“The Defendant has harassed the Claimant by sending numerous emails on various dates to recipients including the Claimant, the Claimant’s wife and legal representatives, members of the HMCTS board and senior leadership team, the Chief Magistrate’s Office (which emails are seen by the Claimant’s direct colleagues), other District Judges and High Court Judges, Masters and staff. The emails in question contain, amongst other things, false and defamatory allegations that the Claimant has been involved in fraud, theft, forgery and other dishonest criminal offences and has abused his judicial office.”
“21. At paragraph 17 of Steyn 1, Steyn J noted that the defendant had communicated his allegations to a sizable cast of people, who included various judges and others working in the legal system as well as various politicians and the Attorney General. She listed them noting, at paragraph 18, that the defendant was deliberately seeking to address, amongst others, the claimant's line managers or leadership judges and other colleagues and associates. At paragraph 20, she found that the communications accused the claimant of fraud, theft, forgery, money laundering, and abusing his position as a judge. She said that there was no supporting evidence for these allegations and she found them to be baseless. At paragraph 29, Steyn J found that it was likely that the defendant would succeed, at trial, in showing that the barrage of emails sent by the defendant amounted to harassment of the claimant and that the defendant was, or ought to have been, aware of this. She also found that the claimant was likely to succeed in showing that the defendant's emails were irrational, by which she may well have meant both baseless and lacking in coherence. 22. In Steyn 2, Steyn J dealt with and rejected various arguments raised by the defendant in relation to the litigation connected with his bankruptcy in 2010 to 2014 and the payment of the£130,000 , drawing on, amongst other things, the judgment of Henderson J, as he then was, in Winsor v Vale2014 EWHC 957 (Ch) which contains a useful summary. At paragraph 28, she noted that although the defendant had filed a plethora of documents since he had had notice of the injunction, he had not provided any evidence to rebut her provisional view, in Steyn 1, that the claimant was likely to succeed in his claim for harassment and that the defendant's allegations against the claimant were irrational: “There is nothing in the material that I have seen that shows the claimant having any involvement at all in the process by which the defendant’s mother received funds from the defendant’s trustees in bankruptcy or in their negotiations with HMRC to persuade them that CGT was not payable or in the process of requesting dismissal of the appeal in Winsor v Vale.” “There is nothing in the material that I have seen that shows the claimant having any involvement at all in the process by which the defendant’s mother received funds from the defendant’s trustees in bankruptcy or in their negotiations with HMRC to persuade them that CGT was not payable or in the process of requesting dismissal of the appeal in Winsor v Vale.”
“2. The Respondent must not: a. Communicate directly with the Claimant whether by telephone, text message, email or any other means; b. Publish, make, repeat or distribute by any means any allegation, statement or suggestion that the Claimant has (in connection with his role as executor of the estate of Ivy Emily Winsor deceased or otherwise) committed fraud or been engaged in money laundering or has committed theft or any other criminal offence or has done anything which would be regarded as misconduct if done by a member of the judiciary; c. In particular, send such allegations by email to the following email addresses or by any other means to the following organisations/persons/categories of person: i. gl-cmo.ddjdeployment@justice.gov.uk ii. CMO.Enquiries@justice.gov.uk; iii. The Chief Magistrate or any employee or officer of the Chief Magistrate’s Office; iv. District Judge Karen Doyle or any other District Judge or Deputy District Judge; v. claire.manning1@justice.gov.uk; vi. correspondence@attorneygeneral.gov.uk; vii. Nick Goodwin or any other member of the HMCTS board or senior leadership team; viii. registry@supremecourt.uk; ix. Civilappeals.cms-support@justice.gov.uk; x. Basingstoke Court Office; xi. Judicial Conduct Investigations Office; xii. West Mercia Police; xiii. Any court officer or employee of HMCTS; xiv. Jesse.norman.mp@parliament.uk. d. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall prevent the Claimant from instructing legal representatives to act for him or to give him legal advice, and it shall not be a breach of this Order for the Claimant to repeat his allegations of the nature set out in paragraph 2(b) above as part of his instructions to his legal representatives.” a. Communicate directly with the Claimant whether by telephone, text message, email or any other means; b. Publish, make, repeat or distribute by any means any allegation, statement or suggestion that the Claimant has (in connection with his role as executor of the estate of Ivy Emily Winsor deceased or otherwise) committed fraud or been engaged in money laundering or has committed theft or any other criminal offence or has done anything which would be regarded as misconduct if done by a member of the judiciary; c. In particular, send such allegations by email to the following email addresses or by any other means to the following organisations/persons/categories of person: i. gl-cmo.ddjdeployment@justice.gov.uk ii. CMO.Enquiries@justice.gov.uk; iii. The Chief Magistrate or any employee or officer of the Chief Magistrate’s Office; iv. District Judge Karen Doyle or any other District Judge or Deputy District Judge; v. claire.manning1@justice.gov.uk; vi. correspondence@attorneygeneral.gov.uk; vii. Nick Goodwin or any other member of the HMCTS board or senior leadership team; viii. registry@supremecourt.uk; ix. Civilappeals.cms-support@justice.gov.uk; x. Basingstoke Court Office; xi. Judicial Conduct Investigations Office; xii. West Mercia Police; xiii. Any court officer or employee of HMCTS; xiv. Jesse.norman.mp@parliament.uk. d. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall prevent the Claimant from instructing legal representatives to act for him or to give him legal advice, and it shall not be a breach of this Order for the Claimant to repeat his allegations of the nature set out in paragraph 2(b) above as part of his instructions to his legal representatives.”
“25. Although the contempt application is based on the Steyn injunction rather than the final order made by DHCJ Eardley, I note that he said that by the time of the hearing before him the volume of materials submitted by the defendant had mounted further. But the defendant still had not addressed the claimant's case on harassment, as opposed to going over the issues in relation to his bankruptcy and the associated litigation 10 or more years ago. 26. Having examined the evidence as it stood in July 2024, Mr Eardley also found in terms that the defendant's communications were targeted at the claimant and that generally they were copied to the claimant's solicitors so as to ensure that they would come to his attention. They were "Obviously persistent, deliberate, oppressive … baseless" and indicative of "a conscious decision to cause the claimant as much embarrassment, alarm and distress as possible … even after having been told in a letter of claim why his conduct amounted to harassment." Mr Eardley also found that this conduct was causing the claimant considerable distress. He awarded costs on an indemnity basis in the light of the defendant's conduct of the litigation.”
“7. The defendant has shown me only limited information or medical evidence. Perhaps the most informative of the documents which has been provided by him is a letter from the Rheumatology Department at the County Hospital in Hereford to his GP. That letter is dated2 July 2024 , following an outpatient face-to-face consultation on18 June 2024 . So far as relevant, this states under the heading "Diagnosis" that the defendant had been treated for a heart issue in November 2021 at Worcester, when a stent was inserted, and that he was still under cardiology awaiting an echocardiogram. The diagnosis section goes on to say that he was having investigations for possible heart failure. Under "Observations" the letter indicates that the defendant was reporting shortness of breath after walking in the order of 30 to 40 yards and back again intermittently. 8. A second relevant health issue or, at least, one relied on by the defendant to explain his professed inability to attend this hearing, is also touched upon by this letter. That is that he was reporting that his hips were very painful and that he was unsure of why this was. It appears that this was a matter that had been investigated over a significant period of time. The defendant had told the doctors at the County Hospital that he had support from home from his aunts but had difficulty and pain going down the stairs. He was not interested in physiotherapy and felt that he had lost motivation. 9. As I have noted, however, and as is apparent from that letter, further treatment and investigations were to take place. Moreover, such information as I had did not specifically address the defendant's ability to attend this hearing. He told me that his symptoms were persisting, and that he had not yet had an echocardiogram. He said that he thought that he would be able to attend in person by the end of October because, by then, his heart condition was likely to have been assessed and addressed. In answer to questions from me, he said that he would have been able to obtain a letter, at least from his GP, to explain the medical position more fully and to address the specific question of his ability to attend this hearing. But he didn't think it would have added anything to what he had to tell me and to what I have seen from the limited documentation that he has submitted to the court.”
“17. Having considered the competing arguments and the concerns which I myself had identified prior to the hearing, I came to the conclusion that I should proceed to the liability stage at least and then review the position, essentially for the reasons given by Mr Samuels. There have already been delays in the proceedings. The issues on liability are, in my view, very straightforward. It is clear to me that the defendant is well able to deal with them. I also accept on the evidence that there is no reason to think that if I were to postpone the hearing at this stage, although I may come back to that point in due course having given judgment, the position would change in relation to legal representation; and I accept that nor is there any reason to think that the position would change in relation to medical evidence. It is the case that the defendant has been told repeatedly that he needs to provide detailed medical evidence if he wishes to postpone hearings and that he has nevertheless failed to do so. I also accept Mr Samuels’ submission that there is no realistic prospect that if he is unable to do so now, and I were to put off the hearing, the defendant would be able to attend in person at the end of October, as he says he would.”
“In short, it is quite apparent that the defendant has paid no heed to the Steyn injunction and has deliberately continued the activities which it was intended to restrain, in my judgment, knowing full well that he was breaching an order of the court and that he risked committal for contempt of court. He contends that he was justified in doing so but that is not an answer in relation to the question of liability.”
“46. My reasons are that, firstly, I remain concerned about the fact that the defendant does not have legal representation. I am reluctantly persuaded that he should have a final opportunity to obtain such representation. As I pointed out to Mr Samuels, the position is materially different now to the position at the beginning of this hearing in that the defendant will be armed with my judgment on the contempt application which identifies very clearly the situation which he is in, and the purpose of the forthcoming hearing. I will also indicate in due course the sort of information which may be of assistance at that hearing. That may well cause lawyers who appear, from the defendant’s account, to have been asked to deal with all of the wider issues going back into the past, to see that they are simply being asked to focus on the issue of sentence arising out of the contempt application and to appreciate that there is eligibility for legal aid in relation to the hearing. My impression was also that the defendant’s efforts would be better spent focusing on local firms of solicitors or, at least firms, that are more local than the London lawyers with whom he said he had been in contact. I am not so naïve as to think that it is impossible that I will find myself in the same situation at the sentencing hearing as I found myself in at the beginning of this hearing. But there does seem to me to be a chance that that position will change. Bearing in mind that the defendant is at risk of an immediate custodial sentence, it does seem to me that he should be given that final chance, albeit I emphasise that it is a final chance. 47. As far as medical evidence is concerned, I agree with Mr Samuels that there is reason to suppose that the position will not be different by the time of the sentencing hearing. But it does seem to me that if the defendant is able to obtain legal representation and/or if he is able to see sense in the light of the judgment which I have given, and what I am about to say to him, then there is a reasonable prospect that further medical evidence will be put before the court which enables the court to make an informed decision as to the length of any custodial sentence and/or the question whether it should be suspended.”
“49. Turning to the question what will happen in terms of the sending of communications between now and the sentencing hearing, again there is a good deal of force in Mr Samuels’ predictions. But it is now very clearly on the record that the defendant has said on affirmation that he will send nothing further between now and the sentencing hearing. It is not necessarily a question of the defendant potentially being arrested if he sends further communications. But what one can say is this: if he sends further communications which breach the Steyn injunction, between now and the sentencing hearing, the likelihood is that my sentence will be more severe. He should be under no misapprehension about that. He has given his word that he will not send further communications. If he does so he will have breached his affirmation and he will have aggravated the conduct that I have found to be in contempt of court. 50. I should also point out that, up to now, the claimant has not issued a further contempt application in relation to the communications that have been sent since the committal application was made on20 May 2024 . It is perfectly open to him to do so between now and the sentencing hearing, and to ask for that application to be considered by me at the forthcoming hearing. It would not be surprising if he did do so if, contrary to the defendant’s affirmation, further communications were sent after today’s hearing, which breached the Steyn injunction.”
“(c) The defendant has sent numerous lengthy and incoherent emails and attachments to this court and the Court of Appeal concerning his appeal and this hearing. These contain material which is largely irrelevant for present purposes, but he has produced some additional medical evidence comprising GP notes which appear to have been printed on15 October 2024 , and a letter from his GP which is dated21 October 2024 . There is also evidence of an appointment tomorrow for a thoracic and abdominal scan, and on23 November 2024 for an echocardiogram, in each case at the Hereford County Hospital. (d) It appeared from the defendant's emails that he wished to postpone today's hearing or alternatively to attend by phone, albeit he did not make an application before the deadline of28 October 2024 . In the light of his GP's letter of21 October 2024 , which said that the defendant would have difficulties in attending a hearing in London in person, but would be able to attend remotely, I permitted the defendant to attend by video link. In an email dated1 November 2024 I also stated clearly that today's hearing would be going ahead, although I indicated that any application to postpone should be made at the hearing but that I was unlikely to grant such an application absent compelling evidence.”
“8. I also decided to proceed with the hearing. There has already been delay in this matter and a number of hearings. In my view, it is important to make progress, particularly given that the defendant continues to send communications which are prohibited by the Injunction, despite his assurance on the previous occasion that he would not do so, and given that he maintains that he has a right to do so. The defendant's appeal against my12 September 2024 Order has been dismissed and in any event his appeal was not a reason to postpone the completion of my task of determining the claimant's application to commit him for contempt. 9. As far as the defendant's health is concerned, I gave an account of the medical evidence as it stood at the time of the 12 September hearing in my judgment, including at paragraphs 3 and 6-9. The evidence of his future medical appointments which the defendant has since produced does not add anything to this account. His GP letter and notes do, but his GP says that although he would struggle to attend court in London, given that he would potentially be required to walk a significant distance, the defendant would be able to manage a remote hearing. There was no sign that I could see in the defendant's robust submissions that this assessment was incorrect. 10. The defendant still does not have legal representation, but as I noted in my previous judgment he has repeatedly been told that he should seek legal advice and representation and that he may be eligible for legal aid, and he had ample opportunity to instruct a representative before the last hearing. Since then he has had a further nearly eight weeks to do so. It appears he would have been able to secure representation were it not for his insistence that any legal representative deals with the background or, as he describes them, the underlying issues, rather than focus on the issues in the contempt application. There is no reason, in my judgment, to think that the position would change in terms of legal representation for the defendant if I were to postpone this hearing.”
“In relation to culpability, I accept that the conduct which formed the basis of the application to commit the defendant amounted to serious contumacious flouting of the Injunction. The culpability of the defendant is in my view compounded by the fact that the nature of the breaches which formed the basis of the contempt application was the continuation of conduct which had been held by Steyn J to be likely to amount to harassment of the claimant and was subsequently held by DHCJ Eardley to amount to harassment. The circulation of the allegations was also found by them to be with a view to harming the claimant in his professional life and causing him embarrassment and distress. Moreover, the allegations against the claimant which he continues to repeat are baseless and incoherent, as he has been told repeatedly and knows or ought to know in any event. As has been pointed out repeatedly by the claimant and accepted by the courts, the defendant's bankruptcy, the associated litigation and the£130,000 payment made to his deceased mother had nothing to do with the claimant. The claimant simply was not involved in these matters.”
“23. As far as mitigation is concerned, the defendant is aged 60 and of previous good character in the sense that he does not have previous criminal convictions. He also has significant health conditions. There is no medical evidence that these materially affect his culpability but they are relevant to the effect on him of an immediate custodial sentence. Contrary to his protestations, he does not appear to be dying, but the medical evidence which he has submitted shows that he his conditions include Crohn's disease, type 2 diabetes, ankylosing spondylitis and coronary artery disease. He had a myocardial infarction and the insertion of a stent in November 2021 and he has impaired functioning of the left ventricle. He suffers from breathlessness and his ejection fraction was just 24 per cent at the time of his last echocardiogram. It is likely that he also has a degree of chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder and possible that he has interstitial lung disease. This is currently being investigated. 24. The defendant’s GP says that his mental health is currently suffering and it is clear that there is a history of his abusing alcohol, which his GP says has worsened recently because of his current stress. He also has memory impairment and poor balance and depression and there are entries in his GP notes referring to depression in 2018 and suicidal thoughts in March 2020 and December 2022. 25. However, I note that the defendant has expressed no remorse for his actions nor any recognition of the seriousness of breaching an order of the court. On the contrary, he has persisted in breaching the Injunction and, as Mr Samuels pointed out, he appears to maintain that he is entitled to repeat his allegations against the claimant because he considers that it is in the public interest for him to do so.”
“I accept that there is much to be said for imposing an immediate custodial term and I also accept that there is at least a strong likelihood that the defendant will simply breach the conditions which I will in a moment impose on him. I have, however, concluded that the defendant should be given a final chance. I do so bearing in mind the possibility that he will finally see sense now that he is under imminent threat of an immediate custodial sentence, and taking into account, of course, the issues in relation to his health.”
“Execution of the Committal Order shall be suspended for a period of 2 years from4 November 2024 on condition that, subject to (a)-(d) below, the Defendant complies with the Order of Mr. Aidan Eardley KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dated18 July 2024 (the “Eardley Injunction”): a. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Court of Appeal in exercising his right of appeal against this Order or in connection with such appeal, or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended. b. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority or the Bar Standards Board in relation to the Defendant’s existing complaints to those bodies or any further complaint to those bodies arising out of the conduct of the Contempt Application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended. c. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to a public authority in response to any express request for further information by that public authority arising out of his correspondence with such authority prior to4 November 2024 shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended. d. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the courts in any appeal against the Extended Civil Restraint Order made on4 November 2024 (the “ECRO”) or in seeking permission pursuant to the ECRO or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal or application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.” a. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Court of Appeal in exercising his right of appeal against this Order or in connection with such appeal, or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended. b. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority or the Bar Standards Board in relation to the Defendant’s existing complaints to those bodies or any further complaint to those bodies arising out of the conduct of the Contempt Application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended. c. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to a public authority in response to any express request for further information by that public authority arising out of his correspondence with such authority prior to4 November 2024 shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended. d. Nothing said or written by the Defendant to the courts in any appeal against the Extended Civil Restraint Order made on4 November 2024 (the “ECRO”) or in seeking permission pursuant to the ECRO or for the purposes of taking legal advice in relation to such appeal or application shall amount to a breach of the condition on which the execution of the Committal Order is suspended.”
“64. The only question therefore which is properly before this court is whether a suspended committal order was wrong, in that it was outside the range properly open to Linden J when he came to consider what sanction should be imposed. The only possible alternative on the facts of this case was an immediate committal to prison. Mr. Winsor seems determined to get himself sent to prison. If he achieves that aim, he will have only himself to blame. This will be a matter of regret, because he is plainly not in the best of health and he appears to have a profoundly distorted view of the world. No-one wants to see a man like him in prison. It is also an undesirable outcome because of the scarcity of prison accommodation which is needed for other people. In the end, though, the court must secure compliance with its injunctive orders. That is necessary in order to protect Mr. Pattinson in this case, but also to promote public confidence in the civil justice system. Injunctive orders cannot be treated in a way which is contemptuous in every sense of that word. Linden J was merciful and fair to Mr. Winsor in the patient way in which he dealt with the case, and the order he made imposing a sanction in this case was unimpeachable. 65. In order to assist in understanding this decision, it is right that I should say that I consider that if Linden J had decided to commit Mr. Winsor to prison immediately for 4 months in November, that also would have been within the range of decisions properly open to him. That is why I describe the decision as “merciful”
“The Defendant says that “The fact is that [he has] never requested remote attendance”
“Dr Turnbull has advised that he did a letter roughly around a year ago but has said that if another letter is needed he thinks it would have to come from either the court or the solicitors representing you who can request a more formal medical report.”
“The terms of the Order of18 December 2025 are clear and must be complied with. They show what medical evidence is required and for what purpose. You should request such evidence from Dr Turnbull or any other appropriate medical practitioner and you can show the Order to such practitioner(s) so that they can see what is needed. The court will consider such evidence as is produced by the stated deadline and make its decisions accordingly. Dr Turnbull is not a party to these proceedings and you have not explained the basis on which the court could order him to provide a medical report, nor why such an order is necessary or appropriate. It is premature to consider an extension of time or any other variation to the order of 18 December.”
“Dr Turnbull has carefully considered your request; however, he is unfortunately unable to assist in the way you are asking. Dr Turnbull has noted that your request would require a full medical reassessment of your medical history, which is complex in nature and extends beyond the scope of routine General Medical Services. If a medical opinion or report is required, this would need to be completed following a full medical assessment with a GP and prepared as a formal medical report which does come with a cost as it falls out of the scope of routine General Medical Services, similar to one requested by a solicitor. While I appreciate that you are acting as a litigant in person, the requirements for such a report remain the same. If you would like me to ask our Administration Team to make contact with you regarding this request so they can explain in more detail, please let me know. Dr Turnbull did provide his previous letter as a goodwill gesture; however, this request goes beyond that and, given his role and limited clinical sessions, he would not be able to undertake this work. Dr Turnbull would like to apologise that he cannot be of further assistance on this occasion.”
“Your email does not include the request or requests which you have made to Dr Turnbull or any other medical practitioner but it appears that you have been asking for a more elaborate document/report than is required. You should show the Order of18 December 2025 to your GP or another practitioner who is able to provide evidence to the court, as the Order says what is required.”
“It is noted that the Defendant has taken legal advice and he is encouraged to take further advice in relation to these proceedings. As he well knows, legal aid is available to him. However, the Defendant has ignored what is said in the Reasons for my Order of5 January 2026 and the emails from the Court dated 5 and6 January 2026 , rather than acting on them. Nor has he supplied the Court with the whole of his communications with his GP surgery. The Court’s emails, and the Orders of the Court including this Order, can be shown to advisers and medical practitioners by the Defendant. They make perfectly clear what is required by way of medical evidence i.e. an up to date explanation and evidence of why he is unable to attend a hearing in London in person, if that is his position. In the circumstances, the Court is not going to initiate correspondence with the Defendant’s GP, or any other medical practitioner, or his GP Surgery. The hearing on23 January 2026 will go ahead. It remains the case that the Defendant is required to attend in person given the lack of any up to date medical evidence to show that he is unable to do so. He has been served with hard copy as well as electronic documents for that hearing, and he should ensure that these are available to him so that he can refer to them.”
“The Order of18 December 2025 was very much in the Defendant’s favour in that, contrary to the submissions of the Claimant, on the day of the committal hearing I postponed that hearing to23 January 2026 . This gave the Defendant a further month to secure legal representation (he has had since February 2024 in any event). I also set a deadline of9 January 2026 for updating medical evidence if his position was that he could not attend the hearing in London in person. The Orders of 5 and16 January 2026 refused to postpone the hearing on23 January 2026 , to enter into correspondence with the Defendant’s GP or to make an order against him that he produce a medical report. I also refused to extend the time for medical evidence on the grounds that this was premature – no such evidence had or has been produced. In emails to the Defendant and in the Reasons which I included in my Orders, I indicated that the Defendant should show his GP the correspondence with the Court and what I had said in my Orders as this made clear what was required and that what the Defendant was asking his GP to produce appeared to be over elaborate. In my 16 January Order I noted that the Defendant appeared to have legal advice and encouraged him to take further advice in relation to these proceedings. I also noted that he had ignored what is said in the Reasons for my Order of5 January 2026 and the emails from the Court dated 5 and6 January 2026 , rather than acting on them. Nor had he supplied the Court with the whole of his communications with his GP surgery. As far as I am aware, the Defendant has taken no further steps to obtain medical evidence since5 January 2026 . I note that the Defendant refers in his19 January 2026 application to losing 3 weeks because, until16 January 2026 , the LAA were adamant that he is not entitled to legal aid and he says that the GLD intervened to change this. He has not provided any evidence of his exchanges with the LAA or the GLD’s intervention but I am willing to consider such evidence if he submits it.”
“This matter does not fall within the remit of the Legal Aid Agency Crime Applications Team. Please note that sending multiple emails to this inbox may result in future messages being treated as spam”
“Mr Winsor’s ability to attend court hearings in London has been an ongoing issue in the proceedings which began in February 2024. The Court has considered the letter provided by Mr Winsor’s GP dated21 October 2024 and has seen a print out of his electronic medical records dated15 October 2024 . These documents suggest that, whilst he may have health issues which make it more difficult for him to do so, Mr Winsor could attend a hearing in London provided he made sensible arrangements to do so and that his failure to attend is because he is not prepared to cooperate with the process. They also indicate that, at that time, he was undergoing treatment/investigations and they are now 15 months out of date. Again, the Court needs reliable and up to date information as to these matters. The Court has repeatedly directed Mr Winsor to provide updated medical evidence but he has failed to do so. Recently, he has said that he has asked his GP but his GP refuses and has asked me to make an order against his GP which I have thus far declined to do. From what I can see, although Mr Winsor has not disclosed relevant information, the problem has arisen because he has been asking for a detailed medico legal report whereas, as I have said repeatedly, that is not what the Court requires. It merely requires reliable and sufficiently detailed information about the matters identified above to enable it to make decisions as to the timing and mode of hearing. That information could be set out in a GP’s letter as before and/or a letter from some other treating practitioner.”
“23.1.26 taken to A&E via ambulance after an anonymous person has called them. Admitted to taking an overdose of a combination of tablets including 91x 2.5mg Bisoprolol, 40x 25mg Spironolactone, 20x 7.5mg Aspirin, 14x 7.5mg Zopiclone, 25x 10mg Dapagliflozin, 11x 1g Metformin and 6x 150mg Venlafaxine. He had left a suicide note citing stressful life events as the cause of his attempted suicide. Initial examination and tests showed bradycardia, hypoglycaemia and acidosis. He was given IV fluids, anti-emetics and proton pump inhibitor and admitted to ITU for observation. He was subsequently moved from ITU to the Medical Team on 24.1.26. He was reviewed by the Crisis team whilst an in-patient and discharged by the medical team on 27.1.26. He was reviewed by the Crisis Team on a number of occasions between 27.1.26 and 30.1.26. He was deemed safe for discharge and follow up by the Neighbourhood Mental Health Team on 30.1.26. Medication on discharge Venlafaxine 75mg.”
“It is not possible for a GP to provide a definitive opinion on whether an individual would be unable to attend a court hearing at a future date, particularly where this is dependent on circumstances at that time. A patient’s ability to attend court would depend on their clinical….”
“…condition at the time of the hearing, including the nature and severity of any symptoms, and whether these would reasonably prevent attendance. This is something that would need to be assessed contemporaneously.”
“on presentation patient has no complaints, no vomiting, no melena, no abdominal or chest pain, on exam patient looks unwell, drowsy, sleepy but conscious orientated…showed no metabolic acidosis, no toxicity at the time”
“Dear Mr Winsor We have received a response from your named GP, who has advised that GPs do not determine whether a patient is fit to attend court. If a patient believes they are not fit to attend, they should raise this directly with the court, which can arrange an independent assessment if required. Unfortunately, we are unable to provide any further comment on this matter”
“My client is immensely concerned by Mr Winsor’s latest correspondence, and the reference to another planned suicide attempt. As I am sure the court will also appreciate, my client is in a very difficult position himself; all he has ever wanted is for the emails to stop. However, I am instructed that my client does not wish to play any part in his brother-in-law coming to harm. He has found the recent developments immensely upsetting, and has come to the conclusion that, in the circumstances, he would like to draw a line under matters. My client has also given careful consideration to Linden J’s exchange with him directly at the hearing in December 2025. In those circumstances, my instructions are that — with a degree of reluctance on my client’s part because of his concern that the harassment may continue — my client will seek to withdraw his application (with the court’s permission) on compassionate grounds, save that my client will seek a summary assessment of his costs thrown away on the basis of the statements of costs filed with the court by my instructing solicitors.”