Humphries v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary & Anor [2026] EWHC 1928 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1928 (KB)Case No KB-2025-002787
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 27/07/2026
Before
MASTER STEVENS
Between
Bethany Theresa HumphriesClaimantChief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary (1)DefendantsNeil Brooker (2)Defendant
Bethany Theresa Humphries, the Claimant, acting in person for in personNicholas Pilsbury (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for Second DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 27 th May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 4pm on 27 th July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MASTER STEVENS

Master Stevens:

[1]This judgment relates to a strike out and/or summary judgment application dated 16th February 2026, brought by the Second Defendant, a practising solicitor whom the Claimant instructed, via the law firm that employed him, Reed Solicitors LLP (“Reeds”) in December 2024. Although I heard a similar application at the same time, brought by the First Defendant, I provided an extempore decision on that application at the end of the hearing that I would not strike it out in its totality, and will not touch further upon it in this judgment, as it is being dealt with by way of separate Order.[2]Proceedings are at an early stage, as the pleadings have only recently closed. Originally there were multiple other Defendants, but currently there are just two, although a reinstatement application has been made by the Claimant in respect of others struck out by Mr Justice Lavender on 24th September 2025. The particular dispute with the Second Defendant is narrowly defined, but the overall context of the claims is complex and wide-ranging.[3]The issues have become rather muddled, because although the Claim Form was endorsed with brief Particulars of Claim, the Claimant subsequently filed a witness statement with the Court consisting of 837 pages. On 22nd August 2025 Mr Justice Dove directed the Claimant to serve a Case Summary of no more than 2000 words. In response to that the Claimant filed a 7 page case summary dated 11th September 2025, a 9 page revised Case Summary dated 16th October 2025 and a 2 page addendum to the revised Case Summary dated 9th November 2025. These documents are in addition to Replies to both the Defence of the First Defendant and that of the Second Defendant. The hearing bundle was over 5200 pages long. Yet more documents were submitted by the Claimant, after the hearing on 17th June 2026 and prior to this judgment, but I already had sufficient material to reach a decision, and it is not due process to allow additional materials to be submitted after a hearing unless they have been formally requested.[4]In addressing the issues this judgment is divided into the following parts:• Factual background and chronology (paragraphs 5-9)• Summary of claims and defence (paragraphs 10-15)• The law on strike out and summary judgment applications (paragraphs 16-30)• The legal test on amendment (paragraphs 31-41)• The standards expected of a litigant in person (paragraph 42)• Submissions on the strike out/summary application by the Second Defendant (paragraphs 43-56)• Submissions on the strike out/summary judgment application by the Claimant (paragraphs 57- 60)• My conclusions on the application as filed, and the oral application for permission to amend (paragraphs 61-77)• Costs submissions (paragraphs 78-82)• Costs rules (paragraphs 83-86)• Costs decision(paragraphs 87-96) FACTUAL BACKGROUND & CHRONOLOGY[5]In essence the Claimant asserts that until around December 2017 her life was going pretty well. She had a longstanding ambition to qualify as a solicitor or legal executive, having been a legal secretary in a conveyancing team for a considerable time, and had commenced CILEX training. Thereafter she became embroiled in an extremely unpleasant dispute with two local families, each of whom contacted the police about her behaviour, which she maintains was malicious and completely without foundation. The police investigated 2 incidents on 26th and 27th March 2018. She was arrested and taken to the police station in relation to the allegations concerning 27th March 2018, but ultimately no further action was taken. Her legal employer provided an alibi in respect of the second incident, and the Claimant relies on an email from PC Davey dated 22nd May 2018 stating the Claimant was not responsible for the alleged events on 27th March 2018, to support her assertion the allegations were baseless. The Claimant maintains she was not aware of the investigation concerning the incident on the previous day until disclosure of some documents in 2024.[6]In July 2024 another police investigation began against her in respect of a further dispute between the Claimant and one of the families that had complained in 2018. She was arrested on suspicion of stalking involving fear of violence, and as part of that investigation the police took various documents from her home which are material to this claim.[7]Initially a colleague of the Second Defendant acted on the Claimant’s criminal defence, but instructions were subsequently transferred to the Second Defendant. He acted for about 3 weeks before the police announced on 12th January 2025 they would take no further action. Thereafter, the police arranged to return the documents which had been seized in connection with the investigation.[8]The Claimant asserts that the significance attached to the documents returned by the police, is that the seized material contains the evidence she needs to defend herself on a return hearing date in November 2026 for another Stalking Protection Order imposed on her by a court in Bristol. It would probably not be an overstatement to say she is terrified that the “chain of custody” of the documents has been broken, such that she will be unable to prove that the police have tampered, removed or destroyed some of her key evidential material, exposing her to far greater risk that she cannot clear her name in court in November, and get her life back on track with her legal career, nor restore her personal reputation and standing in the community and with wider family and friends. The Claimant blames the Second Defendant for creating that risk, she says by not allowing her to inspect and verify the completeness of the returned materials contemporaneously which she says has created loss, albeit that these proceedings also include allegations against the First Defendant for their part in seizing and controlling the material in the first place. The Claimant records that she was of good character until her arrest in 2018 and that she has subsequently been arrested up to 17 times without any charges, has lost 5 jobs because of the arrests and her mental health has been severely impaired as well as the events causing her marriage breaking down.[9]The chronology is as follows: Date Event (C = Claimant and D2 = Second Defendant) 26th March 2018 Complaint to police that C broke into a private residence, assaulted a 12 year old boy and stole a pet…C states she was unaware of this complaint until following disclosure in May 2024 27th March 2018 Complaint to police that C kicked a door in and took a dog from one of the 2 families with whom there had been a long-running dispute. C arrested and released the following day without charge. 26th April 2018 C convicted for sending offensive/indecent/obscene menacing messages/matters, contrary to section 127 (1)(a) and (3) of the Communications Act 2003 and made the subject of a two year restraining order with conditions not to contact certain members of the two families with whom there had been the historic dispute 17th July 2024 C arrested regarding an allegation of stalking with a fear of violence 19th December 2024 C emails D2 C complains that the police are holding onto her civil file of evidence as she believes that the police think without it she cannot pursue her case against them. “The only items I do not have copies of are two memory sticks with evidence, a SIM card and photos of the [first 12 year old said to have been attacked by C] when he was taking pictures”[of her home]. (Highlighted emphasis added for this judgment) 12th January 2025 @17.45 Police communicate decision to Reeds that they have decided to take no further action in respect of C and will arrange return of documents. Bail conditions removed 12th January 2025 @20.09 C sends an e-mail to DC Andrews, D2 and a PSD Investigator saying, “You will now receive a letter before action adding you and everyone from Feb onwards to my claim to include all civilians and officers. Where are my stolen belongings you thief and criminal and liar?” 12th January 2025@ 21.29 C emails DC Ashleigh Andrews, copying in D2 and others employed by D1, requesting the police “send” seized items to D2 so she can “review the items in your presence and confirm what has been taken or potentially stolen.” C explains this is to avoid accusations regarding missing items. (Highlighted emphasis added for this judgment) C attaches a draft letter before action and the cover email includes wording addressed to the DC such as “Please don't walk dog shit all through my house when you break in again tomorrow. I might not be here but my brother is so he can assist you with anything you feel you want to steal from me or my family. Should I tell my children to hide their Christmas presents or are they safe from thieving police officers? Your continued attempts to cover up these crimes are, frankly compound in the original wrongdoing. By doing so, you have inadvertently widened the scope of the claim and implicated individuals who are not initially part of the case.” 13th January 2025 @12.19 D2 advises C by email that he received 2 emails from her the previous day requesting that the police return belongings to the office of Reeds so she could examine them in “our presence”. D2 confirms they can perform that task “if the police are happy to”. D2 says “We would charge an hour's work for making the arrangements and attending upon you and the police at our office, which would be £300 plus VAT ( total £360)”. (Highlighted emphasis added for this judgment) 21st January 2025 C emails D2 stating she wants to receive her belongings at his office “because I guarantee my belongings have been put through the shredder- do I believe the police are going to give me back evidence to take Cumine to court? No.” 3rd February 2025 @ 11.41 Vikki at Reeds emails C to say they have heard from the officer in the case who says they can return the property to the office the next day. She explains D2 is in court in the morning and asked what time would be convenient for C. 3rd February 2025 @ 12.12 C writes to Vikki by email stating that she is unwell and on a second lot of antibiotics and cannot leave her house. She also says she is preparing for an exam on 12 February 2025 and the earliest date she can attend the office is 13th February 2025 3rd February 2025 @ 12.30 C writes to Vikki by email stating concerns that “despite you sending emails requesting the return of my seized property, the police ignored every request- until today. Suddenly, in the wake of the PCC’s decision to investigate Sarah Crew, they are now eager to return my evidence as quickly as tomorrow.” 4th February 2025 @ 10.36 Vikki at Reeds emails C to say “We have heard from the Officer in the case who states that unfortunately he is not free on the 13th February 2025”, and who has explained in light of the current complaint it would be more suitable if C was not there at the same time as the police, and instead the Officer just drops off the property with a continuity form. “He is going to attend our offices today with his Sergeant and will leave your property with us for safekeeping” 4th February 2025 (untimed) D2’s Defence at paragraph 24 B states D1 attended and deposited the property at Reeds. Records confirm documents were accompanied by a property receipt and letter of continuity, at a time when neither C nor D2 were present. 4th February 2025 @ 11.27 (after police have attended) C emails Vikki at Reeds saying “ No. I don't want that please stop it. I'm on phone trying to through to you”. 4th February 2025@ 11.42 C emails D2 saying “ Can you stop this. I want to be with a solicitor and an officer when this is delivered. This whole case is about corruption. They stole civil evidence and I know what was in that bag. If anything missing and they just dropped it off what was the point of me paying you. I want and need to be there. This is so sneaky please stop it” (Highlighted emphasis added for this judgment) D2 states in its Defence at paragraph 32 f) that this was the first time C has stated that she wished to be present when the police attended to go through the returned documents 4th February 2025 @ 11.51 D2 emails C “From what I have been told, the police have already dropped off all your property at the office this morning. I am at court today so I was not present….” 4th February 2025 @ 11.59 C emails D2 stating “ This is a huge mistake as it breaks the chain. I write in the strongest possible terms to object to the proposed return of my property without my presence particularly as I have paid for an appointment to facilitate a proper handover.. By allowing the police to drop off my property without my presence and independent verification, you may be complicit in” there followed a list that can be summarised as …breach of legal professional conduct, potential breach of section 19 of PACE, a failure to uphold the principle of chain of custody and potential breach of contract... “Please confirming that you will follow my instructions and refuse to accept my property without my presence if you have already accepted this can you arrange for it to go back to them and then delivered when I am there”, . 4th February 2025 @ 12.02 C emails D2 stating, “ This is not what I wanted- so if something is missing, where does this leave me? Who is responsible? I paid you the money so I could attend the office for the specific reason of avoiding this as I don't trust them….” 4th February 2025 Telephone attendance note of C’s husband calling D2 requesting that “the property be returned to the police and then resent when Mrs Humphreys is present”. D2 states “the police will not likely agree to this… property is in the office for collection and she can go through it. It was delivered shortly after police indicated they would be dropping it off" 4th February 2025 @ 12.33 C emails D2 “I am beyond devastated. I'm writing to formally object to the police dropping off my evidence without my presence, as this puts my case at serious legal risk. I currently have a warrant summons application at the Magistrates Court being reviewed. If crucial evidence, such as the memory sticks and photographs, is missing, I will no longer be able to prove Sgt Cumine took thecash from [named individual]. This could have devastating consequences” 4th February 2025 @ 14.01 C emails D2 “Would you please let me have copies of all the emails relating to this? Especially, I want to know who you arranged this with. Why did you not seek confirmation from me before you agreeing to this? I am perplexed as I paid for this specifically to avoid the very situation I find myself in now.” 4th February 2025 @ 14.55 C emails D2 .. “I don't understand why you accepted this and didn't even try to call me… THERE CAN BE NO MISTAKE FROM MY INSTRUCTIONS YESTERDAY … I had concerns that critical evidence- particularly memory sticks… might be missing. Provide Me With a Full Inventory… I need to know who agreed to this handover and you overrode my instructions…” 5th February 2025 @ 09.23 C emails D2 “ I'm devastated that my very clear instructions were completely ignored, and rather than being contacted to confirm my position, a decision was made at speed that has resulted in severe damage to my case. Vicky emailed me at around 10:30 AM- why did she not call me instead of such an urgent and serious decision was being made? By the time I even saw the e-mail at around 11:30 AM, the police had already been and gone.” 11th February 2025 @ 15.37 C writes to D2 “I am writing to follow up on my previous emails regarding the mishandling of my evidence, the breach of my clear instructions, and the failure to maintain chain of custody safeguards. Despite the serious legal consequences of these actions, I have yet to receive a substantive response.” 12th February 2025 @ 15.08 D2 writes to C “DC Andrew indicated to us that his position was that it would not be appropriate to attend the office with you present due to the ongoing complaint that you had made against the police force. He also indicated that the property would be returned in the original evidence bags and could be returned the same day. Considering his indication, there was little merit in trying to negotiate another date for the property to be returned. You had made it clear to us that you wanted your property returned as soon as possible. I was of the view that it was in your interest have the property returned. I asked Vicky to e-mail you to advise you of the situation. I understand that DC Andrews and his Sergeant attended the office, although I was not present that day due to other commitments so I do not know what time they attended. I note that you have not yet collected the property. I have had a cursory look at returned items which consist of paperwork, a mobile phone, and a laptop. The property remains in our office in the condition that it was returned. When you intend to collect it?” 16th February 2025 @ 13.23 C emails both Defendants stating she is writing a “Letter Before Action” in accordance with the pre-action protocols “to formally request full disclosure of all evidence records, inventory lists, and chain of custody documents concerning the unlawful seizure and subsequent return of my property on 17th July 2024” 18th February 2025 @ 15.15 D2 emails C to say Reeds cannot store property indefinitely and that he does not “propose to prepare an inventory for your property. It has been left in the same condition as it was when handed over by the police. Once you have collected it, if there is anything you think is missing or anything else the police should have returned to you, you should contact the police directly.” 28th March 2025 C collected her telephone and laptop from Reeds, but said she would not take the documents November 2026 Return hearing date for another Stalking Protection Order imposed on C by Bristol Magistrates Court SUMMARY OF CLAIMS & DEFENCE[10]Due to the proliferation of documents created by the Claimant, which is one of the complaints of the Second Defendant, the particular allegations and causes of action brought against that Defendant, have been hard to pin down. It is trite law that all the pleaded causes of action should be contained in the Statements of Case and no other document.[11]I also remind myself of the ruling in Towler v Wills [2010] EWHC 1209, where Teare J’s analysis of the purpose of pleadings is uncontroversial and helpful. He held, “The purpose of a pleading or statement of case is to inform the other party what the case is that is being brought against him. It is necessary that the other party understands the case which is being brought against him so that he may plead to it in response, disclose those of his documents which are relevant to that case and prepare witness statements which support his defence. If the case which is brought against him is vague or incoherent he will not, or may not, be able to do any of those things. Time and costs will, or may, be wasted if the defendant seeks to respond to a vague and incoherent case. It is also necessary for the Court to understand the case which is brought so that it may fairly and expeditiously decide the case and in a manner which saves unnecessary expense. For these reasons it is necessary that a party’s pleaded case is a concise and clear statement of the facts on which he relies; it is not fair and just that the Defendant cannot be sure of the case he has to meet. It may well be that, with appropriate legal advice, the Claimant could have pleaded a concise, clear and particularised case against the Defendant but that has not been done”.[12]The specific allegations/claims that have been identified are summarised below in chronological order, with my emphasis shown in underlining: i) On the Claim Form, “The immediate return of evidence unlawfully withheld by Neil Brooker of Reeds Solicitors” and “The remainder of the evidence to prove my claim sits with Neil Brooker my solicitor who colluded with the DC Ashleigh Andrews, I allege and DC Nicky Loftus and PC Charlotte Rothero and Sgt Stuart Cumine and Chief Constable Sarah Crew and other actors of Avon and Somerset Constabulary tobreak the chain of custody for the evidence which Neil Brooker of Reeds Solicitors, Bristol office – retains” ii) Within the Particulars of Claim endorsed on the Claim Form, “Refusal to return vital personal evidence by Neil Brooker of Reeds Solicitors” and “The return of personal evidence retained by Neil Brooker of Reeds Solicitors who I made a defendant after his emails confirmed he lied - I allege he colluded with police to break the chain of custody”. iii) Within the revised Case Summary, “Neil Brooker - my former solicitor, whose negligence allowed for the tampering of evidence and loss of critical materials, undermining my legal rights and enabling a continuing cover up by the police…” and “Neil Brooker, my former solicitor, breached his fiduciary duty by neglecting to act on critical evidence and facilitating evidence tampering. His actions contributed to the continuation of the cover up and allowed A&S officers to avoid accountability”. iv) As to remedies, apart from the demand for return of the materials deposited with the Second Defendant by the police, it is unclear from the pleadings what, if anything the Claimant seeks from this particular Defendant. The claim brought initially against multiple defendants within this action sought recovery of £20 million but that was expressed to be “for unlawful state conduct” and therefore would not seem to apply to the Second Defendant who is not a public body. At the hearing, in oral submissions, the Claimant referenced her previous requests to the Second Defendant for a certified inventory listing all materials deposited with his office by the police, and there was argument about a breach of retainer and resultant loss caused/a possible return of the £360 which she believed she had paid expressly for the task; the fact of the payment itself did not appear to be disputed.[13]I have included reference to the revised Case Summary above as a case summary was ordered by Mr Justice Lavender, notwithstanding that does not accord it the same legal status as a properly pleaded Statement of Case.[14]The Reply to Defence is dated 21st January 2026 and does not take matters further forwards. A Reply is not a mandatory step in proceedings but, if served, is intended under the Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) to be a responsive document to the Defence. The Reply in this case seems to respond to points that have not been pleaded; it appears to raise a new claim for breach of retainer. The cross references to the Defence do not work. Just to illustrate the point from one of many examples that could be referenced, the Reply asserts that at “paragraph 12 of the Defence the Second Defendant pleads that the claim is barred by limitation and/or time- barred”. In fact paragraph 12 reads “On 17th July 2024, PC Rothero and PC 4914 Haynes attended the Claimant’s home address. In order to protect a child and/or vulnerable person and to ensure an effective investigation, the Claimant was arrested on suspicion of stalking involving fear of violence, contrary to Section 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997”. There is no reference in the Defence to the claim being time barred. I will not make further reference to the Reply, nor to the Claimant’s supplemental witness statement dated 18th May 2026, filed shortly before the hearing as that is not a Statement of Case.[15]The Second Defendant’s Defence dated 19th December 2025, pursues a primary position that the Claimant’s pleadings are so incoherent and verbose that they are unable to properly respond. Nonetheless, referencing the three key claims, they say that the facts do not support the Claimant’s assertions that the Second Defendant has refused to return the seized materials from the police and in addition broken the chain of evidence. As regards the contentions of collusion with the police and evidence tampering, the Second Defendant maintains that no facts have been asserted, on which the Claimant is said to rely, to justify such a serious allegation. THE LAW ON STRIKE OUT APPLICATIONS[16]Pursuant to CPR 3.4 (2) the Court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the Court:[17](a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to affect the just disposal of the proceedings; or(c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.[20]The notes to the White Book make it plain at 3.4.2 that a claim should not be struck out unless the Court is certain it is bound to fail. In such unwinnable cases the continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit to the respondent and would waste costs on both sides (Harris v Bolt Burdon [2000] C.P. Rep.70). Similar guidance was provided by Potter LJ in Wragg v Partco Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 594. Within the Practice Direction there are examples of cases where the Court may conclude that the Particulars disclose no reasonable grounds because they set out no facts indicating what the claim is about or they are incoherent, alternatively despite a coherent set of facts, those facts even if true do not disclose a legally recognisable claim (Price Meats Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2000] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 346 Ch).[21]As to what is an abuse of process, at 3.4.3 in the White Book the notes record that there is no clear definition, and the scope is wide, but if any abuse can be addressed by less draconian methods than a strike-out, then the other option should be taken.[22]When considering strike-out on grounds of abuse, a two-stage test should be applied as set out in Asturion Foundation v Alibrahim [2020] EWCA Civ 32 at [ 63]:
“First the court has to determine whether the claimant’s conduct was an abuse of process. Secondly, if it was, the court has to exercise its discretion as to whether or not to strike out the claim. It is at that second stage that the usual balancing exercise, and in particular considerations of proportionality, becomes relevant.”
THE LAW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICATIONS[23]Pursuant to CPR 24.2 the Court may give summary judgment on the whole of a claim or a particular issue if it considers that:(i) The claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; …and(ii) There is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at trial[24]Summary judgment applications are useful where there is a short point of law or construction which can adequately be addressed in argument without a fuller investigation into the facts, because there are no reasonable grounds for believing they would add to, or alter the evidence available to a trial judge, and thereby affect the outcome of the case. OVERLAP BETWEEN SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND STRIKE-OUT APPLICATIONS & RELEVANT CASE LAW[25]The decision in Burnford v Automobile Association Developments Ltd, BL-2021-000731 provides some assistance on the question of overlap between a summary judgment application and whether a defendant failing to prove grounds for summary judgment must necessarily fail on its strike out application too. HHJ Paul Matthews made some useful observations at [20], when comparing and contrasting the two types of application, and I have highlighted in bold those which seem particularly pertinent: “These two methods of summarily disposing of a claim without a trial are frequently combined in the same application, as in this case. But it is clear that an application under rule 3.4 is not one for summary judgment: see e.g. Dellal v Dellal [2015] EWHC 907(Fam). It is generally concerned with matters of law or practice, rather than with the strength or weakness of the evidence. So on an application to strike out, the court usually approaches the question on the assumption (but it is only an assumption, for the sake of the argument) that the respondent will be able at the trial in due course to prove its factual allegations. On the other hand, on an application for summary judgment, the court is concerned to assess the strength of the case put forward: does the respondent's case get over the (low) threshold of “real prospect of success”? If it does not, then, unless there is some other compelling reason for a trial, the court will give a summary judgment for the applicant”.[26]At [21] the judge continued, quoting Coulson LJ in Begum v Maran (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 326, (“Begum”), at [20], and again I highlight in bold what seems particularly pertinent:
“in a case like this (where the striking-out is based on the nature of the pleading, not a failure to comply with an order), there is no difference between the test to be applied by the court under the two rules”
. Then continuing at [21], “accordingly, I do not agree with the judge’s observation at [4] that somehow the test under r.24.2 is “less onerous from a defendant’s perspective”. In a case of this kind, the rules should be taken together, and a common test applied. If a defendant is entitled to summary judgment because the claimant has no realistic prospect of success, then the statement of claim discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and should be struck out: see Global Asset Capital Inc v Aabar Block SARL [2017] EWCA Civ 37…”.[27]Coulson LJ continued at [22] “As to the applicable test itself:(a) the court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 AER 91. A realistic claim is one that carries some degree of conviction: ED&F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472. But that should not be carried too far: in essence the court is determining whether or not the claim is “bound to fail””.: Altimo Holdings v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 1804 at [80] and [82].(b) the court must not conduct a mini-trial: Three Rivers District Council v Governor of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1, in particular paragraph 95. Although the Court should not automatically accept what the claimant says at face value, it will ordinarily do so unless its factual assertions are demonstrably unsupportable: ED&F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel; Okpabi and others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another [2021] UKSC 3, at paragraph 110. The Court should also allow for the possibility that further facts may emerge on discovery or at trial: Royal Brompton NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550; Sutradhar v Natural Environmental Research Council [2006] 4 All ER 490 at [6]; and Okpabi at paragraphs 127-128.”[28]On the latter point I am also mindful of the decision in Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Company 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63, where similarly the Court determined that it should hesitate about making a final decision without trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, but where there are reasonable grounds for believing a fuller investigation into the facts would add to, or alter, the evidence available to a trial judge and therefore affect the outcome of the case.[29]Some other key principles to be applied on summary judgment, were set out by Lewison J, as he then was, in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15 vii)], (and which [24] above touched upon) “… it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725”.[30]Finally, it is important to remember that the evidential burden is on the applicant, namely the Second Defendant, to establish that there are grounds to believe there is no real prospect of success and no other compelling reason for trial. It is only when the applicant has produced evidence which is credible to support the application, that the respondent becomes subject to the evidential burden of proving the opposite. THE LEGAL TEST ON AMENDMENT[31]Although there was no formal application to amend the Statement of Case before me, nor a draft amended Particulars of Claim which I could consider, the Claimant submitted from the outset that her case should not be struck out, but that she should be given permission to rectify the errors she had made in her pleading. By the end of the hearing it appeared that she was not so concerned about preserving the claim within this Court, as long as she was given the opportunity to pursue the remedies she sought in the County Court, if that was more suitable. I will return to that later, but for now I will set out a summary of the procedural restrictions that apply regarding amendments to Statements of Case.[32]CPR 17.3.5 sets out the general principles governing the granting of permission to amend by the Court. The starting point is having regard to all the matters mentioned in Rule 1.1 [2] under the overriding objective so as to deal with the case justly and at proportionate cost. This includes so far as is practicable –(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence;(b) saving expense;(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – (i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the financial position of each party;(d) Ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;(e) allotting an appropriate share of court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases; Striking a balance[33]Pursuant to CPR 17.3.5, the power of the Court is a discretionary one, with the Court being required to seek to strike a balance between injustice to both the applying and opposing parties. The notes at CPR 17.3.8 remind parties that the modern approach in litigation is to require them to be open, above board and co-operative such that once the necessity to amend has become apparent they should tell their opponents about the amendment they intend to seek, in order that they can consider whether to oppose or consent to it. A real prospect of success[34]CPR 17.3.6 summarises the case law concerning the need for an applicant to show some prospects of success before permission will be granted. The test is whether or not there is a real prospect of success, as in the test on an application for summary judgment (SPR North Ltd v Swiss Post International (UK) Ltd [2019] EWHC 2004 (Ch)). There is a need to support amendments with evidence rather than “pure speculation or invention”. Clarity[35]I have already referred to the Towler judgment regarding principles on both strike out and amendment of pleadings at [11], “it is necessary that a party’s pleaded case is a concise and clear statement of the facts on which he relies”. Coulson J, as he then was, in CIP Properties (AIPT) Ltd v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd [2015] EWHC 1345 (TCC) refused amendments where he had ruled at [35] “The pleading is not therefore of the tightly-drawn and focussed kind which would ordinarily be permitted as a late amendment”. Proportionality refers to both wasted time and costs[36]I find the judgment of Coulson J in CIP Properties referred to above very helpful. At [15] he reviewed the traditional approach of allowing amendments so the real dispute between parties could be adjudicated upon, provided any prejudice to the other party could be compensated in costs, as the wrong starting point. He referred to an earlier Court of Appeal decision in Worldwide Corporation Limited v GPT Ltd and another [1998] WL 1120764 where Waller LJ “stressed that a payment in costs was not adequate compensation for the other party being “mucked around” at the last moment”. He went on to emphasise the importance today of paying great regard to all the circumstances now summed up in the overriding objective, rather than purely focusing on compensation in costs.[37]Coulson J continued at [18] that “Proportionality is vital… to the vast majority of applications to amend late”. He reviewed a number of earlier authorities, noting those where the prejudice caused by the refusal of an amendment was very substantially caused by the amending party being the author of the prejudice (Archlane Ltd v Johnson Controls Ltd [2012] EWHC B12 (TCC)).[38]In citing Briggs LJ in Hague Plant Ltd v Hague and Others [2014] EWCA Civ 1609, (“the Hague judgment”), Coulson J found favour with the view that lateness, as measured by the amount of existing work that would be wasted, and substantial further work that would be incurred, should weigh in the judge’s mind. Explanation for delay[39]Coulson J also considered lateness to be a relative concept, quoting further from the Hague judgment at [18] “a tightly focussed, properly explained and fully particularised short amendment in August may not be too late, whereas a lengthy, ill-defined, unfocussed and unexplained amendment proffered in the previous March may be too late. It all depends upon a careful review of the nature of the proposed amendment, the quality of the explanation for its timing, and a fair appreciation of its consequences in terms of work wasted and consequential work to be done”.[40]Carr J, as she then was, in Quah v Goldman Sachs International [2015] EWHC 759 (Comm) added, in the same year as CIP Properties, some further very helpful analysis. Although in that case the amendment application was made close to trial there were some observations of wider importance.[41]At [36] Carr J held, “the applicant has to have a case which is better than merely arguable”. And at [38 f) – g)] “it is incumbent on a party seeking the indulgence of the court to be allowed to raise a late claim to provide a good explanation for the delay;” g) “a much stricter view is taken nowadays of non-compliance with the Civil Procedure Rules and directions of the Court. The achievement of justice means something different now. Parties can no longer expect indulgence if they fail to comply with their procedural obligations because those obligations not only serve the purpose of ensuring that they conduct the litigation proportionately in order to ensure their own costs are kept within proportionate bounds but also the wider public interest of ensuring that other litigants can obtain justice efficiently and proportionately, and that the courts enable them to do so.” THE STANDARDS EXPECTED OF A LITIGANT IN PERSON[42]For completeness’ sake, I will mention the amount of latitude that may be given to a litigant in person. Notably the Court does not usually permit a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders than a represented party. I do not believe that principle is in any doubt, arising as it does from a decision of the Supreme Court in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12, which the Claimant had also referenced in materials prepared for the hearing. In that case the Court held that a litigant in person’s failure to issue a Claim Form in accordance with the rules of Court, resulted in him being statute barred from bringing the claim at all. It is hard to imagine a more drastic outcome for a failure to comply with the CPR, therefore emphasising starkly the responsibility of an unrepresented party to comply with rules of Court, or face the ultimate sanction for his failure so to do. The decision also makes clear that the type of allowance a Court may justify, relates to case management decisions and conduct in hearings rather than court rules or orders themselves. SUBMISSIONS ON THE STRIKE OUT/SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICATION Second Defendant

SUBMISSIONS ON THE STRIKE OUT/SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[43]In the Second Defendant’s application they clearly state they are not asking the Court to resolve any question of fact arising from the claim, but simply to dispose of the claim by striking out the Statements of Case because they disclose no reasonable grounds and/or are an abuse of process and/or fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1) because they do not contain a concise statement of facts relied upon. Summary judgment is claimed in the alternative.[44]A preliminary question is raised as to why the Claimant has chosen to sue the Second Defendant personally as the Claimant’s retainer was with the firm, Reeds. Leaving that to one side, I will however mention at this juncture the Second Defendant’s statement in open Court, that if the Claimant wished to bring a claim in respect of breach of retainer in the County Court, whilst there were no concessions on the merits, it would not be opposed on the basis of abuse of process; i.e. that this claim has already been issued relating to similar related matters.[45]Turning to the substance of the application on the three claims pleaded: (i) Return of withheld evidence[46]The chronology taken from documents in the hearing bundle provides ample evidence that there has been no refusal to return the documents, it was asserted. Thus, there is no real prospect of success on this allegation. Counsel referred to written materials authored by the Claimant in the hearing bundle, as also referenced in the chronology above, which clearly demonstrated that it is the Claimant herself who has refused to collect the evidence.[47]The Court's attention was also drawn to the fact that the Claimant’s documents within the hearing bundle refer to theft of the memory stick and SIM card by the police, but it is patently obvious from the property receipt that the police have not purported to return such items to Reeds, therefore it was not the Second Defendant that has caused them to disappear.[48]The Court was also asked to consider, what difference it would have made if the Claimant had been present when the police returned the materials, given that the Second Defendant has confirmed in writing that those available for collection are identical to the ones that were deposited with Reeds by the police. (ii) Breach of chain of custody[49]The Second Defendant submitted that there are no pleaded facts to substantiate this allegation, such as what the Second Defendant is said to have done to tamper with the evidence left by the police. The emails within the bundle, and as referred to in the chronology above, include the Second Defendant's reassurance that the documents are available for collection in the form that they were received. Furthermore, the police have provided a property receipt list for the three items returned and as exhibited at page 5124 of the hearing bundle and a letter of continuity as exhibited at page 5125 of the bundle.[50]A rather more technical objection was also raised in that the “chain of custody” concept only applies during the currency of criminal proceedings, which came to an end when the police decided to take no further action. The items then ceased to be exhibits such that the documents were released from evidential control. (iii) Collusion The Second Defendant submitted that as this is such a serious allegation of deliberate wrongdoing made against a solicitor it should be pleaded with precision, and with a strong factual basis, which it was said is currently lacking as no primary facts whatsoever have been relied upon that would justify the allegation. Counsel drew my attention to the decision in JSC Bank of Moscow v Kekhman [2015] EWHC 3073 (Comm), where the judge held “ …The claimant does not have to plead primary facts which are only consistent with dishonesty. The correct test is whether or not, on the basis of the primary facts pleaded, an inference of dishonesty is more likely than one of innocence or negligence as Lord Millett put it, there must be some fact “which tilts the balance and justifies an inference of dishonesty”. At the interlocutory stage, when the court is considering whether the plea of fraud is a proper one or whether to strike it out, the court is not concerned with whether the evidence at trial will or will not establish fraud but only with whether facts are pleaded which would justify the plea of fraud. If the plea is justified, then the case must go forward to trial and assessment of whether the evidence justifies the inference is a matter for the trial judge…”. (Highlighted emphasis added for this judgment)[51]Although these Statements of Case do not reference breach of fiduciary duty which is merely mentioned in the Case Summary, counsel submitted that it is such a serious allegation, that if proven would need to establish that the Second Defendant had acted consciously or intentionally rather than negligently against the Claimant's interests and not acted in good faith. It was submitted that the same contentions advanced in relation to the lack of pleading relating to collusion applied equally to any suggestion that there is an adequately pleaded claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In the Defence it was pleaded that the Second Defendant was not even involved in the return of the evidence as he was at court on 4th February 2025. Causation[52]Additionally, it was submitted for the Second Defendant that there was a very significant problem with the claim as presented, in that it lacks any real allegation of how the various acts and omissions complained of caused loss. It was submitted that this, of itself, demonstrated there are no reasonable grounds to bring the claim, and it should be struck out. Counsel submitted that the closest the Claimant came to an allegation of causation was in the Case Summary, rather than the Statements of Case, where she contended that the Second Defendant's actions allowed a cover up by the police. Counsel submitted that if the crux of the Claimant’s case is that she does not have access now to various items seized by the police it wasn't the Second Defendant who caused them to disappear as the police have not even tried to suggest that they have returned a memory stick, photographs or a SIM card. Thus it was contended for the Second Defendant that the suggestions of collusion are simply wild allegations and there is nothing in the statement of case capable of sustaining the cause of action.[53]Separately on causation of losses said to arise from collusion, it was asserted there is the spectre of a claim for loss arising from an alleged service failure under the retainer for which £360 was paid. It was submitted that no losses can be proven from the failure to review the documents returned by the police in their presence and the presence of the Claimant. The Second Defendant has already confirmed the documents have been retained in the state in which they were returned and it is still possible to produce an inventory. The instructions to the solicitors which were reviewed in the chronology above did not specify an inventory should be provided by the solicitor, and it was clear from the exchange of correspondence between the Claimant and Second Defendant that he could not compel the manner in which the police would return the documents. It was further contended that for the Claimant to show loss has been caused she would need to show that the police had purported to return a document which she now says they have not. They have never pretended to return memory sticks, a SIM card or photographs.[54]In respect of the summary judgment application, the Second Defendant drew the Court's attention to the fact that there is no draft amended pleading within the extensive bundle. Further, given the passage of time since the claim was commenced, and this application was issued, the Claimant could easily have provided such a document. Notwithstanding that objection, it was submitted that the claim simply does not work as a matter of substance and has no real prospect of success. The contemporaneous documents referred to above were relied upon as a consistent record demonstrating that the Second Defendant has not refused to return the Claimant's evidence, such that the factual assertions are contradicted by the contemporaneous documents and summary judgment could be safely entered.[55]On the second allegation of collusion, and evidence tampering, the Second Defendant reminded me of earlier submissions that there are no primary facts pleaded that would be capable of sustaining the plea; indeed, the documents produced provide a straightforward history showing that there has been no break in the chain of custody.[56]The Second Defendant maintained that the claim is substantively weak and therefore does not meet the threshold requirements in terms of prospects of success. Through reliance on the documentary evidence within the bundle which was contemporaneous, the Second Defendant was unable to suggest any compelling reason the matter should proceed to a trial where oral evidence would be available. Claimant[57]The Claimant’s skeleton argument for the hearing was remarkably brief compared to all the other documents which had been filed in readiness for the application. There were simply five brief points summarising the complaints relating to the Claimant’s inability to verify and access material returned by the police, with grave consequences for the Claimant’s ongoing ability to clear her name at an upcoming hearing in November. The Claimant accepted that any allegation of collusion or deliberate wrongdoing should be properly particularised and, if the Court was to find it was currently insufficiently pleaded, an oral application was made for permission to amend. The Claimant made strong submissions that it would be unjust to strike out a litigant in person where the issues could be narrowed and properly pleaded.[58]The Claimant relayed her anguish at finding that documents had been returned when she was not present. The Claimant regarded it suspicious that the Second Defendant had referred to “he” not “she” when referencing DC Ashleigh Andrews, and the fact there was no attendance note for the return of the documents, suggestive that there had been collusion and a cover up. She also cited the fact that the Second Defendant, according to the records, went directly to Basingstoke Court on the morning of 4th February 2025 so it appeared to her that he had spoken to someone on the Monday in order to have made the arrangements for the return of the documents. She considered that as the documents were returned to the office so early in the morning, the arrangements for return must have been made the previous day. The Claimant was also adamant that she paid £360 for an appointment where she could verify the extent and condition of the returned materials. She acknowledged on causation that she does not know what is missing but said she had a proper contract with Reeds/Neil Brooker and instead of a service being provided he has made her “more vulnerable”.[59]In respect of the summary judgment aspect of the application, the Claimant asserted that there are factual issues including the source-chain for the arrests in 2018, “officer knowledge, alibi evidence, disclosure, alleged mischaracterisation of civil/court/legal correspondence, seizure and handling of laptop/evidence material, current reliance on disputed material in SPO/risk processes, and the property/evidence-return issue involving the Second Defendant” which require “pleading discipline, disclosure and testing. They should not be determined by a mini-trial at a strike out/summary judgment hearing”.[60]The Claimant said she is embarrassed by what she has said and done on occasions, but she has been struggling enormously with the situation she finds herself in. She maintained she is unable to properly defend herself due to lack of previously collected evidence which was seized by the police and not returned, and that situation could be catastrophic for her. MY CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION AS FILED AND THE ORAL APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO AMEND[61]Despite the volume of material presented to me, the claims brought against the Second Defendant are relatively straight forward, namely for losses said to have been caused by a failure to return material seized by the police, a failure to protect the chain of custody and collusion with the police in permitting evidence tampering / a break in the chain of custody. Although the Statements of Case do not expressly refer to a failure to provide the services for which the Claimant paid £360, there was an underlying suggestion/submission that this was an additional claim, alongside breach of fiduciary duty.[62]I would wish to be very clear that I am in no doubt whatsoever that the Claimant is highly distressed by the past events which necessitated her instruction of the Second Defendant in the first place, and is extremely anxious and concerned about the future hearing in November of this year, in another court, where she will be defending herself. Regrettably, and even by her own admission, she has gone about pursuing this claim in the wrong manner. She has not had due regard to what the Second Defendant has been trying to communicate to her, both before and after proceedings. She has been far too hasty in reaching adverse conclusions about the reasons for events unfolding in the way they have, and her language at times has been highly provocative and intemperate. I have omitted from this judgment many inflammatory references in the hearing bundle material. Whilst I acknowledge her distress, and that she is a self-representing party, I do not consider she can be wholly ignorant of due legal process or normal ways of conducting professional business, including raising complaints, as she has worked in a solicitor's office and indeed has completed the second year of a university law degree. Within 8 minutes of receiving notice that the police had returned the documents she started accusing the Second Defendant of potentially being “complicit in” variousbreaches of legal professional conduct, breach of contract and collusion with the police, despite having been told that the Second Defendant was away from the office on other business in Court. That failure to pause and reflect before mounting an attack on the Second Defendant through her keyboard has set in train the sequence of events that has led to this application by the Second Defendant.[63]I have set out above the Court’s task pursuant to the overriding objective, to grasp the nettle early on in claims where time and cost could be wasted for everybody if they proceed further. I have also set out the Court's powers to grant permission to amend, where the merits of the case justify it. I do not consider that amendments at this stage would be too late, despite a lack of a formal written application before me, as the proceedings are at a fairly early stage. However, to properly exercise a discretion to permit amendments, I would need to be satisfied that some or all of the claims had a real prospect of success (as set out at [34] above.[64]Adopting the combined approach of Coulson LJ in Begum at [26] above, I can consider the application to strike out the case because there are said to be no reasonable grounds for bringing it, under a common test with that for summary judgment, remembering the evidential burden is on the applicant, i.e. is there a realistic rather than fanciful prospect of success.[65]In respect of the claim for immediate return of evidence unlawfully withheld, I conclude on the basis of the documents before me that it is utterly hopeless. The Second Defendant has been pleading with the Claimant to collect the documents; that is well evidenced by the documents referred to and no better evidence on the point will be available at trial.[66]In respect of the claim for collusion breaching the chain of custody. I wholeheartedly accept the Second Defendant's submissions that the chain of custody has not been broken. The Second Defendant has already cited the technical reasons why that is the case (referred to above at [50], but additionally the Claimant has the Second Defendant's written assurance that the documents are still available for collection in the format in which they were delivered by the police. This means that the Claimant can examine the documents in the presence of any witness she chooses, and if she identifies missing material from that which was seized, she has the Second Defendant’s evidence already before this Court, that everything she has is what the police returned, and in the condition they returned it, so if it is incomplete, that will have been due to police error or deliberate act.[67]Furthermore, the very documents which the Claimant repeatedly says she is most concerned to have returned from the police raid in July 2024, are conspicuous by their absence from the signed list of items returned by the police; she does not need to sue the Second Defendant or suggest he has colluded in their disappearance - the police fully acknowledged they have not returned those documents, being memory sticks, photographs and a SIM card (see the chronology above at [6] and the email of 19th December 2024 “The only items I do not have copies of are two memory sticks with evidence, a SIM card and photos of the [first 12 year old said to have been attacked by C] when he was taking pictures”. Whether or not the police ever seized these items is a different matter and not material to this application. As I mentioned at the hearing, the greater difficulty for the Claimant is proving what was taken from her home during the raid, but that has nothing to do with the Second Defendant, and there is no reason for the issue to be capable of greater clarification at trial.[68]The Court also considers it a serious matter to suggest deliberate wrongdoing by a solicitor, who also has duties to the Court, to uphold the law, when there is no clear factual basis for this. The Claimant has failed to suggest how she would better particularise an allegation of collusion, and has had ample time and opportunity to think about this. The mere suggestion that the use of the pronoun “he” when referring to a female officer in his email sent from court is wholly unsatisfactory to found such an allegation. It does not make a lot of sense either as DC Andrews is well documented as one of the officers conducting the investigation and she wrote the email referred to in the chronology on 12th January stating she would arrange the return of the documents.[69]The suggestion that the police were unlikely to have moved so quickly to return goods on the morning of 4th February 2025, unless there had been a deliberate plan agreed by the Second Defendant the day before, to avoid the Claimant’s participation in the return of the materials is pure conjecture. The police engage in shift work, and this speculation by the Claimant also completely fails to recognise any possible link between her angry threats to the police the day before, and their reasons stated in the e-mail exchange with the Second Defendant's office as to why they did not consider it wise to be in her presence. I make no factual findings on any of these suggestions, but simply draw them to attention to illustrate the unsafe and wholly vague nature of the Claimant’s inferences about a conspiracy against her, that involved the solicitor who had just succeeded in getting the police investigations against her terminated. The Court requires careful attention to the pleading of the factual basis for such serious allegations, and there has been a wholesale disregard of this. I refer back to [50] above, “The correct test is whether or not, on the basis of the primary facts pleaded, an inference of dishonesty is more likely than one of innocence or negligence”.The Claimant’s case fails to come anywhere near that threshold. The same comments are relevant to any suggestion of a breach of fiduciary duty even though that is not pleaded in a formal Statement of Case.[70]Insofar as the Reply raises the spectre of a claim for breach of retainer, I have already pointed out that the Reply should be a responsive document, rather than one raising new causes of action. In any event the Second Defendant made a good point that breach of a retainer, where a fee of just £360.00 was paid, would not be a High Court matter, so there is no point even considering whether an amendment should be allowed. Technically I cannot strike out a claim or consider summary judgment either where it has not been alleged in the Claim Form and Statement of Case.[71]Counsel made a concession at the hearing, already referred to above at [44], I should emphasise not on the merits of such a claim, but procedurally, that if a new claim was to commence for breach of retainer in the County Court, it would not be defended as an abuse of process, based on such a claim having been mentioned in these proceedings. That of course is not a comprehensive answer to the correct process for raising service standard complaints against a solicitor as it omits any reference to the usual complaints handling processes and Ombudsman routes available. There is probably nothing much else that I can add on the point in this judgment; certainly, the records before me seem to support Counsel’s submission that it was not the Claimant’s written request to be present at the same time as the police, but simply to be present with her solicitor when reviewing the documents. As I mentioned during the course of the hearing it appears to have been the Second Defendant who may have interpreted the request as one that all parties should be present during the materials review, but only if the police were prepared to go along with that suggestion (Second Defendant's e-mail dated 13th January 2025). The argument that the Second Defendant could not compel the police to attend has already been set out above, so I will say no more about it.[72]The request for an inventory, rather than a review, was not expressly referred to in the documents before me when the retainer was established, and the fees paid, but appears to have been articulated for the first time after the police delivered the materials at 14.55 on 4th February 2025.[73]I merely mention these points about the retainer to discourage any thoughts that this Court is commending the commencement of a new action for breach of retainer in the County Court; that is not part of the Court’s role and the prospects of success are not at all straightforward on the papers in the hearing bundle.[74]I will not say much about the flimsiness of the causation arguments put forward by the Claimant, said to result in loss, as I have already found that the lack of materiality of the alleged breaches does not meet the evidential threshold to escape being struck out. The Second Defendant has already put the case on lack of causation well. The Claimant is in no position to say documents have been tampered with when she has not even examined what has been returned by the police, and against a background where the very items she is most concerned about are specifically omitted from the police list of returned documents, such that there is no contest that they are not in the bags in the Second Defendant's office. There was no involvement of the Second Defendant in the police raid when the documents were initially seized and itemised, or not itemised, as having been taken. As long ago as December 2024 the Claimant had identified in writing the “only” items she did not have copies of after the raid, and needed for her own evidential purposes, and they are conspicuous by their absence on the returned property forms.[75]From the foregoing it should be very clear that I do not believe that the claims brought in this action are capable of going forward in this Court, whether by amendment or in their original format. I have borne in mind the exhortation of Coulson LJ in Begum (above at [26] and [54]) that the rules on strike out and summary judgment should be considered together in a case such as this. The allegations do not meet the threshold criteria in the CPR on summary judgment applications as they disclose no reasonable prospect of success. It would be fanciful to believe a fuller investigation of the facts at trial would affect the outcome; there are numerous contemporaneous documents setting out the history. Because the Statements of Case disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claims, they should also be struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4 (2) (a).[76]Having made the decisions above I do not consider it necessary to devote much time to the alternative applications by the Second Defendant for strike out, on the basis the Statements of Case are an abuse of process, or because there has been a failure to comply with the CPR. I have set out the law above, and the recognition that a strike out for abuse is a draconian step, and one way to cure pleadings is to allow amendments, but they need a realistic prospect of success, which I have been unable to establish. Therefore the Second Defendant succeeds on the additional ground for strike out in CPR 3.4 (2) (b). I am not minded to make a similar finding under CPR 3.4 (2) (c).[77]Overall, I am sorry to say, it appears that these proceedings have been a distraction for the Claimant from the real business of ordering and preparing the evidential material that she does have personally, and that which she can collect from the Second Defendant, in order to best prepare her case for the upcoming November hearing in the Magistrates Court COSTS SUBMISSIONS[78]Both parties provided oral submissions on costs, whoever was successful, so that they would not need to return to Court when judgment was handed down.[79]The Claimant objected to any adverse costs order against her, but accepting that amendments would be required, if the claim continued, indicated that she would be content with no order as to costs.[80]The Second Defendant sought not only an order for costs in their favour, but also on the indemnity basis, because of the manner in which the claim had been litigated which they said took it out of the norm, and in particular due to the volume of material adduced and the seriousness of the allegation of collusion without a proper factual basis against a solicitor. They submitted if I was minded to only grant an order on the standard basis, the costs incurred were reasonable in amount and proportionate to the items in issue. On the question of proportionality, the Court was reminded that this not only reflects the value of the claim, but also the complaints raised within the litigation and work generated by the conduct of the opposing party, and in particular drew my attention to CPR 44.3 (5).[81]In response to a request of the Court to be informed as to the nature of any pre-action correspondence to try and resolve the dispute, the Claimant asserted that a Letter Before Action had been served to which she had not received a response. The Claimant also referred to the Second Defendant’s conduct saying that if he had offered to prepare an inventory, as previously agreed, she would not have proceeded with the claim. The Claimant also made submissions about her impecuniosity and said it had not been her desire to pursue the matter through Court, but she was just trying to exercise her rights because she was not getting any satisfaction in communications with the Second Defendant. On an alternative basis, she put forward submissions that the Court should consider a costs reserved order or that each party bear their own costs.[82]Following the hearing the Second Defendant confirmed to the Court there had been pre-action correspondence (although not a formal Letter of Claim) which was sent on and immediately after 4 February 2025. This is referenced in the chronology at [6] above. A pre-action letter was sent on 16 February 2025 threatening an N244 Pre-Action Disclosure application pursuant to CPR 31.16 and the Second Defendant replied on 18th February 2025, stating, “We do not propose to prepare an inventory for your property. It has been left in the same condition as it was when handed over by the police, once you have collected it, if there is anything you think is missing or anything else the police should have returned to you, you should contact the police directly”. This letter did not reference the terms of the retainer specifically. Then two versions of an “Amended Letter Before Action” were sent by the Claimant on 24 March 2025, but it has been confirmed that no Letter of Response was served before the action commenced. The claim was issued on 31 July 2025. COSTS RULES[83]CPR 44.2(1) reminds that the Court that it does not have to make any order for costs, although case law makes it plain that the usual rule is “the winner” recovers costs from “the loser”.[84]Assuming that the Court decides it is going to make an award of costs, it will follow the three stages outlined in the CPR:(i) identify who has been successful– CPR 44.2(2)(a).(ii) consider all of the circumstances to see if some other order is appropriate (44.2(2)(b)).(iii) make the order from the menu of options (44.2(6)).[85]CPR 44.2(4) states that the Court should have regard to all of the circumstances and in particular:(a) the conduct of all the parties;(b) whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful; and(c) any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the Court’s attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply.[86]CPR 44.2(5) further defines conduct as including:(a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the extent to which the parties followed the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct or any relevant pre-action protocol;(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;(c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue;(d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in the claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated its claim; and(e) whether a party failed to comply with an order for alternative dispute resolution, or unreasonably failed to engage in alternative dispute resolution. COSTS DECISION[87]I do not consider it appropriate to make no order as to costs, as the Claimant has suggested, because the Second Defendant has been put to a good deal of time and trouble contesting both the claim and this application. The Claimant had a long period of time in which to have considered withdrawing the claim before the application was heard. I have also set out that the Court expects litigants in person to follow the CPR, which means they cannot run unrealistic arguments in a cost-free zone.[88]Similarly, I cannot reserve costs as the Claimant contended for in the alternative, because this claim is not going to continue in the High Court.[89]The Second Defendant has been wholly successful.[90]I cannot ignore the Claimant’s conduct. The Claimant has threatened to overwhelm both the court file and the hearing bundle with numerous unnecessary documents, which have increased the time and costs of both the other party and the Court itself. The Court had to take the unusual step on 24th February 2026 of making an Order including terms that, “Individual items which will form part of the evidence and/or a hearing bundle should only be filed when ordered, and if the documents form part of a hearing bundle they should be supplied in a single PDF document clearly labelled as to the application to which they relate, unless the judge has directed that a paper copy only is to be supplied”. One of the reasons for this direction as stated on the Order was that, “ The court file is becoming overwhelmed by miscellaneous correspondence from the Claimant in respect of this matter.”[91]The Claimant has also used totally inappropriate language on many occasions towards the Second Defendant which she appears to now regret.[92]Although the Claimant did send a Letter Before Action it was very difficult to follow as it was addressed to multiple defendants, and the language was a foretaste of the convoluted wording used in the Statements of Case which followed, and which it has taken the Court a fair amount of time to decipher and try to make sense of. However, it appears that the Second Defendant did not serve a Letter of Response nor refer the Claimant to the templates available in the Practice Direction, which just might have made things a little clearer.[93]The parties, at my suggestion, made some attempts at ADR during a brief adjournment of the hearing. Some principles for a framework agreement were reached but there was not total agreement. The Claimant sought to rely on the fact that what she considered to be the main terms were now agreed, such that the hearing could have been avoided if earlier attempts at engagement had been made. The Second Defendant was at pains to point out that without agreement of all terms there was no agreement.[94]Overall, having weighed up all the factors under the CPR costs rules, I conclude, using the wide discretion afforded to me, that an Order for costs should be made in favour of the Second Defendant who has been wholly successful in striking out the claim, and therefore should be awarded costs both for the application hearing and the costs of defending the claim generally.[95]I will not however award costs on the indemnity basis because of the failure to engage fully in the pre-action period, or to make any ADR attempt thereafter.[96]The Claimant is concerned about her impecuniosity, but I have drawn attention to all the relevant rules in the CPR and that is not a factor for me to consider. The amount of the costs award which I assess summarily needs to reflect costs that have been proportionately and reasonably incurred or are proportionate and reasonable in amount. The fact that a costs Order is made, is not prescriptive of if, when or how the Defendant may seek to enforce it, although generally it is inferred by the CPR that such Orders can be enforced after 14 days, if the Defendant so chooses. The amount of costs summarily assessed will be contained in the Order following the handing down of this judgment.