"[14] The principles which apply to an application for summary judgment are set out in the well-known passages from the judgment of Lewison J in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd[2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) . It has been quoted several times by the Court of Appeal, see, for example, Malik v Henley Homes plc[2023] EWCA Civ 726 at paragraph 77. This is the relevant passage from Easyair at paragraph 15: 'The correct approach on applications by defendants is, in my judgment, as follows: i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a "realistic" as opposed to a "fanciful" prospect of success: Swain v Hillman[2001] 1 All ER 91 ; ii) A "realistic" claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel[2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]; iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a "mini-trial": Swain v Hillman; iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10]; v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5)[2001] EWCA Civ 550 ; vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] SR 63; vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd[2007] EWCA Civ 725 .' [15] The test in law underCPR 3.4 (2)(a) is not quite the same, although there have been differences of view as to whether this makes any practical difference, see King v Stiefel[2021] EWHC 1045 (Comm) at paragraphs 26-27 and Libyan Investment Authority v King[2020] EWCA Civ 1690 at paragraph 57(4). It will make no difference in the present case, so I can focus on the claim for summary judgment. [16] Mindhouse relied on paragraph 15(iv) of Easyair and also on passages from other judgments in a similar vein. In Maranello Ross Ltd v Lohomij BV[2021] EWHC 2452 (Ch) , HHJ Keyser QC said at paragraph 19: 'Accordingly, where there are disputed questions of fact, it will not generally attempt to determine where the probabilities lie. However, and importantly, the court ought to carry out a critical examination of the available material and is not bound to accept the mere say-so of anybody; where it is clear that a factual case is self-contradictory or inherently incredible or where it is contradicted by the contemporaneous documents, the court, after careful consideration of the evidence that is currently before it and having regard to the nature of such further evidence as might reasonably be expected to be available at trial, is entitled to reject that case even on a summary basis. The court will not be dissuaded from giving judgment by mere Micawberism.' [17] This was approved on appeal by the Court of Appeal, see Maranello Rosso Ltd v Lohomij BV[2022] EWCA Civ 1667 , at paragraph 77. [18] In Korea National Insurance Corporation v Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG[2007] EWCA Civ 1066 , the Court of Appeal ruled that the party responding to an application for summary judgment must go beyond just an assertion that the evidence at trial will support the pleaded case. The party in question should, in evidence at the application, set out the nature of the evidence anticipated at the trial, its source and relevance. Moore-Bick LJ, with whom Jacob and Buxton LJJ agreed, said at [14]: 'In the present case Allianz criticised the judge for having failed to make allowance in its favour for the likelihood that additional evidence relating to various aspects of this defence would be available at trial to cast a more benevolent light on events, but in my view that criticism is unfounded. It is incumbent on a party responding to an application for summary judgment to put forward sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that it has a real prospect of succeeding at trial. If it wishes to rely on the likelihood that further evidence will be available at that stage, it must substantiate that assertion by describing, at least in general terms, the nature of the evidence, its source and its relevance to the issues before the court. The court may then be able to see that there is some substance in the point and that the party in question is not simply playing for time in the hope that something will turn up. It is not sufficient, therefore, for a party simply to say that further evidence will or may be available, especially when that evidence is, or can be expected to be, already within its possession, as is the case here. Allianz was quite entitled, if it so chose, to confine its evidence to the factual allegations in the defence, but having done so, and having failed to give any indication of what other evidence can be expected to be available at trial, it cannot complain that the court has not speculated about whether there might be any such evidence, and if so what its nature might be.'"