TIMOTHY JOHN HULL PATTINSON v ROBERT IAN WINSOR [2025] EWHC 3508 (KB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
[2025] EWHC 3508 (KB)Case No Case No: KB-2024-000256Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Between
TIMOTHY JOHN HULL PATTINSONClaimantROBERT IAN WINSORDefendant
Before
Mr Justice LindenMR HARRY SAMUELS of Counsel for the ClaimantThe Defendant appeared In PersonDate 18 December 2025
[1]MR JUSTICE LINDEN: On 4 November 2024, I sentenced the defendant for contempt of court, having found on 12 September 2024 that on multiple occasions he had breached an interim injunction ordered by Steyn J on 16 February 2024 in proceedings brought by the claimant to restrain harassment of him by the defendant. The Order which I made was that the defendant be committed to prison for four months, but I suspended the execution of the Order for a period of two years on condition that he did not breach a final injunction which had been ordered by Mr Aidan Eardley KC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, on 24 July 2024, in the harassment proceedings. I will call this the "Eardley Injunction". I also made an extended civil restraint order.[2]The defendant appealed against the suspended committal order and, on 26 March 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and certified it as being totally without merit. On 29 April 2025, the Court of Appeal then made a general civil restraint order against the defendant.[3]This is the claimant's application dated 5 June 2025 for my committal order to be executed and a warrant of committal issued. The application alleges that the defendant breached the Eardley Injunction on at least 25 occasions. The claimant also asks that I impose an additional penalty for the breaches of the Eardley Injunction on the basis that they too amount to contempts of court.[4]The defendant was notified of today's hearing by email dated 22 October 2025. In the run up to the hearing he made applications dated 15 and 24 November 2025 which were brought to my attention late on the afternoon of 9 December when I was abroad on leave. There were various incoherent and rambling attachments and it was not clear what relief or remedy he was asking for. Parts of these applications suggested that he wanted to postpone the hearing in order to obtain legal representation, or to appear remotely for reasons related to his health. However, he had not presented any evidence to suggest that a postponement would result in his obtaining legal representation where previous attempts had failed, and he had not provided any medical evidence that he would not be capable of attending in person.[5]On 12 December 2025, I made an Order that in so far as the defendant's application was to postpone today's hearing, that application was refused and that in so far as his application was to attend by CVP or otherwise remotely, that application was also refused. This resulted in a further application by the defendant dated 15 December 2025. The application did include a GP letter dated 21 October 2024 which I had considered at the sentencing hearing but no updated medical evidence. At the September hearing the defendant had put forward the likelihood that his health would improve as a reason for postponing and the position as at 21 October 2024 was that he was awaiting investigation and treatment.[6]Again, it was not clear what the defendant was applying for but he stated at one point that the fact was that he had never requested remote attendance. It appeared that he was applying for the hearing to be postponed and/or for assistance in relation to his attendance in the form of an afternoon listing, payment of his train fare, payment of a taxi fare to bring him from the station to the court and other adjustments during the hearing.[7]On 16 December, I made an Order refusing the defendant's application to postpone the hearing but agreeing that it would start at two o'clock. In my reasons, I said that the contempt application had been made some time ago and against a background of repeated attempts by the defendant to delay or disrupt the progress of the proceedings between the parties. Legal representation had been a continuing issue in the proceedings which were long running and had included appeals to the Court of Appeal. The hearing today had been listed since 22 October 2025 and the defendant had had more than ample time to obtain representation. Nor had he presented any evidence to suggest that a postponement would result in him securing legal representation. There was no acceptable reason, I said, to postpone the hearing.[8]The defendant, I noted, had said that in fact he had never requested remote attendance. I noted the nature of the support that he had requested and the fact that he presented a GP letter that was more than a year old and had been considered at previous hearings. I granted his application to start at two o'clock in order to assist him to attend what I understood to be in person and I said that I would take such steps as appeared reasonable to accommodate his health conditions during the hearing. In both of my Orders I said that the defendant should be in no doubt that if he failed to attend the hearing without good reason, it would proceed in his absence.[9]There was a further application notice later on 16 December 2025 which I am afraid is rambling and incoherent. The relief which the defendant was seeking was unclear.[10]At 1:07 this afternoon, the defendant made an application to attend remotely, for a short adjournment of 14 days to obtain representation and for a short stay of the activation of any Order for his committal to prison so as to allow him to appeal any such Order. I gave him permission to attend remotely for the purposes of his application only, provided this could be facilitated by two o'clock today. In the event, it proved possible to facilitate audio communication between the defendant and the court, but not for him to appear by video.[11]The defendant made his application orally and, in effect, sought to postpone the hearing on two grounds: firstly, that he was still trying to get legal representation. He made a number of references to the Hammerton case and told me that he had contacted 142 lawyers, 39 of which he said he had identified in documents sent to the court, but that he had only had two replies; secondly, the defendant sought a postponement on the grounds of his health conditions, albeit without presenting any further evidence than the GP letter of 21 October 2024. He told me of his various conditions, said that he was suffering from cerebral atrophy, brain fog, unable to remember and so on and said that he had mobility difficulties which meant that it would be impossible for him to attend a hearing in London.[12]He also told me that he did not have the papers with him and that he would not, in any event, be able to remember what they said. He made various points to the effect that as a non-lawyer he would be unable to deal with the allegations against him. When I asked him, he said on more than one occasion, however, that he could attend a hearing in Hereford in person if it were to take place there albeit he would need representation. He also said that he would be able to attend a hearing in Worcester if the matter were listed there.[13]Understandably, Mr Samuels on behalf of his client opposed the application to postpone the hearing. As far as the issue about legal representation is concerned, he took me to what the Court of Appeal said in relation to what has been a recurring theme in the proceedings between the parties, ie the defendant's plea that he needs legal representation, that, if he were only given more time he would be able to secure such representation, and that it is vitally important for him given what he says are his intellectual deficits and given also that his liberty is at stake.[14]At paragraphs 40 to 58 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the appeal from my Order of 4 November 2024, neutral citation number [2025] EWCA Civ 344 , Edis LJ considered the history of this issue, the way in which the defendant had raised it in the course of the proceedings and the way in which the courts including the Court of Appeal itself, had dealt with it. In short, the conclusion of the Court of Appeal was that this was not a Hammerton type of case. The situation was not that the court was denying the defendant the opportunity to seek and obtain legal representation. It was that he had been given ample opportunity to do so. He had been reminded on numerous occasions that legal aid is available to him but he had insisted, so the courts had found, on asking prospective legal representatives not simply to focus on the contempt of court proceedings, but to delve into all of the background to his current situation. The Court of Appeal's conclusion was therefore that the High Court had dealt with the issue of representation impeccably and that that issue did not provide any basis for impugning the decisions which the High Court had taken.[15]Of course, I have considered whether the situation has altered since the Court of Appeal's judgment but, in my view, it has not. The application, as I have said, was made on 5 June 2025. Mr Winsor has therefore had more than ample time to obtain legal representation. The issue is not that the court is unwilling to enable him to do so; the issue is that he is unwilling to seek legal representation in a sensible way and for the purposes of addressing specifically the contempt proceedings which he faces. So I do not accept that that is a basis to postpone today's hearing.[16]As far as medical evidence is concerned, Mr Winsor has not presented any updating medical evidence since 21 October 2024 and I therefore do not accept that there are any health-related reasons which prevent him from participating in this hearing and responding to the case against him. Nor, as matters stand and on the information available, do I accept that he would be unable to attend a hearing in person.[17]I also consider, as Mr Samuels submitted, that the defendant should attend in person. As Mr Samuels put it, this will encourage him to take responsibility for his actions and hold him accountable for them; but it also has a bearing on the question of a fair and efficient hearing.[18]I have also heard from Mr Pattinson himself, who made a number of points to me expressing a high degree of frustration at the legal process, and I had one or two things to say in response to him on that score which I will not repeat. I do understand his frustration that the defendant continues to send emails of the nature that he was prohibited from sending as long ago as February 2024, and I do understand that Mr Pattinson has incurred substantial, and likely irrecoverable, costs in the process of seeking to enforce the injunctions that he has obtained.[19]Nevertheless, I have concluded that the wiser course is to postpone the hearing of this application to a date in January with a time estimate of a day. I appreciate that that was the original time estimate and that I then shortened it, I have to say, not appreciating that the application is not merely to activate the suspended four month custodial term: in addition to that, the court is asked to find the defendant guilty of contempt of court in respect of the alleged 25 instances of alleged breaching of the Eardley Injunction and to impose an additional custodial sentence on him.[20]In the light of the Court of Appeal's observations at paragraphs 64 and 65 of its judgment, the risk that if the defendant is found to be guilty of contempt of court it will be necessary to sentence him to an additional custodial term is significant. That, in turn, plays into the question of ensuring that the defendant has a fair hearing in relation to the case against him and has a full opportunity to respond to it. That, it seems to me, gives rise to the key reason why I propose to adjourn today's hearing and that is that I do not consider that the issues can be fairly determined in relation to the 5 June application in the time that was ultimately left to me after I had heard submissions on the defendant's 1.07pm application. Indeed, the original time estimate of a day seems to me to be right so that, even if we had started at two o'clock, it would have been difficult to complete the hearing.[21]Mr Pattinson is, of course, highly frustrated by any postponement of the hearing, taking the view that it means that he will inevitably incur more irrecoverable costs and certainly be prejudiced in this sense. But against that position I have taken into account the risk that if I were, as it were, to rush the fences today, the risk of proliferation of challenges to any resulting committal to prison would significantly increase and with it the risk of Mr Pattinson incurring significantly more costs than if the matter is dealt with over the course of a day in January.[22]The other matter that I am conscious of is that the defendant was not, in fact, ordered to attend personally, although he was warned that if he did not attend the hearing would proceed in his absence, whereas I agree with Mr Samuels that if possible it is desirable that he attends a hearing of this nature personally.[23]So for all of those reasons, I have concluded that I am going to postpone this hearing and list it for a day in January. I will obviously listen to proposals in relation to directions from Mr Samuels and, of course, information about his availability in January to do such a hearing. I have it in mind to order the defendant to provide updated medical evidence so that informed decisions about the conduct of the hearing can be taken. (Discussion re directions follows) (This Judgment has been approved by Mr Justice Linden.)