Adam Hughes & Ors v World Rugby Limited & Ors [2026] EWHC 2149 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 2149 (KB)Case No QB-2022-002343Case No KB-2023-001233Case No KB-2023-002288Case No KB-2023-004596Case No KB-2024-001839Case No KB-2025-001951
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 21 August 2026
Before
SENIOR MASTER COOK
Between
(1) ADAM HUGHES & 162 OTHERS (KB-2022-002343)Claimants(2) AAKASH RAI & 65 OTHERS (KB-2023-001233)Claimant(3) WILLIAM EVANS & 30 OTHERS (KB-2023-002288)Claimant(4) ANDREW BISHOP & 59 OTHERS (KB-2023-001839)Claimant(5) AIDEN COLVIN & 64 OTHERS (KB-2024-001839)Claimant(6) SMEDLEY & 387 OTHERS (KB-2025-001951)Claimant(1) WORLD RUGBY LIMITEDDefendants(2) THE WELSH RUGBY UNIONDefendant(3) RUGBY FOOTBALL UNIONDefendant
Susan Rodway KC and John Platts-Mills (instructed by Rylands Garth) for ClaimantsNina Goolamali KC, William Clerk and Michael Standing (instructed by DWF Law LLP) for First DefendantMichael Kent KC, Edward Broome and Megan Grfiffiths (instructed by Weightmans LLP) for Second DefendantNeil Block KC and Jack Holborn (instructed by Weightmans LLP) for Third DefendantCase Nos: KB-2023-002280KB-2023-004778KB-2024-002064IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEKING'S BENCH DIVISION
Between
MICHAEL EDWARDS & 120 OTHERS (KB-2023-002280)ClaimantADAM PALFREY & 120 OTHERS (KB-2023-004778)ClaimantALAN HODGKINSON & 33 OTHERS (KB-2024-0020640ClaimantTHE RUGBY FOOTBALL LEAGUE LIMITEDDefendantBRITISH AMATEUR RUGBY LEAGUEDefendantBRITISH AMATEUR RUGBY LEAGUE ASSOCIATION LIMITEDDefendant
Susan Rodway KC and John Platts-Mills (instructed by Rylands Garth) for ClaimantsWilliam Audland KC and Gemma Scott (instructed by Pinsent Masons LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing dates: 22 and 23 July 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down by release to The National Archives on 21 August 2026 at 10.30am.

Senior Master Cook:

[1]This is the hearing of applications made on behalf of the defendants for declarations that a large number of claims, in what has become known as the “Rugby Head Injuries Litigation”, stand struck out by reason of the claimants’ failure to comply with the terms of previous “unless orders” made by the Court. The defendants’ applications are opposed by the claimants, however in the event that their opposition is not successful, applications for relief from sanction have also been made.

The litigation an overview

[2]The litigation an overview The claimants are all former rugby players from both codes, rugby union (“RU”) and rugby league (“RL”). There are approximately 1000 claimants spanning the two codes. They include both women and men, many of whom were dedicated athletes at the pinnacle of their sport. The claimants’ case is that they sustained serious head injuries due to the collision forces from sporting impacts during rugby matchplay or training which have led to both concussions and sub-concussive permanent brain damage. The cumulative nature of such blows is said to have caused neurological injuries. The neurological injuries alleged include; Persistent Post Concussion Syndrome, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, Early Onset Dementia, Parkinson’s Disease, Epilepsy and Motor Neurone Disease. For those who develop such conditions, the consequences can be severe.[3]The defendants are the governing bodies of the two codes. It is alleged by the claimants that the governing bodies owed them a duty of care, and although the appropriate standard of care varied over time, the core duty alleged was to protect the claimants from neurological injury. The governing bodies are said to have had the knowledge and resources to appreciate the likelihood of brain damage and long-term neurological injuries arising from cumulative blows or impacts to the head. In particular it is alleged; they failed to take steps to prevent or reduce the risk and associated injury; they failed to inform the players of this damaging potential consequence. This includes an alleged failure to properly deal with or treat players after collisions, including by not taking them off the playing field and not reducing collisions in training. The claimants say they were ignorant of these risks and outcomes and so did not consent to exposing themselves to the risk of the injuries by playing rugby or training for it.[4]The claimants’ allegations are not accepted by the defendants and, as is apparent from the generic defences filed in RU and RL, the claims are strenuously defended. The defendants challenge the nature and scope of the duty of care alleged. They assert that they have taken appropriate action to reduce the risk of neurological injury. They take issue with the claimants case on causation on both a generic and individual basis. They also rely on defences of limitation and volenti on the basis that the risks were well known and accepted by the players. On any view, these claims raise important issues relating to the conduct and safety of one of our most treasured national sports.[5]The claimants have been represented from the outset by Rylands Garth Solicitors. As far as I can ascertain from the Law Society web site, Rylands Garth is a relatively new firm with one qualified solicitor, Mr Richard Boardman. Rylands Garth has been conducting not only this litigation but another group claim involving association football players who allege they have suffered concussive head injuries caused by heading the ball. These claims are also being brought against the governing bodies of the sport. As will become apparent, I have been concerned for some time as to the ability of Mr Boardman and Rylands Garth to deploy sufficient resources to conduct such complex and large scale litigation.

How have we got here?

[6]How have we got here? The background to these claims and their case management has been comprehensively set out by Dexter Dias J in his judgment [2025] EWHC 3382 (KB) delivered in the context of the claimants’ appeal against my case management decisions and I do not intend to repeat the detail.[7]In short, as the managing Master of this litigation I have been actively managing the claims to get them to a stage where sensible decisions can be made about the selection of a cohort of lead claimants so as to permit directions to be made leading to the trial of the claims. The RU claims first came before me in December 2023 and the RL claims in February 2024 at a time when little progress had been made. The central and most important issue to date has been obtaining proper disclosure of medical records by the claimants. In RU the first disclosure order was made on 20 May 2024 and sealed on 31 July 2024 Its operative provisions were:
"5. The Claimants shall disclose to the Defendants as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event by 4 pm on 31 October 2024, for all existing claims, all documents referred to as part of the "testing process" set out in paragraphs 13 to 21 of the witness statement of Richard Boardman dated 15 May 2024 including but not limited to: a. Neurology interviews; b. Neuropsychological assessments; c. Brain scans i.e. MRI with imaging and reports thereon; and d. letters of diagnosis. 6. Disclosure of documents (1) By 31st October 2024 or, if later, within 8 weeks of service of a claim form, for all existing claims in this litigation (being the claims brought by claimants represented by Rylands Garth Limited against the Defendants, hereinafter referred to as "the Rugby Union Litigation"), the Claimants shall disclose those documents referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 (above). (2) The representatives of the Claimants in the three proceedings shall send forms of authority for the release of medical records (including GP records, hospital records and club records) and club/team records at all levels to the Claimants and/or their litigation friends as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event within 8 weeks of service of a claim form. Upon their return, the Claimants' representatives shall supply them to the Defendants representatives as soon as reasonably practicable."
[8]RL followed a slightly different course. The first disclosure order was made in October 2023 at a time before Mr Boardman had revealed the existence of the “testing process” set out in his witness statement dated 15 May 2024. On 23 February 2024 an extension of time was granted in the following terms:
"2. The time by which each Claimant is to file and serve condition and prognosis reports pursuant to paragraph 2b of the Order dated 2 October 2023 is extended to 4 p.m. on 31 October 2024 such reports to include the relevant expert's opinion within their specialism as to whether the injuries (and where applicable death) complained of are consistent with and caused by the Claimant's (or Deceased's) involvement in playing rugby, identifying those particular aspects of the professional game which the expert considers are likely on the balance of probability to have had a causative effect on the conditions identified with their reasons. 3. The Claimants' solicitors are by 4 p.m. on 31 October 2024 to disclose to the Defendants copies of all medical records (including GP records, hospital records, club records, and if applicable all post mortem and inquest records) for each Claimant; and to give interim disclosure of all such records as are in their possession by 1 May 2024 and 1 July 2024 respectively."
[9]On 14 June 2024 the requirement to produce the “testing process” documents was introduced:
"General case management 8. The Claimants shall disclose to the Defendants by 31 October 2024, for all existing claims, all documents referred to as part of the "testing process" set out in paragraphs 13 to 21 of the witness statement of Richard Boardman dated 15 May 2024 including (but not limited to) all documentation relation to: a. Neurology interviews; b. Neuropsychological assessments; c. Brain scans i.e. MRI with imaging and reports thereon; and d. Neurologist letters of diagnosis."
[10]The final position arrived at was that the “testing process” documents should be produced in both RU and RL by 31 October 2024.[11]Unfortunately, the disclosure orders were not properly complied with by the claimants. The nature of the non-compliance was such that I concluded unless orders were required to secure compliance.[12]In RU the unless order made at the July CMC was:
"2. Unless by 4pm on 26th September 2025: (1) The Claimants in Claim Forms 1 - 5 do properly and fully comply with paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Court Order dated 17 June 2024; and (2) The Claimants' Solicitor do file and serve an affidavit giving full particulars in respect of each Claimant named on Claim Forms 1 - 5 of: a. All medical reports/letters, brain scanning and reports thereon (for the avoidance of doubt to include all MRI, DWI and DTI reports), and medical assessments, obtained, prepared or undertaken, as part of testing the Claimants as referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the order of 17 June 2024. the claims of any Claimants in Claim Forms 1-5 in respect of whom there remains default of paragraphs 5 or 6 of the Court order dated 17 June 2024 be struck out pursuant to CPR3.4(2)(c) and the costs of their claims be paid by the Claimants to the Defendants to be assessed if not agreed. The issue of the timing of the assessment and enforcement is reserved."
[13]In RL the unless order made at the July CMC was:
"2. By 4pm on 17 October 2025, the Claimants (save for those in the Fourth Claim Form) shall comply fully with the following: a. paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Order dated 23 February 2024 (sealed on 19 March 2024); and b. paragraph 8 of the Order dated 14 June 2024. 3. By 4pm on 17 October 2025, the Claimants' solicitor shall serve an affidavit setting out in detail and verifying with reasons compliance with paragraph 2 of this order. For the avoidance of doubt, this document shall address all breaches identified by the Defendants in their application dated 24 June 2025 and their skeleton argument (and appendices) for the CMC on 22 and 23 July 2025. 4. Any claims for which there is default with paragraphs 2 or 3 this Order shall be struck out pursuant CPR3.4(2)(c) without further order of the Court. 5. For any claims so struck out: a. The Claimants whose claims have been struck out do pay the Defendants' costs of their claims, to be assessed if not agreed. The issues of the timing of the assessment and enforcement are reserved. b. Any application by the Defendants for a costs order against the litigation funder(s) of said Claimants shall be notified to the litigation funder(s) and to the Court by 4pm on 12 December 2025. The Court will notify the Defendants and the litigation funder(s) of the time of a hearing to consider directions for any such application. 6. The Claimants (save for those in the Fourth Claim Form) shall pay the Defendants' costs of and occasioned by the Defendants' application dated 24 June 2025, to be assessed if not agreed. The issues of the timing of the assessment and enforcement are reserved."
[14]The claimants chose not to comply with the unless orders, but instead mounted a root and branch attack upon them and the Court’s case management decisions in an appeal which was heard by Dexter Dias J in November 2025. The appeals were robustly dismissed for the reasons given by the judge in his judgment, referred to at paragraph 6 above.[15]The appeals having been dismissed, the date for disclosure of documents was extended by the judge to 6 February 2026. That deadline was subsequently extended by the parties to 13 February 2026.[16]On 30 January 2026, Mr Boardman served the affidavit which he had been required to file, verifying compliance with the RU unless orders and on 19 February 2026 he served his affidavit in relation to the RL unless orders.[17]The defendants have continued to point to ongoing failures to comply with the unless orders. On 18 March 2026 I held a further case management conference to take stock of the situation following the appeal and to make directions to enable a CMC to take place before myself and the managing judge, Mr Justice Cotter in October/November 2026. I also made directions to enable this hearing to take place before the end of the summer term; see paragraphs 3 to 5 of my order.[18]In RU, the Defendants joint application is dated 18 May 2026 and supported by the following witness statements: i) Jennifer Harris dated 18 May 2026 ii) Saul Burton dated 18 May 2926 iii) Phillip Tracey dated 18 May In response there is the witness statement of Richard Boardman dated 7 July 2026.[19]The claimants have issued an application dated 12 June 2026 for relief from sanction. That application is now supported by the witness statement of Mr Richard Boardman dated 10 July 2026.[20]The claimants have also filed responses to the Composite Schedule, which had been prepared at the court’s direction to set out the parties’ respective positions in relation to the production of documents.[21]In RL, the defendants joint application is dated 18 May 2026 and is supported by the witness statements of Charlotte English dated 18 May 2026 and 17 July 2026.[22]In response, there is the witness statement of Richard Boardman dated 25 June 2025.[23]The claimants have issued an application dated 12 June 2026 for relief from sanction. That application is now supported by the witness statement of Richard Boardman dated 3 July 2026.

The position of the claimants’ solicitor Mr Boardman

[24]The position of the claimants’ solicitor Mr Boardman The hearing of the parties’ applications took place before me on 22 and 23 July 2026. Shortly before the hearing I was provided with an e-mail which Mr Boardman had forwarded to my clerk on 20 July 2026:
“Please can you kindly forward this message to the Senior Master on my behalf as lead solicitor for the Claimants in the rugby actions: “Dear Judge I am writing to inform you and the Defendants that my intention is to come off the record in this litigation and I have started steps to do so. You will note that Leigh Day were appointed as a consultant earlier this year. They are currently engaging in a period of due diligence in order to decide whether they would be in a position to take over subject to the clients’ agreement. I will ensure that there is an orderly hand over – to ensure that the Court can have confidence that this litigation will be conducted as it would expect going forward.”
[25]Before this, the most up to date information being provided by Mr Boardman in relation to the resources being deployed on behalf of the RU claimants was set out in paragraph 140 of his witness statement of 10 July 2026:
“To remedy the position, and to ensure that the court can have confidence that this litigation will be conducted as a court would expect on behalf of the Union claimants going forward, I have now brought on board a second silk, and in a consultancy role, Messrs Leigh Day, as a firm with specific experience and expertise in group litigation, and now have the direct assistance of David Preston, partner in that firm.”
[26]I pointed out to Ms Rodway KC that Mr Boardman remained the solicitor on record and that he remained responsible for ensuring compliance with the court’s orders. Ms Rodway KC accepted that fact, but informed the court that her instructions were that the claimants had indicated their intentions to Mr Boardman to change their solicitors on record. On the second day of the hearing the court was informed of the existence of two players’ committees, one for RU and the other for RL. It would seem that these committees were responsible for instructing Mr Boardman. Ms Rodway KC also made reference to a press release which had been issued overnight by Mr Popham to the effect that Mr Boardman’s retainer was going to be terminated by them. Ms Rodway confirmed that Mr Boardman would remain the solicitor on record until the change took effect but could not confirm when the change would take place.[27]After the hearing had concluded and having reflected on the position, I made an order dated 24 July 2026 requiring Mr Boardman and an appropriate representative of each committee to make a witness statement to confirm the following matters, subject to the right to withhold information covered by legal privilege: i) When or by when will Mr Boardman’s retainer be terminated. ii) The identity of the firm or firms it is intended will replace Rylands Garth. iii) When or by when will Rylands Garth’s replacement firm be appointed. iv) In the event that no such firm will accept instructions what arrangements are proposed for the conduct of this litigation. v) In the event that the Court were to grant relief from sanction who would be responsible for ensuring compliance with any conditions relating to disclosure which might be made.[28]On 31 July 2026 witness statements were received from Mr Boardman, Mr Goulding, on behalf of the RL committee and Mr Popham, on behalf of the RU committee. An accurate picture emerges from paragraphs 13 to 30 of Mr Popham’s witness statement, which for present purposes, I am prepared to accept: A notice of change was filed with the Court on 11 August 2026 in accordance with CPR 42 and consequently, KP law is now the solicitor acting for the claimants. “13. I understand that the Court is already aware that the Committee and the Claimants in this litigation have progressively lost confidence in the ability of RGL to adequately manage these proceedings in our best interests, including as result of the failures of RGL to comply with the Court’s requirements and to communicate adequately with the Committee and the Claimants. I am also aware that there has been some suggestion that the Committee has been slow to effect a change of solicitors. Without any waiver of privilege, I would like to make clear to the Court that neither the Committee nor the underlying Claimants have been properly kept abreast of the deficiencies in our representation by RGL/Mr Boardman. We have received numerous assurances from RGL/Mr Boardman as to the progress of the case and were unable to appreciate the risks the Claims faced. It was only upon speaking to counsel directly that we realised some of the risks involved and the need to change solicitors. We have acted swiftly once we were provided with that information. 14. Again, without any waiver of privilege, a Committee Meeting was held on 17 July 2026 at which Mr Boardman was in attendance and at which the Committee Members in attendance decided unanimously that RGL were not competent to take the litigation forward and that it should come off the record. Our provisional view was that Leigh Day were well placed to take over conduct of the litigation as our solicitor of record and our preference to do so. Mr Boardman was instructed to write to the Court to advise it in broad terms of this decision, which he did so on 20 July 2026 [AJP1/1-2]. 15. While our first choice of new solicitors was Leigh Day, in discussions with Leigh Day following the decision made on 17 July 2026 it became clear that Leigh Day did not anticipate being able to complete its due diligence processes in the timescale that the Committee considered would be necessary and appropriate to maintain momentum in the proceedings and compliance with the Court’s timetable. 16. The Committee instructed enquires (sic) to be made and KP Law were identified as a potentially suitable law firm. 17. I understand from KP Law that it is a specialist Claimant law firm with the necessary experience in Group Litigation as well as the capacity and expertise to progress these proceedings effectively. Without any waiver of privilege, I can confirm that KP Law has on 31 July 2026 confirmed to me that:a. they are willing to represent the Claimants and to come onto the record as their solicitors in the both the rugby union and rugby league claims;b. they expect to be in a position to do this by 7 August 2026, subject to receiving the co-operation of Mr Boardman / RGL. I understand the remaining steps are important but largely administrative;c. they have the relevant expertise, experience and resources to conduct the claim. KP Law are a much bigger firm than RGL with 30 SRA regulated solicitors and over 150 employees;d. the Claimants’ current litigation funding arrangements with Asertis Limited will continue;e. KP Law recognises that the risk to the Claims arising from the Defendants’ strike out applications pursued at the hearing on 22 and 23 July 2026 is serious and immediate. Should the Court grant the Claimants relief from sanctions, KP Law will put in place a heavily resourced team, supervised by a designated senior and experienced lawyer and will ensure that the Claimants are able to conduct the future litigation in compliance with the Court’s requirements;f. this would include devoting the human and technical resources necessary to obtain and provide copies of outstanding documents as required as conditions for granting relief from sanctions by the Court;g. KP Law have informed me that their aim would be to address all necessary issues in good time for the Case Management Conference scheduled for 18/19 November 2026 to proceed with a focus on setting directions for the selection of Lead Claimants and timetabling orders to take the case through to a trial of common issues; andh. they would also be able to establish the permanent electronic Case Management Bundle required by the Court in both litigations. 18. The Committee remains of the view that it would also be in the interests of the Claimants for Leigh Day to continue to support them. I understand the Partner who would assist from Leigh Day, David Preston, has particular experience of cerebral injury claims. We understand that Mr Preston’s involvement could happen through a similar arrangement as the existing one between his firm and RGL, but where Leigh Day act as consultants to KP Law. It would be necessary for Leigh Day first to terminate its current arrangement to act as consultants to RGL. To be clear, this is a different proposition to Leigh Day coming on the record as our solicitor and does not give rise to the due diligence issues of which the Court is already aware if Leigh Day were to come on the record. 19. Without waiving any privilege, following the receipt of the Order on 24 July 2026, the Committee convened a meeting on 27 July 2026 to confirm its litigation plan in the light of that Order. At the 27 July 2026 meeting the Committee resolved to: a. take steps to terminate the retainer of the Claimants’ current solicitor, RGL, as soon as reasonably practicable; b. move forward with a plan to instruct KP Law as soon as practicable; c. to confirm our agreement to Leigh Day supporting the Claimants when they are in a position to do so; and d. to provide an update to the Court from the Committee pursuant to the Order. e. I was delegated to carry these things forward. 20. A further Committee Meeting was held on 29 July 2026. 21. Again, without any waiver of privilege, the Committee considered that it was important to appoint an independent lawyer to advise us in relation our (sic) position vis-à-vis KP Law and Asertis (as Asertis and KP are part of the same corporate group). An approach was made to James Oldnall of Milberg London LLP and a meeting held at 2pm on 29 July 2026, which I attended along with Bobbie Goulding on behalf of the Rugby League Committee. I understand that Milberg London LLP are another well-known firm of Claimant solicitors with extensive experience of group litigation. The Committee resolved: a. to instruct Mr Boardman / RGL to prepare the Witness Statement provided in the Order, to be filed only on the Committee’s approval; b. to instruct Mr Boardman / RGL to make requests for disclosure of documents it is anticipated may fall within the scope of any further Order the Court may make in relation to disclosure of Testing Process documents and provide confirmation of doing so by 4pm on 30 July 2026; c. that I prepare this witness statement for filing on 31 July 2026 in accordance with the Order; and d. to consider who to appoint as an independent advisor and as a first step to attend a call or calls with Mr Oldnall of Milberg London LLP. e. I was again delegated to conduct these matters. IV. NEXT STEPS 22. Given the matters I describe in paragraphs 19 to 21 above, the Committee intends now to take the following steps: a. Withdraw its instructions from RGL as soon as KP Law confirms that it is ready to come on the record, it is intended to do so by 7 August 2026; b. File a Notice of Change confirming KP Law as new solicitors on the record and bring about the termination of RGL’s retainer. It is intended to do this by 7 August 2026 also; c. Complete the transfer of all the Claimants’ files from RGL to KP Law; and d. Coordinate with all relevant parties, including KP Law and Asertis, concerning the execution of updated arrangements to support the litigation. 23. The Committee is satisfied that it has been and will continue to be well-represented by its current counsel team but it is intended that this will be enlarged going forward. It is intended that Mr Theo Huckle KC will be instructed as a second silk alongside Ms Susan Rodway KC. The instruction of an additional senior junior barrister is being considered. V. ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE ORDER 24.

(i) -(v) of the

[29]I now set out a summary of the conclusions I have reached. First, I have concluded that the claims which have been identified by the defendants in the evidence in support of their applications and counsel’s submissions to me, stand struck out.[30]As far as RU is concerned that is 377 claimants who have failed to provide neurology interviews and who fall into three categories. There are 85 admitted interviews which have not been provided. There are 189 which were said to have been obtained for condition and prognosis reports. There are 146 who have not provided questionnaires and there are 132 who have not provided earlier versions of the King’s College scans some players are in multiple breach.[31]As far as RL is concerned across claim forms 1 and 3 there are 173 claimants. Of those 132 have failed to provide neurological interviews, 41 have failed to provide DTIs and 86 have failed to provide clinical summaries. The result is that 153 fall to be struck out and 20 claims survive.[32]I am however prepared, with some hesitation, to grant relief from sanction in principle to all players whose claims stand struck out. Any such relief will be subject to conditions which will be decided at a further hearing, however the minimum terms would be payment of the defendants’ costs of securing compliance with the claimants’ disclosure obligations to date and production of the missing documents.

The strike out applications

[33]The strike out applications As I have emphasised on many occasions, these claims are personal injury claims. As I have also made clear, the issue of medical causation sits firmly at the heart of both the RU and RL claims. In the circumstances the court has required the claimants to disclose medical records and in particular all documents forming part of the “testing process”.[34]There are a number of generic issues relating to the claimants disclosure obligations which arise in both the RL and RU claims. I will now deal with these issues which will inform the decisions to be made in the individual claims.[35]In paragraph 14 of his witness statement of 15 May 2024, Mr Boardman stated that:
“…we aim to give each individual i) a neurology interview; ii) a neuropsychological assessment and iii) a brain scan, i.e., an MRI with imaging.”
[36]In so doing Mr Boardman was clearly describing the process by which potential claimants were screened. The order of June 2024 was clearly and carefully worded so as to require disclosure of all documents referred to as part of that “testing process” set out in paragraphs 13 to 21 of the witness statement of Richard Boardman dated 15 May 2024”. This is evident from inclusion of the words “all documentation in relation to” and the fact that the list of documents was expressly stated to be non-exhaustive. In the circumstances there is simply no room to argue, as Mr Boardman seeks to do, that disclosure is dependent on whether or not a particular claimant relied on any such document. As such I agree with Mr Audland KC that the wording contained in his affidavit of compliance in RL to the effect that “the claimants had served all testing process documents on which they relied” was both surprising and inappropriate.[37]In my judgment “all” means all. I was most surprised that Ms Rodway KC even sought to argue that there was some form of ambiguity in the wording of the orders and that it was necessary to give them a strict interpretation. Her arguments that a document could not form part of “the testing process” if it had not been received by Rylands Garth and that the content and scope of the order depended on what Rylands Garth meant it to cover, in circumstances where the orders did not refer to specific classes of document, were to say the least misguided and misconceived.[38]Equally, Ms Rodway KC’s submission that the word “disclosure” as used in the orders, should mean stating that a document exists or has existed in accordance with CPR 31.2. is equally misguided. As I pointed out in the course of argument such an interpretation would drive a coach and horses through the process of disclosing the medical records which the court had put in place and which required the defendants solicitors to have copies of the documents. It also flies in the face of Mr Boardman’s own evidence, at paragraph 63 of his witness statement dated 10 July 2025 he states:
“I repeat, the obligation was to “disclose”
. This was taken to be an obligation to provide copies of documents where they already existed (albeit, technically, all that was required by the CPR was to state that they existed).”[39]Ms Rodway KC also sought to argue that recordings or transcripts of the “neurology interviews” were not within the scope of the “testing process” and were in any event subject to subject legal privilege. This was also a surprising argument and flew in the face of submissions made by her at the CMC in July 2025:
“MS RODWAY: Let me explain the document. It is to do with in some instances, and there are very few, in the condition and prognosis report there being reference to a transcript of an interview. So that is the document. We don’t concede that is all part, we’re getting it in any event, if it exists, there’s a moot point as to whether that’s a privileged document between doctor and patient, it doesn’t matter, we are finding where there are those and they are being sought. MASTER COOK: Again is Mr Boardman under a misapprehension as to the scope of his duty? MS RODWAY: Well he wasn’t aware of these transcripts being in existence and so he is now faced them up and they are being [inaudible]. MASTER COOK: So having been brought to his attention, and he is now chasing them up? MS RODWAY: Correct…”
MS RODWAY: Correct…”[40]As was pointed out by Mr Audland KC these submissions accorded with Mr Boardman’s comments in his witness statement dated 10 July 2025 and served in advance of the CMC:
“If one wanted to be technical about the Order, the Claimants were obliged to “disclose”, i.e. to state that the document exists or has existed (CPR 31.2). The Claimants have not involved themselves in such pedantry and have sought to comply with the spirit of the Order which must have been to provide copies of the same. But if the Defendants insist on pedantry, then in seeking to provide copies of the documents, the Claimants have gone above and beyond the requirements of the Order. In any event, the Defendants have no basis for complaint.”
[41]As is rightly submitted by Mr Audland KC any privilege in these documents has been waived. However, it goes further. The issue was raised before me at the July CMC: MS RODWAY: Well, Judge, I just think this probably needs your intervention here. You know what you intend. MASTER COOK: Well, I mean, I intend all documents that are part of this testing process to be disclosed to the defendants. That is what I intend, Ms Rodway. MS RODWAY: Right. I’d be very grateful. MASTER COOK: I mean, that MS RODWAY: That’s a very much simpler way. MASTER COOK: That is the – whether or not privileged does not seem to me to make any difference. All documents, howsoever, obtained as part of the testing process described by Mr Boardman in paragraph five, the order 31 July, I thought we would have covered it. MS RODWAY: Well, that’s a much simpler formulation. MASTER COOK: And it is all embracing and it is simpler. […]” MASTER COOK: I mean, that MASTER COOK: And it is all embracing and it is simpler. […]”

MASTER COOK: I mean, that

[42]Mr Audland KC submits that this ruling did not form part of the appeal before Dexter Dias J. and in the circumstances the claimants cannot now invoke litigation privilege as a reason to justify failures to comply with the unless orders. That is unarguably correct. I would also add that this is a perfect example of the contradictory and misguided approach that Mr Boardman has displayed with regard to the conduct of this litigation and his compliance with court orders.[43]The last of the generic issues concerns DTI scans and reports undertaken and produced by King’s College. Mr Boardman sought to argue at paragraph 120 of his witness statement of 25June 2026 that these reports and scans did not fall within the scope of the June 2024 disclosure orders. This is another contention that I regard as unarguable and contrary to the evidence provided by Mr Boardman. At paragraph 25 of Mr Boardman’s February 2026 affidavit:
“Prior to using Innovision for the imaging we had been sending players to King’s College for testing. This was done via Recognition Health and took place between about 2020 and 2021. We received very short summary draft reports from King’s College and were not happy with them as they contained little detail and we did not consider them to be documents we wished to rely upon”
[44]As I have previously stated, it matters not that Mr Boardman didn’t wish to rely on them, they clearly formed part of the “testing process” and are therefore disclosable. There is a further issue relating to these reports. Having carefully studied the reports, the defendants have identified that there are different versions of some reports in existence. The majority of the reports which have been disclosed were labelled version 5. However, in the case of some players earlier versions labelled version 4 were also disclosed. The defendants are concerned that some of the prior versions of the reports interpret the data differently to those labelled version 5.[45]Mr Boardman’s response to this discovery is far from satisfactory. Firstly, he asserts there is minimal differences between the different versions. Secondly, his response to this discovery is far from ideal. Whilst he accepts that it might be possible to retrieve earlier drafts and that he is still pressing for any copies of the earlier “draft DTI” reports to be found, he does not seem to show any of the concern one might expect relating to this discovery and his correspondence shows a marked lack of curiosity as to how this situation came about and the reasons for it. To put this into perspective one example will suffice. In the case of Wayne Jackson there are two reports, one dated 22 December 2021 and another dated 5 October 2022. Version dated 22.December 2021 Version 5 dated Oct 2022 “In comparison to a reference range, defined as the central 99% of a healthy control group of 30 subjects aged between 25 and 65 years, the subject shows a minor decrease in FA [Fractional Anisotropy] for the right Inferior Frontal Occipital Fasciculus (IFOF) and the right Inferior Longitudinal Fasciculus (ILF). While still close to the normality threshold, an increase in Radial Diffusivity was also observed for right and left ILF and IFOF. A decrease in FA was also observed in the posterior body of the corpus callosum and the fornix but the presence of also strong increased Mean, Axial and Radial diffusivity likely suggest a partial volume effect with CSF.” “In comparison to a reference range, defined as the central 95% of a healthy control group of 28 subjects aged between 31 and 65 subjects, this subject shows 4 tract(s) with decreased FA: Corpus Callosum Post Body (p:0.000, z:-3.58), Fornix (p:0.042, z:-2.03), Right IFOF (p:0.038, z:-2.07), Right ILF (p:0.024, z:-2.25). Within these tract(s) we also observed increased Mean Diffusivity (MD) in: Corpus Callosum Post Body, Fornix; increased Axial Diffusivity (AD) in: Corpus Callosum Post Body, Fornix; increased Radial Diffusivity (RD) in: Corpus Callosum Post Body, Fornix, Right ILF.” “Multiple factors can be associated to this result. This may include, aging effects, axonal loss, decreased/low axonal density, decreased/low orientational coherence of axons, increase extra-axonal space, decreased myelination, partial volume contamination with CSF or Oedema.” “The combined decrease in FA and increase in MD and RD is consistent with an alteration in white matter compatible with axonal loss, decreased/low axonal density, decreased myelination, increased xtra-axonal space and/or partial volume contamination with CSF or Oedema.” “Since these results do not remain statistically significant after correction for multiple comparison, complementary data is required to confirm these findings.” “Results for Corpus Callosum Post Body, remained statistically significant (p0.05) after correction for multiple comparison.”[46]It can be seen immediately that there are in fact significant differences; i) Different reference ranges have been used between versions which has affected the Results; ii) The summary in the December 2021 version concluded that some of the changes may be due to ageing effect; a conclusion that was not present in version 5; and iii) In December 2021, it was said that the results did not remain statistically significant after correction. By version 5, one result was said to be statistically significant.[47]On any view one might think that Mr Boardman would have been concerned by these differences and have given the matter some immediate thought and attention with a view to drilling down into the reasons for the differences. Ms Rodway KC in her skeleton argument at paragraph 64 sought to characterise the defendants’ concern over this issue as “farcical” in nature. In my judgment the defendant’s concern is anything but farcical. This only goes to underline the concerns the court has expressed about the conduct of this litigation to date and about the ability of the claimants’ legal team to comply with their obligations or give proper explanations if there are difficulties in complying with those obligations.[48]Before I turn to deal with the individual allegations of default in each code it is necessary to make some observations about the evidence. Ms Rodway KC both in her submissions and her skeleton argument sought to portray the Defendants conduct as unfair and nitpicking, seeking to take advantage of procedural technicalities and repeatedly doubting and challenging what Mr Boardman has said. She said this was particularly exemplified by the RL claimants seeking to enlarge their applications and include new allegations at the eleventh hour. With respect to Ms Rodway KC, that totally misses point. As I have repeatedly said the obligation to disclose is upon the claimants. The evidence presented on behalf of the defendants demonstrates that they have devoted time and resources to carefully scrutinising what they have been provided. They have cross referenced the documents and noted where there are gaps or references to documents which must clearly exist and have not been provided. They have raised these issues promptly. On the other hand Mr Boardman has repeatedly confirmed compliance with his obligations whilst failing to deal methodically and sensibly with the issues raised by the defendants. In short I have confidence in and accept the evidence contained in the defendants witness statements. I do not have the same confidence in the evidence of Mr Boardman. Where there is conflict on any issue of fact I prefer and accept the evidence proffered on behalf of the defendants

RU allegations of non-compliance

[49]RU allegations of non-compliance Mr Tracey, on behalf of the third defendant, has taken the lead on dealing with the generic points and I will generally refer to his evidence. Mr Burton and Ms Harris, on behalf of the second and first defendants concentrate on the specific areas of alleged non-compliance.[50]At paragraphs 7 to 14 of his witness statement Mr Tracey deals with Mr Boardman’s failure to comply with paragraph 2 (2) of the unless order which required him to give full particulars in respect of each claimant named on Claim Forms 1 – 5 of all medical reports/letters, brain scanning and reports thereon and medical assessments, obtained, prepared or undertaken. He points out that non-compliance with the order is confirmed by Mr Boardman’s own words in paragraph 3 where he states, exhibit “RB1” lists the documents which have been disclosed to the defendants. This is clearly not what the Unless Order required. In any event, the dates listed on exhibit “RB1” are limited to dates on which Mr Boardman states documents were disclosed and do not relate to all documents. The entire purpose of ordering the Affidavit was to ensure that, following the protracted delays since May 2024, the defendants and the Court had full particulars of the testing which each individual claimant has undergone, the documentation which exists, and to enable full disclosure of documents to be verified by reference to the Affidavit. In a letter dated 20 March 2026 the defendants complain; “it is left to the reader of the Affidavit to work out if Mr Boardman is, by some indirect method, indicating what has in fact been obtained, prepared or undertaken for each Claimant by deduction from what he says has been disclosed” I accept this is a clear breach of the order.[51]At paragraphs 15 and onwards of his witness statement Mr Tracey deals with the failure to comply with paragraph 2 (1) of the order. He starts by making the valid point that in the absence of a compliant affidavit from Mr Boardman each defendant has had to compile a schedule of non-compliance. Both Mr Burton and Ms Harris produce schedules of non-compliance on behalf of the first and second defendants.[52]At paragraphs 16 to 27 of his witness statement Mr Tracey deals with the failure to produce Neurology interview documents. He pointed out that the nature and scope of the neurology interview documentation in existence was only positively acknowledged in paragraph 9 of the claimants` skeleton argument filed for the recent CMC on 18 March 2026. This appeared to be a partial response to his letter of 10 March 2026, and it stated as follows: 9. The nub of the disclosure complaints concerns transcripts and videos of neurology interviews. These exist in some cases but there is a dispute as to whether they are part of the testing process. Whether or not this is the case, the Claimants are prepared to disclose the same on a voluntary basis but there are likely to be sections in all the videos/transcripts that are privileged. Before the Claimants embark on another vastly time consuming and expensive process (a detailed review of hundreds of lengthy interviews) it would be helpful to have an indication from the Court that this is necessary and proportionate. The purpose of disclosure at this stage is to allow selection of Sample/Lead Claimants. The RU Defendants have access to all medical and club records. The Claimants maintain that to require them to review and redact every single transcript/video of every single player is not, at this stage, an efficient or necessary exercise. The appropriate time for disclosure of appropriately redacted transcripts/videos is after selection of the Sample/Lead Claimants.”[53]Mr Tracey then refers to paragraphs 17 and 18 of the same letter which stated: He makes the valid point that all documents relating to neurology interviews were ordered to be disclosed yet Mr Boardman confirms that documents exist for hundreds of claimants and have not been disclosed. “17. It is correct that audio, video and written transcripts of neurology interviews are in existence for many Claimants. All letters and written summaries of these interviews have been disclosed. The audios / videos / transcripts of these interviews are covered by litigation privilege except where the medico-legal expert has relied upon them for the production of the medical report (as in the case of Luke Myring – we disclosed Mr Myring’s interview transcript on 23 April 2025). Any audios / videos / transcripts not covered by litigation privilege would have to be appropriately redacted for confidentiality issues etc. 18. We have undertaken a review of the medical reports (including any supplementary reports by Dr Allder) for the Claimants in Claim Forms One to Five in order to identify exactly which audios / videos / transcripts have been relied upon by the medico-legal expert who compiled the report and are therefore disclosable. We have not identified any cases in which the medico-legal expert has relied upon an audio / video / transcript of a neurology interview (save for the case of Luke Myring).”.[54]At paragraph 24 of his witness statement Mr Tracey gives an example of potentially unidentified neurology documentation which must have been reviewed by the claimants’ experts when producing their reports but which is not listed within the reports: Mr Tracey goes on to point out that the defendants prepared a full list of all claimants on claim forms 1 to 5 for whom written transcripts of neurology interviews, audio and/or video recordings exist and for this information to be provided in a clear format. On 15 May 2026, Rylands Garth responded stating they would not be in a position to provide the information by the deadline and would require at least a further 21 days. “… By way of example only, I note that Dr Allder’s medical report for Leigh Davies (Claim Form 1) dated 25 October 2023 states “The interview was undertaken on 14 August 2021 by Dr Ioannis Mavroudis (Consultant Neurologist) using a video conferencing facility” i.e. not Dr Allder. The only purported neurology interview documents disclosed for Mr Davies are two undated documents which have been saved in PDF format as a “preliminary neurology assessment summary by Dr Ioannis Mavroudis” (the documents are identical in content but are in different fonts). The individual documents are in fact headed “Rugby player feedback” and comprise less than half a page of very brief notes. In contrast, Dr Allder’s medical report contains sections headed “current symptoms”, “family and social history” and “employment” incorporating matters which are not addressed within in the documents labelled preliminary neurology assessment summaries. Given Dr Allder has stated he did not interview Mr Davies, it is entirely unclear how the information within his report has been obtained. The obvious source is the neurology interview documents. There is now produced and shown to me marked “PBT3” copies of the documents disclosed for Mr Davies and the report produced by Dr Allder.[55]I agree that this information must be in the possession of Rylands Garth and that it is reasonable to assume that one document within this category exists for each claimant except the seven deceased claimants. I have already concluded that I do not accept Mr Boardman’s arguments that these documents do not form part of the “testing process” or are privileged. I accept that these claimants who the defendants have identified in the schedule are in breach of the order and their claims stand struck out.[56]At paragraphs 28 to 40 of his witness statement Mr Tracey deals with the Kings College DTI reports. In view of my findings above, I can take this topic shortly, having regard to Mr Tracey’s evidence, I can conclude that there has been and remains non-compliance with the unless order in respect of the brain scan reports in the form of the KC MRI/DTI reports as set out in the schedule prepared by the defendants. The partial explanations which have been provided are unsatisfactory and unconvincing. It appears enquiries have not been undertaken directly with King’s College by Rylands Garth.[57]At paragraphs 41 to 50 of his witness statement Mr Tracey deals with the Neuropsychological assessment/reports. My order required the claimants to disclose all documents to include but not limited to “Neuropsychological assessments’. Mr Tracey states that a review was carried out by the defendants in January 2026 and continuing non-compliance was identified and brought to the attention of Rylands Garth. On 10 March 2026, the second defendant wrote to Rylands Garth identifying examples of neuropsychology reports by neuropsychologists, Dr Atkins and Dr Noad, which contain a footnote stating that the date specified on the report disclosed is in fact the date of the “initial clinical summary that was produced to assist the neurologist in the diagnostic process”. The reports then state that Drs Atkins and Noad have since reviewed the material and produced a final version. In response Rylands Garth stated in their letter of 20 April 2026; “It is our understanding that the clinical summary is an earlier draft of the neuropsychological assessment report which was disclosed. The disclosed report contains the content of the summary. The experts have only seen the disclosed report. Any earlier version of this report is clearly privileged.”. Then on 7 May 2026 Rylands Garth disclosed a copy of a joint email from Dr Noad and Dr Atkins dated 30 April 2026 in which they acknowledged the existence of the clinical summaries and confirmed these had previously been sent to Rylands Garth. These documents remain to be disclosed.[58]Mr Tracey also identifies that neuropsychological reports produced by a Dr Domone for 24 claimants contain the same footnote referring to the production of initial neuropsychological summaries.[59]In the circumstances the claims set out in the schedule in relation to the assessment summaries prepared by Dr Noad, Dr Atkins and Dr Domone stand struck out.[60]At paragraphs 51 to 54 Mr Tracey identifies documents disclosed by Rylands Garth after the deadline for compliance with the unless order. Under cover of letters dated 5, 9, and 12 February 2026 neuropsychological assessments for 36 claimants were disclosed. On 20 April 2026, Rylands Garth disclosed 4 further KC MR/DTI reports and 32 further versions of the KC MRI/DTI reports for claimants for whom a report was disclosed on 30 January 2026, together with other testing documents. On 20 April 2026, Rylands Garth disclosed the MEG scan report by Innovision for Joseph Trayfoot (Claim Form 1) without any explanation. At paragraph 9 of his Affidavit dated 30 January 2025 Mr Boardman stated that “All of the Innovision reports that have been produced have now been disclosed. There are some players who did not go through this testing, and if a report is not disclosed for them, it is because it does not exist” The report of Mr Trayfoot confirms this statement was incorrect. Rylands Garth also disclosed an undated letter from Dr McLoughlin to Dr Allder relating to an assessment of Richard Turner (Claim Form 4). These are all breaches of the unless order.[61]Lastly, at paragraphs 55 to 61 Mr Tracey deals with other documents, which in the absence of a complaint affidavit from Mr Boardman must be presumed to exist. I accept his evidence as reflected in the schedule.[62]The combined result of the proved non-compliance is set out in my summary at paragraph 30 above.

RL allegations of non-compliance

[63]RL allegations of non-compliance At paragraphs 39 to 50 of her witness statement dated 18 May 2026 Ms English sets out in detail the shortcomings in the disclosure provided by Rylands Garth which she has compiled into a schedule which identifies each allegation of non-compliance with the unless order. As I have previously observed, this schedule is the result of a meticulous review and cross referencing of the material which has been supplied by Rylands Garth and I accept its accuracy. Many of her complaints relate to the same classifications of documents as in RU, namely neurology interviews/transcripts, neurological assessments, brain imaging scans and raw data, neurology letters of diagnosis.[64]Ms English has responded to Mr Boardman’s evidence in her witness statement dated 17 July 2026 and has updated her schedule accordingly. At paragraph 12 of her witness statement, she states that given the previous concerns shared by the Court about Mr Boardman’s understanding of his disclosure duties, we asked the claimants if they were prepared to obtain affidavits, including statements of truth, from the various experts confirming that documents do not exist where Mr Boardman had asserted that was the position. The claimants refused to do this.[65]In the circumstances a review of the medical reports for reference to testing process documents (neurological assessments) that Rylands Garth assert do not exist was carried out. There were 22 claimants who were found to have disclosed a medical report that refers to a neurological assessment that was reviewed by the expert; where no such document has been disclosed and where the claimants assert they do not exist and 1 claimant who disclosed a medical report that refers to an MRI report that was reviewed by the expert; and where no such MRI testing document has been disclosed. These amount to breaches of the unless order and have been incorporated into the schedule.[66]As far as the King’s College DTI reports were concerned, on 24 April 2026 Rylands Garth informed the defendants that it had recently come to their attention that there were additional versions of DTI reports for 12 claimants and served version 5 DTI reports for those 12 claimants. Those version 5 reports were served late after the deadline of 13 February 2026, in breach of the order. Ms English also makes the valid point that Rylands Garth had previously asserted versions 2, 3 and 4 do not exist, which was a surprising assertion in the absence of any explanation and that Mr Boardman stated in his letter of 25 June 2026, that King’s College Hospital might be able to retrieve previous versions (i.e. 1, 2, 3 and 4). That can only mean - despite the claimants’ assertion to the contrary – that previous versions are very likely to exist but have not been served, which must amount to a breach of the Unless Order.[67]At paragraph 17 of her witness statement, Ms English notes the same issue with the neuropsychological assessment reports prepared by Dr Atkins, Dr Noad and Dr Domone as in the RU cases and identifies the 86 cases involved which have been incorporated in the schedule.[68]Lastley, at paragraph 25 of her witness statement Ms English deals with 24 testing documents which the claimants assert do not exist but to which reference has been found in the claimant’s medical records. In the absence of a compelling explanation as to why the references in those medical reports should not be accepted as accurate, a further breach of the unless order is made out.[69]The combined result of the proved non-compliance is set out in my summary at paragraph 31 above.

Relief from sanction

[70]Relief from sanction CPR 3.9 provides:
“Relief from sanctions 3.9 (1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need - (a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. (2) An application for relief must be supported by evidence.”
[71]The principles to be applied are derived from the well-known case, Denton v TH White [2014] 1 WLR 3926, in which the majority of the Court of Appeal approved a framework for considering applications for relief from sanctions. First, stage 1: identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with the relevant rule(s) of procedure [25]-[28]. Second, stage 2: consider why the default occurred [29]-[30]. Third, stage 3: evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application including in particular the factors in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the rule, i.e., to consider whether relief is appropriate in all the circumstances [31] [38].[72]Mr Boardman has filed witness statements dated 3 July 2026 in RL and 10 July 2026 in RU, in support of the applications for relief from sanction. They are both lengthy documents and much space is devoted to minimising the extent of the non-disclosure that I have found to exist. These witness statements predate the developments referred to at paragraphs 24 to 28 above.[73]Mr Boardman at paragraphs 144 and of his statement of 3 July 2026 and 99 of his statement of 10 July 2026 states: And at paragraphs 158 of his 3 July 2026 statement and at paragraph 113 of his statement of 10 July 2026 he states: Mr Boardman therefore accepts that he was responsible for the claimants’ disclosure obligations and that any breach of those obligations was not caused by the individual claimants but by him. There is no suggestion that any of the alleged breaches are due to the default, let alone wilful default, of the Claimants themselves. Rather the issues arise because of my conduct of the litigation or the involvement of a third-party. Likewise, I hope the Court will accept my assurance that, even if on occasion we have failed to meet the Court’s order, the large team of lawyers I lead have at all times been trying to approach this litigation in an open-handed way and disclose all relevant material in our possession and in the Claimants’ possession or control. However, having said that, I wish to be clear that I do not in my witness statement addressing compliance seek to minimise the importance of compliance. On the contrary, I expressly and candidly accept personal responsibility for ensuring disclosure obligations are met and do not seek to minimise the importance of compliance with court orders.

Denton Stage 1

[74]I have concluded that breaches of the unless orders in RU and RL were serious and significant. Having regard to the history giving rise to the orders set out earlier in this judgment and the repeated warnings issued by the court such a conclusion was inevitable. The breaches were in relation to an important issue in the proceedings, they were significant and widespread, and even now not properly explained. They have resulted in unnecessary delay to the progress of this litigation and have caused unnecessary costs to be incurred by the defendants.

Denton Stage 2

[75]Denton Stage 2 The note to CPR 3.9.5 in the White Book makes clear that this stage of the exercise is particularly important when the breach is serious or significant. The note also makes clear that, while there is no hard-edged definition of ‘good reason’, the examples of such reasons in decided cases are serious matters like debilitating illness, the period for compliance being unreasonably short, or delays outside of the control of the defaulting party.[76]Mr Boardman has sought to blame the defaults on third parties, such as KCH and Re:Cognition Health, that he had engaged to undertake testing together with his own mistaken understanding of the scope of the disclosure orders.[77]Neither of these reasons stands any degree of scrutiny. As I have already pointed out, it should have been apparent to Mr Boardman that documents were missing. To give two examples, first he must have known that there were different versions of the DTI reports, particularly as some were labelled version 5. Second, the existence of a neurology interview with Dr McLoughlin in the case of Richard Turner must have been evident from a reading of Dr Lashley’s letter. As set out in his witness statement of 25 June 2026, Dr Lashley’s letter referred specifically to Dr McLoughlin’s report of his interview on 8 November 2023. Nevertheless, Mr Boardman claims to have overlooked Dr McLoughlin’s report because he concluded that this was a reference to a condition and prognosis report, despite having instructed Dr Mavroudis to prepare the condition and prognosis report.[78]Even on Mr Boardman’s evidence, it is clear that steps were not taken to obtain relevant testing process documents from third parties until very late in day. All of this disclosure was obtained as part of Rylands Garth’s testing process for the purposes of this litigation and, therefore, was much simpler to acquire than other third-party records such as each claimant’s medical records. Mr Boardman chose to rely on Re:Cognition Health to obtain DTI reports from KCH. In such circumstances, it was incumbent on him to clearly stipulate the disclosure requirements and to check that there had been compliance and the extent of any searches for missing documents that had been carried out.[79]Mr Boardman has been repeatedly warned by the Court about the scope of his disclosure obligations and he has been given several opportunities to comply with the June 2024 order. His continued failure to grasp a fundamental element of civil litigation cannot in any circumstances amount to a good reason for the default.

Denton Stage 3

[80]Denton Stage 3 It is clear from the authorities that the overriding objective and the concept of justice lies at the heart of the third stage of the Denton test and when considering what is just, particular prominence should be given to factors (a) and (b). This much is clear from para 31 of Lord Dyson’s judgment in Denton:
“31 The important misunderstanding that has occurred is that, if (i) there is a non-trivial (now serious or significant) breach and (ii) there is no good reason for the breach, the application for relief from sanctions will automatically fail. That is not so and is not what the court said in the Mitchell case: see para 37. Rule 3.9(1) requires that, in every case, the court will consider “all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application”
. We regard this as the third stage. 32 We can see that the use of the phrase “paramount importance” in para 36 of the Mitchell case has encouraged the idea that the factors other than factors (a) and (b) are of little weight. On the other hand, at para 37 the court merely said that the other circumstances should be given “less weight” than the two considerations specifically mentioned. This may have given rise to some confusion which we now seek to remove. Although the two factors may not be of paramount importance, we re-assert that they are of particular importance and should be given particular weight at the third stage when all the circumstances of the case are considered. That is why they were singled out for mention in the rule. It is striking that factor (a) is in substance included in the definition of the overriding objective in rule 1.1(2) of enabling the court to deal with cases justly; and factor (b) is included in the definition of the overriding objective in identical language at rule 1.1(2)(f ). If it had been intended that factors (a) and (b) were to be given no particular weight, they would not have been mentioned in rule 3.9(1). In our view, the draftsman of rule 3.9(1) clearly intended to emphasise the particular importance of these two factors.”[81]Ms Rodway KC accepted that the fact that an application for relief is in respect of an unless order may well be a factor that militates against the grant of relief, see for example the judgment of Andrews J in Eaglesham v Ministry of Defence [2016] EWHC 3011 (QB) at [46]:
“The risk that was taken in not making sufficient effort to comply with the Unless Order was that judgment on liability would be entered with the result that the merits cannot be fully aired; but nobody could describe this as a claim which is of little or no merit. At the end of the day, Unless Orders should mean what they say. The Defendant knew the risk. Even though this was not a case of a deliberate flouting of a court order it is not an appropriate case in which to grant the Defendant any further indulgence. I therefore refuse the application, with the consequence that judgment will be entered on liability with damages to be assessed. There will need to be provision in the order for further directions in respect of the trial on quantum, and I will consider any further proposals that counsel make in that regard.”
[82]However, even in the case of an unless order the Court must balance all the factors and may grant relief if refusing it would be disproportionate to the default for which the applicant is responsible, see the judgment of Deputy Master Francis in Cavadore Ltd and another v Jawa [2021] EWHC 3382 (Ch) at [46] where having weighed the factors militating against the grant of relief against those prayed in aid for the grant of relief,

the judge stated:

“I have anxiously considered all the factors which weigh in the balance on either side. The decision is not an easy one. However, I have concluded that relief ought to be granted. I am impressed in particular by the fact that the prejudice to the claimants arising from the loss of their claim, if relief is refused, would be disproportionate to the default for which they are responsible, serious though that is. In contrast I consider that any prejudice to the defendants from the grant of relief will be adequately met by the payment of judgment interest on the unsatisfied costs to which the defendants are entitled, together with an order that the claimants pay the defendants’ costs of all three applications. I am perturbed by the manner in which the claimants have pursued the applications to extend time for compliance with paragraph 4 of the Arkush Order, but ultimately satisfied that Mrs Georgallides has made genuine and concerted efforts to progress the funding arrangements and the claimants should be given a final opportunity for those efforts to be brought to fruition for the defendants’ benefit.”
[83]Every case will of course turn on its own facts. There are some important issues arising in this case which are relevant to the context in which I am being asked to exercise my discretion.[84]First, this is large scale litigation which has a particular element of public importance going beyond the individual claims. As I have previously pointed out, this litigation has the potential to greatly impact the way in which one of our National sports is conducted at amateur and professional levels. I of course recognise the countervailing public interest that litigation should be conducted efficiently. I also take into account that there are claims which do not stand struck out and will proceed. The defendants submit that this element of public interest can be met in the event that the remaining claims proceed. I do not necessarily accept that submission. It has been decided that this litigation will be resolved by way of test claims. It is therefore important that the test claims which are chosen properly reflect the nature of the common issues which the court will be asked to determine. While it is not necessary to have many test claimants it is important that they are carefully chosen from as wide a sample as possible, see Lancaster and others v Peacock QC [2020] EWHC 1231 (Ch).[85]It is also an important factor that this litigation is still a long way from trial and that a fair trial can still take place. I recognise the delay and unnecessary expense caused to date, but this delay can be remedied going forward by tight case management and the unnecessary expense can be compensated in costs. In this regard the Court can take comfort in the fact that the claimants are no longer to be represented by Rylands Garth. Had Mr Boardman remained the solicitor conducting this litigation, I could not have had any confidence that future court orders would be complied with timeously or at all. There is a particular responsibility upon those who conduct litigation on this scale to conduct it with openness and probity, any failure to do so puts the very system they seek to utilise under unnecessary stress and detracts resources from other deserving litigants. In the circumstances the appointment of new solicitors with sufficient resources to conduct this litigation is another important factor to weigh in the balance.[86]I also take into account that the serious breaches I have identified were not caused by the individual claimants. Given the vulnerability of many of these claimants, it might be said that they should not be punished for the sins of their legal representative. In Training Compliance Ltd v Dewse [2001] C.P. Rep 46 at [66], Peter Gibson LJ held that:
“It seems to me that, in general, the action or inaction of a party’s legal representatives must be treated under the Civil Procedure Rules as the action or inaction of the party himself. So far as the other party is concerned, it matters not what input the party has made into what the legal representatives have done or have not done. The other party is affected in the same way; and dealing with a case justly involves dealing with the other party justly. It would not in general be desirable that the time of the court should be taken up in considering separately the conduct of the legal representatives from that which the party himself must be treated as knowing, or encouraging, or permitting.”
[87]This view reflects the harsher policy resulting from the Jackson reforms that the court’s ability to enforce procedural requirements should not be hampered by sparing litigants the consequences of their lawyer’s defaults. In many cases the client’s remedy would be against their legal representative and that prejudice would not overcome the need to apply the sanction; see for example the remarks of Turner J in, Gladwin v Bogescu [2017] 4 Costs LO 437 at [32]:
“32. Of course, I fully recognise the prejudice which would be occasioned to the claimant in having to look to his advisers for redress and the potential disadvantages, including the loss of privilege, which this entails. I accept that this is a factor to be borne in mind but, in the circumstances of this case, it does not attract sufficient weight, when taken in combination with all the other relevant factors to be taken into account when seeking to apply the overriding objective, to prevail.”
[88]As was recognised in Badejo v Cranston [2019] Costs LR 1993by Fancourt J at [20]:
“20. The claim that may be brought against the solicitors is of course a harder claim to bring and prove, and would be more expensive for the appellant, and the measure of damages recovered may well be less than the full amount of the claim against the respondent.”
[89]In Welsh v Parnianzadeh [2004] EWHC Civ 791 at [32], Mance LJ observed: On the basis that there was no prejudice to the defendant in this case the court permitted the claim to proceed. “… a claimant who is reduced to a claim which would perforce be on a percentage basis for loss of chance against her legal advisers is not only suffering a real loss in the sense of being caused further delay and expense, but is also suffering a real reduction in the value of her claim.”[90]The case of Hayden v Charlton [2011] EWCA Civ 791 is referred to in the note to CPR 3.9.13 in the White Book. In Hayden the claimants sued the defendants for libel in respect of allegations made on a website. The claimants failed to comply with directions or with subsequent unless orders and the judge struck out the claim on the basis that the claimants had lost interest in it and for it to continue would be an abuse. On appeal, the claimants were permitted to adduce evidence that they had not been kept informed by their solicitors, despite their attempts to contact them, and they had not known the true position until after the strike out had been ordered. The Court of Appeal accepted that evidence as an important factor in favour of granting relief. However, it also took into account other factors, including the considerable burden the proceedings had placed upon the defendants, who were litigants in person. That hardship would have no remedy if relief was granted whereas the claimants would have an opportunity for redress against their former solicitors if the appeal was refused. Overall, it was held that the less unfair result was for the claim to stay struck out.[91]I take from the cases, the fact that individual claimants are blameless and that the default is that of their solicitors, with the result that the claimants would have to rely on a claim for loss of chance against their solicitors, are both factors which are capable of founding an application for relief from sanction.[92]Coming back to the scale of this litigation. In all my experience of managing substantial group claims I have never been presented with such a situation. I asked counsel if their researches had unearthed any examples of cases where the rights of large numbers of claimants fell to be considered in the context of sanctions. Ms Goolamali referred me to one of my own decisions, Collier & Ors v Stellantis [2026] EWHC 1189 (KB). This was an application by approximately 5,000 claimants to join the Group Register in the Nox Emissions litigation after the cut-off date. The claimant’s application to extend time was in effect an application for relief from sanction. The application was considered applying the Denton criteria. I found that the claimants had failed to comply with a clear and unambiguous provision namely the cut-off date in the GLO and had failed to issue their claim forms in time. An important factor in refusing relief from sanctions was the stage at which proceedings had reached and where the liability trial had been concluded. Overall in this case I considered there would be prejudice to the orderly conduct of proceedings if the application for relief succeeded. The facts of this case were a long way from those of the present case. Ultimately, it seems to me the same principles apply no matter how many litigants there are; however the number of litigants may amount to a separate factor in the balancing exercise.[93]If the claimants were forced to rely upon their remedies against Rylands Garth I have no doubt that would lead to a very large number of individual claims in which the value of the loss of chance would have to be determined. This in turn would place significant additional pressure on the resources of the court.[94]It is well recognised that a court may grant relief from sanctions on terms where the circumstances make that appropriate, see the note in the White Book at 3.9.15.[95]Pulling the strings together, I recognise that there are some exceptional factors arising in respect of these claims which would support granting relief from sanctions, in particular;(i) that this large scale litigation is at an early stage,(ii) that it is still possible to have a fair trial,(iii) the litigation is of particular wider public importance and requires a proper range of test claims,(iv) new solicitors have been appointed in which the court can have confidence, and(v) the vulnerable claimants are not responsible for the default and forcing them to rely on their remedy against their former solicitor would be unfair and place additional pressure on the court’s resources.[96]I accept the very real prejudice caused to the defendants by the delay and costs they have incurred to date, however this prejudice can be overcome by ongoing rigorous case management and the imposition of a requirement for their costs of enforcing the claimants disclosure obligations to date to be paid in full.[97]Any grant of relief would also have to be conditional on the claimants complying with their disclosure obligations under the existing court orders before the next CMC. Given the appointment of new solicitors this condition will ensure compliance with the existing orders which is a fundamental requirement of CPR 3.9 (1) (b).[98]I therefore conclude that, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, it is in the interests of justice that relief from sanction be granted in respect of all claims which are deemed to be struck out. Such relief will be subject to at least the two conditions I have identified above. There will be a further hearing at which the precise terms of the conditions will be formulated. I would ask the parties to liaise with each other and my clerk to obtain the earliest possible date.

Order

(i) When or by when will Mr Boardman’s retainer be terminated? 25. The Committee will withdraw its instructions from RGL as soon as KP Law confirms that it is ready to come on the record, it is intended for KP Law to do so by 7 August 2026. 26. As soon as possible after that date, the Committee will file a Notice of Change confirming KP Law as new solicitors on the record and bring about the termination of Mr Boardman / RGL’s retainer. The expectation is that these steps will be completed by or before 7 August 2026 also.(ii) The identify of the firm or firms that will replace RGL? 27. The Committee will appoint KP Law to replace RGL. Milberg London LLP have already been appointed as independent counsel to the Committee.(iii) When will the replacement firm(s) be appointed? 28. The Committee will appoint KP Law as soon as the necessary documents have been completed and signed with the intention that this is by 7 August 2026. Milberg London LLP have already been appointed as independent counsel to the Committee on 29 July 2026 and are assisting with the orderly transfer of the proceedings.(iv) In the event that no firm will accept instructions what arrangements are proposed for the conduct of this litigation? 29. The Committee considers that this does not apply as KP Law have agreed to accept instructions and come on the record.(v) In the event that the Court were to grant relief from sanction who would be responsible for ensuring compliance with any conditions relating to disclosure which might be made? 30. The solicitor on the record will be responsible for ensuring compliance with any conditions relating to disclosure which might be made if the Court were to grant relief from sanctions. It is intended that this will be KP Law.” IV. NEXT STEPS the following steps: V. ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE ORDER A summary of the Court’s conclusions