“a system and method for unloading a powdery cargo from a ship, the system comprising a ship, wherein the ship comprises one or more cargo holds in which the bottom tapers down towards a central point in the cargo hold, and also a fluidisation arrangement for fluidisation of the powdery cargo in the cargo hold so that the cargo flows towards said central point in the cargo hold, the system further comprising a pneumatic unloading pump being arranged in or adjacent the central point in the cargo hold at least partially below the bottom of the cargo hold, and that the pump is arranged to directly receive the fluidised powdery cargo.”
“…to promote a pressure tank pump with side filling and which can be placed centrally in the bottom on a ship carrying cement. The present pump can, as a result of this, be directly filled from the cargo hold without the use of energy.”
“…is primarily that step two has been removed. This is achieved by placing a newly developed unloading tank centrally under or in the cargo hold bottom. When the cement in the cargo hold is fluidised, the cement flows into the pump which is therefore filled due to gravitational forces. The patent-applied unloading appliance described here has consequently only two sequences in the unloading chain which use energy, i.e. fluidisation of the cement in the cargo holds and transportation of the cement via unloading lines to the receiving installation. All other pneumatic, pressurised unloading appliances have at least one sequence more in the unloading chain that uses energy.”
“Powdery cargo that has become fixed in the pump can be air-flushed or broken up with the help of air from a number of nozzles fitted internally in the pump, as the nozzles are supplied air via an inlet in the pump.”
“Steering systems for control of supply/discharge of cargo in the pump, supply/venting of air in the pump and supply of air to the fluidisation arrangements will, in the main, be comprised of known systems and will not be explained in more detail in that these are regarded as known by one skilled in the arts.”
“1. Upon payment of compensation for damage or total loss, the insurer is subrogated to the assured’s rights in the object insured or such parts of the object insured as he has indemnified, unless he, no later than the time of payment, waives this right. §2-4 shall apply correspondingly. 2. In the event of a total loss, the assured shall furnish the insurer with title to the object insured and hand over all documents that are material to him as owner. Costs incurred in this connection shall be borne by the insurer.”
“1. The assured may claim compensation for a total loss if the conditions for condemnation of the ship are met. 2. The conditions for condemnation are met when casualty damage is so extensive that the cost of repairing the ship will amount to at least 80% of the insurable value, or of the value of the ship after repairs if the latter is higher than the insurable value. If two or more insurances have been effected against the same perils but with different valuations, the highest valuation shall form the basis of the calculation.”
“We confirm that the [Vessel] is a total loss as per NMIP § 11-3 and that compensation will be paid according to the regulations of the Plan if and when it is established that the average is recoverable which we need some time to decide. We are still waiting for some documentation of relevance in this regard. If the average is deemed as recoverable all rights to the vessel which follows from section 5-19 of the Plan will be waived. This implies that you in relation to the H & M Insurers are free to dispose of the vessel. We notice that payment also is requested under the Hull- and Freight Interest Insurances. We will revert to this when the coverage has been finally decided.”
“The Owners have … declared the vessel a total loss as per NMIP §11-3 and requested payment of the sum insured. Leading Underwriters have accepted the the [sic] declaration of total loss and renounced the rights under §5-19 to take over the vessel.”
“The Owners and P&I Insurers Gard of [the Vessel] is considering to offer the vessel for sale in damaged condition on an ‘as is, where is’ basis. There is a cement discharging system onboard consisting of three blow tanks fitted in a longitudinal tunnel in the bottom centre of the vessel…. There has been water ingress at the bottom of all cargo holds, and there is hardened cement on all tank tops. There has been water on top of cargo holds no. 2S, no. 3P&S and all three blow tanks have been flooded. It is likely that cement lumps and hardened cement will remain on board.”
“The Buyers undertake not to use or re-commission the Vessel as a pneumatic cement carrier. If the Vessel is re-sold before conversion to bulk carrier, Sellers to have 1st right of refusal. Sellers have the right to verify by inspection that the Vessel is de-commissioned as a pneumatic cement carrier and that the three cement pumps/pressure vessels are destroyed.”
“… in this case the Court of Appeal was in my opinion entitled to substitute its own evaluation because I think, with great respect to the judge, that he did not correctly identify the patented product. He said that the frame was an important part of the assembly and that the defendants had prolonged ‘the screen's useful life’. It is quite true that the defendants prolonged the useful life of the frame. It would otherwise presumably have been scrapped. But the screen was the combination of frame and meshes pre-tensioned by attachment with adhesive according to the invention. That product ceased to exist when the meshes were removed and the frame stripped down to the bare metal. What remained at that stage was merely an important component, a skeleton or chassis, from which a new screen could be made.”
“26. … First, the word ‘makes’ must be given a meaning which, as a matter of ordinary language, it can reasonably bear. Secondly, it is not a term of art: like many English words, it does not have a precise meaning. Thirdly, it will inevitably be a matter of fact and degree in many cases whether an activity involves ‘making’ an article, or whether it falls short of that. 27. Fourthly, the word ‘makes’ must be interpreted in a practical way, by reference to the facts of the particular case. Fifthly, however, there is a need for clarity and certainty for patentees and others, and for those advising them. Sixthly, it should be borne in mind that the word applies to patents for all sorts of products, from machinery to chemical compounds. Seventhly, one should bear in mind, at least as part of the background, the need to protect the patentee's monopoly while not stifling reasonable competition. 28. Eighthly, the word ‘makes’ must be interpreted bearing in mind that the precise scope of a claim may be a matter almost of happenstance in the context of the question whether the alleged infringer ‘makes’ the claimed product. Lord Diplock described the specification of a patent as ‘a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words of his own choosing’ by which he states ‘what he claims to be the essential features of the new product’ – Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd[1982] RPC 183 , 242. As Lord Hoffmann explained in Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd[2004] UKHL 46 ,[2005] 1 All ER 667 ,[2005] RPC 169 , para 21, a claim is, or at least should be drafted ‘not only … in the interest of others who need to know the area “within which they will be trespassers” but also in the interests of the patentee, who needs to be able to make it clear that he lays no claim to prior art or insufficiently enabled products’. As Lord Hoffmann went on to explain in para 35, all sorts of factors, only some of which may appear to be rational, can influence the person drafting a claim. 29. Ninthly, where, as here, there is a decision (United Wire) of the House of Lords or this court on the meaning of the word, it cannot be departed from save for very good reasons indeed. Finally, particularly given that section 60 (like section 125) is one of the sections mentioned in section 130(7) of the 1977 Act, the word should be interpreted bearing in mind that it is included in a provision which is intended to be part of a scheme which applies in many other jurisdictions.”
“50. The mere fact that an activity involves replacing a constituent part of an article does not mean that the activity involves ‘making’ of a new article rather than constituting a repair of the original article. Repair of an item frequently involves replacement of one or some of its constituents. If there are broken tiles on a roof, the replacement of those tiles is properly described as repairing the roof, and such replacements could not be said to involve rebuilding, or ‘making’, the roof. Indeed, replacing the whole of a deteriorated roof of a building could be regarded as repairing the building, taken as a whole, rather than reconstructing the building. There are many cases concerned with repairing obligations in leases which illustrate this point … 51. In the more directly relevant context of chattels rather than buildings, the normal use of ‘making’ and ‘repairing’ demonstrates the same point. Works to a ship or a motor car, which involve removal and replacement of defective significant constituent parts, could be substantial in terms of physical extent, structural significance, and financial cost, without amounting to ‘making’ a ship or motor car, as a matter of ordinary language: in such a case, they would be ‘repair’ of the existing ship or motor car. …”
“Deciding whether a particular activity involves ‘making’ the patented article involves, as Lord Bingham said, an exercise in judgment, or, in Lord Hoffmann's words, it is a matter of fact and degree. In some such cases, one can say that the answer is clear; in other cases, one can identify a single clinching factor. However, in this case, it appears to me that it is a classic example of identifying the various factors which apply on the particular facts, and, after weighing them all up, concluding, as a matter of judgment, whether the alleged infringer does or does not ‘make’ the patented article. In the present case, given that (a) the bottle (i) is a freestanding, replaceable component of the patented article, (ii) has no connection with the claimed inventive concept, (iii) has a much shorter life expectancy than the other, inventive, component, (iv) cannot be described as the main component of the article, and (b) apart from replacing it, Delta does no additional work to the article beyond routine repairs, I am of the view that, in carrying out this work, Delta does not ‘make’ the patented article.”
“We purchased the vessel, towed her to Tuzla and spent 3-4 months upgrading her from top to bottom. … The cargo system has been completely overhauled and renewed. 3 new Arzen compressors and new canvas in all cargo holds. The vessel is a good and strong Ice class 1A ship and with the upgrading she is in fact a new ship.”
“In relation to patents, the specific subject matter of the industrial property is the guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.”
“39. In the present case, it is not disputed that, where he sells goods bearing his trade mark to a third party in the EEA, the proprietor puts those goods on the market within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive. 40. A sale which allows the proprietor to realise the economic value of his trade mark exhausts the exclusive rights conferred by the Directive, more particularly the right to prohibit the acquiring third party from reselling the goods. 41. On the other hand, where the proprietor imports his goods with a view to selling them in the EEA or offers them for sale in the EEA, he does not put them on the market within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive. 42. Such acts do not transfer to third parties the right to dispose of the goods bearing the trade mark. They do not allow the proprietor to realise the economic value of the trade mark. Even after such acts, the proprietor retains his interest in maintaining complete control over the goods bearing his trade mark, in order in particular to ensure their quality.”
“53. Exhaustion occurs solely by virtue of the putting on the market in the EEA by the proprietor. 54. Any stipulation, in the act of sale effecting the first putting on the market in the EEA, of territorial restrictions on the right to resell the goods concerns only the relations between the parties to that act. 55. It cannot preclude the exhaustion provided for by the Directive.”
“(1) The Buyers undertake not to use or re-commission the Vessel as a pneumatic cement carrier. (2) If the Vessel is re-sold before conversion to bulk carrier, Sellers to have 1st right of refusal. (3) Sellers have the right to verify by inspection that the Vessel is de-commissioned as pneumatic cement carrier and that the three cement pumps/pressure vessels are destroyed.”
“154. Where a patentee sells a patented product, then, absent an agreement to the contrary, the purchaser has the right to dispose of the product. If the sale is abroad, the purchaser's rights extend to importing the product into the UK and selling it here. This was established by the well-known case of Betts v Willmott (1870–71) LR 6 Ch App 239. In that case Betts owned both English and French patents for the same invention. He claimed that his English patent had been infringed by Willmott. It appeared that the infringing articles had been manufactured by a factory owned by Betts in France (or, at least, Betts could not prove that this was not the case). Betts argued that, if he sold a patented article in France, it was for the French market and that did not justify a person buying that article in France and importing it into England. Lord Hatherley L.C. held that in these circumstances the use of the invention in England had been authorised by Betts. As he said in a much-cited passage at 245: ‘But where a man carries on the two manufactories himself, and himself disposes of the article abroad, unless it can be shewn, not that there is some clear injunction to his agents, but that there is some clear communication to the party to whom the article is sold, I apprehend that, inasmuch as he has the right of vending the goods in France or Belgium or England, or in any other quarter of the globe, he transfers with the goods necessarily the license to use them wherever the purchaser pleases. When a man has purchased an article he expects to have the control of it, and there must be some clear and explicit agreement to the contrary to justify the vendor in saying that he has not given the purchaser his license to sell the article, or to use it wherever he pleases as against himself.’ 155. As Lord Hoffmann pointed out in United Wire v Screen Repair Services[2001] RPC 24 at [68]-[69], this reasoning amounts to saying that the patentee has impliedly licensed the acts complained of, but an alternative explanation adopted by some other legal systems is that of exhaustion of rights. As Lord Hoffmann noted: ‘The difference in the two theories is that an implied licence may be excluded by express contrary agreement or made subject to conditions while the exhaustion doctrine leaves no patent rights to be enforced.’ 156. As a result of this distinction, the patentee may exclude such an implied licence by expressly limiting the rights granted to the purchaser. To be effective, however, this limitation must be notified to subsequent purchasers of the goods. As Jacob J. stated in Roussel Uclaf v Hockley International[1996] RPC 441 at p.443: ‘It is the law that where the patentee supplies his product and at the time of the supply informs the person supplied (normally via the contract) that there are limitations as to what may be done with the product supplied then, provided those terms are brought home first to the person originally supplied and, second, to subsequent dealers in the product, no licence to carry out or do any act outside the terms of the licence runs with the goods. If no limited licence is imposed on them at the time of the first supply no amount of notice thereafter either to the original supplyee (if that is the appropriate word) or persons who derive title from him can turn the general licence into a limited licence.’” ‘But where a man carries on the two manufactories himself, and himself disposes of the article abroad, unless it can be shewn, not that there is some clear injunction to his agents, but that there is some clear communication to the party to whom the article is sold, I apprehend that, inasmuch as he has the right of vending the goods in France or Belgium or England, or in any other quarter of the globe, he transfers with the goods necessarily the license to use them wherever the purchaser pleases. When a man has purchased an article he expects to have the control of it, and there must be some clear and explicit agreement to the contrary to justify the vendor in saying that he has not given the purchaser his license to sell the article, or to use it wherever he pleases as against himself.’ ‘The difference in the two theories is that an implied licence may be excluded by express contrary agreement or made subject to conditions while the exhaustion doctrine leaves no patent rights to be enforced.’ ‘It is the law that where the patentee supplies his product and at the time of the supply informs the person supplied (normally via the contract) that there are limitations as to what may be done with the product supplied then, provided those terms are brought home first to the person originally supplied and, second, to subsequent dealers in the product, no licence to carry out or do any act outside the terms of the licence runs with the goods. If no limited licence is imposed on them at the time of the first supply no amount of notice thereafter either to the original supplyee (if that is the appropriate word) or persons who derive title from him can turn the general licence into a limited licence.’”
“The sale of a patented article cannot confer an implied licence to make another or exhaust the right of the patentee to prevent others from being made.”