“The owner of land adjoining a highway has a right of access to the highway from any part of his premises. This is so…whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground subjacent to the highway or not. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to this right of access; just as the right of access is subject to the rights of the public and must be exercised subject to the general obligations as to nuisance and the like imposed upon a person using the highway.”
“An interference with the right is actionable without proof of loss, and if an interference does cause a loss, then damages can be obtained. Taking the last part of the extract from Marshall above, in my judgment the key question here is the qualification of the right of access by the rights of the public. In Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown[2017] EWHC 2945 (Ch) , Morgan J considered at [107] the interaction of the adjoining landowner’s right of access to the highway with the protestors’ right to a reasonable use of the highway. He assumed in favour of the protestors that if they were carrying on a reasonable use of the highway which impacted on the rights of the claimants in that case to access the highway, that would not be an infringement of the right of access to the highway. While Morgan J did not have to decide the point, because the claimants in that case put their case on the basis of public nuisance rather than the landowner’s right to access the highway, in my judgment that is correct and I should take the same approach here. The rights of the public include the right to reasonable use of the highway. Therefore, applying the principles set out in Marshall, a reasonable use of the highway by members of the public will not constitute unlawful interference with the adjoining landowner’s right to access the highway. It was submitted by the Claimants that the decision of Julian Knowles J in High Speed Two (HS2) Limited v Four Categories of Persons Unknown & Monaghan & Others[2022] EWHC 2360 (KB) at [196] suggests that no balancing act is to be applied between the right to access the highway and the Article 10 and 11 rights of the defendants, because in a claim under this cause of action much, if not all, of the relevant protest is taking place on private land. I do not take Julian Knowles J to be going so far in [196]. Rather he simply put forward the fact that in the case before him much if not all of the protests had taken place on private land as being the first of three reasons why there was no unlawful interference with Articles 10 and 11 on the facts before him. Further, here, the Claimants rely on the obstruction of the highway, such as by protestors mounting and affixing themselves to vehicles on it, as future acts that would breach their right to access the highway, and that acts are not taking place on private land. However, as set out below, I consider that the apprehended actions would amount to a violation of the Claimants’ right to access the highway whether or not such a balancing act is to be applied. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to consider further the question of whether such a balancing act needs to be applied.”
“(a) There is a right to peaceful assembly on the highway, but it must be remembered that the highway is more than just the carriageway. The assembly on the highway in Jones, was concerned with the grass verge; (b) That right does not extend so far as to allow the committing of a public nuisance; (c) While the right to use the highway comprises activities such as assembly on the highway, such activities are subsidiary to the use for passage, and they must be not only usual and reasonable but consistent with the primary use of the highway to pass and repass, if a person is deliberately interfering with the primary use to pass and repass, they are obstructing the highway; (d) That public nuisance may arise by the unreasonable obstruction of the highway, such as unreasonably impeding the primary right of the public to pass and repass; (e) Whether an obstruction of the highway is unreasonable is a question of fact, but will generally require that the obstruction is more than de minimis, and must be wilful.”
“Articles 10 and 11 are subject to limitations or restrictions which are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Those limitations and restrictions include the law of trespass, the object of which is to protect property rights in accordance with A1P1. On the other hand, property rights might have to yield to articles 10 and 11 if, for example, a law governing the exercise of those rights and use of land were to destroy the essence of the freedom to protest. That would be an extreme situation.”
“it will be an unusual case where Article 10 and 11 rights of those who trespass on private land will outweigh the A1P1 rights of the landowner”
“any [claimant] applying for an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers … must satisfy the court by full and detailed evidence that there is a compelling justification for the order sought … There must be a strong probability that a tort … is to be committed and that this will cause real harm. Further the threat must be real and imminent.”
“In my judgment, the test articulated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown[2019] 4 WLR 2 and approved by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR in Barking and Dagenham v Persons Unknown[2022] EWCA Civ 13 has been subsumed into the Wolverhampton framework. The Vastint test, however, provides a useful double check.”
“all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”
“Drawing these authorities together, on a review of an interim injunction against PUs and named Defendants, this Court is not starting de novo. The Judges who have previously made the interim injunctions have made findings justifying the interim injunctions. It is not the task of the Court on review to query or undermine those. However, it is vital to understand why they were made, to read and assimilate the findings, to understand the sub-strata of the quia timet, the reasons for the fear of unlawful direct action. Then it is necessary to determine, on the evidence, whether anything material has changed. If nothing material has changed, if the risk still exists as before and the claimant remains rightly and justifiably fearful of unlawful attacks, the extension may be granted so long as procedural and legal rigour has been observed and fulfilled. On the other hand, if material matters have changed, the Court is required to analyse the changes, based on the evidence before it, and in the full light of the past decisions, to determine anew, whether the scope, details and need for the full interim injunction should be altered. To do so, the original thresholds for granting the interim injunction still apply.”
“In my judgment the correct approach is dictated by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton and in particular [225]. This is not a “tick box” exercise, but the matters on which evidence should be adduced and argument focussed are (i) how effective the order has been; (ii) whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; (iii) whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and (iv) whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made. The parties should give full disclosure, supported by appropriate evidence, directed towards those questions.”
“The actual or intended respondents to the application must be defined as precisely as possible. In so far as it is possible actually to identify persons to whom the order is directed (and who will be enjoined by its terms) by name or in some other way, as Lord Sumption explained in Cameron, the local authority ought to do so. The fact that a precautionary injunction is also sought against newcomers or other persons unknown is not of itself a justification for failing properly to identify these persons when it is possible to do so, and serving them with the proceedings and order, if necessary, by seeking an order for substituted service. It is only permissible to seek or maintain an order directed to newcomers or other persons unknown where it is impossible to name or identify them in some other and more precise way. Even where the persons sought to be subjected to the injunction are newcomers, the possibility of identifying them as a class by reference to conduct prior to what would be a breach (and, if necessary, by reference to intention) should be explored and adopted if possible.”
“I observe that the suggestion of a blanket requirement for all newcomer injunctions in protest cases appears to have been made per incuriam given other relevant authorities, such as AG v Times Newspapers Ltd[1974] AC 273 , Sectorguard plc v Dienne plc[2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch) , and PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v. Maksimov & Ors[2014] EWHC 4370 (Comm) . These cases suggest that the courts already possess adequate mechanisms to address disproportionate committal applications.”
“We write in respect of the Order made today renewing the Injunction and ordering costs of£6,125 against each of the named defendants in the Injunction Proceedings of£6,125 , to be paid by 4pm on8 August 2025 . The reason for this email is that our clients had understood that a settlement had been reached in the Contempt Application, which ensured that no costs would be sought against them in the Injunction Proceedings, as well as the Contempt Application. It was the Defendant’s understanding that the settlement agreement would be a full and final agreement relating to all financial claims and costs between the parties. The terms of the agreement are described in the Claimant’s skeleton argument as: “The Claimant will undertake not to pursue the Defendants for any financial loss at this time or in the future”