“30. In In re Richborough Furniture Ltd[1996] 1 BCLC 507 the question was raised whether one of the three respondents, who was not a director of the company de jure, was nevertheless a director of the company de facto and as such liable undersection 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 to be disqualified. Asking himself what is a de facto director, Timothy Lloyd QC (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) said, at p 524: “It seems to me that for someone to be made liable to disqualification under section 6 as a de facto director, the court would have to have clear evidence that he had been either the sole person directing the affairs of the company (or acting with others all equally lacking in a valid appointment, as in Morris v Kanssen[1946] AC 459 ) or, if there were others who were true directors, that he was acting on an equal footing with the others in directing the affairs of the company. It also seems to me that, if it is unclear whether the acts of the person in question are referable to an assumed directorship, or to some other capacity such as shareholder or, as here, consultant, the person in question must be entitled to the benefit of the doubt.”
“For myself I think it may be difficult to postulate any one decisive test. I think what is involved is very much a question of degree. The court takes into account all the relevant factors. Those factors include at least whether or not there was a holding out by the company of the individual as a director, whether the individual used the title, whether the individual had proper information (eg management accounts) on which to base decisions, and whether the individual had to make major decisions and so on. Taking all these factors into account, one asks ‘was this individual part of the corporate governing structure’, answering it as a kind of jury question. In deciding this, one bears very much in mind why one is asking the question. That is why I think the passage I quoted from Millett J is important. There would be no justification for the law making a person liable to misfeasance or disqualification proceedings unless they were truly in a position to exercise the powers and discharge the functions of a director. Otherwise they would be made liable for events over which they had no real control, either in fact or law.”
“I do not understand Jacob J, in the first part of that passage, to be enumerating tests which must all be satisfied if de facto directorship is to be established. He is simply drawing attention to some (but not all) of the relevant factors, recognising that the crucial issue is whether the individual in question has assumed the status and functions of a company director so as to make himself responsible under the 1986 Act as if he were a de jure director.”
“91. Once the concept of de facto director was divorced from the unlawful holding of office, there were two consequences. The first consequence was that the distinction between de facto directors and shadow directors was eroded. … The second consequence is that the courts were confronted with the very difficult problem of identifying what functions were in essence the sole responsibility of a director or board of directors. A number of tests have been suggested of which the following are the most relevant. First, whether the person was the sole person directing the affairs of the company (or acting with others equally lacking in a valid appointment), or if there were others who were true directors, whether he was acting on an equal footing with the others in directing its affairs: In re Richborough Furniture Ltd[1996] 1 BCLC 507 . Second, whether there was a holding out by the company of the individual as a director, and whether the individual used the title: Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Tjolle[1998] 1 BCLC 333 . Third, taking all the circumstances into account, whether the individual was part of “the corporate governing structure”: see Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Tjolle , at pp 343–344, approved in In re Kaytech International plc[1999] 2 BCLC 351 , 423, where Robert Walker LJ also approved the way in which Jacob J in the Tjolle case had declined to formulate a single test. He also said, at p 424 that the concepts of shadow director and de facto director had in common “that an individual who was not a de jure director is alleged to have exercised real influence (otherwise than as a professional adviser) in the corporate governance of a company”
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, para 2.5).”
“I have already formed ‘EECO Ltd’ and ‘Environmental Ethanol Company Ltd.’ EECO has gained EIS status, and for simplicity I have been using this name to promote the business – as unsure how it would develop. I wish to keep EECO Ltd, and the logo, as my own separate Co. I have agreed that the company LCI and Family and friends will invest in is Environmental Ethanol Co. My Accountant has suggested simplest way forward is to ‘swap’ company names, due EIS clearance. Can this be achieved with name change to Elsworth from ‘Environmental Ethanol?”
“Elsworth was formed just over one year ago, to commercialise Prof. Hartley’s novel idea…for the bioconversion of sugars…into Bio-ethanol, for use as a bio-fuel.”
“…I note that the 3rd point in your email states that: “Elsworth paid for the filing, Brian Hartley only making the suggestion of BCTL as you walked out the room to file”
“13. The two patents were assigned to BCTL and filed with Reddie and Grose by myself and Neil Bookless on24th March 2006 . … [Mr Bookless] was present and did not object to this assignation” … [Mr Bookless] was present and did not object to this assignation”