan is 4 hours ahead of Moscow. A flight from Moscow to Abakan International Airport would normally last in the region of four hours (assuming good conditions en route). c. On31 January 2005 , the mean temperature in Abakan was recorded at -28.1 degrees centigrade. Temperatures dropped as low as -34 degrees centigrade. d. Sunset that day was at approximately 5.33 pm and there were less than 9 hours daylight in total. e. Lord Mandelson was required to be back in Brussels for a series of official engagements and meetings early in the morning of Tuesday1 February 2005 . [Mr Rothschild]’s private jet was designated to fly Lord Mandelson back to Brussels and was booked to leave Abakan at 5.15am local time on the morning of 1 February. The plane was scheduled to land at Brussels Airport at 6.51am local time… 6.42.5 Had [Mr Rothschild] kept to the itinerary that was anticipated when he first invited Lord Mandelson and had the joint venture party flown to Abakan on the morning31 January 2005 , Lord Mandelson’s supposed sight-seeing trip to Siberia would have taken place largely (and quite possibly entirely) in darkness, in extreme sub zero temperatures and would have barely lasted 12 hours in total. In the circumstances, there was no sensible reason for [Mr Rothschild] to invite Lord Mandelson to travel to Russia on30 January 2005 if the object of the trip was merely to afford him an opportunity to visit Siberia as a place of interest. 6.42.6 Further [Mr Rothschild] must have applied his mind to the transport arrangements and to where Lord Mandelson would stay in Siberia on a private trip arranged at such short notice in mid winter. In view of subsequent events (see below) it is to be inferred that the understanding was that Lord Mandelson would fly with the rest of the party from Moscow to Siberia on Mr Deripaska’s private jet, would stay at Mr Deripaska’s compound/chalet in a ski resort in Siberia with the rest of the party at Mr Deripaska’s expense and would be flown back to Brussels on [Mr Rothschild]’s jet or that of Mr Deripaska. As [Mr Rothschild] must also have known at this stage, Lord Mandelson would not be paying for the flights or the hospitality whose costs would be met by himself and/or Mr Deripaska. These were substantial benefits (in which context para 6.44 below is repeated). It is also to be inferred at this stage that when an overnight stay in Moscow was envisaged, that [Mr Rothschild] would have known that the hotel would have been of a high standard and that [Mr Rothschild] or Mr Deripaska would have paid that bill too. 6.42.7 [Mr Rothschild] must have known that it was unlikely that Lord Mandelson would have disclosed the fact of the trip or the details of the free travel and hospitality received precisely because it was compromising of his position. 6.43 On30 January 2005 [Mr Rothschild] and Lord Mandelson flew from Davos to Moscow in [Mr Rothschild]’s private jet. Lord Mandelson did not pay for the flight, which was funded directly or indirectly by [Mr Rothschild] and represented a substantial benefit to Lord Mandelson … 6.44 [Mr Rothschild] would or should have appreciated that in giving himself, and arranging for Mr Deripaska to give such favours to Lord Mandelson he was exposing Lord Mandelson to allegations of taking favours from [Mr Rothschild] and Mr Deripaska in the context of a private business trip and where Mr Deripaska’s business interests in particular (including Roussel) closely engage (and were likely to continue to engage) issues relating to EU trade policy. The trip was not made on EU business and was not paid for by the EU. Nor in consequence were any representatives of the EU present to record what Lord Mandelson did or said or to ensure transparency. Notwithstanding the fact that he met with a Russian government minister during the trip Lord Mandelson similarly failed to disclose either the fact or nature of the visit to two officials at the European Commission on his return to Brussels. 6.45 These actions by [Mr Rothschild] and the resulting favours exposed Lord Mandelson to the accusation that he was thereby beholden to [Mr Rothschild] and Mr Deripaska and Rusal. 6.46A By its very nature (see paragraph 50 below), [Mr Rothschild]’s decision to invite Lord Mandelson on a business trip to Russia was likely to involve Lord Mandelson being placed in situations pertaining to the commercial interest of Mr Deripaska and [Mr Rothschild] and thereby would expose him to accusations that he was beholden to or unduly close to or unfavourably predisposed to the commercial interests of Mr Deripaska (and those of his companies and business partners, including [Mr Rothschild]) in a way which conflicted with the objectivity and independence of commercial interests required of his role as EU trade commissioner. 6.46 Prior to leaving for Moscow Mr Deripaska was engaged by [Mr Rothschild] to arrange a private meeting between a Russian minister and Lord Mandelson which the latter had requested. Mr Deripaska arranged for the dinner to take place at the Cantinetta Antinori Restaurant. Lord Mandelson did not disclose the fact or nature of the dinner to the European Commission on his return to Brussels. The dinner was arranged without any reference to Lord Mandelson’s office. [Mr Rothschild] must have known that Mr Deripaska was keen to foster a relationship with Lord Mandelson … and it was at least likely that the dinner and the private room would be paid for by Mr Deripaska, having regard also to paragraph 6.47 below. 6.47 On the evening of30 January 2005 a “closing dinner” was held in Moscow in anticipation of the Alcoa deal’s completion. The dinner which was booked by Mr Deripaska, was held in a large private room on the first floor at the Cantinetta Antinori and was attended by Mr Deripaska together with others [including representatives of Alcoa] and Peter Munk, who had hosted the dinner in Davos the previous evening was also present. 6.48 On arrival in Moscow (if not before) [Mr Rothschild] was invited by Mr Deripaska to join the dinner referred to in paragraph 6.47. By then (if not before) [Mr Rothschild] knew that Mr Deripaska had arranged for Lord Mandelson to dine with a Russian minister at the same restaurant as his own party. [Mr Rothschild] went to the restaurant with Lord Mandeleson. 6.49 On arrival at the restaurant or if not before, [Mr Rothschild] knew that Mr Deripaska had booked a large private room at the Cantinetta Antinori for his own party and therefore that he had, or was likely to have guests with business interests connected with his own. [Mr Rothschild] took Lord Mandelson to the large private room (the Russian minister having not yet arrived) and introduced him to a party which essentially of those involved in the Alcoa-Rusal deal and those involved with the potential joint venture in Siberia (the unifying feature being Mr Deripaska’s private business interests). This was likely to give the impression that Lord Mandelson was well disposed towards Mr Deripaska and [Mr Rothschild] and their commercial interests, especially in the context of the favours given to Lord Mandelson in terms of travel and hospitality. All those present would have appreciated the obvious importance of EU trade policies generally, and EU aluminium tariff policies in particular, to Mr Deripaska’s commercial interests. 6.49A After Lord Mandelson had left the Alcoa dinner to take up his engagement with the Russian minister, [Mr Rothschild] and Mr Deripaska subsequently went downstairs to the room where that dinner was taking place and stayed with Lord Mandelson and the Russian minister for a period of some 15 minutes. 6.50 In bringing him to the dinner and then appearing with Mr Deripaska at Lord Mandelson’s meeting with the Russian minister, [Mr Rothschild] self-evidently exposed Lord Mandelson to the accusation that he was by his attendance favourably disposed to Mr Deripaska and his commercial interests, so compromising (or at the least putting at risk) Lord Mandelson’s independence as Commissioner and calling his integrity into serious question. That exposure was aggravated by the background of favour arising from the undeclared travel and hospitality (given and to be given) as pleaded above and below. 6.50 Following the conclusion of the Alcoa dinner [Mr Rothschild], Mr Deripaska, Mr Munk and Lord Mandelson travelled from Moscow to Siberia. As to this trip to Siberia: 6.50A.1 In fact, and as pleaded in paragraph 6.42.4(a) above during the course of the Alcoa/Rusal dinner on30 January 2005 a decision was taken by [Mr Rothschild], Mr Deripaska and Mr Munk to depart from Moscow that evening – i.e. after the conclusion of the dinner and after [Mr Rothschild], Mr Munk and Lord Mandelson had been allowed an opportunity to return to their hotel to gather their belongings. The reason for this decision was apparently to afford the joint venture parties sufficient daylight to inspect the relevant industrial plant. In this regard: a. The parties (including Lord Mandelson) flew from Moscow to Abakan International Airport in Mr Deripaska’s private jet. b. On arrival at Abakan Airport the parties immediately travelled to the industrial plant. This visit took up the majority of the day. It is to be inferred that Lord Mandelson also accompanied Mr Deripaska and Mr Munk on the site visit at the said plants, not least having regard to: the suddenness and ad hoc nature of these arrangements; Lord Mandelson’s status; the presence on that site visit of another person with no direct interest in the proposed joint venture (Mr Taylor); the matters pleaded in paragraph 6.50A(c) below; the adverse weather conditions in Siberia. c. The parties then travelled to Mr Deripaska’s Siberian compound/chalet where they spent the evening being entertained by Mr Deripaska. Lord Mandelson and Mr Munk stayed in the same chalet there, prior to Lord Mandelson having to leave sometime before the anticipated departure of [Mr Rothschild]’s private jet from Abakan at 5.15 am the following morning. Neither that flight, nor any of the hospitality which he received while in Siberia was declared by Lord Mandelson on his return to Brussels…” 6.50A.2 Accordingly [Mr Rothschild] invited Lord Mandelson on a business trip: a. The principle purpose of which was to allow [Mr Rothschild], his patron Mr Deripaska and latter’s business partner, Mr Munk, to inspect assets relevant to the viability of a major and politically sensitive venture; b. Which was organised, paid for and funded by Mr Deripaska, the owner of companies with substantial and continued interest in the EU market, and by a person closely associated with those interests ([Mr Rothschild]) and which necessarily involved Lord Mandelson accepting (and being seen to accept) substantial hospitality and travel benefits from Mr Deripaska and [Mr Rothschild] in the direct context of that proposed commercial venture; c. Which self-evidently conflicted with Lord Mandelson’s role as Trade Commissioner and which was accordingly likely to leave Lord Mandelson susceptible to the charge that he was favourably disposed or aligned to Mr Deripaska and the commercial interests of his company; d. Which hospitality and benefits by the same token Lord Mandelson was most unlikely to declare formally or otherwise publicly admit. 6.51 Against this background and, further, in light of: (1) the reality of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Mr Deripaska and the false statements which he made in October 2008 to the effect that his relationship with Mr Deripaska had commenced only in 2006 (as pleaded at paragraphs 6.19-6.25 above and which [Mr Rothschild] also would have known were false); (2) Lord Mandelson’s extraordinary evasiveness in October 2008 as to whether he had discussed aluminium tariffs with Mr Deripaska (paragraphs 6.33-6.34) and his failure to disclose the fact or nature of his visit to Russia between 30 January and1 February 2005 to the European Commission (paragraph 6.43, 6.44 and 6.50 A.1(c) above). (3) [Mr Rothschild]’s own conduct in seeking to divert political and media attention away from investigating the truth of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Mr Deripaska (paragraphs 6.26 – 6.32 above); (4) [Mr Rothschild]’s willingness on other occasions: to seek to acquire political influence on behalf of Mr Deripaska and his companies by means which [Mr Rothschild] knew to be insalubrious ( paragraph 6.32(c) above); To place Lord Mandelson in a situation where he was (or ran the risk of being seen to be beholden to Mr Deripaska) despite his awareness of Lord Mandelson’s role as Commissioner and the scrutiny his conduct was likely to attract as a result of his past conduct (paragraph 6.15 and 6.21 above), There exist reasonable grounds for believing that: a. Lord Mandelson did discuss aluminium tariffs with Mr Deripaska on the Russian trip in terms which are open to criticism as inappropriate; b. [Mr Rothschild] facilitated contact and encouraged an inappropriate relationship between Lord Mandelson and Mr Deripaska in the context of which those discussions could occur.” a. The decision to travel overnight from Moscow to Abakan in Siberia on30 January 2005 was made at short notice during the course of the Alcoa/Rusal dinner. When [Mr Rothschild] initially made his offer to Lord Mandelson at Davos the previous evening, the intention was for the joint venture party to fly to Siberia on the morning of 31 January. b. Abakan is 4 hours ahead of Moscow. A flight from Moscow to Abakan International Airport would normally last in the region of four hours (assuming good conditions en route). c. On31 January 2005 , the mean temperature in Abakan was recorded at -28.1 degrees centigrade. Temperatures dropped as low as -34 degrees centigrade. d. Sunset that day was at approximately 5.33 pm and there were less than 9 hours daylight in total. e. Lord Mandelson was required to be back in Brussels for a series of official engagements and meetings early in the morning of Tuesday1 February 2005 . [Mr Rothschild]’s private jet was designated to fly Lord Mandelson back to Brussels and was booked to leave Abakan at 5.15am local time on the morning of 1 February. The plane was scheduled to land at Brussels Airport at 6.51am local time… a. The parties (including Lord Mandelson) flew from Moscow to Abakan International Airport in Mr Deripaska’s private jet. b. On arrival at Abakan Airport the parties immediately travelled to the industrial plant. This visit took up the majority of the day. It is to be inferred that Lord Mandelson also accompanied Mr Deripaska and Mr Munk on the site visit at the said plants, not least having regard to: the suddenness and ad hoc nature of these arrangements; Lord Mandelson’s status; the presence on that site visit of another person with no direct interest in the proposed joint venture (Mr Taylor); the matters pleaded in paragraph 6.50A(c) below; the adverse weather conditions in Siberia. c. The parties then travelled to Mr Deripaska’s Siberian compound/chalet where they spent the evening being entertained by Mr Deripaska. Lord Mandelson and Mr Munk stayed in the same chalet there, prior to Lord Mandelson having to leave sometime before the anticipated departure of [Mr Rothschild]’s private jet from Abakan at 5.15 am the following morning. Neither that flight, nor any of the hospitality which he received while in Siberia was declared by Lord Mandelson on his return to Brussels…” a. The principle purpose of which was to allow [Mr Rothschild], his patron Mr Deripaska and latter’s business partner, Mr Munk, to inspect assets relevant to the viability of a major and politically sensitive venture; b. Which was organised, paid for and funded by Mr Deripaska, the owner of companies with substantial and continued interest in the EU market, and by a person closely associated with those interests ([Mr Rothschild]) and which necessarily involved Lord Mandelson accepting (and being seen to accept) substantial hospitality and travel benefits from Mr Deripaska and [Mr Rothschild] in the direct context of that proposed commercial venture; c. Which self-evidently conflicted with Lord Mandelson’s role as Trade Commissioner and which was accordingly likely to leave Lord Mandelson susceptible to the charge that he was favourably disposed or aligned to Mr Deripaska and the commercial interests of his company; d. Which hospitality and benefits by the same token Lord Mandelson was most unlikely to declare formally or otherwise publicly admit. (1) the reality of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Mr Deripaska and the false statements which he made in October 2008 to the effect that his relationship with Mr Deripaska had commenced only in 2006 (as pleaded at paragraphs 6.19-6.25 above and which [Mr Rothschild] also would have known were false); (2) Lord Mandelson’s extraordinary evasiveness in October 2008 as to whether he had discussed aluminium tariffs with Mr Deripaska (paragraphs 6.33-6.34) and his failure to disclose the fact or nature of his visit to Russia between 30 January and1 February 2005 to the European Commission (paragraph 6.43, 6.44 and 6.50 A.1(c) above). (3) [Mr Rothschild]’s own conduct in seeking to divert political and media attention away from investigating the truth of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Mr Deripaska (paragraphs 6.26 – 6.32 above); (4) [Mr Rothschild]’s willingness on other occasions: to seek to acquire political influence on behalf of Mr Deripaska and his companies by means which [Mr Rothschild] knew to be insalubrious ( paragraph 6.32(c) above); To place Lord Mandelson in a situation where he was (or ran the risk of being seen to be beholden to Mr Deripaska) despite his awareness of Lord Mandelson’s role as Commissioner and the scrutiny his conduct was likely to attract as a result of his past conduct (paragraph 6.15 and 6.21 above), There exist reasonable grounds for believing that: a. Lord Mandelson did discuss aluminium tariffs with Mr Deripaska on the Russian trip in terms which are open to criticism as inappropriate; b. [Mr Rothschild] facilitated contact and encouraged an inappropriate relationship between Lord Mandelson and Mr Deripaska in the context of which those discussions could occur.”
“….You have not really dealt with the facts in the article, or your clients position. Presumably therefore you accept the following matters are accurate statements: 2.1 Your client has over the past few years become a close friend and advisor of Mr Deripaska, who is also your clients patron. Although this was not reported in the article as it was not relevant, Mr Deripaska and your client have jointly invested in projects for example in Montenegro. Their connection has been recognised for a number of years. … 2.2 Your client is also a close friend of Lord Mandelson who at the time of the dinner was the European Union’s Trade Commissioner. 2.3 Your client is a businessman who does not hold high or, indeed, any public office. The rules under which your client and Mr Mandelson operate are therefore naturally very different. 2.4 Your client flew Lord Mandelson in his private jet to Moscow 2.5 The article notes that the trip was arranged with such speed that Lord Mandelson did not have a visa and one had to be arranged by a head of security of Rusal. 2.6 Your client attended the dinner in Moscow in January 2005 at the invitation of Mr Deripaska. 2.7 Your client invited Lord Mandelson to go to Cantinetta Antinori, knowing that the Rusal/Alcoa party and others were present. 2.8 The deal between Rusal and Alcoa was announced the day after the dinner. The Alcoa representatives were in Moscow to complete the deal and the dinner took place the following night to celebrate the completion. 3. However, although you ignore most of the contents of the article, you put forward two points which you say show that the sting (an artificial construct in itself) is false: 3.1 You make the point that Lord Mandelson was waiting for another meeting to begin. This rather misses the point. The central point is that he was there at all, but that is a matter for Lord Mandelson. You also overlook the fact that the article does not say that trade tariffs were discussed at the dinner at which Lord Mandelson was present… 4. Finally, you suggest that no attempt was made to check the facts. The same could be said in reply. A list of questions were put to Rusal, for whom your client is an advisor, on the day before publication. They offered no comment. Lord Mandelson was also given the opportunity to comment prior to publication. In these circumstances, unless you are able to shed more light on your complaint, your client’s demand for damages, and undertaking a statement in open court and an apology are not appropriate.”