Mohamed Amersi v BBC [2025] EWHC 1323 (KB)

[2025] EWHC 1323 (KB)Case No KB-2022-003244
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 30 May 2025
Before
MR JUSTICE JOHNSON
Between
Mohamed AmersiClaimantBritish Broadcasting CorporationDefendant
Justin Rushbrooke KC and Kate Wilson (instructed by Carter-Ruck) for ClaimantCatrin Evans KC, Jonathan Scherbel-Ball and Luke Browne (instructed by Bristows LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing date: 22 May 2025
Approved Judgment
[1]The claimant sues the defendant in libel in respect of publications which conveyed the meaning set out below, broadly that there were strong grounds to suspect his involvement in corrupt deals. The defendant advances a defence of truth. There are three linked applications before the court: an application to strike out individual passages in the truth defence, an application to amend the truth defence, and an application to require the claimant to provide further information.

The background

[2]The claimant was a businessman. In the 2000s and 2010s, he was involved in the telecommunications industry in emerging markets in ex-Soviet and Eurasian states. This included work undertaken between 2007 and 2013 with Telia, a large multinational Swedish-Finnish telecoms company. That work included, on the claimant’s account, scoping new strategic opportunities, advising on transactions and assisting in their execution. In 2012, Telia engaged Norton Rose Fulbright LLP (“NRF”) to undertake a review of some of its operations. In February 2013, Telia’s CEO resigned following allegations of corruption in respect of Telia’s operations in Uzbekistan. The claimant and Telia agreed not to continue working together on the same terms as previously.[3]On 4 October 2021, the defendant published on its website an article entitled “Pandora Papers: Tory donor Mohamed Amersi involved in telecoms corruption scandal.” On the same day it broadcast an episode of Panorama entitled “Pandora Papers: Political Donors Exposed.”[4]The claimant issued his claim on 3 October 2022. There has been an energetic exchange of correspondence, statements of case and requests for further information. HHJ Lewis determined that the publications, in their natural and ordinary meaning, convey the following meaning which is defamatory of the claimant at common law:
“There are strong grounds for suspecting that, during his work for Telia, Mr Amersi had been involved in deals on its behalf which he knew or ought to have known were corrupt, or involved corrupt payments”
[5]The defendant denies that the claimant has sustained serious harm and thus denies that the meaning is defamatory of him within the meaning of the Defamation Act 2013, section 1. It also advances defences of truth and public interest. The trial is listed to commence on 15 June 2026 with a provisional time estimate of 6 weeks.

The truth defence

[6]It is common ground that to succeed in the truth defence, the defendant must prove:(1) Specific Telia deals were corrupt or involved a corrupt payment.(2) The claimant was involved in those deals.(3) There are strong grounds to suspect that the claimant knew or ought to have known of the corruption.[7]The defendant’s truth defence is based on the claimant’s involvement in complex corporate telecoms transactions for Telia in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Nepal. It spans 99 paragraphs and 49 pages. The claimant’s pleaded reply is similarly extensive. The issues on the applications before the court primarily concern the pleaded (or proposed amended pleaded) truth defence in respect of events in Kazakhstan. It is common ground that, at the relevant time, “Kazakhstan was subject to an autocratic regime with political power and the central economy under the control of a small elite, principally President Nazarbayev…, his family and close associates.” The defendant contends that there was pervasive corruption, including in the telecoms sector; that Karim Massimov (who was at material times Prime Minister) was a close associate of President Nazarbayev; that Aigul Nuriyeva was a prominent trusted proxy of Karim Massimov; that she nominally held telecoms assets on behalf of Mr Massimov to conceal his ownership and that the claimant knew this; and that the claimant was engaged by Telia to combat state hostility and to secure advantages that would not otherwise be available, to lobby (amongst others) politically connected or influential persons and/or their middlemen (who the defendant describes as “politically exposed persons”) and to enter into deals with politically exposed persons to assist Telia. It refers to this as “the hostile environment strategy”. The defendant contends that it is to be inferred that these deals were corrupt, and there were strong grounds to suspect the claimant knew or ought to have known they were corrupt.[8]The grounds for that contention involve a number of interlinking strands. One concerns the alleged fact that Telia paid more than the market price for certain deals, to the benefit of Karim Massimov and/or Aigul Nuriyeva. Thus, in one deal, the purchase price paid by Telia for a company, at just over US$1.5 billion, is said to be 50% higher than a subsequent listing price for that company in a public offering. All of this is set out in the existing truth defence. The claimant does not seek to strike out any of these core allegations and does not oppose amendments to some of the detail.[9]The controversy surrounds some of the additional interlinking strands in the truth defence from which, the defendant says, corruption is to be inferred. Specifically, the defendant seeks to rely on what it says are instances of the claimant providing “lavish entertainment” for politically exposed persons, and entering into “back to back” contracts, and agreeing to provide “lobbying activities”. The claimant says that the pleaded (and proposed amended) case in these respects is defective, that certain components of the case should be struck out and that, so far as the defendant is seeking permission to amend to advance the case, that should be refused. For its part, the defendant seeks an order requiring the claimant to provide further information in respect of his pleaded reply to the truth defence. The legal framework Strike out / amendment

The legal framework

[10]Part of a defence may be struck out where it does not disclose reasonable grounds for defending the claim or it is an abuse of the court’s process or it is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings, or it fails to comply with a practice direction: CPR 3.4(1), (2)(a)-(c).[11]The defendant may amend its defence with the court’s permission: CPR 17.1(2)(b). In deciding whether to grant permission, the court applies a broad discretionary judgement in accordance with the overriding objective under CPR Part 1. If the proposed amendment would be liable to be struck out (for example if it does not disclose reasonable grounds for defending the claim or because it does not comply with a practice direction) then the court is unlikely to give permission.[12]To an extent, the application to amend and the application to strike out can be seen as opposite sides of the same coin. If a plea is good then it will survive an application to strike out and, everything else being equal, an amendment to advance the plea is likely to be permitted. If it is bad, then it is likely to be struck out and an amendment to advance the plea is likely to be refused. Sometimes, the position is not precisely symmetrical, particularly where an application to amend is made late in the proceedings. That is not the case here. The parties did not make substantive distinctions between the strike out and amendment applications, and they addressed the two applications compendiously. The underlying issues are whether the existing pleas, and the proposed amended pleas, are good or bad.

Plea of truth

[13]It is a complete defence to a libel claim to show that the defamatory imputation conveyed by the published statement is substantially true: Defamation Act 2013, section 2(1). Where the defamatory imputation is that there are reasonable grounds to suspect a claimant of misconduct, the defendant must prove the primary facts which give rise to such reasonable grounds: Feyziyev v Radu [2019] EWHC 3372 (QB) per Whipple J at [11]. The fact that a third party believes a claimant is guilty of misconduct is irrelevant: Shah v Standard Chartered Bank [1999] QB 241 at 269G-H.[14]A defence must be verified by a statement of truth: CPR 22.1(1)(a). The defendant may thus not rely on matters which it does not believe to be true. It follows that it may not rely on matters that are unsupported by any evidence: Clarke v Marlborough Fine Art (London) Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1731 per Patten J at [30].[15]A defendant relying on a truth defence must give details of the matters on which it relies: CPR PD 53B paragraph 4.3(2).[16]The obligation to particularise a plea of truth arises at the time of the defence – it is not open to a defendant to delay until after inspection of documents: Zierenberg v Labouchere [1893] 2 QB 183 per Lord Esher MR at 188 and Kay LJ at 189. A defendant can selectively rely on parts of a claimant’s case in support of a defence of truth: Rothschild v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 3462 (QB) per Tugendhat J at [46] – [48]. But a defendant cannot rely on a reply to an illegitimate defence in order to legitimise that defence by its own bootstraps: Miah v British Broadcasting Corporation [2018] EWHC 1054 (QB) per Warby J at [43].[17]The defendant may not plead allegations in support of a defence of truth unless they are relevant to and supportive of the defamatory meaning, or a reasonably necessary part of the narrative to that end: Hunt v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 110 (QB) per Eady J at [24].[18]A truth defence must be capable of establishing the truth of the defamatory meaning: Ashcroft v Foley [2012] EWCA Civ 423 [2012] EMLR 25 per Pill LJ and Sharp J at [49]. Where the defence is dependent on an inference, sufficient primary facts must be pleaded to support that inference, and those primary facts must be capable of proof: Hunt at [30].[19]The pleaded facts must enable the claimant to know the precise nature of the case against him, providing sufficient detail of what the claimant is alleged to have done to enable the claimant to meet that case: McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 3 All ER 755 per Lord Woolf at 793C, Ashcroft at [49]. That is the more so where the allegation is of corruption. In such a case, the claimant “is entitled to have the particularity of an indictment”: Hickinbotham v Leach (1842) 10 M&W 361, Zierenberg at 187 and 190, Wootton v Sievier [1913] 3 KB 499 per Kennedy LJ at 503, Ashcroft at [53].[20]There are, likewise, exacting requirements when alleging fraud or dishonesty: such an allegation must be explicitly made and sufficiently particularised, and particulars that are consistent with honesty are insufficient: Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Millett at [186]. The need for sufficient particulars does not impose a requirement for full and exhaustive details of every allegation. The courts adopt an approach of “cautious realism” to the level of detail required, applying “a measure of generosity in favour of a claimant”, recognising that a fraudster seeks to conceal their conduct so that the precise detail may lie within their exclusive knowledge: Persons Identified in Schedule 1 v Standard Chartered PLC [2024] EWCA Civ 674 [2024] 1 WLR 4589 per Newey LJ at [49], Nokia Corportation v AU Optronics Corporation [2012] EWHC 731 (Ch) per Sales J at [67].[21]Catrin Evans KC, for the defendant, submits that the “measure of generosity” that is recognised in the fraud cases applies to a truth defence which raises an allegation of corruption.[22]Justin Rushbrooke KC, for the claimant, submits that the fraud cases are different, they do not involve defamation proceedings, and they do not cut across the requirement for the “particularity of an indictment” when advancing an allegation of corruption in the context of a defence of truth. He says that Ashcroft directly concerns the requirements of a truth defence in defamation proceedings, and it is binding.[23]I disagree that there is a significant difference between the pleading requirements for a claimant in a fraud claim, and those for a defendant who seeks to defend, on the grounds of truth, a publication alleging fraud. Take a case where a person publishes a statement that they have been defrauded by another and brings a civil claim in fraud against that other person. The defendant denies the allegation and brings a claim in libel. The claimant advances a defence of truth to the libel claim. There is no reason why there should be any more exacting requirement for the particulars of the truth defence than for the direct allegation of fraud. It would be incoherent for the truth defence to be struck out and judgment entered for the libel claim, but for the claimant to succeed at trial on the fraud claim.[24]The decisions in Ashcroft and Standard Chartered and Nokia are not inconsistent, and they do not depend on the precise underlying cause of action. They all concern the details required when making a serious allegation such as dishonesty or fraud or corruption. A court can, on the one hand, insist on the “particularity of an indictment” whilst, on the other hand, also recognising that there is sometimes a limit to the detail that can be provided, particularly where the underlying alleged conduct took place in secret. An indictment for murder must allege sufficient facts to constitute that offence: the unlawful killing of another with intent to kill or cause really serious bodily harm. It is not always necessary to identify the victim, or the precise date of the offence, or the method of the killing. So too in the case of a defence of truth of a defamatory sting of corruption, it is necessary to plead sufficient facts to establish the allegation and to enable the claimant to know the case he has to meet, but that does not mean that every single detail of the corruption must be spelt out, particularly where (if the defendant’s case is well founded) that is likely to be in the sole knowledge of the claimant.

Requirement for further information

[25]The court may order a claimant to clarify any matter which is in dispute or give additional information in relation to any matter that is in dispute: CPR 18.1.[26]The defendant should first make a written request for the clarification or additional information: CPR PD 18 para 1.1.[27]That request must be concise and strictly confined to matters which are reasonably necessary and proportionate to enable the defendant to prepare its case or to understand the case it has to meet: CPR PD 18 para 1.2.[28]In deciding whether to order the claimant to respond, the court has regard to the overriding objective in CPR Part 1. That includes assessing the extent to which requiring a response will assist in narrowing the issues, saving costs or enabling the defendant to know the case it has to meet.

The application to strike out the defence and the application to amend the defence

[29]The claimant does not seek to strike out the truth defence. Nor does the defendant seek to amend its defence to introduce an entirely new, free-standing, defence of truth. Rather, the clamant seeks to strike out some of the detail of the existing truth defence (recognising, implicitly at least, that the remainder of the pleading is sufficient to advance a truth defence) and the defendant seeks to introduce some new particulars or detail of its existing truth defence. Allowing for some narrowing of the issues as a result of discussions between the parties, the residual arguments concern 5 separate parts of the proposed amended defence.[30]The principal arguments advanced by Mr Rushbrooke are that the pleading is insufficient to establish corruption, that it lacks adequate particulars of the allegations that are advanced, that it does not provide the “particulars of an indictment”, that it does not enable the claimant to know the case he has to meet, and that it impermissibly relies on the claimant’s response to what are, otherwise, illegitimate lines of defence.[31]In response, Ms Lewis submits that the pleaded case, if proved, is sufficient to establish the substantial truth of the publications, that it is sufficiently particularised to enable the claimant to know the case he has to meet, and that, insofar as it relies on statements made by the claimant, that is legitimate.

Lavish entertainment of politically exposed persons

[32]In support of its truth defence, the defendant pleads in its proposed amended defence:
“…the Claimant’s and Telia’s strategy of active relationship management… went beyond acceptable or conventional lobbying. It included lavish corporate entertainment of Kazakh PEPs which the Claimant set up and/or participated in. By way of example, according to the Claimant… over a period of over seven years this entertainment included attendance at football matches, fashion shows and other sporting and social events. One such event consisted of a single trackside Formula 1 weekend on which the Claimant incurred expenses of US$100,000. Between about 2008 and 2012 the cost of this entertainment exceeded US$1M. The Claimant did not provide Telia with receipts, or at least not after 2010, and claimed reimbursement of expenses in round figures… for between US$100,000 and US$200,000 [per month]. …As someone holding himself out as a competent professional advisor with specialist expertise in telecoms in the region, and also as a qualified corporate solicitor, the Claimant knew or should have known the law in this area and that dealing with, let alone lobbying through lavish entertainment of, PEPs presented a risk and perception of corruption including as to the company paying for any entertainment or other benefits. … In the context of (a) the anti-corruption laws referred to above, (b) the notoriously corrupt and kleptocratic nature of the business environment in Kazakhstan, as pleaded above, (c) the Claimant’s admission that foreign businesses knew there were (undefined) “challenges” in operating in Kazakhstan… (d) the retention of the Claimant by Telia in May 2010 with the aim of lobbying on its behalf and making relevant introductions to individuals and companies in Kazakhstan as part of its hostile environment strategy as pleaded above, (e) the targeting of PEPs being part of the hostile environment strategy as pleaded above, (f) the very substantial cost and regularity of the payments made for the purpose of such entertainment, and (g) the lack of or inadequacy of receipts produced by the Claimant for this lavish entertainment, it is to be inferred that the payments made by Telia for entertaining PEPs were corrupt and intended to incentivise them to assist Telia in avoiding and minimising hostile state attacks, and there are strong grounds to suspect the Claimant knew or should have known this.”
[33]Mr Rushbrooke says that this plea is both insufficient and lacking in adequate particulars. It is insufficient because it is incapable of establishing corruption. It is lacking in adequate particulars because it does not provide any information as to who was lavishly entertained, when they were lavishly entertained, the type of entertainment, or how much was expended. Further, it impermissibly relies on the claimant’s own account, and (as a request for further information from the claimant demonstrates) it is impermissibly dependent on the claimant providing further information to support the defendant’s case.[34]I reject each of these objections. The plea is not advanced as the sole basis for the truth defence, nor is it a self-contained basis for the truth defence. It is one component of a wider and more complex truth defence. It must be seen in that context. That means that it is not necessary for the defendant’s plea of lavish entertainment to be sufficient, in itself, to establish corruption. What matters is whether the overall plea of truth is sufficient to establish that defence, and whether the plea of lavish entertainment is relevant to, and supportive of, that overall defence.[35]The claimant implicitly accepts (and I would anyway find) that the overall plea is sufficient: if the facts set out in the defence are established then it necessarily follows that(1) specific Telia deals were corrupt or involved a corrupt payment,(2) the claimant was involved in those deals, and(3) there are strong grounds to suspect that the claimant knew or ought to have known of the corruption. The plea of lavish entertainment is relevant to and supportive of the defence of truth given that, on the defendant’s case, that entertainment was provided in the context that the defendant sets out, including that the payments for the entertainment were corruptly made to incentivise politically exposed persons to assist Telia.[36]The plea provides information as to who was lavishly entertained: it says that the recipients of the entertainment were Kazakh politically exposed persons who are defined in the pleading as “politically connected or influential persons, and/or their middlemen”. That is enough to enable the claimant to know the case he has to meet, even if the defendant is unable to name specific individuals. The same applies to the question of when the lavish entertainment took place, the type of entertainment, and how much expenditure was incurred: the defendant sets out its case with sufficient clarity by reference to exemplar specific events and specific periods of time. There is also sufficient detail as to the link to corruption. Aside from how it fits within the overall truth defence there is the amount of money involved, the lack of receipts, and the rounded amounts of the expense claims.[37]The claimant is right that the pleaded case on lavish entertainment (or at least much of its detail) is taken from what was said in a letter written by the claimant’s solicitors on 18 March 2022. That is not objectionable. It is not a “bootstraps” case of the defendant relying on the claimant’s response to a plea that would otherwise be unsustainable. It is, instead, relying on something that was said even before proceedings had been issued which is capable of lending further support to what is, anyway, a sufficient plea of truth. Nor is it dependent on the claimant providing further information. Adequate detail is given on the face of the pleading without requiring further information from the claimant. The question of whether further information should be ordered is separate and is the subject of a separate application.[38]In respect of this aspect of the case I therefore refuse the claimant’s application to strike out, and I grant the defendant’s application to amend.

Lobbying

[39]The defendant seeks permission to amend the defence to plead that the claimant entered into lucrative consultancy agreements to engage in lobbying of persons and companies:
“In this regard, the Defendant will refer to retainers entered into by the Claimant… with Telia on dates between May 2010 and February 2012. Under the first retainer dated 4 May 2010 (and the second dated 1 July 2011) the Claimant was hired (among other things) to engage in lobbying in Kazakhstan on Telia’s behalf in order to avoid “misperceptions about and manage the process of taking possible necessary actions and procedures in relation to various operational and M&A activities”
. Within the scope of that agreement the Claimant was required to introduce Telia to “related people and organisations”. At approximately the same time as the Claimant and Telia agreed the 4 May 2010 retainer for lobbying services to avoid “misperceptions”, according to the Claimant the then Kazakhstan telecoms minister (who was appointed to his position in March 2010) was putting Telia under… pressure… The Defendant will contend that the coinciding of these two events cannot have been by mere chance and that the expectation of lobbying activities by the Claimant within the retainers supports the existence of the hostile environment strategy and the Claimant’s lead role in it.”[40]The claimant says that permission to amend should be refused, because it is wholly unclear as to whether it is being said that the claimant was actually engaged in lobbying of a corrupt nature, or whether the defendant is just relying on the retainer to provide lobbying services.[41]I do not agree. The defendant does not seek to defend the truth of the publications simply on the basis of a contention that the claimant was involved in corrupt lobbying. Rather, its broader truth defence relies on a context of state-hostility and Telia’s strategic response, which, it says, involved Telia entering into corrupt deals. As part of its case on a hostile state environment, it seeks to amend its defence to include an allegation that the claimant was retained in a lobbying role to assist Telia to operate in that context. That allegation is relevant to, and is capable of supporting, the broader truth defence, even though it does not itself establish any form of corruption. That this was the intention behind the plea was confirmed by Ms Evans in the course of submissions. Mr Rushbrooke responded that, on this basis, “the problem goes away”.[42]I therefore grant the defendant permission to amend in respect of this aspect of the defence.

Payment to Ms Nuriyeva of US$135,000

[43]The defendant’s existing case involves allegations about the use of “back-to-back contracts”. These are alleged instances of Telia paying money to a company founded by the claimant, “ETV”, and ETV then entering into a separate agreement for the same amount with a third party who would receive the money paid by Telia. Ms Evans emphasises 5 features of the existing case on “back-to-back contracts.” First, there are at least 4 such contracts, with a total value of US$4.2M. Second, one of the contracts relates to radio spectrum frequency licences and involves a payment of US$135,000. Third, the invoice issued by the claimant for this payment is described as “special” and Telia asked for it to be reissued in “more neutral” terms. Fourth, there is no apparent legitimate reason for the arrangements to be structured in this “back-to-back” manner. Fifth, an inference of corruption can be drawn.[44]The proposed amendment concerns the US$135,000 payment to ETV. The defendant says that the claimant paid Ms Nuriyeva the same sum, US$135,000 “on behalf of Telia for her costs incurred in respect of assistance resolving a dispute.” It states:
“…it is to be inferred that it was… a corrupt payment by Telia in that it was intended to incentivise Nuriyeva to provide Telia with the assistance it sought in regard to the dispute over frequency licences, and there are strong grounds to suspect the Claimant knew or ought to have known that it was corrupt.”
[45]The defendant provides extensive particulars for its contention that the claimant knew or ought to have known that the payment was corrupt. These include a contention that his explanation for the payment is lacking in credibility.[46]Mr Rushbrooke objects to this amendment on the ground that it is not sufficient to sustain an allegation of corruption. MsNuriyeva was a shareholder in the company and was able to help to solve problems without recourse to litigation; that does not arguably amount to corruption. Mr Rushbrooke also submits the amendment falls far short of the “particularity of an indictment.” In particular, it does not explain how the alleged corruption worked. It is also incoherent because it relies, in part, on cherry-picked parts of the claimant’s pleaded case which are taken out of context, but the defendant also “not admits” that case. It also impermissibly relies on what the claimant said in the course of the NRF review, and in response to the draft NRF review report, but some of the detail of what the claimant said was plainly incorrect.[47]The claimant’s objection does not sufficiently account for the complexity and detail of the defendant’s case. The truth defence is not simply based on the fact of a payment to MsNuriyeva for help to resolve a problem. It is based on a constellation of features, many of which are set out in the unamended case, from which the defendant says that corruption can be inferred. The draft amendment forms part of a coherent whole which provides a sufficient basis for advancing a defence of truth.[48]This is, moreover, an instance where the claimant overstates the Ashcroft requirement of pleading a case with the “particularity of an indictment.” It is not necessary for the defendant to plead precisely how the corruption worked. The existing pleaded case is sufficient to sustain a defence of truth. The proposed amendment adds additional detail. It provides sufficient information for the claimant to know the case he has to meet: it identifies the precise payment that is alleged to be corrupt.[49]The defendant is entitled to rely on what the claimant himself has said. It is not a “bootstraps” case where reliance is being placed on a response to an allegation that would otherwise be unsustainable. Whether or not some of the details of the claimant’s response to the NRF review are incorrect will be a matter for trial. It will be for the defendant to prove its case at trial, and it will not be able to do so simply on NRF’s conclusions in its draft report. It will have to prove its case for itself, but that does not mean that permission to amend should be refused.

Deals structured to incentivise politically exposed persons to support Telia’s business

[50]The defendant pleads that the deals on which it relies:
“served no proper or minimal operational need for Telia and/or were structured to incentivise PEPs, whom it is inferred were Nuriyeva and/or Massimov, to use their influence to protect and support Telia’s business in Kazakhstan. Accordingly, and in the circumstances pleaded below, it is to be inferred this was a corrupt purpose. Some of the Claimant’s negotiations were conducted with Nuriyeva as she was a substantial shareholder in companies involved in all three deals. In this regard, the Defendant will also rely on the Claimant’s statement to Tom Burgis that the negotiation of these deals lasted eighteen months and this included negotiating with “the political establishment”.”
[51]The claimant seeks to strike out the words “and/or were structured to incentivise PEPs, whom it is inferred were Nuriyeva and/or Massimov, to use their influence to protect and support Telia’s business in Kazakhstan.” Mr Rushbrooke submits that it is ambiguous as to what is being alleged. Even on its own terms, the pleading is no more than an inchoate allegation of corruption. There is a pregnant implication of an allegation that Ms Nuriyeva and/or Mr Massimov used their influence in some corrupt way, but unless this is spelt out the current pleading cannot stand.[52]Ms Evans submits that the defence is sufficiently pleaded for the claimant to know the case he has to meet, and that as the fraud cases show it is not necessary to plead every detail of the alleged corrupt relationships – that would be unrealistic, and the claimant is setting the bar too high.[53]Here, too, I accept the defendant’s argument. The claimant’s approach again reads too much into the Ashcroft requirement to plead the case with the particularity of an indictment. The pleaded case sets out the defendant’s case in a way that is sufficient to establish the truth defence and to enable the claimant to know the case he has to meet. The specific deals on which the defendant relies are identified. The manner in which politically exposed persons (whom the defendant infers were Ms Nuriyeva and/or Mr Massimov) were corrupted is explained, and the influence alleged to have been brought to bear by them is also explained, namely that they assisted Telia to deal with the hostile state environment.

Termination of the claimant’s relationship with Telia

[54]The penultimate section of the pleaded truth defence (before a conclusory section) concerns the termination of the claimant’s relationship with Telia. It alleges that the NRF review made serious criticisms of the claimant’s work and recommended that Telia terminate its relationship with the claimant.[55]Mr Rushbrooke submits that this is not relevant to, or supportive of, the truth defence. The defendant must prove the underlying facts – it is not sufficient or relevant to prove NRF’s account of the underlying facts. The pleaded case in this respect simply introduces prejudice and necessitates an extensive factual response to rebut allegations that are not properly made.[56]Ms Evans responds that the plea is helpful narrative which explains how the relationship came to an end. That is relevant because if he was dismissed as a result of NRF’s findings then that is potentially relevant to the question of the level of the claimant’s involvement in the underlying events. The concern about prejudice is misplaced because the trial will be heard by a judge sitting alone.[57]On this issue, I accept Mr Rushbrooke’s submissions. The question of whether the claimant was dismissed because of the NRF review is not directly relevant to the issue of whether the defamatory meaning is substantially true. That must be proved by the defendant on the basis of primary facts, rather than on the basis of NRF’s views of the primary facts, or Telia’s reaction to NRF’s articulation of its views. Nor do I accept that the plea amounts to narrative that is reasonably necessary in the context of the truth defence or sufficiently connected to that defence. It is likely to generate additional unnecessary satellite argument, distracting from the focus of the case and unnecessarily increasing the costs.[58]I strike out this part of the defence pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a)-(c). That is because the plea does not provide reasonable grounds for advancing the truth defence, it is vexatious, and it does not give details of matters on which the defendant may permissibly rely in support of its truth defence.

The application for further information

[59]On 9 December 2024, the defendant served on the claimant a request for further information in respect of the defendant’s pleaded reply. There were 78 requests. The claimant submitted a 40 page response, supported by a statement of truth, on 7 February 2025.[60]Jonathan Scherbel-Ball, who argued this application on behalf of the defendant, contends that the response to 13 of the requests is inadequate and inconsistent with the “cards on the table” approach that the civil procedure rules require. He seeks an order that the claimant provide responses to these 13 requests, or else that they are addressed in the amended reply which will necessarily follow service of an amended defence.[61]Kate Wilson, for the claimant, submits that it is neither reasonably necessary nor proportionate to require the claimant to answer the outstanding requests. The claimant’s pleaded case is set out in the Reply. That explains which of the defendant’s allegations in support of its truth defence are denied, and why. The defendant knows the case it has to meet. The requests amount to an attempt to secure information that might bolster the defendant’s case, rather than to narrow the issues or enable the defendant to know the case it has to meet.[62]The requests can be divided into three categories: the challenges faced by Telia in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the agreed entertainment terms, and the payment to Ms Nuriyeva of US$135,000.

The challenges faced by Telia in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan

[63]One of the overarching contextual features pleaded by the defendant in support of its truth defence is that Telia was operating in a prevailing environment in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan where corruption was common. The claimant’s pleaded response is to admit that there were challenges, but to deny that it was impossible for foreign companies to operate lawfully under the prevailing applicable law, or that the claimant knew or believed that to be the case.[64]The defendant seeks further information in respect of the claimant’s admission that there were “challenges”, and, in particular seeks an order requiring the claimant to specify the challenges that were faced, the periods when they were faced, and the challenges which businesses generally knew about.[65]It may be observed that the defendant is here seeking further information about an admission that the claimant has made. Insofar as that admission is lacking in specificity, it might be said that the underlying allegation made by the defendant is itself lacking in specificity. Given the contextual scene-setting nature of the allegation, that is understandable. It would likely be impracticable to require either party to particularise every challenge faced by a business operating in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. The parties’ respective positions as to the general nature of the prevailing environment is clear enough. Requiring further specificity would likely increase costs and the prolixity of the statements of case, to no proportionate litigation purpose.[66]I therefore refuse the application to order further information in respect of these requests.

The agreed entertainment terms

[67]The claimant’s response to the defendant’s allegation that he engaged in lavish entertainment of politically exposed persons is to state that “all entertainment was in accordance with terms agreed with Telia.” The defendant asks for details of these terms. That is a reasonable request to enable the defendant to know the case it has to meet. The allegation of lavish entertainment is an important part of the defendant’s defence of truth. The claimant has made a specific positive averment as to the entertainment, but it is not clear what that means in practice. In order to know what it means in practice, it is necessary to know something about the terms. It is not disproportionate to require an answer, and that is likely to assist in defining and narrowing the issues between the parties and therefore in saving costs. I will order the claimant to answer this request.

The payment to Ms Nuriyeva of US$135,000

[68]The remaining requests concern the payment to Ms Nuriyeva of US$135,000. That is a significant part of the amendment application, which I have granted. The defendant will need to file an amended defence in line with the order I make on the amendment application. The claimant will then need to reply to that amended defence. In doing so, the claimant will need to provide adequate particulars. In principle, that includes providing adequate particulars of any case that he advances in respect of the alleged payment to Ms Nuriyeva of US$135,000. It is, however, premature to rule on the requests for further information in this respect. That will have to await the exchange of further statements of case.

Outcome

[69]The paragraphs of the defence which address the termination of the claimant’s engagement with Telia will be struck out. Otherwise, the application to strike out parts of the defence is refused. The application to amend the defence is granted.[70]The claimant must give further information as to the terms that were agreed with Telia in respect of entertainment. Otherwise, the application to order the claimant to provide further information is refused.