Idowu OgunkanmiI v Cynthia Chia [2025] EWHC 1404 (KB)

[2025] EWHC 1404 (KB)Case No KB-2024-002266
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 17/06/2025
Before
DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE SUSIE ALEGRE
Between
MR IDOWU OGUNKANMIClaimantMS CYNTHIA CHIADefendant
George Symes (instructed by Holloway & Rose Solicitors) for Claimant for The Defendant did not appear and was not represented.Hearing Hearing dates: 7 May 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17 June 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE SUSIE ALEGRE

DHCJ Susie Alegre :

[1]This is my judgment on the remedies for a claim for harassment and defamation arising out of a pattern of behaviour by Ms Cynthia Chia (the Defendant) directed against Mr Idowu Ogunkanmi (the Claimant) over several years from early 2016 to date.[2]Mr Ogunkanmi was not present at the hearing but was represented before me by Mr Symes. Ms Chia was not present and was not represented. She has not engaged at all with the proceedings to date. Also present at the hearing, representing Meta Inc (formerly joined as a defendant) with a watching brief, was Ms Hamer.[3]These proceedings for a claim under the Defamation Act 2013 were brought by way of a claim form dated 3 April 2024 against Meta Platforms Inc and Cynthia Chia. The Amended Particulars of Claim were dated 6th November 2024 and include a claim for harassment in addition to the defamation claim. While I note that an issue related to the limitation period for claims brought in defamation could have been raised, Ms Chia did not file an Acknowledgement of Service and has not engaged with the proceedings at all. She has offered no defence. The proceedings against Meta Inc were to be defended on various grounds but have now been discontinued.[4]As a result of the lack of engagement, a default judgment was entered against Ms Chia on 13 February 2025 by Master Stevens, sealed by the court on 24 February 2025. Pursuant to an order by Steyn J dated 25 February 2025, the issues for me to decide are: a) the appropriate level of damages to be awarded against Ms Chia; and b) the need for and nature of any injunctive relief that may be required against her.

Factual Background

[5]My decision on the appropriate remedies is necessarily based upon the default judgment and the factual background as pleaded in the Amended Particulars of Claim along with the witness statements provided by Mr Ogunkanmi and Ms Okoye. As the Defendant has not engaged with the process, I have no evidence or submissions from her.[6]Mr Ogunkanmi is originally from Nigeria, based in Dubai and travels regularly for work. Ms Chia lives in London, is from Cameroon but has contacts in the Nigerian diaspora.[7]Ms Chia and Mr Ogunkanmi met in London in a night club in 2015. Mr Ogunkanmi passed his number to Ms Chia through another woman, Prisca Okoye. Ms Chia and Mr Ogunkanmi then arranged to meet up and spent the night together in Mr Ogunkanmi’s hotel where they had sex. Mr Ogunkanmi flew back to Dubai, where he lives and works, the following day.[8]Despite the short-lived nature of their encounter, Ms Chia and Mr Ogunkanmi kept in touch afterwards on apparently friendly terms. But in early 2016, the Claimant received a call from Ms Chia accusing him of having had sex with Ms Okoye. The Claimant and Ms Okoye both say this was untrue. Ms Chia, however, then started to call and message the Claimant persistently with these allegations until he asked her not to call him about the subject again and went on to block her number, although he accepts that he continued communicating about other matters with her at that stage.[9]The nature of the communications from Ms Chia included threats to “destroy” Mr Ogunkanmi and he says she asked him for thousands of pounds. He says he paid her £250 which he believed was to cover her phone bill. The intimidating nature of the communications from Ms Chia then escalated with her threatening to send messages about the Claimant to people he knew and calling his workplace over and over again, sometimes over a hundred times in a day. The harassment became oppressive, negatively affecting Mr Ogunkanmi’s colleagues as well as himself.[10]In May 2016, Mr Ogunkanmi travelled back to London to refer this conduct to the Metropolitan Police and in June 2016, Ms Chia was arrested, interviewed and later bailed with conditions: a) Not to contact the Claimant directly or indirectly: and b) Not to attend or contact the Claimant’s office, workplace or colleagues.[11]Around six weeks later, Ms Chia contacted one of the Claimant’s colleagues saying that Mr Ogunkanmi “will spend the rest of his life in jail.” This message was shared with the police and, on 15 August 2016, Ms Chia was issued with a First Instance Harassment Warning by the Metropolitan Police.[12]In late September 2016, Mr Ogunkanmi was informed that Ms Chia had made an allegation of rape against him. He returned for a voluntary police interview in London in October 2017 and in December 2017 he was told that the police were taking no further action in relation to the rape allegation.[13]Shortly after that, in January 2018, the Defendant started to call Mr Ogunkanmi again and he reported this to the Metropolitan Police. In early 2018, he became aware of profiles on Instagram that appear to belong to or be managed by Ms Chia. The multiple defamatory statements complained of were mostly posted on Instagram through various different profiles with names including cindylicious11 (later changed to u_smell-nice-witch), all of which the Claimant says belong to Ms Chia.[14]The first set of publications on Instagram in April 2018 included the following posts: a) “The rapist aka Benny who thought he was above the law. Tell people how you were begging for a child after rape. Looking for a son? If you turn left over there Desparate errandguru with her belly like a mother of 4 can help you with a child. Oops I forgot you know the trash (Prisca Okoye)...” b) “Idowu Ogunkanmi of Sahara is the rapist I am talkin about. The rapist went as far as paying people to destroy evidence.” The post also bore the caption:
“ENOUGH! This ANIMAL, rapist has the gods to pay people to destroy evidence. From police officers, to medical staffs. Why did you lie to the police you don’t know someone whom you know and much more????? Why did you lie about when you met the person you raped??? I am coming with more, wait on it.... Should I call names. God punish you. DO NOT EVER MISTAKE ME FOR THESE MONEY HUNGRY WITCHES YOU HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH. I guarantee you, I will get justice, and you cannot buy...” c) “Idowu Ogunkanmi the rapist, the animal who goes around paying money hungry individuals to cover up his dirty deeds.” d) “Idowu Ogunkami YOU ARE A RAPIST” e) “Idowu Ogunkanmi is a rapist and Prisca Okoke errand runs kill you there. Cheap thirsty Closethoe.”
[15]The Claimant pleads that the usual meaning of these publications and ‘the impression which would be formed by any member of the public would be that(a) the Claimant was a rapist; and(b) the Claimant had paid police and medical staff to alter or destroy the evidence in the course of a criminal investigation against him.’[16]The publications on Instagram from March 2020 were of a similar vein and included the following: a) “I HAVE HAD ENOUGH. This ANIMAL Idowu Ogunkanmi told police I blackmailed him, blackmailed you to rape me? Stop going around raping people because you want a son okurrr. I WANT JUSTICE. You thought I would NEVER findout what you and your accomplices did. This desperate thing called Prisca Okoye knows what you did to me right. You planned with that desperate witch Prisca and went to the police together, didn’t you. Tell the public what you two did. You all thought, you had buried me right? Little did you know. And you sent the desperate yoyo Prisca to be calling police up and down London. This desperate thing Prisca knows you are a rapist but she is the most desperate money hungry witch I have ever known in my life. Where your oga know” b) “Rapist... son of a beach ask does desperate 9ja women to give you a son ok go and section your mother, arrest your father from the grave. Find a desperate hungry 9ja girl to rape and impregnate. I have never seen where an innocent person goes around paying people to destroy evidence” c) “Idowu Ogunkanmi STOP going around raping women because you want a son... When my abuser claims to be the victim...”[17]The pleaded meaning of these posts is ‘that(a) the Claimant is a rapist;(b) that the Claimant paid people to destroy evidence in a criminal investigation; and(c) that the Claimant conspired with Ms Okoye to pervert the course of justice. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant understands ‘9ja’ is a short hand for ‘Nigeria(n)’.[18]Many other posts were made with the same meaning including a post published up until at least 31 December 2021 with a photograph of the Claimant’s face and the text:
“This is the animal who drugged, raped, impregnated me and was begging me to keep it that he wants a son. I know gree. He went to the police where the desperate hungry friend of mine called Prisca Okoye to make himself the victim. He has insulted Prisca over and over again, she know this and he was sleeping with her behind my back. He lied he does not know Prisca. He has been reported and he has been paying people to destroy evidence which shows he is guilty. No biju go police first day win case. You and your accomplices must face justice. BTW Prisk who done give you belle?”
[19]The Claimant says ‘the obvious meaning of this post is(a) that the Claimant drugged, raped, and impregnated the Second Defendant;(b) that the Claimant misrepresented facts to the Metropolitan Police; and(c) the Claimant paid people to destroy evidence which would incriminate him.’[20]The Instagram posts were made between January 2018 and 31st December 2021. Mr Ogunkanmi reported the posts to Hertfordshire Police but was told that they could not get information from Meta about the owner of the accounts and the crime report was closed because of these evidential difficulties.[21]In September 2022, on Twitter (now X), two tweets were posted from the account @savemychild3 with the display name Cynthia C which repeated the allegation that the Claimant was a rapist. A further Instagram account with the username rapist_trying_to_avoid_justice was discovered by the Claimant in December 2022. That account posted eight defamatory posts on 10-11 December 2022 which had a similar meaning to the previous posts complained of. Among these was the following text over a photograph of the Claimant’s face, with the text:
“stop this animal and his many accomplices from abusing my child to cover up their gross misconduct. THIS ANIMAL IS A RAPIST.”
And the caption:
“A rapist doing everything in his power to escape justice @met police_uk @Dubai police HQ @national_crime_agency @Crime Stoppers trust.”
[22]The Claimant says that ‘the intended meaning of the posts is obvious – that the Claimant is a rapist who lied to the police and paid for evidence to be doctored and/or destroyed in a rape investigation against him, and that he has been abusing the [...] Defendant’s child.’[23]The Instagram posts were restricted for access from England and Wales on 20 January 2023 after the Claimant complained to Meta. Access has since been restricted by Meta from Dubai and Nigeria in November 2023.[24]The particulars of the defamation set out in the amended particulars of claim, are that the combined and overlapping posts on Instagram and Twitter were defamatory in that they: a) Suggested the Claimant was a rapist b) Suggested the Claimant drugged the Defendant c) Suggested the Claimant bribed police officers and medical staff to destroy or manipulate evidence in a criminal investigation against him; d) Suggested the Claimant was involved in a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice; and e) Suggested the Claimant somehow abused the Defendant’s child. The Claimant says that the impact these statements would have on his reputation are obviously so severe as to pass the threshold of serious harm on their face.[25]The particulars of harassment as set out in the amended particulars of claim are that Ms Chia: a) Attempted to call and text the Claimant repeatedly, from multiple numbers, despite his numerous requests that she stop; b) Used alternative numbers to contact the Claimant in an effort to circumvent the Claimant having blocked her number c) Repeatedly contacted the Claimant’s workplace, despite being told not to call; d) Threatened to send damaging messages to the Claimant’s family, friends, colleagues, and the general public (including, specifically, the Claimant’s child’s school); e) Contacted the Claimant, in breach of her conditions of bail, threatening that he would spend the rest of his life in prison; f) Published numerous untrue posts about the Claimant in an effort to cause him distress.

Hearing

[26]Before proceeding to the substantive remedies hearing, I sought to clarify a number of procedural issues to decide whether it would be appropriate to consider remedies at that stage or if an adjournment would be needed due to issues raised by Ms Hamer, representing Meta Inc as well as the absence of the Defendant.

Absence of Ms Chia

[27]Firstly, I considered the absence of Ms Chia noting that she has failed to engage in any way with the proceedings to date. A witness statement was provided by Ms Okoye which confirmed that Ms Chia had been given a custodial sentence of 10 weeks on 12th March for common assault on Ms Okoye which is related to the harassment and defamation in this claim. Ms Okoye’s witness statement explained, however, that Ms Chia was no longer in custody as Ms Okoye had encountered her in the street in Central London on 2 May 2025, a few days before the hearing.[28]It is clear, therefore, that the reason for Ms Chia’s absence was not connected to her custodial sentence and I have seen no other reasonable justification for her absence. I have taken account of the obligation set out in s.12(2) of the Human Rights Act which requires me to be satisfied that no relief affecting the Defendant’s right to freedom of expression is to be granted unless the court is satisfied that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent.[29]Since the hearing and before handing down this judgment, I have checked Certificates of Service of the Claim form and further documents including the default judgment and the order of Steyn J of 25th February 2025. I have also seen the letter to Ms Chia from the Claimant’s solicitors informing her of the date of the hearing. In the circumstances and given the long history of non-engagement with the court process, I am satisfied that the Claimant has made every practical effort to notify the respondent of the hearing and the proceedings more broadly, but she has ignored this. It would therefore not have been in the interests of justice to adjourn the remedies hearing given the long and difficult history in this case. It would appear that Ms Chia is aware of the proceedings and was not prevented from attending the hearing.

Procedural Questions Regarding Meta Inc

[30]Ms Hamer’s presence at the hearing arose out of the fact that, while the order of Steyn J of 25th February 2025 made provision for a remedies hearing in relation to Ms Chia (the Defendant) alone, the draft Order provided by the Claimant’s representative included a request for an order under section 13 of the Defamation Act 2013 against Meta Inc (at that time joined as the first Defendant). In addition, Ms Hamer raised the issue that Meta Inc could be jointly and severally liable for any damages ordered against the Second Defendant while they were still a party to the proceedings.[31]I was concerned about the potential impact of the remedies sought in the draft order against Ms Chia on the potential continuation of proceedings against Meta Inc. So I asked for submissions on a practical way forward to ensure that any order made against Ms Chia would not need to be unravelled as a result of protracted and complex jurisdictional proceedings against Meta Inc. Such unnecessary complexity would go against the overriding objective.[32]Mr Symes submitted that an order under section 13 could be made against a non-party and therefore the draft order was within the scope of Steyn J’s order for a hearing on remedies against the Second Defendant alone. The problem with that argument, however, is that Meta Inc was not, at that stage, a non-party. On the issue of joint and several liability for damages, Mr Symes submitted that the Claimant could agree not to pursue Meta Inc for damages if that would assist in progressing the remedies hearing against the Ms Chia.[33]Ms Hamer noted that this was the first time the Claimant had suggested that they would not be pursuing damages against Meta Inc. As it was accepted that a s.13 Order could be made against a non-party to proceedings and that it appeared no further remedies would be sought against Meta Inc, she proposed that a possible solution would be a discontinuance of proceedings against Meta Inc.[34]I allowed the parties some time to explore the best way forward and, after a short adjournment, they agreed by consent to a discontinuance of the claim against Meta Inc. This was agreed on the basis that the Claimant would not seek a s. 13 order against Meta Inc at the hearing before me, although there would be no bar to the Claimant seeking such an order at a later date. Meta Inc agreed that it would not pursue the Claimant for costs in proceedings to the date of hearing before me.[35]The discontinuance of proceedings against Meta Inc, which has now been served on the parties and the consent order agreed and approved, allowed me to proceed with the substantive hearing on remedies against Ms Chia.

Substantive Hearing on Remedies

[36]The remedies sought against Ms Chia in the claim include: a) Injunctive relief to the extent that the Second Defendant remove the offending posts and not be permitted to post anything further in relation to the Claimant on any social media platform; b) Injunctive relief to the extent that the Second Defendant may not contact the Claimant or his family via any means, including his workplace; c) Compensatory damages to be assessed; and d) Costs.[37]Having resolved the earlier procedural questions, Mr Symes made brief oral submissions at the hearing and provided a skeleton argument on the remedies to be awarded against Ms Chia. In the absence of Ms Chia, there were no submissions made on her behalf.[38]In relation to the appropriate level of damages for the defamation, Mr Symes set out a figure of £120,000 in his skeleton argument to include damages for both the defamation and the harassment. In his limited submissions before me, he referred to two recent authorities which he said were relevant comparators for the present case.[39]Firstly, Blake and Seymour v Fox [2024] EWHC 956 KB, in which Collins Rice J awarded £90,000 each to the two Claimants in relation to two tweets that essentially alleged that the Claimants were paedophiles. Secondly, Aaronson v Stones [2023] EWHC 2399 KB in which Knowles J awarded the Claimant £110,000 for a number of serious accusations on Twitter and YouTube to the effect that the Claimant was a serial rapist.[40]Mr Symes put it that “both rape and paedophilia are exceptionally grave and cruel allegations, treated with exceptional repugnance, and which present a powerful reputational pollutant.” He drew comparisons with Blake v Fox and Aaronson both in relation to the cruel nature and the gravity of the libel and to the effect of ‘percolation’ and the spread of posts on social media.[41]Mr Symes said that the libel of rape in the present case contained an added aggravating factor in that the “non-incredible quality” was made worse by the fact that the Claimant and Defendant had indeed met and engaged in consensual sexual activity together. This created a “kernel of truth” behind the defamatory claims that the Claimant had raped and drugged Ms Chia.[42]He argued that Ms Chia’s posting from several Instagram accounts as well as a Twitter account built up a picture of ‘believability’ so that someone seeing the posts might conclude there was ‘no smoke without fire’. While the range of accounts and posts made it difficult to assess the exact extent of publication, he said this provided evidence of ‘percolation’ on social media. He referred to one of the Defendant’s Instagram accounts having around 1200 followers and to the tagging of accounts with high followings including the Met Police (106,000 followers at the time), Instablog9ja (5.7 million followers at the time), and Sahara Reporters (1 million followers at the time). However, he said that Blake related to only two Twitter posts so given the fact that the Defendant in this case had been a ‘far more prolific poster’, the award for damages should be higher.[43]There were no separate submissions before me in relation to damages for the harassment aspect of the claim with the overall figure covering both defamation and harassment.[44]On the application for injunctive relief, Mr Symes said in his skeleton argument:
“To avoid citing numerous cases dealing with each issue, reliance is again placed on (for example) Blake v Fox, wherein injunctive relief was granted in the same way requested.”
Before me, he relied on the test in American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396. While, when challenged, he accepted this was not the correct test, he did not have any further submissions on this point at the hearing.[45]The absence of Ms Chia or any representative on her behalf, made it all the more important, in the interests of justice, to ensure that relevant legal issues and authorities were considered. Because I was concerned that the submissions made before me did not cover everything needed to reach a reasoned decision, I conducted additional research following the hearing. As a result, I requested written submissions from the Claimant on the relevance and correct approach to several authorities and legal issues which I felt were necessary to reach a reasoned decision on the remedies in this case. As the Court has had no engagement from the Defendant or any representative on her behalf, she was not asked for further submissions.[46]I asked for further clarification and submissions on the following points: a) the potential impact of the Claimant’s limited connection to the jurisdiction on quantum of damages and injunctive relief with reference to Gatley on Libel and Slander 13th Edition (10-010 and authorities in footnote 124) and to recent authorities: Wei & Ors v Long & Ors [2025] EWHC 912 (KB) and HXZ v NMX [2025] EWHC 697 (KB) and Sayn-Wittgenstein-Sayn v HM Juan Carlos Alfonso Victor Maria De Borbon y Borbon [2023] EWHC 2478 (KB); b) the relevance of additional comparator cases mentioned in Gatley on Libel and Slander 13th Edition to the quantum of damages, in particular Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB), Bloom v Robinson-Millar, 7 October 2009 (later given a neutral citation of [2013] EWHC 3918 (QB)); c) the relevance of Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2021] EWHC 1797 (QB); [2022] E.M.L.R. 2 on the approach to multiple libels in the assessment of quantum of damages; and d) the application of s.12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to the decision on a final injunction.[47]I am grateful to Mr Symes for his written submissions on these points which I have considered in reaching this decision. Relevant Law General Principles on Quantum of Damages

Relevant Law

[48]In accordance with CPR 12.12(1), the court should assess damages on the basis of the Claimant's unchallenged particulars of claim in the case of a judgment by default.[49]As to the general approach to damages for defamation, in Monir v Wood, [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB) Nicklin J explained that: “Damages for libel cannot be calculated on any mathematical basis. By definition, they seek to provide compensation for harm that it is almost impossible to quantify in monetary terms. The Court attempts to achieve consistency in awards by applying the principles I have identified above, but in reality, no case presents exactly the same circumstances and only some level of commonality or general principle can be extracted” [228][50]Warby J set out the principles to apply in assessing damages in defamation cases extensively in Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB), [20]-[21] (cited by Julian Knowles J in Aaronson [422]) citing the Court of Appeal in John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586):
“20. The general principles were reviewed and re-stated by the Court of Appeal in John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 … Sir Thomas Bingham MR summarised the key principles at pages 607-608 in the following words: ‘The successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover, as general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him for the wrong he has suffered. That sum must [1] compensate him for the damage to his reputation; [2] vindicate his good name; and [3] take account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation the most important factor is [a] the gravity of the libel; the more closely it touches the plaintiff's personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. [b] The extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of people. [c] A successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation: but the significance of this is much greater in a case where the Defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the Defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published and publicly expresses regret that the libellous publication took place. It is well established that [d] compensatory damages may and should compensate for additional injury caused to the plaintiff's feelings by the Defendant's conduct of the action, as when he persists in an unfounded assertion that the publication was true, or refuses to apologise, or cross-examines the plaintiff in a wounding or insulting way. Although the plaintiff has been referred to as “he” all this of course applies to women just as much as men.’21. I have added the numbering in this passage, which identifies the three distinct functions performed by an award of damages for libel. I have added the lettering also to identify, for ease of reference, the factors listed by Sir Thomas Bingham. Some additional points may be made which are relevant in this case: (1) The initial measure of damages is the amount that would restore the Claimant to the position he would have enjoyed had he not been defamed: Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2004) 41 EHRR [37], [45]. (2) The existence and scale of any harm to reputation may be established by evidence or inferred. Often, the process is one of inference, but evidence that tends to show that as a matter of fact a person was shunned, avoided, or taunted will be relevant. So may evidence that a person was treated as well or better by others after the libel than before it. (3) The impact of a libel on a person's reputation can be affected by: a) Their role in society. The libel of Esther Rantzen was more damaging because she was a prominent child protection campaigner. b) The extent to which the publisher(s) of the defamatory imputation are authoritative and credible. The person making the allegations may be someone apparently well-placed to know the facts, or they may appear to be an unreliable source. c) The identities of the publishees. Publication of a libel to family, friends or work colleagues may be more harmful and hurtful than if it is circulated amongst strangers. On the other hand, those close to a Claimant may have knowledge or viewpoints that make them less likely to believe what is alleged. d) The propensity of defamatory statements to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs, a problem made worse by the internet and social networking sites, particularly for Claimants in the public eye: C v MGN Ltd (reported with Cairns v Modi at [2013] 1 WLR 1051) [27]. (4) It is often said that damages may be aggravated if the Defendant acts maliciously. The harm for which compensation would be due in that event is injury to feelings. (5) A person who has been libelled is compensated only for injury to the reputation they actually had at the time of publication. If it is shown that the person already had a bad reputation in the relevant sector of their life, that will reduce the harm, and therefore moderate any damages. But it is not permissible to seek, in mitigation of damages, to prove specific acts of misconduct by the Claimant, or rumours or reports to the effect that he has done the things alleged in the libel complained of: Scott v Sampson (1882) QBD 491, on which I will expand a little. Attempts to achieve this may aggravate damages, in line with factor (d) in Sir Thomas Bingham's list. (6) Factors other than bad reputation that may moderate or mitigate damages, on some of which I will also elaborate below, include the following: a) ‘Directly relevant background context’ within the meaning of Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579 and subsequent authorities. This may qualify the rules at (5) above. b) Publications by others to the same effect as the libel complained of if (but only if) the Claimants have sued over these in another defamation claim, or if it is necessary to consider them in order to isolate the damage caused by the publication complained of. c) An offer of amends pursuant to the Defamation Act 1996. d) A reasoned judgment, though the impact of this will vary according to the facts and nature of the case. (7) In arriving at a figure it is proper to have regard to (a) Jury awards approved by the Court of Appeal: Rantzen 694, John, 612; (b) the scale of damages awarded in personal injury actions: John ,615; (c) previous awards by a judge sitting without a jury: see John 608. (8) Any award needs to be no more than is justified by the legitimate aim of protecting reputation, necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of that aim, and proportionate to that need: Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers(1986) Ltd [1994] QB 670 . This limit is nowadays statutory, via the Human Rights Act 1998.” (1) The initial measure of damages is the amount that would restore the Claimant to the position he would have enjoyed had he not been defamed: Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2004) 41 EHRR [37], [45]. (2) The existence and scale of any harm to reputation may be established by evidence or inferred. Often, the process is one of inference, but evidence that tends to show that as a matter of fact a person was shunned, avoided, or taunted will be relevant. So may evidence that a person was treated as well or better by others after the libel than before it. (3) The impact of a libel on a person's reputation can be affected by: a) Their role in society. The libel of Esther Rantzen was more damaging because she was a prominent child protection campaigner. b) The extent to which the publisher(s) of the defamatory imputation are authoritative and credible. The person making the allegations may be someone apparently well-placed to know the facts, or they may appear to be an unreliable source. c) The identities of the publishees. Publication of a libel to family, friends or work colleagues may be more harmful and hurtful than if it is circulated amongst strangers. On the other hand, those close to a Claimant may have knowledge or viewpoints that make them less likely to believe what is alleged. d) The propensity of defamatory statements to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs, a problem made worse by the internet and social networking sites, particularly for Claimants in the public eye: C v MGN Ltd (reported with Cairns v Modi at [2013] 1 WLR 1051) [27]. (4) It is often said that damages may be aggravated if the Defendant acts maliciously. The harm for which compensation would be due in that event is injury to feelings. (5) A person who has been libelled is compensated only for injury to the reputation they actually had at the time of publication. If it is shown that the person already had a bad reputation in the relevant sector of their life, that will reduce the harm, and therefore moderate any damages. But it is not permissible to seek, in mitigation of damages, to prove specific acts of misconduct by the Claimant, or rumours or reports to the effect that he has done the things alleged in the libel complained of: Scott v Sampson (1882) QBD 491, on which I will expand a little. Attempts to achieve this may aggravate damages, in line with factor (d) in Sir Thomas Bingham's list. (6) Factors other than bad reputation that may moderate or mitigate damages, on some of which I will also elaborate below, include the following: a) ‘Directly relevant background context’ within the meaning of Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579 and subsequent authorities. This may qualify the rules at (5) above. b) Publications by others to the same effect as the libel complained of if (but only if) the Claimants have sued over these in another defamation claim, or if it is necessary to consider them in order to isolate the damage caused by the publication complained of. c) An offer of amends pursuant to the Defamation Act 1996. d) A reasoned judgment, though the impact of this will vary according to the facts and nature of the case. (7) In arriving at a figure it is proper to have regard to (a) Jury awards approved by the Court of Appeal: Rantzen 694, John, 612; (b) the scale of damages awarded in personal injury actions: John ,615; (c) previous awards by a judge sitting without a jury: see John 608. (8) Any award needs to be no more than is justified by the legitimate aim of protecting reputation, necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of that aim, and proportionate to that need: Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers(1986) Ltd [1994] QB 670 . This limit is nowadays statutory, via the Human Rights Act 1998.”

Jurisdiction and harm

[51]Gatley on Libel and Slander, 13th Ed at 10-010, elaborates on the issue of jurisdiction and harm in its footnote 124 with the following references and authorities that have some relevance in this case as the Claimant lives and works outside the jurisdiction:
“Shevill v Presse Alliance SA [1995] 2 A.C. 18 ECJ. See also Hussein v Hamilton Franks & Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 462 (QB): damages reduced to take account of fact that this jurisdiction was not the main locus of the Claimants’ reputations or of those with whom they mostly dealt (at [33]). See also Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Ltd [2016] EWHC 3110 (QB); [2017] E.M.L.R. 10 at [103].”)”
[52]In Hussein, HHJ Moloney QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) explained the impact of jurisdiction on the locus of harm and, as a consequence, on damages in a defamation case [33]-[34]:
“33. […] Counsel has cited to me various authorities showing how, for allegations of this degree of gravity against persons resident in this country, sums of the order of £80,000 to £100,000 have from time to time been awarded. I accept that; but for the reasons I have given, in this case the sum that is awarded should be lower than that. Not because the allegations are not of equal gravity but because this jurisdiction though significant to the Claimants is not the main locus of their reputations or of those with whom they mostly deal. It would not be right for me to take into account the complaints which they make in their witness statements about some of the problems they have had in the United States in this regard. They may well be justified complaints: but I am afraid that is a matter for the laws of the United States and not for me. 34. It appears to me however that these allegations are of such severity and the ambit of publication in this country is sufficiently large that on the solatium principle I should make an award which in each case is enough to stand as a clear declaration of vindication in relation to each of them. It appears to me that in modern conditions that sum is as follows: for Dilber Hussein and for Amtul Hussein £10,000 each and for Mr Omar Hussein, who is younger and has more active connections with this country. £20,000.”
[53]In a similar vein, in Shakil-Ur-Rahman, Sir David Eady (sitting as a High Court Judge) observed at [103]:
“…I must focus upon injury to the Claimant's reputation in this jurisdiction and only that attributable to these broadcasts. I must put to one side, in so far as it is possible to do so, any damage caused to the esteem in which he was held elsewhere, and also any elements of distress brought about by other allegations or publications for which these Defendants are not responsible. The principle is clear. It is a matter of judgment and common sense, however, how it is put into effect, since obviously no precise calculation is possible.”
[54]In the same judgment, he discussed the consequences in relation to a claim for harassment where the victim is outside the jurisdiction. While conceding that there appeared to be no English authority on point at that time [118], he rejected the Claimant’s arguments on the jurisdictional reach of the Harassment Act and dismissed the harassment claim although he noted that it would not have made much difference to the outcome and had barely been dealt with at trial [119]-[120]:
“Mr Nicklin's response was put in these terms: "The Act is clearly premised on and directed at acts committed within the jurisdiction of the Court. The suggestion that the victim has to be present in the jurisdiction in order to be harassed is novel and takes a rather out-dated view of the myriad ways in which a victim can be subjected to harassment". Clearly modern technology and instantaneous communication have made it easier to reach such "victims" wherever they may be, but that does not mean that jurisdictional reach has been correspondingly extended. It seems to me that Mr Nicklin is right in the first of those two sentences: it is indeed necessary to demonstrate acts committed within the jurisdiction, but he makes insufficient allowance for the nature of this particular wrong. It is an essential element of it that the person concerned should be harassed. It will not suffice for the Defendant to complete his act or acts within the jurisdiction unless there is also an impact there upon the "victim".[…]”
[55]In a recent authority that grapples with the impact of jurisdiction on harm in proceedings involving both harassment and defamation claims as well as the evidence of reputational damage following a default judgment, Wei & Ors v Long & Ors [2025] EWHC 912 (KB), Hill J noted at [138] that:
“The Claimants’ cases on injury to reputation entirely overlap with their cases on serious harm summarised at [89]-[99] above. They pragmatically accepted, through Ms Wisson’s submissions, that there were gaps in the evidence regarding reputational damage within this jurisdiction. For example, there was no evidence from anyone other than the Claimants of the impact of D1’s actions on their reputations within the jurisdiction. The Claimants conceded that this would inevitably impact upon the awards that could properly be made under this heading.”
[56]In Wei, taking account of the limited evidence of reputational damage in the jurisdiction from two of the Claimants, Hill J awarded a nominal £500 damages for defamation [142].

Section 12 Human Rights Act 1998

[57]In relation to the granting of an injunction which will impact on the right to freedom of expression, a court must have regard to section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998. In Gatley the application of section 12 in relation to injunctions of the type sought is explained as follows at 10-040:
"In principle, the grant of a final injunction is subject to s.12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, since it is relief which “affects the Convention right to freedom of expression”. In practice, however, this provision is much more important in relation to interim injunctions and, at least where the libel is a serious one and the injunction is expressed only in terms necessary to prevent repetition, the grant of a final injunction after trial will be a legitimate and proportionate interference with freedom of expression, necessary for the protection of the reputation of the Claimant."
[58]In relation to jurisdiction and injunctive relief in relation to harassment, in HXZ v NMX [2025] EWHC 697 (KB), a case where the Claimant was based in Asia but visited the UK for business, Ritchie J noted at [52]:
“[…] The Claimant will have to return to the jurisdiction to manage his business interests. He does not want to return to England while the Defendant continues her campaign against him. In my judgment an anti-harassment injunction should be granted in relation to the feared breaches in this jurisdiction, even though the Claimant is not currently here, because he has been here and will be here in future.”

Analysis

[59]In the absence of any input from the Defendant and based on the judgment in default of Master Stevens, I have considered the facts of the case on the basis of those set out in the amended particulars of claim along with the witness statements of Mr Ogunkanmi and Ms Okoye and their respective exhibits.[60]CPR 12.12(1) allows me to proceed on the basis of the unchallenged particulars of claim including the pleaded meanings set out above. I am satisfied that the pleaded meanings are not “wildly extravagant and impossible” (Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB) [84]-[86]). The meanings are relatively clear from the selection of posts I have included they are defamatory as pleaded.[61]There is a discrepancy between the claim form (dated 3 April 2024), which refers only to a claim in defamation, and the amended particulars of claim (dated 6 November 2024), which include a claim in defamation and a claim in harassment. This is not reflected in the default judgment by which I am bound, and I have therefore considered the issues on the basis of the pleaded case in the amended particulars of claim which are quite limited in their particularisation and evidence of harm so that I am obliged, to a certain degree, to make inferences about harm in the assessment of damages (Barron v Vines [21]).[62]Mr Ogunkanmi describes the impact on him in his witness statement saying:
“I have suffered immensely in dealing with this campaign of calumny, defamation and harassment. I have had to deal with repairing my marriage, almost losing my job, dealing with daily anxiety and panic attacks which is now taking a toll on my overall health. I am also now dealing with high blood pressure issues related to anxiety and panic attacks over the last eight years.”
[63]The harm described by Mr Ogunkanmi appears to arise out of both the harassment and the defamation. Indeed, they are difficult to separate from each other on the pleadings. The defamatory statements were posted as part of the campaign of harassment and the background of harassment may be considered as an aggravating factor to the defamation. Mr Symes did not address me separately on damages for harassment, suggesting instead that a global award should be made. However the majority of the evidence and the detail in the Amended Particulars of Claim relates to the harassment aspect of the claim so I will consider both in my assessment of damages.[64]I note Hill J’s observation in Wei at [108]:
“To avoid double counting, when awarding damages for both harassment and libel, the court can either make a single award reflecting the totality of the damage, harm and distress that the claimant has suffered by both torts, or make separate awards. In deciding which approach to adopt, the court will need to consider the extent to which the causes of action overlap on the particular facts.”
In the circumstances of this case there is a very significant overlap between the harm caused by the harassment and that caused by the libel. Indeed, it is difficult to unpick the two on the limited evidence before me, particularly in the absence of any submissions from Mr Symes on damages for harassment. I therefore adopt the approach of a single award reflecting the totality of the damage.

Impact of Jurisdiction

[65]There has been no dispute about the court’s jurisdiction to hear the claim against Ms Chia. She lives in England and the defamatory statements and the harassment have all emanated from here. There is, however, a question as to the impact of jurisdiction on harm for the purposes of assessing the quantum of damages because Mr Ogunkanmi lives and works outside the jurisdiction. This means that much of the harm suffered by him in relation to both the defamation and the harassment occurred outside the jurisdiction.[66]I have taken note of Mr Symes’ written submissions that, on one reading of the European Court of

Justice judgment in Shevill v Presse Alliance SA [1995] 2 A.C. 18 ECJ, that:

“the court can (and should) award damages for the entirety of the harm, not just that in England and Wales. Therefore, consideration of the locus of reputation is somewhat artificial, as the court is making an award for loss of reputation in all loci.”
[67]That case was a reference from the House of Lords to the European Court of Justice about the application of article 5 of the Brussels Convention 1968 to defamation proceedings in a case brought by a UK resident against a French publisher. Mr Ogunkanmi lives and works in Dubai and there is mention of travel in Africa and the USA, there is nothing in the pleadings to indicate a locus of reputation in any other European jurisdiction. Mr Symes has not explained the particular relevance of Shevill to the present case or why I should adopt that approach over the approach in Hussein. Therefore, in my overall assessment in this case, I have taken account of the fact that the majority of the harm experienced in relation to harassment was outside the jurisdiction (Shakil-Ur-Rahman [118]).[68]I have weighed up the fact that the main locus of Mr Ogunkanmi’s reputation is outside this jurisdiction while recognising the gravity of the accusations (Hussein [33]-34]). On the basis of Ms Okoye’s first witness statement, I accept that the defamatory posts on Instagram were seen by members of the Nigerian community in England, some of whom knew Mr Ogunkanmi and understood the posts were about him. However, I note the very limited and generalised evidence of harm and the lack of particularisation of harm in the pleadings or in submissions before me. In particular there is very little specific evidence of the harm to Mr Ogunkanmi’s reputation arising from the defamation, either within this jurisdiction, or globally. This has necessarily had an impact on my overall assessment of damages appropriate to this case (Wei [138]).

Harassment

[69]Based on the evidence in Mr Ogunkanmi’s witness statement, the harassment began in February or March 2016 when Ms Chia began bombarding him with calls and threats including persistent calls and abuse directed at his workplace and requests for money. As a result of the impact it was having on him, in particular at work, Mr Ogunkanmi travelled to the UK to report the harassment to the Metropolitan Police in May 2016. This led to the criminal harassment proceedings against Ms Chia which resulted in her being bailed on 5 June 2016 with conditions not to contact the Claimant either directly or indirectly and not to attend or contact any office, workplace or colleague of the Claimant.[70]On 11 August 2016, however, in breach of those conditions, she contacted the Claimant’s workplace with a further threatening call. As a result, she was issued with a First Instance Harassment Warning on 15 August 2016. Following Ms Chia’s allegation of rape in September 2016, Mr Ogunkanmi returned to the UK briefly in October 2017 for a voluntary police interview. He was then told on 20th December that the police would take no further action over the rape allegation. From early 2018, Ms Chia shifted her tactics to harassment by way of the defamatory online posts complained of. Those posts were restricted for access in this jurisdiction by Meta Inc in December 2022 and have subsequently been restricted for access in Dubai, where the Claimant lives and works, and in Nigeria.[71]It is clear that the Claimant has been the victim of a sustained, relentless and vindictive campaign of harassment for almost nine years. It is a thoroughly unsubstantiated campaign of vitriol emerging out of a brief sexual encounter. Ms Chia is so obsessed with damaging the Claimant that her campaign has even spilled over into sustained harassment and even violence against her former friend, Ms Okoye, who she falsely believes to have been in a relationship with the Claimant. Ms Chia has even served a prison sentence for common assault against Ms Okoye. The severity and long-standing nature of the harassment described in the witness statements and amended particulars of claim must undoubtedly have taken a very serious toll on Mr Ogunkanmi.[72]However, in relation to the harassment claim, I can only consider harm experienced in this jurisdiction (Shakil-Ur-Rahman [119]). Mr Ogunkanmi, in his witness statement explains that he is “in a continuous working and travelling pattern with and in Dubai, Singapore, Geneva, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, United States of America.” He makes no mention of regular visits to the United Kingdom, and the evidence before me shows only three short visits to England since the harassment began. Those visits were to speak to the police about the harassment in May 2016 and, according to the evidence of Ms Okoye again in 2018 and for a voluntary police interview in relation to the allegation of rape in October 2017. By the time he visited the UK and met with police along with Ms Okoye in 2018, the defamatory online statements were a part of the campaign of harassment which, according to Ms Okoye, at least some people in the Nigerian community in England were then aware of.[73]While I have no doubt that Mr Ogunkanmi has suffered, as he says he has, as a result of this campaign of harassment, based on the very general evidence I have, I am unable to find any more than negligible harm actually experienced within this jurisdiction. Therefore I do not have sufficient evidence to justify a separate award for damages for harm related to harassment experienced in this country. In addition, I did not benefit from any submissions from Mr Symes in relation to damages for harassment. The relentless campaign of harassment does, however, provide context to the full picture of the defamation and is of relevance to the global award of damages.[74]An assessment of damages for libel is not an exact science and cannot be ‘calculated on any mathematical basis’ (as per Nicklin J in Monir at [228]). There is significant overlap in the numerous posts on Instagram and Twitter (now X) and it is clear that all the defamatory statements allege very serious criminality - both sexual offences and offences of dishonesty and corruption - that would cause serious harm to a person’s reputation.[75]In relation to the consideration of aggravated damages, Mr Symes relies on Nicklin J’s observation in Lachaux at [227] that:
“separating out a specific award for “aggravated damages” is unnecessary and, I consider generally unwise. The Court’s task is to assess the proper level of compensation, taking into account all the relevant factors, which include any elements of aggravation.”
I adopt this approach in my consideration of the appropriate award and include the backdrop of harassment amongst the factors I have taken account of.[76]The gravity of the libel is the most important factor in considering compensatory damages (Barron v Vines [20]). Mr Symes’ submissions focused on the rape allegation, but the allegations of bribery of public officials, drugging, perverting the course of justice and unspecified child abuse are, in my view, equally damaging to reputation. They are clearly designed to hurt the Claimant in his personal and professional life, to undermine trust in him and to drag him through the dirt publicly with absolutely no justification.[77]The gravity of libel relating to such types of serious criminality is reflected in the high level of damages awarded in the comparator cases cited by Mr Symes. Blake relates to an allegation of paedophilia with an award of £90,000 for each Claimant. Aaronson with an award of £110,000 for allegations that the Claimant had raped several people.[78]Mr Symes suggests that there are many similarities between this case and Aaronson citing the facts to consider and the aggravating factors put forward by the Claimant in that case which are set out at [432] and [433]. Knowles J accepted the thrust of the Claimant’s submissions on those points at [434] but, other than referring to that judgment as a “compelling comparator case in this matter,” Mr Symes’ submissions are quite limited. In his skeleton argument he says:
“In this instance, given the large audience, the numerous defamatory claims, the grave nature thereof, and the sheer number of posts coming from different accounts on numerous platforms, the figure awarded in this case should logically be higher. The Claimant submits an award of in excess of £120,000 would be proportionate given the caselaw.”
[79]But this case is quite different to Aaronson and to Blake when one considers the next factor to be assessed - the extent of publication. In Aaronson the Defendant’s Twitter account alone had an estimated 144,000 followers, the majority of which were assumed to be in England and Wales as the account was registered as being in Manchester. In Blake, the Defendant’s Twitter account was estimated to have around quarter of a million followers at the time of the offending tweets and the ‘percolation’ effect was maximised by avid media coverage of the dispute and the subsequent court case which served only to increase the scale of the publication.[80]While I accept that there is some degree of comparison between the gravity of the allegations in those cases, I am not persuaded by Mr Symes’ further arguments relating to their comparability. An assessment of compensatory damages must take account of the whole picture, not just the meaning of the libel. The overall picture of the facts in this case is completely different to those in Blake and in Aaronson, in particular as regards to the scale of distribution. I do not think the audience in this case could be described as “large” when compared to those cases.[81]On the evidence provided, one of the Defendant’s Instagram accounts “u_smell_nice_witch” appears to have had 1247 followers at the time of one of the posts, I have no evidence of the numbers of followers for the other accounts. In the screenshots exhibited to the Claimant’s witness statement, there are signs of some engagement from other people. A post on 15 May 2020, for example, has 72 likes which, on the evidence I have, appears to be the maximum for any post. Ms Okoye, in her first witness statement, says that there were 27 posts on that Instagram account with references to her and Mr Ogunkanmi and that 17 accounts were tagged. Mr Ogunkanmi says that Ms Chia tagged and sent follower requests to his friends and family from at least one account, drawing the attention of people he knew to the defamatory posts.[82]Mr Symes argued that, as the Second Defendant had tagged accounts with large followings, I should infer that the posts had been seen by many more people than those directly following the accounts alluding to the ‘percolation’ effect of social media referred to by Collins Rice J in Blake [10],[17]. But there is no evidence before me to back that up. The offending posts on Instagram were accessible in this jurisdiction between early 2018 and 19 December 2022. Although they were live for several years, there is no sign of virality or of substantial ‘onward percolation’. It appears they were available but did not get any traction or significant interest online. There is no evidence before me as to what has happened to the offending posts on Twitter.[83]Mr Symes also suggested that the use of several accounts might add to the “believability” of the libels and give rise to the assumption that “there was no smoke without fire.” He mentioned the kernel of truth to the allegations (i.e. the consensual sexual encounter) that could add to their believability.[84]I am not persuaded by those arguments. Despite the apparent attempt by the poster to share more widely, there is no evidence at all that any of the accounts tagged did share the posts or that they were shared extensively or at all. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that accounts associated with the Metropolitan Police or the Dubai Police (both of which were tagged) would ever share this type of content.[85]Rather than adding to the believability, the scale of the posting and the style of the posts tends rather to undermine their credibility. Tagging does not, as Mr Symes seems to suggest, necessarily lead to increased visibility. The tagging of accounts with big followers with this kind of content might tend more to indicate that the posts are vindictive spam rather than indicating that they are to be believed. They are not presented in any way as journalistic. Rather than a sign that “there is no smoke without fire”, the nature and pattern of these posts indicates that the poster has an axe to grind and is obsessed with the Claimant.[86]Given the multiple Instagram accounts used for posting, it is likely that at least some of the likes came from her own accounts rather than from other people. Taken at its highest, on the evidence I have, it seems that around 70 people engaged with the defamatory posts on Instagram which might indicate that a number in the low hundreds could have seen them. I have no concrete evidence relating to the posts on Twitter so cannot conclude that their distribution was any wider. The scale of publication in this case is, therefore, a tiny fraction of the distribution in Blake or Aaronson.[87]A more comparable case, in my view, is Monir v Wood, a case about a tweet alleging child sexual abuse that Nicklin J found had been distributed to around 1000 people in a WhatsApp group. Around 20 people had drawn the Claimant’s attention to it but an unquantifiable number of those who saw it would have recognised the Claimant [130].[88]In his judgment in Monir, Nicklin J, reflecting on the interaction between the severity of the allegation and the scale of publication in deciding on an award of damages noted at [236] that:
“had this libel been published in a national newspaper, an award of £250,000 or more could easily have been justified. Necessarily, I have to ensure that the award I make is proportionate to the limited scale of publication...”
In light of the relatively small scale of the publication and the issue with causation in that case, he made an award of £40,000. It is worth noting that the evidence of harm suffered by the Claimant was detailed and severe in that case while it is not here.[89]The harm described in the amended particulars of claim and in Mr Ogunkanmi’s witness statement is general in nature with no specific examples. It is difficult to separate out harm from the defamation from the general harm caused by the campaign of harassment which seems to have particularly impacted him in his workplace in Dubai. With regard to the reference Mr Ogunkanmi makes to the impact on his marriage, it is equally difficult to unpick the harm of the defamation from the impact of the wider context of the defamation and harassment stemming, ultimately, from an extra-marital affair.[90]I bear in mind that the “initial measure of damages is the amount that would restore the Claimant to the position he would have enjoyed had he not been defamed” (Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2004) 41 EHRR [37], [45]).[91]That means I need to consider the Claimant’s position before the defamation in early 2018. At that point, his colleagues and family must have been aware that he had been subjected to a campaign of harassment arising out of a brief extra-marital affair. Some of them must have been aware that he had had to travel to the UK in late 2017 for a voluntary interview with the police connected to a report of rape arising out of the same circumstances. Much of the damage suffered by the Claimant had, therefore, already happened before the defamatory posts online. The escalation to online defamatory posts only served to aggravate the situation and broaden the range of people who might be aware of it beyond those the Claimant had necessarily needed to share with up to that point.[92]Mr Ogunkanmi says that the posts have been seen by some of his friends and family, which is how he discovered the later Instagram account. I recognise what Warby J referred to as “[t]he propensity of defamatory statements to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs” (Barron v Vines [21] and I can see how distressing it must be for the Claimant to be subjected to such a seemingly endless campaign of harassment and upsetting to know that his friends and family have seen defamatory posts alleging very serious criminal behaviour on his part. But those people who were aware of the harassment would be unlikely to actually believe that there was any truth in the posts (see Barron v Vines [21] at point (3)).[93]In these circumstances, the impact of the defamatory posts themselves on his reputation is likely to have been minimal. They did not come out of the blue and would be understood as coming from someone who was clearly obsessed with attacking Mr Ogunkanmi in any way possible. In addition, the tone of the posts does not give them any kind of weight – they appear to be what they are, a personal and vindictive attempt to sully the Claimant’s reputation.[94]It is important for general damages in a defamation action to vindicate the Claimant’s good name and it should be clear, from this judgment, that there is no truth at all in the defamatory posts. The fact that the Mr Ogunkanmi had a consensual sexual encounter with Ms Chia does not reflect “a kernel of truth” and in no way justifies the horrific campaign of harassment, abuse and defamation that he has been subjected to for over nine years. The posts were clearly malicious which may be considered an aggravating factor and one for which a degree of compensation is due for injury to feelings (Barron v Vines [21])[95]In light of all the circumstances of this case, weighing up the gravity of the allegations, the backdrop of years of harassment, malicious intent and a failure to engage on the part of the Defendant against the very meagre evidence of harm, particularly in this jurisdiction, and the limited distribution of the libel, I award a global figure of £25,000 in damages for both the harassment and the libel.

Injunctive relief

[96]The injunctive relief against the Defendant sought in this case includes a prohibition on posting about the Claimant and a prohibition on contacting the Claimant, directly or indirectly. As such injunctive relief clearly has an impact on Ms Chia’s right to freedom of expression, I have taken account of section 12 of the Human Rights Act and considered the necessity and proportionality of the injunctive relief.[97]The libel in this case is serious, involving completely unfounded allegations of serious crimes. The Claimant has succeeded in his claim in its entirety by virtue of the default judgment which has not been challenged.[98]The harassment has been ongoing now for nearly ten years and has involved criminal proceedings. Ms Chia has flouted her police bail conditions in relation to the criminal complaint of harassment brought by Mr Ogunkanmi. Arising out of her obsession with Mr Ogunkanmi, she has physically attacked Ms Okoye several times in public and, as a result, was convicted of common assault in February of this year and sentenced on 12 March 2025 to 10 weeks imprisonment and a restraining order for 5 years. One of the conditions of the Restraining Order was “Not to post any messages or images regarding Prisca Okoye on any social media platform”.[99]Therefore, I find that injunctive relief, both in relation to posting messages or images on social media about the Claimant and in relation to communicating, directly or indirectly with the Claimant is justified to protect Mr Ogunkanmi’s reputation and his right to private life. It is clear that such injunctive relief is a necessary and proportionate measure to put a stop to the ongoing attacks on the Claimant.

Costs

[100]Costs for the Claimant to be the subject of a detailed assessment taking account of the discontinuance of proceedings against Meta Inc.