Alfie Collier & Ors v Stellantis Auto SAS & Ors [2026] EWHC 1189 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1189 (KB)Case No KB-2024-004176
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 2 June 2026
Before
SENIOR MASTER COOK
Between
Mr Alfie Collier & OrsClaimantsStellantis Auto SAS & OrsDefendants
Andrew Smith KC (instructed by Bingham Long Solicitors Ltd) for ClaimantsSamuel Ritchie (instructed by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing date: 14 May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 2 June 2026 by circulation to the parties’ representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Senior Master Cook :

[1]This is an Application brought on behalf of approximately 5,000 Claimants [the BL Claimants] by which they seek to be added to the Peugeot/Citroen/DS NOx Emissions Group Litigation [PCD GLO or GLO]. This PCD GLO was made by me on 22 January 2024 as part of what has come to be known as the Pan-NOx Emissions Litigation.[2]The manging judges of the Pan-NOx litigation are Lady Justice Cockerill and Mr Justice Constable, I am the managing Master. Following a Pan-NOx case management conference before the Managing Judges in March 2024, there are effectively two categories of Diesel NOx GLO "ALGLOs" and "Non-ALGLOs". ALGLO stands for "Additional Lead Group Litigation". The ALGLOs are Mercedes, Ford, Nissan/Renault, and Peugeot/Citroen. The remaining Diesel NOx Emissions GLOs are Non-ALGLOs. The present GLO has proceeded to a trial on liability which has recently concluded, with judgment awaited and subject to the outcome of that trial, there will be a trial of quantum in October 2026.[3]The application notice is dated 12 January 2026 and issued on 20 January 2026, it is supported by the witness statement of James Twigg dated 16 December 2025. Mr Twigg is a solicitor advocate who has conduct of these proceedings on behalf of the BL Claimants.[4]The application is opposed by the Defendants on the basis that the Claim Form was served on the Defendants after the cut-off date provided by paragraph 46 of the PCD GLO and that it would not be appropriate to grant the Claimants relief from sanctions. The Defendants rely upon the witness statement of Mr James Norris-Jones dated 14 April 2026.[5]Mr Twigg asserts in his witness statement, and it is argued with some force by Mr Smith KC, that the Claim Form was in fact served in accordance with the provisions of the PCD GLO, alternatively that it would be appropriate to grant the BL Claimants relief from sanctions and permit the claims to be added to the Group Register.[6]The relevant factual background is not and in my view, cannot be the subject of dispute between the parties.

The GLO Cut-off Date

[7]Paragraph 46 of the PCD GLO provided, under the heading “Cut-off Date”, a clear and unambiguous requirement that “In order to be entitled to enter on to the Group Register, a Claimant whose claim falls within the scope of this GLO must have issued and served a Claim Form by 4 p.m. on 15 December 2024”.[8]As explained by Mr Norris-Jones in his witness statement, on 15 November 2024, Pogust Goodhead, one of two Lead Solicitors acting for claimants in the PCD Proceedings, wrote to his firm explaining that(i) delays were being experienced between issuing claim forms and receiving sealed versions for service from the Court, and(ii) this delay meant that claimants who had issued their claim before the cut-off date risked being excluded from the Group Register as a result of administrative reasons outside of their control.[9]In the circumstances, Pogust Goodhead proposed that, to avoid prejudice to potential claimants, paragraph 46 of the PCD GLO should be amended so that claims issued before the cut-off date would be eligible for entry onto the Group Register provided that they were served within 7 days of receipt of the sealed claim form from the Court. Pogust Goodhead stated that this was to avoid prejudice arising “purely for administrative reasons entirely outside their (and all parties’) control”.[10]Following this proposal the PCD Defendants agreed to an amendment to the GLO which was incorporated in a consent order dated 11 December 2024 and sealed on 11 February 2025. Paragraph 46 of the GLO was amended to provide:
“In order to be entitled to enter on to the Group Register, a Claimant whose claim falls within the scope of this GLO must have (i) issued a Claim Form by 4 p.m. on 15 December 2024; and (ii) served a Claim Form in one of the following ways: (a) Claim Forms sealed prior to 8 December 2024 must be served by 4 p.m. on 15 December 2024; and b) Where the sealed Claim Form issued in compliance with (i) is received from the Court on or after 8 December 2024, it must be served within 7 days of the Claimant receiving the sealed Claim Form from the Court.”
[11]It is abundantly clear that this was a narrow and pragmatic amendment designed to alleviate a particular issue identified by Pogust Goodhead with workload at the Court. Importantly, it did not extend the cut-off date, and it did not provide any long extension for service. Rather it provided a very short extension to address an administrative issue that was outside the control of the Claimants. The issue and service of the Claim Form.[12]On 2 December 2024 Mr Twigg wrote to the Defendants’ solicitor stating that he acted on behalf of approximately six thousand clients, giving his contact details and enquiring whether the Defendants’ solicitors had instructions to accept service, “given the need for proceedings to be issued and served shortly,”. The Defendants’ solicitor confirmed that they had instructions to accept service on 3 December 2024.[13]On 11 December 2024 Mr Twigg submitted the Claim Form to the Court using CE-File. On 13 December 2024 he wrote to the Defendants’ solicitor informing them that the Claim Form had been submitted, that he was waiting for the sealed documents to effect service and that he had been informed by the Court Office that “proceedings should be received back in a further 2 to 3 business days.”[14]What happened next is clear from the correspondence and the documents. On 16 December 2024 the Claimant’s solicitor received an e-mail headed “Filing Approval Case No KB-2024-002796.” The body of the e-mail read, “This is a notice to inform you that the filings filed in Case No. KB-2024-002796 have been accepted by the Clerk on 16-12-2024. You can view this filing using the following link”.[15]On 12 January 2025 at some point in the morning Mr Twigg accessed CE-File and downloaded the Claim Form and its schedules at 12.21 and served them by e-mail on the Defendants’ solicitor.[16]Given Mr Twigg’s previous indication in his letter of 11 December 2024, the Defendants’ solicitor immediately enquired when the Claimants’ solicitor had received the sealed Claim Form from the Court. At 1.20 Mr Twigg sent this response, “We refer to your email of 13:04 today. We can confirm that the same were obtained from CEFILE shortly prior to our email to you by way of service, please see the below screenshot which shows the time and date of download. We understand that the date of 11 December contained therein is simply the date that the documents were submitted to the Court, this date was also communicated to you in Paragraph 2 of our correspondence dated December 13 2023, a copy of which we enclose for ease of reference.”. This response prompted the Defendants’ solicitor to examine the court file in more detail. On 13 January 2025 the Defendants’ solicitor wrote to Mr Twigg, “our letter of 13 December 2024 stated "We have made enquiries with the Court office. and understand that proceedings should be received back in a further 2-3 business days". We can see from CE-file that claim number KB-2024-004176 was filed on 11 December 2024 and that the filing status was then updated on 16 December 2024. Please confirm as a matter of urgency when you received the email notification from the Court informing you that the filing of the claim form had been accepted.”[17]This enquiry prompted a response from Mr Twigg, “We can confirm that we were notified that the filing was accepted on 16 December 2024. The CEFlLE system was not accessed, nor the documents downloaded until January 12 (yesterday) when we immediately took steps to serve the same. Whilst we do not consider that there has been a breach of the previous arrangements with respect to service, if it is your client's position that service should have taken place within 7 days of December 16 2024, we can confirm that we would be amenable to agreeing a consent order in order to resolve this issue. Our proposal as set out above is intended to be a pragmatic attempt to resolve your concerns, and is made without prejudice to our client's position that service has been effected in compliance with the arrangements for the same.”[18]Mr Twigg’s response resulted the Defendants’ solicitor writing on 15 January 2025 making four observations concerning purported service of the Claim Form; “7. The Claim Form was issued on 11 December 2024 and in accordance with paragraph 46(b) of the GLO was therefore required to be served within 7 days of receipt of the sealed Claim Form from the Court. 8. On 13 December 2024, you informed us that you had "made enquiries with the Court office" and understood that ''proceedings should be received back in a further 2-3 business days". 9. We are aware from CE-File that the filing status for the Claim Form was, consistent with the Court's indication, updated on 16 December 2024 and you have since confirmed that you received an email notification from the Court informing you that the Claim Form had been accepted on 16 December 2024. 10. The sealed Claim Form was therefore available to download from CE-File on 16 December 2024 and this is the date on which it was received from the Court in accordance with paragraph 46 of the GLO. As such, the Claim Form should have been served by 24 December 2024. You did not, however, attempt to serve the Claim Form until 12 January 2025 with the result that the Claim Form was not served within the timeframe provided for by the GLO.” In the circumstances the Defendants’ solicitor contended that the Claim Form had not been served in accordance with the GLO and that the BL Claimants were not entitled to be entered onto the Group Register.

Relevant events thereafter

[19]On 20 January 2025 Mr Twigg responded setting out his argument as to why he was not in breach of the amended GLO:
“Whilst we accept receiving a communication from the Court on December 16 2024, notifying that the Claim had been accepted, this falls somewhat short of “receiving the sealed claim form from the Court.” as contained in the consent order. Adopting a plain and literal reading of the Consent Order, which will be the likely approach adopted by the Court, this firm was only in receipt of the sealed claim form when the same were accessed from the CEFILE system on January 12 2025. Under cover of our second email of January 12 2025, we enclosed thereto a ‘snippet’ which demonstrated the date and time on which the documents were downloaded. Any contention that our client has received the sealed claim form, merely because this firm had been notified that the claim was accepted, is not accepted, is factually incorrect and is bound to fail.”
Mr Twigg then stated, if he did not hear further with a consent order confirming his client’s position by 4pm 24 January 2025 he would issue an application seeking an order confirming that service was in accordance with the provisions of the GLO.[20]Mr Twigg’s deadline came and went. On 21 May 2025 he wrote to the Defendants’ solicitor threatening to make an application for relief from sanctions unless the Defendants confirmed within 48 hours that they would not oppose entry of his clients onto the Group Register.[21]On 30 September 2025 the BL Claimants’ solicitor wrote to the Defendant’s solicitor complaining of their lack of engagement and again threatening to make an application for relief from sanctions. A similar letter was written on 17 December 2025.[22]This application was eventually issued on 20 January 2026.

The Parties’ submissions

[23]On behalf of the BL Claimants, Mr Smith KC’s primary submission, as already foreshadowed, was that the requirements of the amended GLO in relation service of the Claim Form had been met. He submits that the Amended GLO means what it says: that the seven days for service is required once the sealed Claim Form is received from the Court. This means they have to actually have received it; not that it was available for downloading. He accepted that the sealed Claim Form was available for download from 16 December 2024 however, he pointed out that the notification from the Court did not state that the sealed Claim Form was available, just that it had been accepted by the Court.[24]Mr Smith KC also made reference to the Government website (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/hmcts-e-filing-service-for-citizens-and-professionals#filing), which indicates that the “acceptance” of a document means simply that it is accepted by the Court Service as being received and ex facie compliant with filing requirements. In particular he placed reliance on the following words:
“Once we have received your filing, you will receive a notification in the E-Filing service or an email, depending on what option your chose (see the create and manage your account guide). We will review the filing and send you another notification or email to say that it has been accepted or rejected. If rejected, we will explain why. It is usually that a form has been completed incorrectly, the incorrect fee has been paid or the correct document has not been sent. You will be able to resubmit rejected filings. Once your files have been accepted, you can monitor the progress of your case and see any sealed documents by searching for them on the E-Filing service (see the submit and manage your filings guide). For new cases you will also be sent a letter explaining what to do next, which will depend on what jurisdiction you have filed in.”
[25]Lastly, Mr Smith KC made reference to the language used by the Defendants’ solicitors in their letter of 27 January when they referred to being notified by Pogust Goodhead that “delays were being experienced between issuing claims and receiving sealed versions back from the Court for service …” He submitted that the wording was carefully chosen by them, to cater for the fact that there may not be constant monitoring, or errors by the Court. The words “received” and “receiving” mean of course arriving with the solicitors or parties as appropriate. In circumstances, the drafting was ambiguous and the Defendants should not be permitted to take advantage of any such ambiguity.[26]Next Mr Smith KC made submissions on what he termed the inconsistent position of the Defendants as to whether the BL Claimants were in fact on the Group Register and whether that had caused delay in making the application. This issue was quickly resolved in the course of the hearing. It would seem the BL Claimants had been entered onto a spreadsheet maintained by Pogust Goodhead as a working document when the claims were purportedly served but not onto the formal Group Register.[27]In the alternative Mr Smith KC submitted that either the GLO should be amended to read: “In order to be entitled to enter on to the Group Register, a Claimant whose claim falls within the scope of this GLO must have(i) issued a Claim Form by 4 p.m. on 15th December 2024; and(ii) served a Claim Form in one of the following ways: (a) Claim Forms sealed prior to 8th December 2024 must be served by 4 p.m. on 15th December 2024; and (b) where the sealed Claim Form issued in compliance with (i) is received from the Court on or after 8 December 2024, it must be served within 7 days of the Claimant receivingdownloading the sealed Claim Form from the court HM Courts E- Filing Service. The final date on which such claims must be entered on the Group Register will be 4 p.m. on 14th February 2025. Both cut off dates shall be subject to review by the Court at the hearing listed on 11 to 15 March 2024 or other subsequent hearing. Or that the BL Claimants should be granted relief from sanctions for failure to serve their Claim Form in time and to allow their claims to be added to the Group Register.[28]Mr Smith KC accepted that the Court would need to consider the principles set out in Denton v TH White & Ors [2014] 1 WLR 3926.[29]The seriousness and significance of the breach; Mr Smith KC accepted that breach was serious and significant but suggested there was a scale of seriousness which was mitigated by the explanation given by Mr Twigg.[30]Why the default occurred; Mr Smith KC pointed to what he said was the explanation given by Mr Twigg that the breach occurred because of a combination of a change of email address; and a misunderstanding of the meaning of the Court’s communications.[31]All the circumstances of the case; Mr Smith KC submitted the delay was only a few days, over the festive period. On the other hand he pointed out, if the BL Claimants are excluded from the Group Register, they will need to commence their own group proceedings. This he suggested, would result in an unfortunate position that there will be parallel proceedings being taken on identical issues to the current Group Proceedings. Therefore, having regard to the Overriding Objective, this is a waste of not only the parties’ costs, but the Court resources, and for no good reason.[32]Lastly, Mr Smith KC submitted that the PCD Defendants cannot point to any actual prejudice. The pool for lead cases is wide; and they cannot point to any additional work that they would require to carry out by adding these Claimants to the Group Register.[33]On behalf of the Defendants, Mr Ritchie accepted the relevant facts were not in dispute. However, he pointed to the evidential shortcomings in Mr Twigg’s witness statement I have already identified.[34]Mr Ritchie submitted that the BL Claimant’s submission that the Claim Form was received only when Mr Twigg accessed CE-File and downloaded the Claim Form was untenable as a matter of law, for the following reasons; i) The interpretation of the PCD GLO is a matter of the language used against the relevant legal background. Before turning to the meaning of “received” within the context of CE-File and the CPR, the absurdity of the Claimants’ position is clear from what the consequences of it would be. If the Claimants were correct, any firm acting for any number of claimants could have issued claim forms before 15 December 2024 and then unilaterally extended the date for service indefinitely by not accessing CE-File. This would fatally undermine the finality that the cut-off date is intended to achieve, with the potential for huge disruption to litigation on the scale of the Pan-NOx Emissions litigation. ii) The provision of a claim form by the Court is specifically dealt with by para 7.1 of CPR PD5C, the Practice Direction relating to CE-File. Para 7.1 provides:
“When a document has been issued in a relevant court, unless Practice Direction 3A paragraph 2.1 applies, the submitting party will receive a notification that the document is available on CE-File”
PD5C para 7.2 then provides:
“Unless the court orders otherwise, any document filed at a relevant court which is required to be served must be served by the parties and not the court”
PD5C para 7.2 then provides: iii) This position is repeated in the King’s Bench Guide, para 3.17 of the 2026 12th Edition is in the same terms as para 3.18 of the 10th Edition which was the current edition when the relevant Claim Form was filed:
“… When the court issues a claim form it will put a notice of issue on CE file asking the claimant to download a copy for service. The claimant is responsible for service of the claim form and any particulars of claim.” iv) In circumstances where it is many years since the Court issued paper claim forms with a physical seal on, there can be no doubt that the notice of issue on CE-File is the moment at which a claim form is received from the Court Office. v) This was also clearly understood to be the position by Pogust Goodhead, one of the firms of Lead Solicitors for the Claimants in the PCD GLO. In their letter dated 15 November 2024 explaining the issues which were arising with Pan-Nox Claim Forms being sealed, express reference was made to “delays of several weeks… in receiving the sealed version from the court office.”
Contrary to Mr Smith KC’s submission, it is apparent from the request that Pogust Goodhead made for an extension to the cut-off date in the PCD GLO that they were not referring to a delay in their ability to download the Claim Form which was otherwise available on CE-File but the date at which a sealed Claim Form became available and the CE-File notification was sent.[35]Mr Ritchie therefore submitted that the Claim Form was clearly served out of time and that the argument the GLO was impossible to comply with was inconsistent with Mr Twigg’s own evidence and simply not credible given the content of the CPR and the King’s Bench Guide.[36]Mr Ritchie noted that the application was framed as one for an extension of time under CPR 3.1(2) (a) or an application for relief from sanction whereas Mr Smith KC had introduced the argument that the GLO could be amended so that the relevant date from which the 7 days for service runs is the date of downloading the Claim Form from CE-File. He characterised this as an obvious attempt to avoid the need for an out of time extension which should be rejected.[37]Mr Ritchie accepted that whatever the way Claimants put their application they would have to address the Dentoncriteria. He submitted that it was also necessary to consider the purpose of the GLO and the cut-off date itself and referred me to the remarks of Thirlwall J in the PIP Breast Implant Litigation, Holloway and Others v Transform Medical Group and Others [2014] EWHC 1641 (QB) at [17]:
“These applications are made in the context of well publicised litigation which has been tightly managed for some eighteen months. The purpose of a GLO is to ensure the orderly and disciplined progress of large numbers of cases. The advantage to the claimants in this GLO is that relatively modest claims are managed together so that costs are not disproportionate to the individual claims. The advantage to the defendants is that they can ascertain the scope of the litigation and organise their affairs accordingly. Some of the case management decisions have been reached after a good deal of argument. Compliance with the orders has required rigour and has from time to time strained the resources of the legal representatives on all sides. The orders have been necessary to further the overriding objective, which I shall not repeat. Tandem Law knew all of that.”
And in relation to the cut-off date at [22]:
“The purpose of a cut-off date is to secure the good management of the claims subject to the GLO.”
[38]As to the Denton criteria, Mr Ritchie noted that Mr Smith KC accepted that the breach was serious and significant. As to whether there was a good reason for the delay he pointed to the lack of evidence as to why the notification from the Court on 16 December was not acted upon or why Mr Twigg did not access CE-File until 12 January 2025.[39]Lastly, Mr Ritchie submitted than when the Court considered the third Denton question, all the circumstances of the case, the overwhelming conclusion was that relief should be refused for the following reasons: i) The extraordinary delay in bringing the application. Despite knowing of the failure to serve the Claim Form the Claimants’ solicitor waited a year to issue the application and then took another month to serve it. ii) No explanation for the delay has been proffered other than the fact that discussions were taking place between the parties. The nature of those discussions does not excuse the failure to issue the application as soon as it was obvious the date for service had been missed. iii) There would be prejudice to the orderly conduct of the proceedings: the liability trial has happened with the Sample Vehicles chosen from the extant Group Register. The Quantum Trial is listed, again with Sample Claimants already chosen from the Group Register as it stands. iv) There would be prejudice to PCD: as explained in at paragraph 38(b) of Mr Norris-Jones’ witness statement, PCD has analysed the Group Register for claims that should not have been included and anticipates shortly issuing an application to resolve this. There appear to be similar issues with claims brought by Bingham Long and if they are permitted to be added to the Group Register PCD’s ability to issue an application will inevitably be delayed by further data analysis and correspondence that will be required. This is unfair in circumstances where, if Bingham Long had complied with the Court’s order, that process would have been undertaken in line with the assessment of those who are on the Group Register. v) There is the potential risk of opening the floodgates for other parties that are out of time to seek to join a Group Register which should have now been closed for 18 months. vi) Finally, to the extent that refusal causes additional costs to the Claimants, they would appear to have a strong claim for those against Bingham Long.

Discussion and conclusions

[40]The Claimants’ argument that the Claim Form was received only when Mr Twigg accessed CE-File on 12 January 2025 is in my judgment unsustainable for the reasons put forward by Mr Ritchie on behalf of the Defendants.[41]I accept the proposition advanced on behalf of the Defendant that any experienced litigator conducting litigation in the High Court would know that the use of CE-File is compulsory and would either know how the system worked or would take reasonable steps to find out.[42]Mr Ritchie referred to CPR PD 5C paras7.1 and7.2 which makes clear that the Court will send a notification to the submitting party that a document is available on CE-File and that the parties are responsible for serving documents which require to be served. These provisions replaced CPR PD 51O which was in force at the relevant time. Para 8.1 of PD 51O provided:
“8.1 The Court will electronically return the sealed and issued claim form, appeal notice or originating application to the parties Electronic Working on line account and notify the party that it is ready for service.”
If anything that Practice Direction was even clearer, however the process remains the same. It is this process which would have informed the drafting of the GLO cut off provisions.[43]It must also follow that the Claimant’s submission that the GLO was impossible to comply with must be rejected. The Claim Form was received from the Court on 16 December 2024 in accordance with the GLO.[44]I now turn to consider the alternative application for an extension of time and/or relief from sanction.[45]Whichever way the Application is put it is clear that the Denton Test applies.

The First Stage

[46]Having regard to paragraph [35] of Mr Twigg’s witness statement:
“[35] I accept that a failure to comply with a court order is a serious breach. Any failure to abide by a provision of the CPR, or a court order, will naturally be serious. It must however follow that there is a scale of severity upon which breaches should be viewed, and, on the face of it, viewed in isolation, a failure to have issued and served a claim form by 24 December 2024 in circumstances where there was service by 12 January 2025, is significant. The difference is a period of 19 days and well within the 4 months otherwise provided for by the CPR.”
I have no hesitation in concluding the breach was serious and significant.[47]I do not accept Mr Twigg’s argument that the delay of 19 days puts the breach at the lower end of the scale of seriousness because it is otherwise with in the 4 months otherwise provided by the CPR. The GLO in this case was made on 22 January 2024. The GLO was well publicised and provided for review and update of the Group Register on a quarterly basis. The cut-off date was clearly stated,

The Second Stage

[48]In the words of Mr Twigg at paragraph [39] of his witness statement:
“[39] There has certainly been no malice or ill-will, nor has there been any attempt to obtain a tactical or procedural advantage in the litigation. This firm had issued proceedings, and not complied with a relatively strict court order modifying the ordinary operation of the CPR over the festive period.”
[49]The cut-off date is an important provision of the PCD GLO made under CPR Part 19, see the remarks of Thirlwall J in the PIP Breast Implant Litigation at paragraph [41] above. For the reasons already given I do not accept that there was compliance with the modified GLO. The breach was serious and significant and it has been clear since the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537; [2014] 1 WLR 795 that “overlooking a deadline, whether on account of overwork or otherwise, will rarely be a good reason” (at [41]) and nor will “well-intentioned incompetence” (at [48]). In the circumstances Mr Twigg’s statement that there was “no malice or ill-will” cannot possibly amount to a good explanation. The Third Stage Further observations on the evidence of Mr Twigg

The Third Stage

[50]In the course of the hearing it was necessary for me to remind Mr Smith KC of the actual evidence provided by Mr Twigg in his witness statement. In relation to the issue of the Claim Form Mr Twigg’s only direct evidence was:
“13. As I have said above, the claim form was submitted to the court on 11 December 2024. This was using the CE-File platform. For the reasons explained in more detail below, I accessed CE-File on 12 January 2025 and at that point received the sealed claim form from the court. By email on that same day, 12 January 2025, I served the sealed claim form on Cleary in the manner they stated was permitted ("JMT1 34"). 14. The same day, Cleary replied to make enquiries as to when we had received the sealed claim form from the court ("JMT1 35"). I responded that day to explain that they claim form was received once I had accessed CE-File on 12 January 2025 ("JMT1 36"). 15. On 13 January 2025, Cleary wrote to explain that their position was that the 'filing status' of the claim was updated on 16 December 2024 ("JMT1 37") and requesting when we had received an email notification from the court that the filing of the claim form had been accepted. ("JMT1 38"). 16. In response to Cleary's email of 13 January 2025, I replied to confirm that we had been notified by the court on 16 December 2025 that the filing was accepted, but that I had not actually accessed the CE-File until 12 January 2025 ("JMT1 39").”
In relation to what he termed the “Reason for Default” and service of the Claim Form Mr Twigg’s only direct evidence was:
“36. In early 2024, my primary email address was changed from james@binghamssolicitors.com ("the Old Email Address") to james@binghamlong.co.uk. I retained access to the Old Email Address as this account was the registered email address for CE-File. This essentially meant that the Old Email Address was used solely for CE-File notifications and was intentional to ensure that no filing was overlooked due to the large number of emails that are received each day. 37. The Old Email Address did not have a high amount of traffic to it. On Sunday 29 December 2024 when checking my inbox for the Old Email Address, access was refused. Unbeknownst to me, Bingham Long's IT provider had implemented multi-factor authentication without prior warning, which had the effect of preventing access to key systems including the Old Email Address. I flagged this on 29 December 2025, however there was a delay in resolving the same due to the festive period, as such access was fully restored on 6 January 2025. 38. After returning from the festive break on 2 January 2025 I started to go through my emails, including those which had been sent to the Old Email Address.. As a result of this, the CE-File on the present case was not checked until 12 January 2025, at which point the sealed documents were identified, downloaded, and served in accordance with the agreed requirements for service.”
The balance of Mr Twigg’s witness statement consisted of argument and argument is not evidence.[51]As is made clear in the note to CPR 23.6 in the White Book:
“23.6.2 In many instances, the subject matter of an application will be apparent on the formal procedural documents and all of the material requiring consideration by the court will be contained therein, apart from such additions as may be found in the legal submissions of the parties. However, in many instances the moving party will be required to establish matters of fact if they are to be entitled to the relief they seek, or the respondent party will be expected to establish facts which may ground their arguments in opposition. Therefore, on proceedings begun by application notice, evidence will be required, especially where matters of fact are contested.”
[52]Given the nature of this application and the issues raised by the Defendants’ solicitor in correspondence, one might have expected Mr Twigg’s witness statement to deal with some important issues. Firstly, the nature and extent of his previous experience of CE-File; he simply mentions he had a specific e-mail address for CE-File notifications, a fact which might lead one to suspect he was very familiar with CE-File’s use and operation. Secondly, he does not deal directly with whether or when he received the CE-File notification sent by the Court on 16 December 2024. Thirdly he does not explain why he expected the Court to send him the sealed Claim Form instead of using the link provided to download the claim form, which he did on 12 January 2025. Fourthly, he does not begin to explain the relevance of being unable to access his inbox between the 29 December 2024 and 2 or 6 January 2025.[53]I have to conclude that Mr Twigg’s evidence in relation to these highly important issues is at best opaque. In the circumstances I can only conclude that there has been extraordinary delay in bringing this Application. As is clearly provided in PD 23A, para 2.5 ) provides that every application should be made as soon as it has become clear that it is “necessary or desirable to make it”. The existence of without prejudice discussions between the parties should have been explored in the context of an issued application. In any event, even on the Claimant’s own case, these discussions had ceased by 10 June 2025, which was 7 months before the Application was issued.[54]Turning then to consider all the circumstances of case, I accept Mr Ritchie’s submission that there would be prejudice to the orderly conduct of the proceedings for the reasons he put forward, namely the prejudice that flows in relation to the selection of Sample Claimants given the conclusion of the liability trial and the fact that the Quantum trial has been listed with the Sample Claimant’s already chosen from the Group Register.[55]Lastly, I accept Mr Ritchie’s submission that if the Application were to be granted there would be the potential risk of other parties who are out of time seeking to join the Group Register long after it has been closed.[56]In the circumstances I conclude there has been a serious and substantial breach for which no good explanation has been provided and where all the circumstances militate against granting relief. The Application will be dismissed.

Cited in 1 later judgment