“43Occupied hereditaments liability (1) A person (the ratepayer) shall as regards a hereditament be subject to a non-domestic rate in respect of a chargeable financial year if the following conditions are fulfilled in respect of any day in the year— (a) on the day the ratepayer is in occupation of all or part of the hereditament, and (b) the hereditament is shown for the day in a local non-domestic rating list in force for the year.”
“4(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations containing rules for the calculation of an amount for a chargeable financial year in relation to each billing authority (to be called its non domestic rating contribution for the year). (2) The Rules shall be so framed that the amount calculated under them in relation to an authority is broadly the same as the total which, if the authority acted diligently, would be payable to it in respect of the year under Sections 43 and 45 above.”
“Schedule 9 below (which contains provisions about administration, including collection and recovery) shall have effect.”
“(e) that the payee must serve a notice or notices on the ratepayer stating the amount payable or its estimated amount and what payment or payments he is required to make (by way of instalment or otherwise), (f) that no payment on account of the amount payable need be made unless a notice requires it, (g) that a notice and any requirement in it is to be treated as invalid if it contains prescribed matters or fails to contain other prescribed matters or is not in a prescribed form.”
“(g) that a notice must be in a prescribed form, (ga) that a notice must contain prescribed matters, (gb) that a notice must not contain other prescribed matters, (gc) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (g) or (ga) above, and the circumstances are such as may be prescribed, a requirement contained in the notice by virtue of regulations under paragraph (e) or (f) above shall nevertheless have effect as if the notice were valid, (gd) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (g) above, and a requirement has effect by virtue of regulations under paragraph (gc) above, the payee must take prescribed steps to issue to the ratepayer a document in the form which the notice would have taken had it complied with regulations under paragraph (g) above, (ge) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (ga) above, and a requirement has effect by virtue of regulations under paragraph (gc) above, the payee must take prescribed steps to inform the ratepayer of such of the matters prescribed under paragraph (ga) above as were not contained in the notice.” (ga) that a notice must contain prescribed matters, (gb) that a notice must not contain other prescribed matters, (gc) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (g) or (ga) above, and the circumstances are such as may be prescribed, a requirement contained in the notice by virtue of regulations under paragraph (e) or (f) above shall nevertheless have effect as if the notice were valid, (gd) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (g) above, and a requirement has effect by virtue of regulations under paragraph (gc) above, the payee must take prescribed steps to issue to the ratepayer a document in the form which the notice would have taken had it complied with regulations under paragraph (g) above, (ge) that where a notice is invalid because it does not comply with regulations under paragraph (ga) above, and a requirement has effect by virtue of regulations under paragraph (gc) above, the payee must take prescribed steps to inform the ratepayer of such of the matters prescribed under paragraph (ga) above as were not contained in the notice.”
‘A list must be maintained for as long as is necessary for the purposes of this Part, so that the expiry of the five year period for which it is in force does not detract from the duty to maintain it.’
“I should mention that the Magistrates noted that they did not need to decide whether the requirement imposed by Regulation 5(1) was mandatory. Counsel for the billing authority has not advanced any argument seeking to limit the consequences of there being a breach of Regulation 5(1). That does not surprise me. Regulation 5(1) contains a balance between the interests of the ratepayers and the practicalities of administration. Parliament must have intended that if the billing authority has not complied with the requirement it would be wrong in principle for the ratepayer to have an obligation thereafter to pay.”
“The statutory duty is imposed at least in substantial part for the protection of those from whom the billing authority may seek payment of council tax. The notice is required to enable the recipient to know that a claim may be made for payment and accordingly to take immediate steps to prepare and assemble any necessary evidence to establish that there is not a duty to pay … and to arrange his finances to make payment.”
“23. In my judgment, and subject to observations which I shall make shortly on the other authorities, that approach of focussing intently on the consequence of non-compliance, and posing the question, taking into account those consequences, whether Parliament intended the outcome to be total invalidity, should inform and govern the analysis in this case.”
“31. I turn to consider the time limit in the present case under the Regulations. It is not a fixed time. … It is governed by considerations of practicability. The ratepayer himself will not know, and will in the ordinary case have no means of finding out, what those considerations of practicability are. He will not know the internal workings of the rating authority, its manpower, its funding or its organisation. 32. It would, in my judgment, be highly unsatisfactory for the citizen's liability to pay a tax, or not to pay it, to depend on the administrative details of the organisation of the rating authority in circumstances where the citizen himself cannot find out what the position is. 33. Mr. Hamlin for the appellant in this case has sought to persuade me that seriousness of the breach in this case, as it was characterised by the District Judge, could allow the court to take a serious view. A demand served equally late, but for a less egregious reason, might not, he submits, have disentitled the authority from collecting the rates. I reject this approach. The authority here is seeking to rely on a late notice; it is not seeking to rely on the earlier notices, which were wholly defective. 34. The District Judge described reliance on those notices as having been disgraceful, but that description cannot fairly be attached to the notices on which the authority seeks now to rely. 35. Very importantly, particularly, in my judgment, in the light of Soneji, there is no prejudice alleged or found. The appellant knew, on receipt of the original but defective notices, the amount of money which was being demanded. It is true that the appellant could not check the amount in respect of the period with which we are now concerned, because certain calculation information was missing from the document and that was a breach of the Regulations, but insofar as it is appropriate to look at the later 2003 Regulations at all, they indicate that it was not Parliament's intention that absence of information by itself should allow a ratepayer to escape liability, at any rate in circumstances where the absence of information was due to a mistake. 36. I emphasise that this is a case where the ratepayer claimed and suffered no prejudice from late service of the notice. In a case where there is prejudice, the position may be different. Like Walker J in Hardy and Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council[2006] EWHC (Admin) 1928 , I am prepared to assume, without in any way deciding, that a Magistrates' Court which is invited to make a liability order may be entitled to refuse to make such an order in a case where there has been a serious breach of the mandatory provisions of the Collection Regulations which has caused prejudice to the ratepayer. 37. It may also be possible to envisage a case where the decision of a rating authority to proceed with enforcement may, in the light of its own breaches of the Regulations, and consequent prejudice to the ratepayer, be so unfair as to call for the intervention of the court on judicial review.”
“First of all, there is the importance of the requirement. Some requirements are so important that absence of prejudice resulting from non-compliance is irrelevant. Secondly, the courts do consider whether the statutory requirement or purpose could be fulfilled by substantial compliance. If not, then the requirement may well be taken to be mandatory. Thirdly, regard should be had to the consequences of non-compliance. Fourthly, the issue is often determined in practice in the context of the facts of a specific case. Particularly helpful guidance was given in relation to this area by Lord Woolf MR in R v Home Secretary ex parte Jeyeanthan[2000] 1 WLR 354 , 358-362. The starting point is that where the word "shall" is used "the requirement is never intended to be optional" (see page 358G).”
“ … indicates that Parliament expected that substantial compliance should be achieved, and therefore that the presence or absence of any prejudice to the ratepayer caused by a period of “delay” should be capable of being a relevant consideration.”
“45. As a result of considering these arguments for and against the proposition that the effect of regulation 5(1) is mandatory or absolute, I conclude that it is not. Instead, it is necessary to consider whether there has been substantial compliance with the regulation and its objectives. That includes consideration of the question whether the ratepayer has suffered prejudice by any particular delay which could qualify as a failure to serve a demand notice as soon as practicable. That was the approach taken by Lightman J in the Regentford Limited case in relation to very similar wording dealing with the recovery of Council Tax. There has been no indication -- certainly none that has been referred to in this court -- that his decision has given rise to any practical difficulties in the implementation of the Council Tax legislation. In my view, on a proper reading of the legislation the same basic approach to this question should be taken when construing or applying regulation 5(1). “45. As a result of considering these arguments for and against the proposition that the effect of regulation 5(1) is mandatory or absolute, I conclude that it is not. Instead, it is necessary to consider whether there has been substantial compliance with the regulation and its objectives. That includes consideration of the question whether the ratepayer has suffered prejudice by any particular delay which could qualify as a failure to serve a demand notice as soon as practicable. That was the approach taken by Lightman J in the Regentford Limited case in relation to very similar wording dealing with the recovery of Council Tax. There has been no indication -- certainly none that has been referred to in this court -- that his decision has given rise to any practical difficulties in the implementation of the Council Tax legislation. In my view, on a proper reading of the legislation the same basic approach to this question should be taken when construing or applying regulation 5(1). 46. In summary, the Magistrates' Court needs to consider whether there has been substantial compliance with regulation 5(1) and its objectives which include the matters I have set out above (in paragraphs 43 and 44) and the issue of whether the time which has elapsed has resulted in procedural or substantive prejudice for the ratepayer. If the billing authority substantially complies with regulation 5(1) so that, for example, no significant prejudice is caused to the ratepayer, the ratepayer becomes liable to pay the sum demanded upon the service of the notice and in due course a liability order may be sought. 47. I would not want it to be thought, however, that that conclusion provides some sort of charter or licence for local authorities not to take seriously their duty to serve demand notices in accordance with regulation 5(1) as soon as is practicable. The context for this regulation remains one of the imposition of taxes and considerable importance is to be attached to that duty. However, it does seem to me that in circumstances where a particular delay has caused no prejudice whatsoever to the ratepayer concerned, if that be the case, then it would be wrong to hold that that was a matter which was incapable of being taken into account. 48. I do not think I should attempt to go into the matter in any further detail because, as the judgment of Lord Woolf in the Jeyeanthan case emphasises, the conclusion which is to be reached by a particular court will be fact specific. It may just, however, be helpful to say this. The longer the delay that is involved in the serving of a demand notice then the greater the risk that a ratepayer will be able to show prejudice. It seems to me that Parliament has legislated in such a way that that is a matter the court should be able to take into account and it is then a matter for the judgment of the court at first instance.”
“The real question in all these cases is this: A thing has been ordered by the legislature to be done. What is the consequence if it is not done? … There may be many provisions in Acts of Parliament which, although there are not strictly observed, yet do not appear to the court to be of that material importance to the subject matter to which they refer, as that the legislature could have intended that the non-observance of them should be followed by a total failure … On the other hand, there are some provisions in respect of which the court would take the opposite view… I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory.” (210-211) A similar approach was adopted by Lord Hailsham in London & Clydesdale Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council[1980] 1 WLR 182 when he said at 189-190: “When Parliament lays down a statutory requirement for the exercise of legal authority it expects its authority to be obeyed down to the minutest detail. But what the courts have to decide in a particular case is the legal consequence of non-compliance on the rights of the subject viewed in the light of the concrete state of facts and continuing chain of events. It may be that what the courts are faced with is not so much a stark choice of alternatives but a spectrum of possibilities in which one compartment or description fades gradually into another. At one end of this spectrum there may be cases in which a fundamental obligation may have been so outrageously and flagrantly ignored or defied that the subject may safely ignore what has been done and treat it as having no legal consequences upon himself. In such a case if the defaulting authority seeks to rely on its action it may be that the subject is entitled to use the defect in procedure simply as a shield or defence without having taken any positive action of his own. At the other end of the spectrum the defect in procedure may be so nugatory or trivial that the authority can safely proceed without remedial action, confident that, if the subject is so misguided as to rely on the fault, the courts will decline to listen to his complaint. But in a very great number of cases, it may be in a majority of them, it may be necessary for a subject, in order to safeguard himself, to go to the court for declaration of his rights, the grant of which may well be discretionary, and by the like token it may be wise for an authority (as it certainly would have been here) to do everything in its power to remedy the fault in its procedure so as not to deprive the subject of his due or themselves of their power to act. In such cases, though language like "mandatory", directory", "void", "voidable", "nullity" and so forth may be helpful in argument, it may be misleading in effect if relied on to show that the courts, in deciding the consequences of a defect in the exercise of power, are necessarily bound to fit the facts of a particular case and a developing chain of events into rigid legal categories or to stretch or cramp them on a bed of Procrustes invented by lawyers for the purposes of convenient exposition. As I have said, the case does not really arise here, since we are in the presence of total non compliance with a requirement which I have held to be mandatory. Nevertheless I do not wish to be understood in the field of administrative law and in the domain where the courts apply a supervisory jurisdiction over the acts of subordinate authority purporting to exercise statutory powers, to encourage the use of rigid legal classifications. The jurisdiction is inherently discretionary and the court is frequently in the presence of differences of degree which merge almost imperceptibly into differences of kind.”
“Having reviewed the authorities cited by the taxpayer in this appeal, not all of which are referred to in this opinion, their Lordships consider that when a question like the present one arises - an alleged failure to comply with a time provision - it is simpler and better to avoid these two words "mandatory" and "directory" and to ask two questions. The first is whether the legislature intended the person making the determination to comply with the time provision, whether a fixed time or a reasonable time. Secondly, if so, did the legislature intend that a failure to comply with such a time provision would deprive the decision maker of jurisdiction and render any decision which he purported to make null and void? In the present case the legislature did intend that the commissioner should make his determination within a reasonable time. At the same time it is no less plain that the legislation imposed on the Inland Revenue authorities, including the commissioner, the duty of assessing and collecting profits tax from "every person carrying on a trade, profession or business in Hong Kong:" section 14. If the commissioner failed to act within a reasonable time he could be compelled to act by an order of mandamus. It does not follow that his jurisdiction to make a determination disappears the moment a reasonable time has elapsed. If the court establishes the time by which a reasonable time is to be taken as having expired, which will depend on all the circumstances, including factors affecting not only the taxpayer but also the Inland Revenue, it would be surprising if the result was that the commissioner had jurisdiction to make the determination just before but not just after that time. Their Lordships do not consider that that is the effect of a failure to comply with the obligation to act within a reasonable time in the present legislation. Such a result would not only deprive the government of revenue, it would also be unfair to other taxpayers who need to shoulder the burden of government expenditure; the alternative result (that the commissioner continues to have jurisdiction) does not necessarily involve any real prejudice for the taxpayer in question by reason of the delay.”
“Having reviewed the issue in some detail I am in respectful agreement with the Australian High Court that the rigid mandatory and directory distinction, and its many artificial refinements, have outlived their usefulness. Instead, as held in Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 1999), the emphasis ought to be on the consequences of non-compliance, and posing the question whether Parliament can fairly be taken to have intended total invalidity. That is how I would approach what is ultimately a question of statutory construction. In my view it follows that the approach of the Court of Appeal was incorrect.”
“Those words were introduced to make it clear that central and local Government owed a duty to each other and to the general body of local taxpayers to be prompt in some of the stages of the rating process. They were not intended to create a situation in which delay either would or might extinguish the liability of an individual ratepayer.”
‘there is no support for imputing a motive to the introduction of Regulation 5 from threatened insurrection.’
‘possible to be accomplished within known means and resources’ can properly be applied to the obligation under Regulation 5. That, in my judgment, is for practical purposes synonymous with ‘feasible’
“The issue is not whether the billing authority was unaware of the location of the premises before7th November 1997 and therefore whether it was not feasible physically to serve the notices prior to that date … Rather the issue is whether it was practicable for the billing authority to have identified the location of the premises at an earlier date and therefore physically to have served the notices at an earlier date.”
“(a) make regular inspection and research of relevant properties as agreed by the [Council’s contract monitoring manager] (b) ensure that all new non-domestic properties where work is in progress are regularly inspected and issue completion notices for such properties as appropriate. (c) … (d) liaise with the Valuation office regarding the nature and effective date of alterations which affect the rating assessment. (e) visit non-domestic properties as required to trace taxpayers, obtain forwarding addresses and investigate queries relating to liability, discounts and other relevant matters. (f) liaise with the Council’s Planning Directorate where appropriate to obtain information concerning changes to properties.”
“The contractor shall: a) issue a legally valid non-domestic rating bill/demand/notice to the ratepayer(s) for each property shown in the rating list for the Council area in accordance with the statutory requirements, as soon as practicable taking account of reliefs etc. b) … c) … d) amend and update rating records where a change in liability occurs and issue amended demand notice e) … f) … g) … h) … i) take prompt action to trace the ratepayer where demand notices are returned “gone away” or similar j) … k) …” a) issue a legally valid non-domestic rating bill/demand/notice to the ratepayer(s) for each property shown in the rating list for the Council area in accordance with the statutory requirements, as soon as practicable taking account of reliefs etc. b) … c) … d) amend and update rating records where a change in liability occurs and issue amended demand notice e) … f) … g) … h) … i) take prompt action to trace the ratepayer where demand notices are returned “gone away” or similar j) … k) …”
“Q. We differ over when you worked it out and when you should have worked it out, but the reality was that the inspection system had broken down in the period between 2002 and 2006? A. My Lord, unfortunately that is the case.”
“There are void properties on the NNDR System where the owner is not known to the NNDR Section. A void exemption is applied to the account and is not removed until the owner or new occupier is identified. A void exemption should only be applied for a period of three months, after this period empty property relief of 50% should be awarded.”
“Use as a compound for the transit storage of ‘Honda’ branded motor vehicles manufactured by the Tenant which are awaiting export by water transport from the Port of Bristol together with such other use that the Landlord may make of the Premises under clause 3 8 2 and paragraph 7 of schedule 2.”
“In the Landlord’s exclusive discretion and without costs or charge to use such parts of the Premises as shall not from time to time be occupied by motor vehicles stored by the Tenant in accordance with the Authorised Use. Before exercising the rights granted in this paragraph 7, the Landlord shall obtain the Tenant’s consent, which the Tenant covenants not unreasonably to withhold or delay and which consent shall be deemed given if given orally or in writing by any employee, agent or other representative of the Tenant at the Premises or elsewhere. If the Tenant reasonably requires the Landlord to vacate parts of the Premises used by the Landlord in order to allow those parts to be used by the Tenant for the Authorised Use, then the Tenant may give notice to the Landlord (such notice being given orally or in writing by the Tenant or any employee, agent or other representative of the Tenant) specifying the parts affected and the time and date on which the Tenant’s use of the relevant parts of the Premises for the Authorised Use is to start (the “appointed time”). Provided that the Tenant’s notice is given sufficiently in advance of (and in any event not less than 48 hours before) the appointed time to enable the Landlord reasonable time to relocate the motor vehicles stored by it on the relevant parts of the Premises, the landlord shall vacate the relevant parts of the Premises specified in the notice by the appointed time. In exercising the rights of access and use granted by this paragraph 7, the Landlord shall not erect any permanent buildings or other structures on the Premises, but this shall not prevent the Landlord bringing onto the Premises any plant, machinery or equipment required by the Landlord in connection with its use of the Premises provided the same is removed at the end of such use. Provided always that in exercising the foregoing rights and all other rights of entry and access in connection with such rights generally the Landlord shall cause as little interference as possible to the Premises and the business of the Tenant and shall forthwith make good any physical damage caused to the Premises by the exercise of the said right and indemnify and keep indemnified the Tenant against all actions, claims proceedings, expenses and demands in any way relating to the exercise of those rights.”
“3 2 1 To pay and discharge to the relevant authorities or (if no direct assessment is made on the premises) to pay to the Landlord on demand a due proportion (to be determined by the Surveyor, whose decision shall bind the Tenant) of all rates, taxes, outgoings and impositions whatsoever of whatever kind payable in respect of the Premises by the owner or occupier other than any payable by the Landlord in respect of the grant of this lease, the receipt of rents under this lease or any dealing with its reversionary interest. 3 2 2 To pay for all drainage, water, gas, electricity, telephone communications and any other services or amenities of a like nature used by or available to the Premises (including all standing charges) and to observe and perform all present and future regulations and requirements of the statutory supply authorities and to keep the Landlord indemnified against non-payment, breach, non-observance or non-performance.”
“I have again checked with my clients. There is a lease in the name of Honda Motor Europe Limited which is a separate body to that of Honda UK Limited albeit, of course, within the same overall Honda group of companies. Despite the existence of the lease, Honda Motor Europe Limited have not been in exclusive occupation or possession of the property. They have an agreement with the Port whereby the Port handle Honda cars and receive an all-inclusive payment from Honda on a per car per day basis or on a gate fee. Since 2002, other companies have occupied Main Site. Part has been disposed of to a third party. For significant periods the entire site was vacant. We are advised that the Dock has a contractual agreement for the storage and export of cars for Honda Motor Europe Limited in which the Dock are responsible for rates. It is accepted that this has not yet been agreed with the Dock but the parties are in active discussions to try to resolve the issue in order to inform you of the agreed situation. We hereby confirm that if it is proven that the ratepayers are Honda Motor Europe Limited they will meet their liability provided it reflects the accurate facts of occupation.”
“The lease seems to suggest that Honda are liable for rates. However, there is an option to which Honda need to give consent to allow the Landlords to use empty parts of the site for other purposes. This is common usage provision. It doesn’t to me seem to give the Landlord paramount control of the overall site however. The Landlord have exercised that option, with Honda’s consent and Toyota have used part (presumably) of the site at some stage.”
“It is our contention that, at any time from 2002 onwards, there have been a number of possible ratepayers involved in this hereditament. Whilst the lease confirms that Honda Motor Europe Ltd are responsible for rates it does not confirm that they were themselves in paramount ‘rateable occupation’. Occupation has been shared and/or held in common with companies other than HME. Rate demands have not been issued by North Somerset District Council since 2002. It was the firm understanding of the management of HME that any rate liability was being met by way of their contractual arrangements of car management with The Port who pay rates within their Cumulo assessment based on revenues generated from this and other sites. There has been an entry for the Main Site throughout the 2000 Rating List. The case of [Encon] found in favour of an appellant where a Local Authority issued demands some time after occupation commenced. The Charging Authority could not recover for a period prior to the year in which the demands were issued. Any occupation of Main Site is clearly visible from public and private roads. It can be argued that the Authority could reasonably have expected to have charged HME had the Authority considered HME to have been the ratepayer. The fact that it has not charged HME has caused HME to reasonably consider that it did not have a rate liability on Main Site. HME believed that any rate liability was being met. The Charging Authority have been in the position to ascertain the relevant facts relating to the rateable occupier and rate liability since 2002.”
“They haven’t agreed to ‘waive’ rates before 1/4/05 which I think might be a practical solution I could recommend to you, but they haven’t issued demands and are still considering the arguments. They have maintained that you are the ratepayer and have been since 1/10/02. Have you partitioned the area yet to define the occupied and vacant areas? We spoke about using fencing to delineate?”
“There may be rival occupancy in some persons who, to some extent, may have occupancy rights over the premises. The question in every such case must be one of fact – namely, whose position in relation to the occupation is paramount, and whose position in relation to the occupation is subordinate; but in my opinion, the question must be considered and answered in regard to the position and rights of the parties in respect of the premises in question, and in regard to the purpose of the occupation of those premises.”
“MR. DRABBLE: My Lord, those, I think, are the legal submissions. Could I just highlight some aspects of the note on the facts that we have put in. MR. JUSTICE BURNETT: Have you anything to help me on the European point? MR. DRABBLE: The short answer to that is no. I am not sure, with respect, I understand it.”
“That provision [i.e. Article 29 EC; now Article 35 TFEU] concerns the national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade in such a way as to provide a particular advantage for national production or for the domestic market of the State in question at the expense of the production or of the trade of other Member States. This is not so in the case of a prohibition like that in question which is applied objectively to the production of goods of a certain kind without drawing a distinction depending on whether such goods are intended for the national market or for export.”
“Having received authority to split the docks RV, all the appropriate 1995 and 2000 separate valuations have now been agreed with the exception of the Chevrolet site. They took over the Daewoo car operation in November 2002. They will need to sign any agreement which I make with the other agents as they are a party. At the moment [GVA Grimley] is trying to obtain instructions to act for them in this matter, but, of course the decision lies with Chevrolet. If they say ‘no’ then the 2 cases we are using for the 1995 and 2000 list reconsiderations will need to be listed by the VT and a decision given before I can make 2 lists.”
“It is a cost which, if [Chevrolet] had known about it, would have formed one of the many factors used by [Chevrolet] and General Motors in setting its wholesale vehicle prices to dealers and their onward pricing to customers, negotiating or renegotiating terms with its suppliers (in particular the terms of its agreements with the Landlord for the provision of port related services and with Walon UK for logistics services). These matters cannot be retrospectively altered or renegotiated. Thus [Chevrolet] has lost the ability to mitigate or offset such liability forever.”
“WR [Wendy Rowley of the VOA] called back. Discussed issues re value and fragmentation. Also touched on rateability. WR not willing to concede on this point and therefore accepted.”
“this notice is for your information. No payment is necessary.”