Vertical Aerospace Group Limited v Thandiwe Ngoma [2026] EWHC 1449 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1449 (KB)Case No KB-2026-001230
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate 12/06/2026
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
TOM LITTLE KC(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
VERTICAL AEROSPACE GROUP LIMITEDClaimantTHANDIWE NGOMADefendant
Paul Nicholls KC (instructed by Osborne Clarke LLP) for ClaimantDiya Sen Gupta KC and Nick Zweck (instructed by Farrer & Co) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 29 April and 8 May 2026
APPROVED JUDGMENTThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Monday 15 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Tom Little KC:

[1]This short judgment deals with the issue of costs. Background[2]On 8th May 2026 I handed down a judgment in this claim (with the neutral citation [2026] EWHC 1096 (KB)) following a hearing that had taken place on 29th April 2026. Following that hand down I heard argument as to the terms of the order that I should make. Whilst I heard some argument on the issue of costs at the hearing on 8th May 2026 I gave directions for the parties to serve sequential written submissions on the question of costs.[3]I have now considered the oral and written submissions and the authorities referred to in those submissions. I have also reviewed the issues that I had to decide at the hearing on 29th April 2026, what consideration was given to them during the hearing and what the substantive outcome was on all of the issues. Framework for my consideration[4]A decision as to costs is a matter for my discretion but to be exercised consistently with CPR 44.2 which, so far as is material, provides:(1) The court has discretion as to – (a) whether costs are payable by one party to another; (b) the amount of those costs; and (c) when they are to be paid.(2) If the court decides to make an order about costs – (a) the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party; but (b) the court may make a different order. ….. (4) In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court will have regard to all the circumstances, including – (a) the conduct of all the parties; (b) whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful; and (c) any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the court’s attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply. (5) The conduct of the parties includes – (a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the extent to which the parties followed the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct or any relevant pre-action protocol; (b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; (c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue; (d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in the claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated its claim; and (e)whether a party failed to comply with an order for alternative dispute resolution, or unreasonably failed to engage in alternative dispute resolution. (6) The orders which the court may make under this rule include an order that a party must pay – (a) a proportion of another party’s costs; (b) a stated amount in respect of another party’s costs; (c) costs from or until a certain date only; (d) costs incurred before proceedings have begun; (e) costs relating to particular steps taken in the proceedings; (f) costs relating only to a distinct part of the proceedings; and (g) interest on costs from or until a certain date, including a date before judgment. (7) Before the court considers making an order under paragraph (6)(f), it will consider whether it is practicable to make an order under paragraph (6)(a) or (c) instead. …. Submissions[5]The Claimant submits that on proper analysis it has succeeded in its applications and in response to the Defendant’s application and for that reason it should recover its costs. In particular they submit that the costs of obtaining and serving the imaging order, including the costs of the supervising solicitor and of the IT expert, fall to be paid by the Defendant because the order was obtained due to the Defendant's conduct and the order was upheld at the contested Return Date. In relation to relevant material on the Defendant’s electronic devices the Claimant submits that in substance the Claimant has secured swift access to these documents (well in advance of disclosure in the usual course), which they say was the evident purpose of their application even if their application was not successful in the terms sought.[6]The Defendant submits that the Claimant’s application for an ‘interrogation order’ was refused and she should have her costs of that application and that the remaining costs should be costs in the case or costs reserved on the basis that it is premature for the Court to assess costs without knowing the value of the imaging order to the litigation as a whole. Discussion[7]As is clear from the submissions the parties have fundamentally different and divergent views on who succeeded and on what issues. They are both partially correct but also both partially incorrect. Having considered the matter carefully and having taken into account the arguments on and the outcome of each of the decisions that I had to make it is tolerably clear to me that there was here no clear winner and no overall winner. I have considered making an issue based costs order but given how interwoven some of the issues were I have concluded that that would not be the appropriate order nor would any form of order which sought to attribute a particular percentage of costs. Indeed, seeking to separate out applications that went to the maintenance of and the terms of the imaging order is, in my judgement, wholly artificial on the facts of this case.[8]The reality is that both parties won certain arguments and lost certain arguments. I will not descend into granular detail about it but the Defendant’s application to set aside the imaging order on the grounds of a failure of full and frank disclosure did not succeed. However, I varied the terms of the affidavit to be filed and served by the Defendant in terms appreciably narrower than had been sought by the Claimant and obtained originally by the Claimant.[9]I refused the Claimant’s application for what was referred to as an interrogation order in relation to the electronic devices but did not accede to the approach invited by the Defendant as to disclosure. The eventual outcome in that regard was very much a middle ground.[10]All of the applications and arguments were interlinking and therefore it would not be appropriate to make individual costs orders on individual applications. The reality is that roughly 50% of time was spent on arguments which led to a positive outcome in some way for each side. Properly applying CPR 44.2 to the circumstances before me the appropriate costs order to make is costs in the case. I make clear that I considered whether the costs should be reserved or whether some part of the costs should be reserved. However, given what was contested in this case I do not regard that order as the correct one to make here. Conclusion[11]An order should be drawn up for costs in the case.