“We have been instructed by Edgbaston Holdings Ltd. in connection with the above. In order that we may advise our client, the sum of£10,000 is to be transferred to this firm from the company’s Barclays Bank account ….. As soon as we are in funds the first step will be for our client to provide evidence of assets in affidavit form. We consider that it is likely that an application for a variation of the Freezing Order will then be sought to enable our client to pay legal fees in excess of£10,000 , mortgage repayments on the properties, any insurance payments that are due, maintenance on the properties and any other routine company expenditure. We shall, of course, provide the necessary advance notification of such an application. We note that there is no provision in the Freezing Order for the parties to agree a variation. Further, we shall be advising our client upon the merits of applying to set judgment aside...”
“At first blush it might be thought that any inappropriate delay whatever on the part of an applicant would require that he be found not to have acted promptly. Yet such a construction would carry with it the Draconian consequence that, even if he had a good, perhaps compelling, reason for not having attended the trial, and a reasonable - perhaps, indeed, excellent - prospect of success at trial, the court would still be bound to refuse him a fresh trial. I would accordingly construe ‘promptly’ here to require, not that an applicant has been guilty of no needless delay whatever, but rather that he has acted with all reasonable celerity in the circumstances. That said, I too would regard the appellant here as having failed even in that obligation. 30 days was altogether too long a delay before making this Part 39 application.”
“….. the only significant difference between the provisions ofCPR 24.2 and 30.3(1) is that under the former the overall burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish that there are grounds for his belief that the respondent has no real prospect of success whereas, under the latter, the burden rests upon the defendant to satisfy the court that there is good reason why a judgment regularly obtained should be set aside. That being so, although generally the burden of proof is in practice of only marginal importance in relation to the assessment of evidence, it seems almost inevitable that, in particular cases, a defendant applying underCPR 13.3 (1) may encounter a court less receptive to applying the test in his favour than if he were a defendant advancing a timely round of resistence to summary judgment underCPR 24.2 .”
“(a) the interests of the administration of justice; (b) whether the application for relief has been made promptly; (c) whether the failure to comply was intentional; (d) whether there is a good explanation for the failure; (e) the extent to which the party in default has complied with other rules, practice directions, court orders and any relevant pre-action protocol; (f) whether the failure to comply was caused by the party or his legal representative; (g) whether the trial date or the likely date can still be met if relief is granted; (h) the effect which the failure to comply had on each party; and (i) the effect which the granting of relief would have on each party.”
“7. …. I was therefore somewhat confused as to how and why the claimant had obtained a freezing order over assets which the SFO had already obtained a restraining order. To me this seemed an unnecessary exercise on the claimant’s part. Allied to the fact that I considered and indeed still consider the claimant’s claim to be baseless and riddled with untruths, I unfortunately did not give the matter the urgency which I now accept that I should have. I would point out, however, that both I and my family were all already under a great deal of strain due to the actions of the SFO and their ongoing investigation. 8. Messrs. Salahan & Co. Solicitors were already acting on mine and the defendant’s behalf in relation to the restraining order obtained by the SFO. It seemed logical, therefore, to consult them and take their advice as to the claimant’s claim. I accordingly approached them with the documentation which I had received from the claimant and sought their advice upon the same. Regrettably Mr. Salahan, who was the solicitor acting on my behalf, was of a similar opinion to myself in that he considered the claimant’s attainment of a freezing order to be pointless due to the restraining order already in place. Unfortunately, Mr. Salahan’s advice led me to believe that the claimant’s claim was not particularly pressing and that it was not necessary to worry unduly about the same as nothing would be happening until the SFO had completed their investigation. This advice, which I now consider was misconceived, took away any sense of urgency I had in dealing with the claim.”
“It is averred that all negotiations with the claimant were conducted by Mr. Wasim. Mr. Wasim, in turn, dealt principally with Nisar Afzal of the defendant.”