“29. I considered the applicable law recently in Alcon v. Actavis[2021] EWHC 1026 (Pat) , drawing heavily on the decision of Birss J, as he then was, in Illumina v. Latvia[2021] EWHC 57 (Pat) . The particularly relevant passages are [68]-[70] in Illumina and [31] in Alcon. 30. At [68] in Illumina Birss J provided the following approach: "68. I conclude that in a case in which it is necessary to define the skilled person for the purposes of obviousness in a different way from the skilled person to whom the patent is addressed, the approach to take, bringing Schlumberger and Medimmune together, is: i) To start by asking what problem does the invention aim to solve? ii) That leads one in turn to consider what the established field which existed was, in which the problem in fact can be located. iii) It is the notional person or team in that established field which is the relevant team making up the person skilled in the art." 31. And in Alcon at [31] I said: "31. I intend to apply that approach. I take particular note of: i) The requirements not to be unfair to the patentee by allowing an artificially narrow definition, or unfair to the public (and the defendant) by going so broad as to "dilute" the CGK. Thus, as Counsel for Alcon accepted, there is an element of value judgment in the assessment. ii) The fact that I must consider the real situation at the priority date, and in particular what teams existed. iii) The need to look for an 'established field', which might be a research field or a field of manufacture. iv) The starting point is the identification of the problem that the invention aims to solve."” "68. I conclude that in a case in which it is necessary to define the skilled person for the purposes of obviousness in a different way from the skilled person to whom the patent is addressed, the approach to take, bringing Schlumberger and Medimmune together, is: i) To start by asking what problem does the invention aim to solve? ii) That leads one in turn to consider what the established field which existed was, in which the problem in fact can be located. iii) It is the notional person or team in that established field which is the relevant team making up the person skilled in the art." "31. I intend to apply that approach. I take particular note of: i) The requirements not to be unfair to the patentee by allowing an artificially narrow definition, or unfair to the public (and the defendant) by going so broad as to "dilute" the CGK. Thus, as Counsel for Alcon accepted, there is an element of value judgment in the assessment. ii) The fact that I must consider the real situation at the priority date, and in particular what teams existed. iii) The need to look for an 'established field', which might be a research field or a field of manufacture. iv) The starting point is the identification of the problem that the invention aims to solve."”
“(i) The first overarching principle is that contained in Article 69 of the European Patent Convention. (ii) Article 69 says that the extent of protection is determined by the claims. It goes on to say that the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. In short the claims are to be construed in context. (iii) It follows that the claims are to be construed purposively – the inventor's purpose being ascertained from the description and drawings. (iv) It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood alone – the drawings and description only being used to resolve any ambiguity. Purpose is vital to the construction of claims. (v) When ascertaining the inventor's purpose, it must be remembered that he may have several purposes depending on the level of generality of his invention. Typically, for instance, an inventor may have one, generally more than one, specific embodiment as well as a generalised concept. But there is no presumption that the patentee necessarily intended the widest possible meaning consistent with his purpose be given to the words that he used: purpose and meaning are different. (vi) Thus purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day concerned with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the Protocol – a mere guideline – is also ruled out by Article 69 itself. It is the terms of the claims which delineate the patentee's territory. (vii) It follows that if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate limitation in his claims, it must have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously intentional elements. (viii) It also follows that where a patentee has used a word or phrase which, acontextually, might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it does not necessarily have that meaning in context. (ix) It further follows that there is no general 'doctrine of equivalents.' (x) On the other hand purposive construction can lead to the conclusion that a technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the meaning of the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a doctrine of equivalents: it is because that is the fair way to read the claim in context. (xi) Finally purposive construction leads one to eschew the kind of meticulous verbal analysis which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge.”
“obtaining a graphical encoded information item which is displayed on a display of a computing apparatus, wherein the computing apparatus comprises the display and an electronic apparatus, and wherein the display is a sign”
“transmitting a first message to first server apparatus, the first message including the decoded information and a first identifier identifying the device or a user of the device, wherein the decoded information includes an apparatus identification information item for allowing identification of the computing apparatus”; and “the first server apparatus: receiving the first message from the device; establishing the identity of the user of the device, wherein establishing the identity of the user comprises using the first identifier to determine if the user is registered with the first server apparatus”
“According to one alternative embodiment, the invention can be implemented in a building security system. In such embodiment, the computing apparatus 10 may comprise an electronic door lock. The encoded information item 112, 312, such as a GO as described above, may be displayed on a sign geographically proximate to the electronic door lock. Alternatively, the GO 112, 312 may be provided on an electronic display geographically proximate to the electronic door lock. In such embodiments, the encoded information item may be periodically updated following receipt of signals from the first server apparatus 14 (or from the second server apparatus 16 if the system is as shown in Figure 2).”
“Preferably, the decoded information includes an apparatus identification information item for allowing identification of computing apparatus on, by, or near to which the encoded information object is provided.”
“The function of the claims is to define clearly and with precision the monopoly claimed, so that others may know the exact boundary of the area within which they will be trespassers.” 100. In the case of an invention which, ex hypothesi, is new it may not be easy to delineate the boundary with precision. In the same way as a conveyance of land may not tell you precisely where the boundary is, with the result that any dispute may have to be resolved by looking at topological features on the ground, so the boundaries of an invention may have to be determined as a matter of interpretation in the light of the common general knowledge that the skilled person would possess. But once that exercise has been carried out (these days including the possibility of equivalents), the court will be able to answer the question whether someone has crossed the boundary “yes” or “no”