“In addition to the multiple allegations of individual counts of criminal contempt of court, the Defendants, participated in an egregious multi-party fraud on the court. The Defendants deliberately directed the fraud at the court with the intention of interfering with the due administration of justice in order to defeat the Claimant in the 2019 Action and 2020 Action and inflict maximum loss and damage on the Claimant. In furtherance of the fraud on the court and by multiple individual acts in contempt of court, the Defendants dishonestly, individually and collectively, painted a false and misleading picture of which they knew was false and misleading. They persuaded the court to make decisions which they knew to be incorrect, unfair and to the Claimants’ extreme detriment. The Defendants succeeded in interfering with the due administration of justice and have so far escaped justice.”
“the number of allegations which may be pursued at a hearing of a committal for contempt is often necessary to ensure compliance with the overriding objective…”
“2. The relevant repairing obligations in the Lease are placed upon the Manager [OM]...Accordingly, while it is admitted that the Landlord [St James] is obliged to give the Tenant quiet enjoyment of the Premises, and not to derogate from its grant...none of the alleged breaches of the repairing obligations are capable even in principle of constituting a breach of either of those pleaded obligations or of any obligation imposed on the Landlord bysection 4 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 (as pleaded in paragraph 25.2).”
“Ms Shand has taken certain steps that makes [sic] it impossible to proceed with my original commission in the manner envisaged”
“We conclude…that most of your complaints about poor service and breach of duty are justified. There is prima facie evidence that you were misled by [Mr Warren]…but your claims of dishonesty, deceit and bullying by Mishcon are not established on the evidence we have seen.”
“All issues, causes of action for damage and references to “intent to injure the Claimant” and “furtherance of the conspiracy to injure the Claimant by unlawful means” and “perverting the course of justice”; “All issues, causes of action for damages and references to dishonest state of mind”; and “All issues, causes of action and reference to “tort of deceit”.”
“Proceedings for contempt of court are public law proceedings and therefore when considering whether to give permission for proceedings to be taken in any particular case the court must have regard to the public interest alone. Knowingly to give false evidence in a witness statement intended for use in proceedings, particularly proceedings of a kind that are ordinarily determined without oral evidence, will usually involve an attempt to interfere with the course of justice and such proceedings might therefore be regarded as a matter primarily for the public authorities. However, a private individual, usually a party to the proceedings, may well be directly affected by such action… so it is perhaps not surprising that rule 32.14(2)(b) contemplates that proceedings for contempt may in some cases properly be brought by a private person. None the less, because the proceedings are of a public nature “The court from which permission is sought will be concerned to see that the case is one in which the public interest requires the committal proceedings to be brought”: per Sir Richard Scott V-C, at p 396. And “In my view the wider public interest would not be served if courts were to exercise the discretion too freely in favour of allowing proceedings of this kind to be pursued by private persons. There is an obvious need to guard carefully against the risk of allowing vindictive litigants to use such proceedings to harass persons against whom they have a grievance, whether justified or not [...] I would therefore echo the observation of Pumfrey J in the Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer case… that the court should exercise great caution before giving permission to bring proceedings.”
“for the alleged contemnor to know that what he is saying is not true. It is not sufficient to say that the contemnor did not care whether what he said was true or not. It must first be proved to the requisite standard that he knew that he did not know whether what he said was true or not.”
“Even if permission is not required for ground 1, the allegations of fact relied on in relation to both ground 1 and ground 2 are in all respects identical. In these circumstances, there is at least a serious possibility that the court would consider it appropriate to stay contempt proceedings based on ground 1 if permission is refused on ground 2 … and, if the refusal were to be on the basis that the contempt application was being made for an improper purpose, that might be a ground for striking it out altogether…. It follows that I will simply determine the question of whether permission should be granted on ground 2 without regard to any consideration that an application based on ground 1 might proceed in any event.”
“Most obviously an allegation that a defendant interfered with the due administration of justice in existing proceedings by him or herself making a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth should, in my judgment, be regarded as in substance an allegation that falls within rule 81.3(5)(b). The important issue of whether permission is required cannot turn on the skill of the draftsman but must be approached on the basis of the true substance of the allegation.”
“A statement of truth verifying a statement of case must be signed by either the party or the legal representative on behalf of the party (r.22.1(6)). In either event, it is the party and not the legal representative, who is “putting forward the document.””
“On application by the respondent or on its own initiative, the court may strike out a committal application if it appears to the court- (1) that the application and the evidence served in support of it disclose no reasonable ground for alleging that the respondent is guilty of a contempt of court; (2) that the application is an abuse of the court’s process or, if made in existing proceedings, is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of those proceedings; or (3) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.”
"But Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not. Thus while I would accept that lack of funds would not ordinarily excuse a failure to raise in earlier proceedings an issue which could and should have been raised then, I would not regard it as necessarily irrelevant, particularly if it appears that the lack of funds has been caused by the party against whom it is sought to claim. While the result may often be the same, it is in my view preferable to ask whether in all the circumstances a party's conduct is an abuse than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse and then, if it is, to ask whether the abuse is excused or justified by special circumstances. Properly applied, and whatever the legitimacy of its descent, the rule has in my view a valuable part to play in protecting the interests of justice."
“113. In my judgment, it remains open to a party to rely upon Henderson v Henderson abuse of process where the first claim has been discontinued as well as resulting in a judgment or compromise. With the greatest of respect to HHJ Matthews (Ward-v-Hutt2018 EWHC 77 Ch) his decision on this point was not necessary for his decision because he had already decided to strike out the claim for failure to comply withCPR Part 38.7 .”
“On the 14th of January 2014 I sent the Claimant an e-mail responding to her concerns and suggesting a way forward…I can see that this e-mail refers to my “having discussed the matter with Jonathan and considered the file”
“The claimant now believes from our own research that the Berkely Group has been a “widely touted and major client” of Mishcon de Reya since at least the time of the Claimant’s instruction of Mishcon de Reya in February 2013 ( see section entitled “conflict of interest” in Part 1 and the supporting evidence in bundle 1)…Mishcon’s failure (by Mr Levy) to disclose the material fact that the Berkley Group was a key client to the firm and to immediately stop acting for the Claimant in January 2014 when Mr Levy became aware of the complaints about Mr Warren instead of continuing to act until May 2016, was an extremely serious breach of the trust that the Claimants had reposed in Mr Levy and the fiduciary duty that Mishcon (by Mr Levy) owed to the Claimant.”
“any situation where your duty to act in the best interests of any client in relation to a matter conflicts, or there is a significant risk that it may conflict, with your own interests in relation to that or a related matter.”
“D1 does not accept it acted in breach of any fiduciary duties it owed to C. D1 does not believe that there was anything deliberate about D10’s shortcomings, as described at paragraph 29 above. D10’s professional errors do not appear to have arisen from any conflict between his or D1’s duties to C or his or D1’s duties to any other legal person.”
“I am not and have never been aware of any conflict between the individuals named (or indeed any individuals at Mishcon) and Berkeley Group regarding Ms Shand (or any conflict between these parties at all).”
“D1 (by Mr Levy) breached the fiduciary duty of care D1 owed to the Claimant in 2014 when Mr Levy provided deliberately false and misleading advice to the Claimant in response to a complaint by the Claimant about Mr Warren’s conduct and handling of case reference 2YM71662 (the “2012 Action”). D1 and D2 engaged in an egregious conspiracy to injure by unlawful means intended to deliberately mislead the Court, to interfere with the due administration of justice and to cause loss and damage to the Claimant during civil proceedings case reference BL-2019-001173 (the “2019 Action”) and case reference BL-2020-001764 (the “2020 Action”).”
"A practice direction may set out— a) the circumstances in which the court has the power to make a civil restraint order against a party to proceedings; b) the procedure where a party applies for a civil restraint order against another party; and c) the consequences of the court making a civil restraint order."
“…from issuing claims or making applications in— …(b) the High Court or the County Court if the order has been made by a judge of the High Court; …concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order; ”