“Perversion of Justice reveals how Epstein came to run a global sex-trafficking pyramid scheme with impunity for years, targeting vulnerable teens, often from fractured homes, and then turning them into recruiters.”
“Shortly thereafter, a silver-haired man with a long face and bushy eyebrows entered the kitchen, along with a young woman who appeared to be about Haley’s age. His name was Jeffrey. The young woman’s name, police would later learn, was Emmy Tayler. At the time, Tayler arranged Epstein’s massage schedule and also worked as Maxwell’s assistant. After the introductions, Tayler led Jane Doe 1 up a spiral staircase from the kitchen to a master bedroom and bath. Jane told the police she became anxious as Tayler put up a folding massage table and laid out a bunch of oils. ‘Jeff will be up in a minute,’ she told Jane. There has been nothing to suggest that Tayler was aware of what happened in the room nor that she participated in any sexual activity.”
“(1) The Claimant arranged Jeffrey Epstein’s massage schedule in 2005 at a time when he was a prolific paedophile who regularly sexually abused underage girls under the guise of paying them to receive massages. On one occasion in 2005, when Epstein was aged in his 50s, the Claimant led a 14-year-old child – ‘Jane Doe 1’ - to a bedroom in Epstein’s Palm Beach residence. The Claimant set up a massage table and oils and left the girl alone in the master bedroom, having told her, and knowing that, Epstein would be joining the girl in the room shortly. (2) The child was subsequently seriously sexually assaulted by Epstein. The Claimant thereby knowingly facilitated the paedophilia of a notorious child abuser, or there are strong grounds to suspect that she did so.”
“In 2005 the Claimant was a young woman who worked as an administrative assistant to Ghislaine Maxwell, a close associate of Jeffrey Epstein, and also arranged massages for Epstein which, on one occasion, according to a later police report, involved the Claimant showing an unnamed girl into a massage room at Epstein’s Palm Beach mansion where, subsequently, behind closed doors and without the Claimant knowing about it, he proceeded to sexually abuse the unnamed girl who was also, it transpired, underage.”
“11. The court’s task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, which is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words bear. It is well recognised that there is an artificiality in this process because individual readers may understand words in different ways: Slim v. Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 Q.B. 157. 12. The following key principles can be distilled from the authorities … i) The governing principle is reasonableness. ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic “rogues’ gallery” case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication’s readership. xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant’s pleaded meaning).” iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic “rogues’ gallery” case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication’s readership. xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant’s pleaded meaning).”
“This simply means that in reading the article as a whole if a ‘stain’ is removed in another part of the publication, the bane and antidote must be taken together when considering whether the article is defamatory, see Cruise v. Express Newspapers [1999] Q.B. 931 at 939. Whether the antidote has removed the bane is very much a matter of impression. In Cruise it was suggested that it would be rare that the antidote removed the bane, and reference was made to cases in which the bane had been destroyed by the contents of the article. There is no rule of law to the effect that antidote can never remove the bane, and there is no rule of law to the effect that an antidote will always remove the bane. It is a matter for the hypothetical reasonable reader.”
“The bane and antidote theory … is merely a vivid way of stating that the whole publication must be considered, not a segment of it.”
“One asks, therefore, in this as in any other case where the principle is invoked, whether, considered as a whole, the publication is damaging to the claimant’s reputation.”
“I reasoned that we don’t call people who are burglarized ‘alleged burglary victims.’ I also pointed that in this case, the victims were all listed as victims by the US Attorney’s Office as part of the final plea agreement that Epstein signed.”
“That is not to say that words in the text of an article will always be efficacious to cure a defamatory headline. It all depends on the context, one element of which is the layout of the article. Those who print defamatory headlines are playing with fire. The ordinary reader might not be expected to notice curative words tucked away further down in the article. The more so, if the words are on a continuation page to which a reader is directed.”
“By 2005, the operation was in full swing. Girls from in and around West Palm Beach arrived two, three, four, or more times a day to Epstein’s cotton-candy-pink waterfront mansion on the island of Palm Beach.”
“For at least six years, multimillionaire financier Jeffrey Edward Epstein, fifty-three, and others working for him had been luring middle school and high school girls to his waterfront mansion in Palm Beach, Florida by offering to pay them for massages. The girls mostly thirteen to sixteen years old, arrived at all hours of the day and night, whereupon they were sexually abused in acts ranging from inappropriate touching to rape. Afterward, Epstein paid them two to three hundred dollars each, then offered to give them even more money if the teenagers brought their friends, creating a revolving door of fresh young girls to fill his paedophile obsession… … Epstein was wealthy enough to buy anything he wanted, including prostitutes. But he didn’t want experienced women: his preferred prey were waiflike prepubescent girls from troubled backgrounds who needed money and had little or no sexual experience.”
“A further construct to make up for the absence of evidence of knowledge in the text on the Claimant’s part is to present Jane Doe 1 in the meaning being advanced as ‘a child’. The Book refers to her only as ‘a girl’ at high school. Chapter 1, which relates the police report of the Jane Doe 1 case contains no reference to the word ‘child’ at all, which is a word that tends to conjure up a different impression than the one of Jane Doe 1 actually given by the Book. Instead, it is suggested that she led a tough life, running away, partying, drinking, taking drugs, and living at a ‘facility’ for ‘troubled kids’whilst attending a Florida school with a significant gun violence problem (page 12). Jane Doe 1 stated she was 18 and was believed to be that age, the Book records (page 15). A police stake-out of Epstein’s mansion as part of their investigation concluded that the girls seen entering did not appear underage (page125).”
“She said that [Epstein] wanted all very young girls, and she explained how he had once gotten angry when she brought him a twenty-three-year old. The youngest girl she introduced him to was fourteen, she said, naming a total of six girls whom she had brought to his mansion.” 32.3 At pages 83-84, where the 2006 taped statement of a houseman employed by Epstein between November 2004 and May 2005 is quoted: “Rodriguez said Epstein had many visitors, most of them young masseuses who he said appeared to be of high school age. … He said the girls who were coming to Epstein’s house came at all hours of the day and, as time went on, they appeared to be younger and younger.” 32.4 At pages 176-177, Ms Brown refers to Courtney Wild’s account that she was fourteen when she was first abused by Epstein. The sexual abuse happened so many times that Ms Wild was unable to count the number. Ms Brown then adds, at page 177: “Like other girls who were brought to his house, [Wild] learned that she could avoid being abused herself by offering him new, younger girls to divert his attention from her. She started bringing him victims morning, noon and night.” 32.5 Further, at page 179: “By the time she was seventeen, Epstein no longer wanted Courtney sexually. She was too old for him, and she no longer hung around with girls who were thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen. She began to have trouble finding girls of that age to bring to him.” 32.6 On the same page, the book records Ms Wild’s description of Epstein’s preference for “short, little white girls.”
“Epstein asked [Jane Doe 1] how she knew Haley, how old she was, what grade she was in, and what school she went to. She lied, telling him that she was an eighteen-year-old senior at Wellington High School.”
“The Claimant arranged Jeffrey Epstein’s massage schedule in 2005 at a time when he regularly received massages from underage girls. Unknown to her, he was a prolific paedophile who sexually abused the girls under the guise of paying them to receive massages. On one occasion in 2005, when Epstein was aged in his fifties, the Claimant led a fourteen-year-old child - ‘Jane Doe 1’ - to a bedroom in Epstein’s Palm Beach residence. The Claimant set up a massage table and oils and left the girl alone in the master bedroom, having told her, and knowing that, Epstein would be joining the girl in the room shortly. Jane Doe 1 was subsequently sexually assaulted by Epstein.”
“At common law, a meaning is defamatory and therefore actionable if it satisfies two requirements. The first, known as ‘the consensus requirement’, is that the meaning must be one that ‘tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally.’ The Judge has to determine ‘whether the behaviour or views that the offending statement attributes to a claimant are contrary to common, shared values of our society’: Monroe v. Hopkins[2017] EWHC 433 (QB) , [2017] 4 W.L.R. 68 [51]. The second requirement is known as the ‘threshold of seriousness’. To be defamatory, the imputation must be one that would tend to have a ‘substantially adverse effect’ on the way that people would treat the claimant: Thornton v. Telegraph Media Group Ltd[2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) , [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1985 [98] (Tugendhat J).”