“Behind the scenes we’re constantly coming up with all sorts of fun ideas… Unfortunately we can’t tell you about all of them just yet (wouldn’t want the transphobes catching on too soon!)…”
“(a) a pinned post appears at the top of the page, which was published on26 May 2025 . The caption is long, but includes the statement “[w]e are occupying the outside of Tintagel House (where EHRC offices are located) in order to protest against the harmful interim update on guidance which clearly sets out to honour the Supreme Court ruling surrounding what defines a woman”
“must satisfy the court by full and detailed evidence that there is a compelling justification for the order sought . . . There must be a strong probability that a tort or breach of planning control or other aspect of public law is to be committed and that this will cause real harm. Further, the threat must be real and imminent.”
“9. The following general principles are well-settled, and uncontroversial on this appeal. (1) Peaceful protest falls within the scope of the fundamental rights of free speech and freedom of assembly guaranteed by Articles 10(1) and 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Interferences with those rights can only be justified if they are necessary in a democratic society and proportionate in pursuit of one of the legitimate aims specified in Articles 10(2) and 11(2). Authoritative statements on these topics can be found in Tabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence[2009] EWCA Civ 23 [43] (Laws LJ) and City of London v Samede[2012] EWCA Civ 160 [2012] 2 All ER 1039 , reflecting the Strasbourg jurisprudence. (2) But the right to property is also a Convention right, protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol (‘A1P1’). In a democratic society, the protection of property rights is a legitimate aim, which may justify interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 10 and 11. Trespass is an interference with A1P1 rights, which in turn requires justification. In a democratic society, Articles 10 and 11 cannot normally justify a person in trespassing on land of which another has the right to possession, just because the defendant wishes to do so for the purposes of protest against government policy. Interference by trespass will rarely be a necessary and proportionate way of pursuing the right to make such a protest.”
“45 We conclude that there is no basis in the Strasbourg jurisprudence to support the defendants proposition that the freedom of expression linked to the freedom of assembly and association includes a right to protest on privately owned land or upon publicly owned land from which the public are generally excluded. The Strasbourg court has not made any statement to that effect. Instead, it has consistently said that articles 10 and 11 do not bestow any freedom of forum in the specific context of interference with property rights (see Appleby at paras 47 and 52). There is no right of entry to private property or to any publicly owned property. The furthest that the Strasbourg court has been prepared to go is that where a bar on access to property has the effect of preventing any effective exercise of rights under articles 10 and 11,or of destroying the essence of those rights, then it would not exclude the possibility of a state being obliged to protect them by regulating property rights. 46 The approach taken by the Strasbourg court should not come as any surprise. Articles 10, 11 and A1P1 are all qualified rights. The Convention does not give priority to any one of those provisions. We would expect the Convention to be read as a whole and harmoniously. Articles 10 and 11 are subject to limitations or restrictions which are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Those limitations and restrictions include the law of trespass, the object of which is to protect property rights in accordance with A1P1. On the other hand, property rights might have to yield to articles 10 and 11 if, for example, a law governing the exercise of those rights and use of land were to destroy the essence of the freedom to protest. That would be an extreme situation. . . .”