“We, the applicant and the sureties, have read and understood this bail decision and agree to pay the sums of money set out above if the applicant fails to comply with the following primary condition: …”
“I certify that I have granted/continued bail to the applicant subject to the conditions set out above and have taken the recognisance of the applicant and the first and second surety.”
“… It is noted that your client is no longer on Immigration Judge bail and is now on restrictions imposed by the Home Office. Consequently, this allows the Home Office to make changes to your clients[’] conditions without the need to making [sic] a further application to the court. Therefore the restrictions imposed on your client are maintained.”
“4. In essence, a First-tier Tribunal Judge will grant bail where this in no sufficiently good reason to detain a person and lesser measures can provide adequate alternative means of control.”
“33. The first condition is to specify when bail will end. Where no immigration appeal is pending, a First-tier Tribunal Judge should grant bail with a condition that the applicant surrenders to an Immigration Officer at a time and place to be specified either in the bail decision itself or in any subsequent variation. 34. The judge will usually specify the immigration reporting centre nearest to where the applicant it to reside when released and will often specify that the application should answer to an Immigration Officer within seven days. 35. Once the applicant has answered to an Immigration Officer in accordance with that primary condition, the duration of any further grant of bail will be made by a Chief Immigration Officer rather than the Tribunal.” [Emphasis added]
“While, of course, Parliament is entitled to confer powers of administrative detention without trial, the court will see to it that where such a power is conferred the statute that confers it will be strictly and narrowly construed and its operation and effect will be supervised by the court according to high standards.”
“29. … In the present case our particular focus is not on a power of executive detention, but on a power to grant bail. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the purpose may be to effect a release from detention, I consider that this similarlyattracts the presumption of statutory interpretation because theconditions which may be attached to a grant of bail arecapable of severely curtailing the liberty of the personconcerned. It was common ground before us that bail under the1971 Act may be subject to conditions which constitute adeprivation of liberty within article 5(1)(f) ECHR. As Mr Tam frankly accepts, the ability to exercise control through the use of what may be stringent conditions of bail in part underlies the purposive interpretation for which he contends. Moreover, this is, to my mind, a situation where the principle of legality is in play. As Lord Hoffmann observed in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms[2000] 2 AC 115 , 131D-G: “Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.”
“the power to grant bail… attracts the presumption of statutory interpretation…”
“…because the conditions which may be attached to a grant of bail are capable of severely curtailing the liberty of the person concerned”
“It would, however, be inconsistent with the doctrine of ultra vires as it has been developed in English law as a means of controlling abuse of power by the executive arm of government if the judgment of a court in proceedings properly constituted that a statutory instrument was ultra vires were to have any less consequence in law than to render the instrument incapable of ever having had any legal effect…”
“…[T]hough language like “mandatory,” “directory,” “void,” “voidable,” “nullity” and so forth may be helpful in argument, it may be misleading in effect if relied on to show that the courts, in deciding the consequences of a defect in the exercise of power, are necessarily bound to fit the facts of a particular case and a developing chain of events into rigid legal categories or to stretch or cramp them on a bed of Procrustes invented by lawyers for the purposes of convenient exposition. As I have said, the case does not really arise here, since we are in the presence of total non-compliance with a requirement which I have held to be mandatory. Nevertheless I do not wishto be understood in the field of administrative law and in thedomain where the courts apply a supervisory jurisdiction overthe acts of subordinate authority purporting to exercisestatutory powers, to encourage the use of rigid legalclassifications. The jurisdiction is inherently discretionary and the court is frequently in the presence of differences of degree which merge almost imperceptibly into differences of kind.” [Emphasis added]
“15. … The rigid mandatory and directory distinction, and its many artificial refinements, have outlived their usefulness. Instead, …the emphasis ought to be on the consequences of non-compliance, and posing the question whether Parliament can fairly be taken to have intended total invalidity. That is how I would approach what is ultimately a question of statutory construction.”
“43. It is clear from the analysis [by the House of Lords] in Soneji that in any case concerning the consequences of a failure to comply with a statutory time limit, there are potentially two stages in the inquiry. The first is to ask thequestion identified by Lord Steyn: did Parliament intend totalinvalidity to result from failure to comply with the statutoryrequirement? If the answer to that question is ‘yes’, then nofurther question arises. Yet if the answer is ‘no’ a furtherquestion arises: despite invalidity not being the inevitable consequence of a failure to comply with a statutory requirement, does it nonetheless have that consequence in the circumstances of the given case and, if so, on what basis? It is at this second stage that the concept of substantial compliance may yet have a bearing on the outcome.” [Emphasis added]
“26. … This is a time-honoured form of words to express the idea of surrendering to bail. Once a bailed person surrenders to his bail (whether to magistrates or the Crown Court in a criminal case or to an immigration officer in an immigration case) it is then for the person to whom he surrenders to re-fix bail, if he or she considers it appropriate to do so and to determine any appropriate conditions.”
“27. It is fair to say that there are no express words in paragraph 22 saying that bail conditions are to cease on surrender but in my view Mr Clement’s [Bail Guidance] correctly states the position as a matter of necessary inference from the terms of paragraph 22 and particularly paragraph 22(1A). It follows that there is no sub-scenario of FTT bail ofnon-finite duration in a case where there is no pending appeal to the FTT. …” [Emphasis added]
“50. With respect to Mr Singh, I do not consider that AR (Pakistan) has anything material to say about this question of statutory construction. The fact that there is ‘no sub-scenario of FTT bail of non-finite duration” in a case where there is no pending appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (paragraph 27 of the judgments) does not mean that bail is necessarily void, if, through error, a judge fails to comply fully with the legislative requirements.”