Sharon Elizabeth Brown v The Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Constabulary & Ors [2026] EWHC 1313 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1313 (KB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeHearing Heard on 27 th February 2026
Strand,
London, WC2A 2LL
Draft to parties: 12 th April 2026
Judgment given on: 10 th June 2026
Before
MASTER YOXALL(Sitting in Retirement)
Between
SHARON ELIZABETH BROWNClaimant[1] THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF HERTFORDSHIRE CONSTABULARYDefendant[2] THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR HERTFORDSHIREDefendant[3] CATCH 22 CHARITY LIMITEDDefendant(Sued as CATCH 22 TRADING AS BEACON VICTIM CARE)DefendantThe Claimant appeared in person for in person for First Defendant: Ms Emma Price, of counsel, instructed by its Legal Services Department for Second Defendant: Mr. Edward Barham, of counsel, instructed by Weightmans LLP for Third Defendant: Mr. Remi Reichhold, of counsel, instructed by Stone King LLPJUDGMENTThis judgment was handed down by the Judge remotely by circulation to the parties and their representatives by email and release to the National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 2pm on 10 th June 2026Date 2026-06-10
[1]Each Defendant in this case has issued an application for an order that that the claim against it be struck out or that it be granted summary judgment.[2]The Claimant appeared before me in person. Ms Emma Price, of counsel, appeared on behalf of the First Defendant [“the police”]; Mr. Edward Barhem, of counsel, appeared on behalf of the Second Defendant; and Mr. Remi Reichhold, of counsel appeared on behalf of the Third Defendant.[3]I am grateful to the Claimant and to counsel for their oral and written submissions. The Claimant provided me with discrete skeleton arguments in respect of each Defendant.[4]I granted the Claimant’s request that she be permitted to reply after each counsel for the Defendant had made their submissions.[5]I also had the benefit of a witness statement by Trusha Govinder dated 12th December 2025 on behalf of the First Defendant; a witness statement by Nicholas Story dated the 13th January 2026 on behalf of the Second Defendant; and witness statements by Nigel Richards dated 15th December 2025 and Jonathan Copping dated 15th December 2025 on behalf of the Third Defendant.[6]I also had the benefit of a “rebuttal statement” by the Claimant dated the 5th February 2026. This statement was signed with a statement of truth.[7]The role of the First Defendant [“the police”] is self-evident. The Second Defendant holds the Hertfordshire Constabulary to account by setting its priorities, engaging its budget and ensuring that policing meets community needs. The Second Defendant is not responsible for day-to-day policing. The Third Defendant is a registered charity. One of the services it provides is Beacon Victim Care which is commissioned to support victims of crime in Hertfordshire.[8]As far as striking out the claims are concerned, CPR r.3.4 provides:(1) In this rule and rule 3.5, reference to a statement of case includes reference to part of a statement of case.(2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order; ….[9]As far as summary judgment is concerned, I remind myself that it is not for the Claimant to show that she would win her cases. It is for the Defendants to show that the Claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim and there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial; see CPR r.24.3. As is well known, a fanciful prospect of success will not do.[10]The principles relating to summary judgment were set out by Lewison J (as he then was) in Easyair Ltd v. Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) and approved in AC Ward & Sons Ltd v. Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098. Lewison J stated at [15]:
“i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a "realistic" as opposed to a "fanciful" prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91; ii) A "realistic" claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8] iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a "mini-trial": Swain v Hillman iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10] v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550; vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63; vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.”
[11]The claim form was issued on 8th November 2025 and is marked “received by the Court on 14/10/25”. The latter date is significant as there are limitation issues in relation to various claims. See: CPR PD 7A paras 6.1 and 6.2.[12]The brief details of claim on the claim form state:
“Claim for estimated damages of £350,000 for misfeasance in public office, negligence, breaches of statutory duty (Data Protection Act 2018 / UK GDPR), breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Arts 3, 6, 8 & A1P1), and disability discrimination, harassment and failure to make reasonable adjustments contrary to the Equality Act 2010. The claim arises from continuing misconduct and discrimination by Hertfordshire Constabulary, the Police and Crime Commissioner and Beacon Victim Care (Catch 22) between 2015 and 2025, including failures to investigate, misuse of safeguarding and data, denial of reasonable adjustments, and obstruction of civil justice.”
[13]The Particulars of Claim run to 15 pages. It is not easy to make out the claims against each Defendant. The Particulars of Claim are lacking in relation to dates and the details of what is said to have happened. The Particulars of Claim do not include a concise statement of the facts upon which the Claimant relies as required by CPR r.16.4. That said, the relevant facts appear to be as follows. For the purpose of the applications, I proceed on the basis that the facts alleged by the Claimant are true. The Background[14]The Claimant suffered childhood physical, emotional and sexual abuse. Later she suffered domestic abuse by her daughter from her teenage years onwards. The daughter’s behaviour was controlling, aggressive, and emotionally abusive.[15]In 2015 there was a court-ordered handover of the Claimant’s granddaughter – attended by the Claimant, and the Claimant’s daughter and mother-in-law. The daughter became verbally aggressive and threatening in front of the child. The Claimant attempted to complete the handover quickly and to de-escalate the confrontation. The Daughter’s 2015 police reports[16]At a later stage on that day, the daughter became increasingly impatient and called the police alleging, correctly, that the Claimant had squeezed her arm No assault was intended by the Claimant. She was trying to get her daughter to calm down. .[17]The police attended and spoke to those present. They concluded that the granddaughter was too distressed for the contact visit to continue and advised everyone to leave separately. The police recorded “no offence.”[18]The following day, the daughter made a second report to the police falsely alleging that the Claimant had attacked her and claiming that she had sustained cuts and bruises all over her face and body. No such injuries were observed or recorded by the police and the report was correctly recorded as “no crime”. The Claimant was not aware of this second report for some years.[19]Subsequently, the Claimant received a text message from the police instructing her not to contact her daughter. The Claimant states that this severed communication about child-contact arrangements and that she was obliged to issue Family Court enforcement proceedings to restore contact.[20]During those enforcement proceedings, the daughter misused a false narrative based on her second false police report presenting the false account as though it presented genuine police action and investigation. The court proceeded on the basis the police had taken steps which in fact never occurred and accepted the daughter’s version at face value.[21]The Claimant states that she became overwhelmed and was forced to discontinue the 2015 enforcement proceedings because of her daughter’s continued abuse through the legal process.[22]The Claimant owned a horse named “Anouska Van de Sluize” (“the horse”). In about 2015, the Claimant’s daughter took the horse and concealed it from the Claimant for over a decade.[23]At some time in 2017, the police forced entry into the Claimant’s home under s.17 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Claimant states that the police were acting on a safeguarding alert wrongly believed to have been made by a psychiatrist – whereas the referral was from an administrative staff member. The Claimant pleads that there were no reasonable grounds to justify entry under s.17. The Claimant pleads this forced entry breached Article 3 of ECHR. The police have no record of this alleged incident or any forced entry. This matters not as any cause of action arising from these facts is time barred.[24]In 2024, in the course of disclosure in court proceedings, the Claimant received copies of the police files relating to the 2015 incidents and for the first time discovered the existence of her daughter’s second false report (see paragraph 18 above). The Claimant’s report to the police[25]On 5th May 2024 the Claimant reported her daughter to the police for [1] making the second false 2015 report to the police; [2] for domestic abuse; and [3] for the theft of the horse.[26]Later in 2024, the Claimant was interviewed at the police station by PS Essam. He later wrote to the Claimant stating that he was closing the case but would reopen it, explaining that this was because the Claimant had requested additional time to prepare due to health reasons. PC Fiona Hitchcock[27]The case (or the Claimant’s crime report) was re-opened with PC Hitchcock conducting the investigation. The Claimant contends that PC Hitchcock’s handling of the investigation into the theft of the horse and domestic abuse allegations was procedurally improper, discriminatory and contrary to College of Policing domestic abuse guidelines.[28]According to the Claimant, PC Hitchcock made it clear from her initial telephone contact that she was only investigating the theft of the horse allegation and stated expressly that she would not investigate the domestic abuse or false report allegations.[29]The Claimant complains that PC Hitchcock refused to offer the Claimant “a proper, trauma-informed interview or Domestic Abuse Risk Assessment” but insisted instead on telephone communication and pressing the Claimant, by email, for immediate evidence. PC Hitchcock stated that if the evidence was not supplied within a very short period of time, the investigation would be closed. There are no particulars of the “very short period of time” or when the requests for evidence were made.[30]At this point, the Claimant had no support worker as the Third Defendant had failed to assign one.[31]However, the Claimant did supply ownership documents relating to the horse and information about the domestic abuse. PC Hitchcock stated that the information was useful background but that she did not regard the domestic abuse or false report as part of the same matter. Shortly afterwards, PC Hitchcock emailed the Claimant stating that she had spoken to the Claimant’s daughter who said that she had sold the horse over a decade ago to a film company and did not know whether the horse was alive or dead.[32]On the 27th December 2024, PC Hitchcock emailed the Claimant stating that the case was merely “a civil dispute over ownership”, that the other matters of domestic abuse and the 2015 false report were being dealt with by someone else. PC Hitchcock stated that she would have no further contact with the Claimant and that the case was closed. In the crime report the date of disposal is stated as 17thNovember 2024.[33]There were court proceedings involving the Claimant and her daughter. In those proceedings the daughter disclosed email correspondence in February 2025 between the daughter and PC Hitchcock. Those emails showed that PC Hitchcock had contacted the Belgian Warmblood Society. The Claimant complains that PC Hitchcock had accepted at face value the daughter’s statement that her name appearing on the horse’s passport proved ownership whereas the registry contains no ownership data. PC Hitchcock told the daughter that the case had been filed (closed) on that basis.[34]In the same correspondence, PC Hitchcock stated that the Claimant and her daughter had “a complex relationship”, expressed sympathy for the daughter and emphasised that the daughter should report the Claimant for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1977 if any further incidents occurred. The Claimant makes the point that as there had been no contact between the Claimant and her daughter for about 10 years, the inference is that PC Hitchcock was treating the Claimant’s lawful police reports as harassment of the daughter.[35]According to the Claimant, it is the policy of the First Defendant that a Victim’s Right to Review [“VRR”] is not permitted where the suspect has not been formally interviewed. The Claimant states that PC Hitchcock’s refusal to interview her daughter ensured that no VRR could be sought.[36]The Claimant states that PC Hitchcock’s conduct collectively amounts to harassment, procedural unfairness, discrimination contrary to s.29 of The Equality Act 2010, and misfeasance in public office. The Daughter’s 2025 false police report[37]In 2025, the Claimant issued civil proceedings in the High Court against her daughter for theft of the horse and related domestic abuse allegations. The Claimant states that she issued these proceedings because of the police failure to investigate her daughter.[38]The service of these proceedings prompted the daughter to make a further false report to the police in June 2025. The daughter repeated unverified family statements portraying the Claimant as “mentally ill” and “suicidal”. When asked by the police if the Claimant had ever attempted suicide, the daughter replied, “once – to get what she wants.” PC Jack Hughes[39]The Claimant complains that the investigating or interviewing officer PC Hughes accepted the daughter’s assertions without verification, refused to carry out a Domestic Abuse Risk Assessment [“DARA”] and “non-crimed” (sic) the allegation without notifying the Claimant that it existed. The daughter herself refused to answer DARA questions. The Claimant states that the matter was closed with no proper investigation. (The First Defendant accepts that the decision was taken not to investigate the daughter’s report because it disclosed no evidence of a crime. The report related to Facebook comments the Claimant had posted about her daughter, against the backdrop of litigation brought by the Claimant against her daughter and a reported history of physical domestic abuse by the Claimant against her daughter 10 years previously. ) The Safeguarding Referral[40]Shortly afterwards, PC Hughes created a safeguarding referral to Hertfordshire Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust [“the Trust”]. The Claimant states that the referral falsely implied that the Claimant was suicidal and linked this to her ongoing civil litigation. The Claimant states that this safeguarding referral embedded both the 2015 “non-crime report” and the 2025 false report into a single document. According to the Claimant, this caused the false data to become embedded in the records of the Trust and the NHS. The referral was circulated to the Trust and the Claimant’s GP practice. The Claimant only became aware of the referral later.[41]The Claimant became aware of the safeguarding referral a few days later when she received a telephone call from a duty GP. The GP said that the daughter had reported the Claimant for domestic abuse, had told the police the Claimant was suing her for theft of the horse and had claimed that the Claimant was suicidal because of the civil claim. The GP repeatedly referred to the safeguarding referral. This was also the first time that the Claimant was aware of her daughter’s false 2025 report and that inaccurate material had been circulated.[42]After the call from the GP, the Claimant contacted the Trust about the referral and was told that the referral and its covering police email had been marked “not for disclosure to the service user”. The Claimant states the accompanying email had been sent to the Trust’s Safeguarding Hub to justify the referral “evidencing deliberate concealment and co-ordinated misuse of safeguarding between the police and NHS partners during ongoing civil litigation.”[43]After the Claimant had contacted the Trust, she made her own crime report to the police to record the false allegation and to seek redress. According to the Claimant, several police officers contacted her using “inconsistent and pressurising” methods. Despite repeated requests, the Claimant was denied “a trauma-informed” interview and reasonable adjustments. One police officer stated that she could not investigate because the matter had been “non-crimed”. The Claimant wanted “a domestic-abuse-trained and trauma-informed officer”. Rather than accommodate this, the Claimant was recorded by the police as being “difficult” and “demanding”. The Claimant states that this shows a discriminatory attitude towards her disability and trauma needs.[44]PS Hammond then telephoned the Claimant. He agreed that the daughter’s allegation was false but stated that it was for the police to decide whether to prosecute. In relation to the referral, he said that it was “automatic”, triggered because the daughter had said the Claimant once tried to commit suicide to get what she wanted. He added that the previous incident was a decade ago. PC Hammond refused to interview the daughter. The Claimant states that this prevented any Victim’s Right to Review.[45]It is not clear how, but the Claimant obtained a copy of the referral and it confirmed that PC Hughes was its author. The Claimant states that the police contradictory explanations and concealment of the covering email demonstrate “retaliatory and discriminatory misuse of safeguarding during live civil litigation and at a critical stage in the Claimant’s High Court proceedings”. The Claimant contends that the actions of the First Defendant breached Articles 6 and 8 of ECHR and the UK GDPR and s.29 of the Equality Act 2010.[46]The Claimant states that the Reviews Team of the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, the Second Defendant, later attempted to obtain a Victim’s Right to Review of PS Hammond’s decision, despite being legally unavailable where no suspect interview occurs. The Claimant pleads that:
“This demonstrates a collapse of independent oversight and institutional conflict of interest within Hertfordshire Constabulary.”
[47]The Trust rejected the said referral. The Trust social worker declined to share any medical data and recorded that the matter was “not mental health”.[48]The Claimant states that despite repeated police actions leaving her suicidal, the police refused a statutory Community Trigger review, preventing multi-agency scrutiny and allowing inaccurate records and discriminatory practices to continue unchecked. The inaccurate records and discriminatory practices are unparticularised. The Second and Third Defendants[49]The Claimant pleads that the Third Defendant refused to provide her with support – she being a confirmed vulnerable victim – leaving the Claimant without assistance during multiple police investigations into her daughter. The Claimant states that she was specifically referred to the Third Defendant by police Victim Services in relation to investigations into her daughter, including the theft and concealment of the horse, associated domestic abuse and earlier false police reports.[50][1] The Claimant pleads that the Third Defendant responded to this referral by email, copied to the Claimant, stating that they do not support the Claimant on any investigation involving her family. The Claimant pleads that this was discriminatory and contrary to domestic abuse and victim-care guidance. [2] The Claimant has accepted that this allegation is incorrect in that the email did not come from the Third Defendant but from police victim services.[51]The Second Defendant was later made aware of the Third Defendant’s refusal to be involved but failed to take any steps to rectify the position or to ensure alternative provision of victim support. The Claimant was left without any independent assistance or advocacy despite being recognised as a vulnerable victim.[52]The Claimant subsequently requested a review by the Second Defendant limited to: the failure of PC Hitchcock to investigate the reports of theft I assume the Claimant is referring to the theft of the horse. ; domestic abuse; the previous false police report; and the inadequacy of a DI Eldridge’s complaint investigation into those failures.[53]The Second Defendant’s Complaints Resolution Team [“CRT”] carried out a general review. It concluded that the police refusal to provide the Claimant with a trauma informed interview by a domestic abuse trained officer was reasonable. The Claimant states that she did not request that the CRT be involved and that it exceeded its remit. She only asked that her complaint be formally recorded “and allocated for proper investigation”.[54]The Claimant pleads that by acting in this way, the Second Defendant blurred the boundaries between complaint logging, investigation and independent review. She states: “Its dual role created a conflict of interest and undermined the independence required under the statutory framework. These failures demonstrate a collapse of independent oversight and reinforce the Claimant’s case that [the Second Defendant] and [Third Defendant] operated in alignment with Hertfordshire Constabulary rather than as independent bodies. Their conduct forms part of the continuing pattern of procedural unfairness; discrimination and institutional collusion pleaded in this claim.” …..[55]Having set out most of the facts alleged in the Particulars of Claim at some length, I can proceed to deal with the merits of the claims against each Defendant with relative brevity. The mere rehearsal of the facts pleaded indicates the weakness of the claims.[56]In summary, the Claimant alleges: [1] misfeasance in public office against the police and the Second Defendant; [2] negligence by the police in the operational handling of safeguarding, data and victim support functions; [3] negligence by the Third Defendant in the provision of victim services; [4] breach of statutory duty by the police under the Data Protection Act 2018 an UK GDPR; [5] breaches by the police of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Arts 3, 6, 8 and A1P1); [6] disability discrimination (including discrimination arising from disability, failure to make reasonable adjustments and harassment) contrary to ss.15, 20, 21, 26 and 29 of the Equality Act 2010. The Claim Against the First Defendant Misfeasance in Public Office[57]The tort of misfeasance in public office has been authoritatively defined in the speech of Lord Steyn in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1, Lord Steyn explained that there were two different forms or limbs of the tort (p.191) “First there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior motive. The second form is where a public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves bad faith inasmuch as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act is lawful.”[58]By no stretch of the imagination could the facts pleaded against the police amount to the tort of misfeasance in public office. The police were acting on information provided to them by the Claimant’s daughter. The refusal to investigate the alleged domestic abuse and the false report cannot be said to have been carried out in bad faith – particularly as the domestic abuse and false reporting happened in about 2015. Likewise, the referral by PC Hughes cannot be said to have been carried out in bad faith. Putting it another way, the Claimant has no real prospect of proving bad faith.[59]On page 3 of the Claimant’s rebuttal statement (there are no paragraph numbers), she refers to the issue of “the exercise of professional judgment by PC Hughes in 2025 to initiate a Care Act referral without consent …”. If the pleaded facts relating to the exercise of that judgment are equally consistent with a mistake or error of judgment on the part of the police, the misfeasance in public office must fail; i.e: bad faith cannot be proven.[60]Furthermore, there is no evidence of loss or damage caused to the Claimant as a result of the alleged police conduct.[61]In short, the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim in misfeasance in public office against the police. Put another way, this claim has no real prospect of success. Negligence[62]There are no particulars of negligence. This appears to be a case in which the Claimant is alleging negligence in the way in which the officers failed to investigate complaints against the daughter – what they omitted to do. I consider that the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim in negligence against the police. On the facts as asserted by the Claimant, I consider that there is no real prospect of the Claimant establishing that a duty of care was owed to her or that there was any assumption of responsibility by the officers to give rise to a duty of care. It is to be noted that the police had no special level of control over the Claimant’s daughter.[63]In Woodcock v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 13 at [120], the Court of Appeal stated:
“It is common ground between the parties that there are three relevant general rules. First, that the common law does not impose liability in the tort of negligence for omissions or failures to act. Secondly, that the police do not owe a duty to individuals to protect them against harm caused by the criminal actions of a third party. Thirdly, that foreseeability of harm is not in itself sufficient to give rise either to such a duty or to the narrower duty to warn for which Ms Woodcock contends. We have no doubt that Ms Woodcock's case falls within the scope of those general rules, and is not a novel case calling for an assessment of whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability upon the Chief Constable.”
[64]In respect of the Claimant’s complaint that the police did not do enough to investigate or take action against her daughter, both in respect of reports the Claimant made to them and reports her daughter made to them, even taking her pleaded case at its height, the Claimant’s allegation is one of failing to “confer a benefit” or “to protect from harm” as opposed to “making matters worse” or “harming” on the other; the general rule is that the former will not give rise to a duty of care: Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33, at [1].[65]It is now well established that, in the absence of special circumstances, the police owe no duty of care to individuals affected by the discharge of their public duty to investigate offences and prevent their commission: see: Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, at [64], citing Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50; [2009] AC 225. Claims under the HRA[66]As far as the Article 3 claim is concerned, the Claimant gives no particulars save to state the words “degrading treatment, humiliation, forced entry”. As far as the alleged forced entry is concerned, I have dealt with this above. Any claim arising from the 2017 incident is time barred. With a lack of any other particulars or supporting facts, I must conclude that the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim under Article 3.[67]I would add that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim under Article 3 in respect of the police investigations. Firstly, in so far as there were any failures, they are not of sufficient severity to give rise to liability under Article 3; see DSD v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2019] A.C. 196.[68]Article 6, so far as material, states: 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.[69]On behalf of the First Defendant it was submitted that the claim under Article 6 was misconceived there having been no criminal proceedings brought against the Claimant. I do not accept that Article 6 is inapplicable on this basis. The Article does extend to civil proceedings. That said, I consider that the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim under Article 6 against the police. The Claimant alleges there was a “denial of a fair and transparent process in the handling of complaints and civil proceedings, including obstruction, withheld disclosure, and refusal of a Victim’s Right to Review (VRR), thereby undermining effective access to justice”. This allegation has no real prospect of success. The police were not involved in the civil proceedings between the Claimant and her daughter and, obviously, were not a party to those proceedings. There is no evidence of the police interfering with proceedings before the civil court or impeding the Claimant’s access to that court.[70]As to the VRR, the police had made it plain that they were not investigating the domestic abuse allegations. In the circumstances, there was no obligation to provide the Claimant with a VRR in respect of domestic abuse. In the circumstances, there was no obligation to provide a VRR in relation to the theft of the horse. In any event, the failure to carry out a VRR does not give rise to a cause of action in damages.[71]In paragraph / section 3.3 of the Particulars of Claim, the breach of Article 8 is said to relate to misuse and disclosure of inaccurate personal data. There are no particulars of this breach. Under Article 8, the Claimant has the right to respect for her private and family life. The First Defendant submits that any infringement of the Claimant’s Article 8 rights by the making of the safeguarding referral was justified given the information provided to the officers by the daughter about a past suicide threat. I accept that submission.[72]Protocol 1, Article 1 provides for the protection of property. The Claimant pleads that the breach was by “the failure to investigate and safeguard the Claimant’s possessions (horse and property rights”). Paragraph / Section 3.3 of the Particulars of Claim. The Claimant may not have liked the outcome but the allegation relating to the horse was investigated. Any argument to the contrary has no real prospect of success. What “property rights” refers to is not clear.[73]I consider that the Claimant has no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim against the police for breach of this protocol. Alternatively, the claim has no real prospect of success. Claims under The UK GDPR and DPA 2018[74]The Claimant pleads – “inaccurate data, unlawful processing, failure to rectify” under paragraph / section 3.4 of the Particulars of Claim. There are no particulars in respect of these alleged breaches.[75]It is submitted on behalf of the First Defendant that by virtue of Article 2(2)(b), the UK GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data by a competent authority for any of the law enforcement purposes. I accept this submission.[76]As far one can ascertain, the Claimant’s data protection allegations focus on the recording of the allegations made and information provided by the Claimant’s daughter to Hertfordshire Police officers and the sharing of the Claimant’s sensitive personal data with other agencies as a result of adult safeguarding concerns about the Claimant.[77]To the extent that the Claimant suggests data held by the police about the Claimant is not accurate, the First Defendant submits that officers accurately recorded what they were told by the Claimant’s daughter as they were required to do – so that there is no breach; see: AB v Chief Constable of Transport Police [2022] EWHC 2749 (KB).[78]In respect of the sharing of information reported to officers in the adult safeguarding referral made in June 2025, the First Defendant submits that sensitive processing of the Claimant’s personal data was in accordance with section 35(5) of the DPA. Specifically, the purpose of the sensitive processing was the protection of the Claimant who, on the information available to the police, was at risk, for the purposes of section 4 of Schedule 8 to the DPA (dealing with “safeguarding of children and individuals at risk”).[79]I accept the submissions of the First Defendant. In my judgment, the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim under the UK GDPR and DPA. Alternatively, such a claim has no real prospect of success. Equality Act claims[80]In paragraph 3D of the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant pleads that the police (and the other Defendants) discriminated against the Claimant, contrary to s.29 of the Equality Act 2010 by [a] denying reasonable adjustments, including refusing a trauma-informed interview, declining to allocate a domestic abuse trained officer, failing to allow additional time for responses due to the Claimant’s health conditions, and refusing to communicate in accessible written form; [b] subjecting her to harassment related to disability; [c] treating her unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of disability by “relying on her disabilities to justify unequal treatment and by portraying her as suicidal or mentally unstable without medical basis, causing stigma and denial of proper procedural participation.”[81]Bearing in mind that on the Claimant’s case the police had made it clear that they were not investigating the domestic abuse allegations, I do not see how the refusal to provide a trauma informed interview or to allocate a domestic abuse trained officer can give rise to any claim. I accept that the Claimant felt under pressure, but she was able to provide responses.[82]There is no evidence of harassment by the police under s.26 of the Equality Act. The Claimant asserts that there was harassment but there is a complete lack of particulars or evidence to justify such an allegation. For the purposes of s.26 of the Act, a person harasses another if they engage in unwanted conduct related to a protected characteristic that has the purpose or effect of: violating the person’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment. The Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing a discrimination or harassment claim against the police.[83]The First Defendant submits that in respect of reasonable adjustments, there is no sustainable suggestion that there would have been a different response to the reports made to officers by the Claimant even if adjustments had been made.[84]In the circumstances, I consider that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim against the police under the Equality Act 2010. Alternatively, such a claim has no real prospect of success. Limitation[85]The First Defendant concludes its submissions by making various points on limitation. Ms Price notes that the Claimant states in her skeleton argument that “the core acts relied upon occurred in 2024-2025” (paragraph 43). Ms Price submits that the Claimant does not engage with the fact that any Equality Act claim relating to the actions of PC Hitchcock and / or other officers prior to 8 May 2025 Or 14th April 2025 is out of time and that any HRA claim relating to the actions of PC Hitchcock and / or other officers prior to 8 November 2024 Or 14th October 2024 is out of time. It is noted that the investigation following the Claimant’s report of theft on 5 May 2024 was closed on 17th November 2024. The majority of the complaints made by the Claimant about PC Hitchcock pre-date 8 November 2024. They all pre-date 8 May 2025. Ms Price submits that there is no good reason for the Court to extend time. Indeed, she submits, no reason for failure to bring the claims in time is given by the Claimant at all.[86]I accept the First Defendant’s submissions. I consider that in the circumstances of this case the Claimant has no real prospect of obtaining an order disapplying or extending the various limitation periods. Of course, I accept that not all claims are statute barred. First Defendant - Conclusion[87]In my judgment the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim against the First Defendant. Alternatively, the claim against the First Defendant has no real prospect of success and there is no compelling reason why the claim should be disposed of at trial. The Claim Against the Second Defendant[88]As far as the misfeasance in public office allegation is concerned, the Second Defendant relies on the Three Rivers case (see above) and makes the point that bad faith is an essential ingredient of the tort. The point is made that bad faith must be particularised; see eg: Carter v The Chief Constable of Cumbria Police [2008] EWHC 1072 (QB) at [68]. I accept these submissions.[89]As with the claim against the First Defendant, I consider that the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim in misfeasance in public office. The particulars pleaded come nowhere near establishing bad faith or justifying the claim. Put another way, the claim has no real prospect of success.[90]I should add that if what the Claimant alleges is equally consistent with a mistake or error of judgment on the Second Defendant’s part, the misfeasance in public office claim must fail.[91]The Particulars of Claim are inadequate as far as the Second Defendant is concerned. Apart from the misfeasance in public office claim, it is not at all clear what other cause of action is being alleged against the Second Defendant.[92]As far as a possible claim in negligence is concerned, the Second Defendant submits that it owed no duty of care to the Claimant. It is submitted that it is well established that, absent special circumstances which do not apply to this case, public authorities (like private individuals) do not owe a duty of care in negligence to take positive actions. The Second Defendant relies on Poole BC v GN [2019] UKSC 25 at [65]: “… public authorities do not owe a duty of care at common law merely because they have statutory powers or duties, even if, by exercising their statutory functions, they could prevent a person from suffering harm […] public authorities can come under a common law duty to protect from harm in circumstances where the principles applicable to private individuals or bodies would impose such a duty, as for example where the authority has created the source of danger or has assumed a responsibility to protect the claimant from harm, unless the imposition of such a duty would be inconsistent with the relevant legislation” (at [65] per Lord Reed). (My emphasis).[93]I accept the Second Defendant’s submissions. I have already dealt with negligence in relation to the First Defendant and the same principles apply.[94]The Claimant has shown no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim in negligence against the Second Defendant. Such a claim has no real prospect of success. On the facts alleged, there was no duty of care owed to the Claimant.[95]As far as claims under the ECHR are concerned, there are no particulars given of how Articles 3, 6 , 8 and A1P1 are engaged as against the Second Defendant or of how those provisions have been breached by the Second Defendant.[96]As to Article 3, the Second Defendant relies on the DSD and NVB case (see above) in relation to the degree of severity required to establish a claim under that Article. The Claimant appears to abandon A.3 in her skeleton argument.[97]As far as the claims under Article 6, Article 8 and A1P1 is concerned, the claims against the Second Defendant are incomprehensible. The Claimant submits that the Article 6 claim is fact sensitive. That may be so in some cases, but the Claimant must first show how Article 6 is engaged and how it is said to be breached by the Second Defendant. She has failed to do so.[98]In the circumstances, on the Claimant’s pleaded case – such as it is – I consider that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing the HRA claims against the Second Defendant. In the alternative, the claims have no real prospect of success.[99]It is not at all clear that the alleged breaches of the Equality Act 2010 and the GDPR/DPA 2018 apply as against the Second Defendant. There are insufficient particulars. Second Defendant - Conclusion[100]The Claimant may well have been dissatisfied with the way in which the Second Defendant dealt with the issues she raised or how it exercised oversight over the police - but she has failed to plead any valid claim or cause of action against it. I consider that on the Claimant’s pleaded case, there are no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim against the Second Defendant. In the alternative, the claim has no real prospect of success and there is no compelling reason why the claim should be disposed of at trial. The Claim Against the Third Defendant[101]As already stated, the Third Defendant [“Catch22”] is a charity. Mr. Richards, its Deputy Chief Executive, has provided a helpful witness statement setting out the services which Catch22 delivers and Catch22’s involvement with the Claimant.[102]The history set out by Mr. Richards is not disputed by the Claimant.[103]One of the services that Catch22 provides is Beacon Victim Care (“Beacon”). As set out on its website:
“Beacon is Hertfordshire’s Victim Care Centre and is staffed by professionals from both Hertfordshire Constabulary and Catch22, an independent organisation commissioned to support victims of crime in Hertfordshire”
. Catch22 started to provide the Beacon service in April 2018.[104]When someone has reported a crime in Hertfordshire, the Victim Service Team of the police [“VST”] contact the victim and may refer them to Beacon if they require a service that Beacon provides. If VST refers a victim of crime to Beacon then a Catch22 employee who is working on the Beacon service will make contact with the victim of crime. Because VST deal with the victim of crime first, it is the case that a referral is not made to Beacon for all matters.[105]If VST refers a victim of crime to Beacon, the service that Beacon provides is to initially make contact over the phone to a victim of crime to introduce the service and complete a needs assessment. Beacon then gauges whether the victim of crime would like to continue the support once they are informed of the service. Most victims of crime opt to continue with phone support (for convenience) but it is also possible to provide support in person.[106]The services Beacon can provide are described on its website as follows: “Our independent Beacon Support Workers from Catch22 can provide you with: emotional support, someone to talk to about what happened and how it’s impacted you; practical support, information and assistance; and signposting to, or contact with, other agencies that can provide specialist support such as mental health and legal support.” (My emphasis).[107]Mr. Richards states that there are limits to Beacon’s support. For example, Beacon does not employ legal professionals and therefore cannot provide legal support, but it can signpost victims to other services, such as the Citizens Advice Bureau.[108]Mr. Richards states that whilst Beacon can provide emotional support, this service mainly involves low level emotional support such as listening, supporting and offering reassurance around all the emotions that can come with being a victim of crime. If specialist mental health support or counselling is required, Beacon can signpost to local counselling routes through GPs/NHS mental health services or other known local services. Beacon can only provide support (within the scope of its services) to standard risk domestic abuse victims. If a victim scores medium or high risk on the domestic abuse risk assessment (DASH/DARA) they will be signposted/referred onward to appropriate specialist domestic abuse services. Para 15 of his witness statement.[109]Beacon provided services to the Claimant on and off since 2018. These services have included providing the Claimant with emotional and practical support within the scope of the services that Beacon offers, i.e. victims of crime in Hertfordshire.[110]In April 2021, the Claimant raised a complaint with Beacon regarding early case closure and claimed dishonesty on the part of Beacon’s then Head of Service, Rebecca Bayley, for allegedly holding meetings with the police without her consent. However, the Claimant did not wish to engage with the investigation and the complaint was put on hold.[111]In January 2022, the Claimant made further wide-ranging complaints against Beacon. Various allegations were made, including that Beacon did not support the Claimant with regard to an issue she had with Superintendent Trotman of Hertfordshire Constabulary, that a member of the Beacon team ‘overstepped’ by giving a task to another member of the Beacon team without the Claimant’s permission, that a meeting with Hertfordshire Constabulary was cancelled because Claimant did not have adequate support from Beacon, and that the Claimant’s confidentiality was breached as a result of contact through the generic inbox for the Beacon service.[112]The Claimant’s complaints were investigated by a Director of Community Links (part of Catch22), Mr Chi Kavindele, and none of them were upheld. On 7 March 2022, Catch22’s Director of Justice, Ms Lisa Smitherman, sent a formal response to the Claimant, setting out the outcome of her complaints, and reasons for which they were not upheld. This letter explains that the Claimant had the right to appeal the outcome within 28 days.[113]On the 8th March 2022, the Claimant replied by email stating:
“Another coverup I have evidence on the lack of support at police meeting and more. I will at some point work through what you have looked at and what you have not.”
The Claimant asked for an explanation of exactly what service Beacon offer vulnerable victims like herself. She stated:
“At this present time I am only getting sign posted to other agencies that inevitably bring me back to Beacon as it is deemed the support should be coming from Beacon. The only other help is just to ask questions and not guarantee any answers on updates on investigation….”
. The Claimant stated that she was not getting the correct and adequate support from Beacon.[114]On the 28th March 2022, Ms Smitherman replied to the Claimant by email. I set the email out in full. Dear Sharon, Via our Hertfordshire Beacon service, Catch22 has been in communication with you since July 2018, seeking to provide emotional and practical support within the scope of the services we offer, based on our applicable expertise and charitable remit. We understand you are now wanting support directly in relation to your police complaints, including the review of and advice on documentation, representation and advocacy. The support services Catch22 provides simply do not extend to such a role. We provide support to people in relation to the impact of being a victim of crime, including supporting personal empowerment and resilience. While such support can relate to circumstances which may also give rise to an associated possible complaint against the police, including guidance on the Victims Right to Review (VRR), specifically advising on the substance of such a complaint and providing representation and advocacy is a very different type of service. We have done what we can by, on your behalf, establishing contacts for: the primary police complaints processes, the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, National Victim Support and Citizen’s Advice. It is with regret we are not in a position to take the matter any further ourselves. As your complaint against police is now your main concern, our continuing support is, unfortunately, no longer providing the intended value and your complaint about our support indicates that to be your view also. That complaint, not upheld following an in-depth review, further indicates how you are expecting something our service does not offer. We have sustained supportive contact with you for significantly longer than in most cases. It is unfortunate that your particular, continuing needs go beyond our capacity and capability for further support. It is not our intention to cause any additional distress and anxiety, and as our communication and efforts clearly no longer provide you with the actual support you seek, we must now, with regret, discontinue our service and kindly ask that you do not continue contact with our Hertfordshire Beacon service. We suggest that the following organisations may offer legal help:• https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/law-and-courts/legal-system/finding-free-oraffordable-legal-help/• Law Centre Networks which be contacted on 01483 216528. They can signpost to potentially free legal advice depending upon individual circumstances.• http://policeactioncentre.org.uk/about-us/ And that the following organisations may offer you related personal support:• Shout, free and confidential text service open 24/7 to anyone. Just text 85258• Samaritans, free and confidential service open 24/7 to anyone. They support by phone- 116 123 and online www.samaritans.org• Hertfordshire Mental Health Single Point of Access are open 24/7 and you can call them on 0800 6444 101 We do hope you will be able to resolve your outstanding concerns in an appropriate way. Kind regards, Lisa Lisa Smitherman Director of Justice[115]The Claimant did not directly respond to the email of 28th March 2022 and did not appeal the outcome of the complaint procedure.[116]In 2022 and 2023, the Claimant continued to send further correspondence to Beacon, including requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 2000, other information requests and related complaints. However, Mr. Richards states that as far as he is aware, no further communication was received from the Claimant regarding referrals as a victim of crime in this period.[117]Mr. Richards states that on 29 August 2024, a referral was received from VST for support for the Claimant regarding an anti-social behaviour issue. This was a matter in relation to which Beacon could potentially provide the Claimant with support by telephone. The Claimant initially engaged with support from Beacon, but then disengaged after a call with her support worker on 5 September 2024 and Beacon subsequently closed the case on 27 September 2024 and wrote to Ms Brown confirming this – stating that if the Claimant would still like support or found that she required further support around the anti-social behaviour issues, she could still make contact with Beacon.[118]Mr. Richards states that following this, there have been no further referrals made to Beacon in respect of the Claimant and there has been no contact with the Claimant, except in relation to her legal proceedings and an email that she sent on 13 February 2025 in which she enclosed a screenshot of an article and a negative comment she made about Beacon online. Beacon decided not to engage with this email, notwithstanding that it disagreed with what the Claimant had written.[119]The Claimant accepts that she did not make or seek any further referral to Beacon after the September 2024 referral. See para 18 C’s skeleton v D3[120]On the 20th May 2025, Ms Brown wrote to Mr Kavindele, who investigated her complaints (see paragraph 111 above), asking for information purportedly under UK GDPR. Notwithstanding that more than three years had passed since the complaints were determined, Mr Kavindele nevertheless responded to Ms Brown on 23 May 2025, addressing all of her enquiries.[121]Against this background, the Third Defendant/Beacon submits that there is no basis for alleging improper or unfair complaint handling. Negligence[122]According to the Claimant’s skeleton argument against the Third Defendant, the allegation of negligence is said to be in the alternative to the Equality Act claim. I have dealt with the legal requirements of negligence as against the First and Second Defendants and do not propose to rehearse them again. The Third Defendant relies on the case of Poole and the distinction made between acts (referred to as “causing harm” or “making things worse”; and omissions (“not conferring a benefit” or “not making things better”). Omissions do not give to a duty of care; see also Woodcock. On the pleaded facts against the Third Defendant, we are concerned with omissions.[123]Mr. Reichhold submits that for private individuals and public bodies: a duty to protect from harm, or confer some other benefit, only arises in particular circumstances, such as where a source of danger has been created, or there has been an assumption of responsibility to protect from harm, e.g. Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004, as explained in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at §39.[124]I accept these submissions. As far as any assumption of responsibility is concerned, the Third Defendant did not assume any responsibility. Indeed, we have the reverse with the Beacon explaining to the Claimant why they could not assist her – or assume responsibility in relation to historic matters; see the email dated 28th March 2022.[125]The Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim in negligence against the Third Defendant. Equality Act 2010[126]The Claimant alleges that Catch22’s decision that it could no longer offer her support with respect to the historic matters amounts to: [a] discrimination on grounds of disability contrary to ss.15 and 29 EA 2010; [b] failure to make reasonable adjustments contrary to ss.20-21 EA 2010; and [c] harassment contrary to s.26 EA 2010.[127]In relation to the disability discrimination claim, Mr. Reichhold submits that Ms Smitherman’s email of 28 March 2022 spells out precisely why Catch22 could no longer provide the Claimant with the support she was requesting. Put simply, Beacon had already, over a number of years, provided the Claimant with as much support as it could within the scope of its services. The Claimant was no longer satisfied with this support, and Beacon’s support was longer providing the intended value. There is nothing in the pleaded case, nor in any of the documents before the Court, that provides any support for the Claimant’s assertion that Beacon’s decision had anything to do with disability, whether directly or indirectly.[128]I accept this submission in its entirety. The Claimant asserts that there has been disability discrimination but the pleaded facts and documents before the court do not support the allegation.[129]As to the alleged failure to make reasonable adjustments, this appears to relate to Catch22’s handling of the Claimant’s complaint. Mr. Reichhold makes the point that when the Claimant’s complaint was resolved, she was granted 28 days to appeal in accordance with Catch22’s complaints policy. The Claimant wrote to Catch22 more than three years later, referring to PTSD and trauma, and to the need for reasonable adjustments in the form of more time “to provide full evidence”. Catch22 treated this as a request for a reasonable adjustment and granted the Claimant precisely the adjustment she requested. Catch22 responded to all of the questions raised by the Claimant (notwithstanding the passage of three years) and the door was not closed on the Claimant progressing her complaint to the next stage.[130]The pleaded claim does not refer to any other requests for reasonable adjustments made to Beacon, nor any refusal by Beacon to make adjustments.[131]On the facts pleaded, I accept the Third Defendant’s submission that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim against the Third Defendant for failing to provide reasonable adjustments. Alternatively, I find that such a claim has no real prospect of success.[132]With respect to harassment contrary to s.26 of the 2010 Act, the only complaint made of Beacon is that, as of 28 March 2022, it declined to continue providing support to the Claimant in relation to historic matters. This decision was reiterated to the Claimant on 9 September 2024 via Hertfordshire Constabulary’s Victim Service Team.[133]Mr. Reichold submits that such a decision cannot – on any interpretation of the facts or the law – be said to amount to conduct relating to a protected characteristic which has the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.[134]I accept this submission. The Claimant asserts that there has been discrimination and harassment, but the pleaded case and the evidence do not come anywhere near justifying the allegations. I consider that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing a claim under the Equality Act against the Third Defendant.[135]Mr. Reichhold makes the point that insofar as the Claimant argues that Beacon should have provided her with support specifically in relation to the horse theft: the Claimant wrote to Hertfordshire Constabulary on 5 October 2024 stressing that the horse theft is “so intrinsically linked to the domestic abuse” which had been reported earlier. These are matters in relation to which Beacon provided support to the Claimant for “significantly longer than in most cases” and which ultimately exceeded the scope of services offered by Beacon. Limitation[136]The Third Defendant submits that the Equality Act claims against it are time barred. Claims under the Equality Act must be brought within six months starting with the date of the act to which the claim relates.[137]Beacon’s decision declining to continue offering support for historic matters was communicated to the Claimant in writing on 28 March 2022. The subsequent email from Hertfordshire Constabulary dated 9 September 2024 merely re-iterates this earlier decision.[138]The claim was filed more than three and a half years after Beacon’s decision to discontinue support for historic matters, and more than one year after Hertfordshire Constabulary’s re-statement of that earlier decision.[139]In these circumstances, I consider that the claims are statute barred and that there is no real prospect of the Claimant obtaining an extension or disapplication of the limitation period.

Abuse of Process

[140]The Claimant has previously brought proceedings against the same three defendants (claim number: KB-2024-007520). The Second and Third Defendants submit that the current proceedings are an abuse of process. The burden of proving abuse of process is on the Second and Third Defendants.[141]The first claim was struck out by an order of Master Eastman dated 7th May 2024 but has been restored on appeal by order of Sweeting J dated 19th December 2025 subject to re-amendment of the Particulars of Claim. At the time of the hearing before me, the Re-Amended Particulars of Claim had not been served on the Defendants.[142]There has been no adjudication on the merits of the first claim. Accordingly, if there is an abuse it must be under the principle first formulated in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, at 115, which precludes a party from raising in subsequent proceedings matters which were not, but could and should have been raised in previous proceedings. See: Lord Sumption JSC in Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd [2013] UKSC 46; [2014] A.C. 160, at [17].[143]Whether re-litigation of a decided issue is an abuse depends upon all of the circumstances. It does not follow that a matter should have been raised in earlier proceedings simply because it could have been raised in those proceedings. A broad, merits-based judgment should be adopted, taking account of all the public and private interests involved and all the facts of the case; Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (No.1) [2002] 2 A.C. 1, HL.[144]The Amended Particulars of Claim do not comply with CPR r.16.4 and it is difficult to work out what the various claims are. There is to be a re-amendment of the Particulars of Claim. It is difficult, therefore, to carry out the necessary broad, merits-based judgment. That said, I consider that the claims against the Second and Third Defendant could have and should have been brought in the first proceedings – those Defendants being, relatively speaking, on the periphery of the case with relatively limited allegations. Accordingly, I find that the claims against the Second and Third Defendant in these second proceedings are an abuse of process.[145]The continuance of the present claim against the Second and Third Defendant would be an abuse of process. This is a further reason why the claims against them must be struck out.

CONCLUSIONS

[146]My conclusions are as follows: [1] The Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing any of the claims against any of the Defendants. The Particulars of Claim and the claims against the Defendants must be struck out under CPR r.3.4(2)(a). [2] The Particulars of Claim raise an unwinnable case against each Defendant. The continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit to the Claimant and would waste resources on all sides. [3] The claims against the Second and Third Defendant are also an abuse of process under the Henderson v. Henderson principle and must be struck out on this additional ground. [4] Further, the Claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on any of the claims against any of the Defendants; and there is no other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at a trial. [5] My order will record that the claim against each Defendant is totally without merit. [6] The claims in misfeasance in public office against the First and Second Defendants are hopeless and misconceived. There is no evidence of bad faith. [7] The claims in negligence are based on alleged omissions. Accordingly, the Defendants did not owe the Claimant a duty of care and did not assume any responsibility towards the Claimant. A claim in negligence is not possible. [8] As to the claims under A.3, A6, A8 and A1P1 of ECHR, the Particulars of Claim do not state how the said Articles and the protocol were engaged and were breached. The claims are time barred in any event. [9] As to the claims under the Equality Act 2010, there is no evidence of any breach by any Defendant. The claims are time barred in any event. [10] As to any breach under Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR, there are insufficient particulars and there is no evidence of any breach by any Defendant. [11] I should add that the defects to the Claimant’s case are such that they cannot be cured by amendment. The Claimant submitted, inter alia, that the claim should not be struck out, or summary judgment ordered, before disclosure. I reject that submission as disclosure will not cure the fundamental defects in the Claimant’s case.