M & N (Children) (Abduction: Ireland; Art 13(b); Child Objections), Re [2026] EWHC 284 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 284 (Fam)Case No FD25P00620
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND CUSTODY ACT 1985
AND IN THE MATTER OF M (A GIRL)
AND IN THE MATTER OF N (A GIRL)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 11 February 2026
Before
MR DAVID REES KC(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)(In Private)
Between
TLApplicantMBRespondent
Mr Edward Bennett (instructed by Wilsons Solicitors LLP) for ApplicantMs Mehvish Chaudhry (instructed by Freemans Solicitors) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 10 February 2026This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.Mr David Rees KC:

Introduction

[1]This is an application for the summary return of two girls, M and N, who are respectively nearly 14 and 13, to Ireland pursuant to the 1980 Hague Convention. For the reasons that I explain in this judgment, I have decided to make an order for their return.[2]It is worth, at the outset, emphasising the summary nature and limited scope of proceedings under the 1980 Convention. As Mostyn J identified in B v B [2014] EWHC 1804:
“2. The Hague Convention of 1980 is arguably the most successful ever international treaty and it has over 90 subscribers to it, over half the countries in the world. The underlying and central foundation of the Convention is that, where a child has been unilaterally removed from the land of her habitual residence in breach of someone's rights of custody, then she should be swiftly returned to that country for the courts of that country to decide on her long-term future. 3. There are very few exceptions to this and the exceptions that do exist have to be interpreted very narrowly in order that the central premise of the Convention is not fatally undermined. It is important to understand what the Convention does not do. The Convention does not order a child who has been removed in the circumstances I have described to live with anybody. The Convention does not provide that the parent who is left behind should, on the return of the child, have contact or access in any particular way. The Convention does not provide that, when an order for return to the child's homeland is made, the child should stay there indefinitely. All the Convention provides is that the child should be returned for the specific purpose and limited period to enable the court of her homeland to decide on her long-term future. That is all it decides. 4 ... Equally, if the exception that is relied on is that there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation, that again has to be seen through the lens of the objective of the Convention. We are not talking here about long- term risks. We are not talking here about long-term harm. We are talking about risks and harm that would eventuate only in the period that it takes for the court of the child's homeland to determine her long-term future and to impose the necessary safeguards, if necessary, in the interim.”
[3]The parents are both of Iraqi heritage but have both acquired Irish citizenship. The father moved to Ireland in 1996 and has lived there ever since. The parents met in Iraq when the father had returned to that country for a visit and married there in 2010. The mother subsequently moved to Ireland and lived there until July 2025. Both children were born in Ireland and lived their entire lives there until they were brought to England by the mother in July 2025.[4]The parents separated in 2015 and, in 2016, the Irish Court made an order providing that neither parent was to remove the children from Ireland without the consent of the other parent or a court order. The parents obtained a religious divorce in Iraq in 2016 and a civil divorce in Ireland in 2025. Following the parents’ separation the children lived with their mother. At one stage following the parents’ separation, the father was having regular and unsupervised contact with the children, but this had ceased by early 2024.[5]This is a case where very little beyond the chronology that I have set out above is common ground. The mother has made a wide range of allegations of domestic abuse and violence against the father, including physical, emotional and sexual abuse. Both children have also made allegations of abuse, including sexual abuse, against the father. For his part, the father denies these allegations and alleges that the complaints against him have been fabricated and that the children have been intentionally influenced or convinced by the mother into making allegations against him.[6]Some of the allegations made against the father, and in particular an allegation of sexual abuse made by N, the younger child, have been referred to the Irish Gardai and to children’s social services in Ireland. The children have an allocated social worker in Ireland, and in 2025 public law proceedings were issued by the Irish Child and Family Agency in the Irish courts in relation the children. This resulted in a supervision order being made on 20 February 2025 in the Irish court, enabling the Child and Family Agency to visit the children on such occasions as it considers necessary to satisfy itself as to the welfare of the children and to give the parents any necessary advice as to the care of the children. The children are represented by a guardian ad litem in those proceedings. In May 2025 further orders were made requiring the children to attend a specific address, I understand for the purposes of having supervised contact with the father. A contact session with the father, facilitated by the children’s social worker took place on 21 July 2025. Two days later the Irish court extended the length of the supervision order until 23 January 2026, with a review date in October 2025. The following day, 24 July 2025, the mother removed the children from Ireland and brought them to England without the consent or knowledge of the father, Irish children’s social services, the children’s guardian ad litem or the Irish court. The mother’s evidence is that she left because she feared that the supervision order would be extended and further arrangements would be made for the father to see the children.[7]Since their arrival in England the mother and children have been living in a refuge. The father’s application for a summary return under the 1980 Convention was filed with the court on 16 September 2025. Because the father was unaware of the whereabouts of the mother and children, disclosure orders and a location order were needed. The location order was finally executed on 14 November 2025. Directions were given by Lieven J at an attended hearing on 20 November 2025 and respectful requests for the provision of a substantial amount of documentation from the Irish courts and authorities were made. By this time, a Child and Family Assessment of the mother and children had taken place in England and disclosure orders in respect of these investigations were also made.[8]The answer filed by the mother in response to the father’s application indicated that she would be relying on Art 13(b) of the 1980 Convention and the children’s objections to a return by way of defence to the application. Lieven J therefore also made orders for the children to be seen by Cafcass to report on the children’s maturity and upon their views, wishes and feelings regarding a return to Ireland. The children have subsequently been seen by Ms Catherine Callaghan of Cafcass who has prepared a report.[9]The matter came before me for hearing yesterday. The father is represented by Mr Bennett of counsel; the mother by Ms Chaudhry of counsel and I am grateful to them both for their submissions. The mother attended in person; the father attended remotely via video-link. Ms Callaghan attended and was cross-examined by both counsel. There was no other oral evidence, although both counsel made oral submissions.[10]I did not meet with the children. Although both children (and in particular M) had told Ms Callaghan that they would like to meet with the judge, if possible, no arrangements had been made for them to do so, and both were at school. Ms Callaghan, in her oral evidence also expressed a degree of caution about the children meeting with me, as she felt that they wished to do so to make sure that I was aware of the strength of their feelings. Given that the children were at school, and had not been prepared for a meeting with me, I decided that it would not be appropriate to try to arrange one at short notice, particularly in circumstances where the children’s desire for the meeting appears to have been borne from a wish to use it to provide me with evidence, something which falls outside the purpose of such a meeting. The Court of Appeal has previously indicated (Re P (A Child) (Abduction: Child’s Objections) [2024] EWCA Civ 1569 at [75]) that considerable care needs to be taken before a judge decides to meet with a child for the purposes of proceedings under the 1980 Convention. I concluded that given the short notice and the lack of any advance preparation for a meeting and the concerns raised by Ms Callaghan a meeting was not appropriate in this case. Where such a meeting is sought the parties should liaise with the court and Cafcass in advance. It should not be left to the day of the hearing itself. I have however written to N and M to explain my decision to them.[11]It is common ground that as at the date of their removal from Ireland, the children were habitually resident in that jurisdiction. It is also agreed that the removal was in breach of the father’s rights of custody, and thus “wrongful” in terms of the 1980 Convention. This is therefore a case under which this court has an obligation to return the children to Ireland unless the mother can make out one of the defences under Art 13 of the 1980 Convention. Here, as I have previously explained, she relies on two defences; Art 13(b) and the child objections defence.

The Law

[12]There was no dispute between the parties as to the applicable law, although I was referred to a number of different cases. Art 13(b)[13]Art 13(b) provides that the court is not obliged to return a child under the 1980 Convention if the parent opposing a return establishes that “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” I take the following summary of the principles that are to be derived from the leading cases on Art 13(b) (and in particular Re E (Children) (Custody Appeal) [2012] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144 and Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10, [2012] 2 AC 257) from Ms Chaudhry’s skeleton argument:
“the terms of Art 13(b) are plain, require neither elaboration nor gloss and by themselves demonstrate the restricted availability of the defence and where allegations of domestic abuse are made, the court should first ask whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation; if so, the court must then ask how the child can be protected from that risk; if the evaluation of the protective measures fails to meet the identified grave risk, the court may have to do the best it can to resolve the disputed issues of fact. It is submitted that the following form key features of the “exception”: i) The burden of proof lies with the person who opposes the child’s return. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities; ii) Article 13(b) is not to be constructed narrowly; by its very terms, it is of restricted application. The words of the Article were plain and needed no further elaboration or gloss; iii) It is rarely appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under article 13(b); iv) The risk of the harm must be “grave”; it was not enough for the risk to be “real”
. It must have reached such a level of seriousness as to be characterised as “grave.” A relatively low risk of death or really serious injury might properly be qualified as “grave” while a higher level of risk might be required for other less serious forms of harm; v) Intolerability denotes a situation that the particular child in the particular circumstances of the case should not be expected to tolerate; vi) The source of the risk is irrelevant: eg. where a mother’s subjective perception of events leads to a mental illness which could have intolerable consequences for the child; vii) When assessing the risk that a child faces on return the court will have regard to protective measures; viii) Critically, pursuant to Article 11(4) of Brussels II Revised a court cannot refuse to order a child to return when Article 13(b) is raised when it is “established that adequate arrangements can be made to secure the protection of the child after return”; ix) Where there are disputed allegations which can neither be tried nor objectively verified, the focus of the inquiry is bound to be on the sufficiency of any protective measures which can be put in place to reduce the risk. The clearer the need for protection, the more effective the measures will have to be; x) Inherent in the Convention is the assumption that the best interests of children as a primary consideration are met by a return to the country of their habitual residence following a wrongful removal. That assumption is capable of being rebutted only in circumstances where an exception is made out.” i) The burden of proof lies with the person who opposes the child’s return. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities; ii) Article 13(b) is not to be constructed narrowly; by its very terms, it is of restricted application. The words of the Article were plain and needed no further elaboration or gloss; iii) It is rarely appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under article 13(b); iv) The risk of the harm must be “grave”; it was not enough for the risk to be “real”. It must have reached such a level of seriousness as to be characterised as “grave.” A relatively low risk of death or really serious injury might properly be qualified as “grave” while a higher level of risk might be required for other less serious forms of harm; v) Intolerability denotes a situation that the particular child in the particular circumstances of the case should not be expected to tolerate; vi) The source of the risk is irrelevant: eg. where a mother’s subjective perception of events leads to a mental illness which could have intolerable consequences for the child; vii) When assessing the risk that a child faces on return the court will have regard to protective measures; viii) Critically, pursuant to Article 11(4) of Brussels II Revised a court cannot refuse to order a child to return when Article 13(b) is raised when it is “established that adequate arrangements can be made to secure the protection of the child after return”; ix) Where there are disputed allegations which can neither be tried nor objectively verified, the focus of the inquiry is bound to be on the sufficiency of any protective measures which can be put in place to reduce the risk. The clearer the need for protection, the more effective the measures will have to be; x) Inherent in the Convention is the assumption that the best interests of children as a primary consideration are met by a return to the country of their habitual residence following a wrongful removal. That assumption is capable of being rebutted only in circumstances where an exception is made out.”[14]Ms Chaudhry also relied on the following additional points:a. The Court must consider the cumulative effect of the allegations that have been made for the purpose of evaluating the nature and level of any grave risk and also when considering the protective measures available to address such risk (Re B (Children) [2022] 3 WLR 1315 per Moylan LJ at [70].b. “Intolerable” is a strong word, but when applied to a child must mean “a situation which this particular child in these particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate”. Re D (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51 per Baroness Hale at [52].c. It is inconceivable that a court which reached the conclusion that there was a grave risk that the child's return would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation would nevertheless return him to face that fate. Re D (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51 per Baroness Hale at [55].d. Where the court is considering protective measures designed or relied upon to protect a child from an Art 13(b) risk, the efficacy of the measures will need to be addressed with care. Clearly the more weight placed by the court on the protective nature of the measures when determining the application, the greater the scrutiny required in respect of their efficacy. Re S (A Child) (Hague Convention 1980: Return to Third State) [2019] EWCA Civ 352 per Moylan LJ at [56].[15]In this regard Mr Bennett also referred me to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re IG (A Child) (Child Abduction: Habitual Residence: Article 13(b)) [2021] EWCA Civ 1123 and to the summary of Baker LJ at [47]:
“(1) The terms of Article 13(b) are by their very nature restricted in their scope. The defence has a high threshold, demonstrated by the use of the words "grave" and "intolerable". (2) The focus is on the child. The issue is the risk to the child in the event of his or her return. (3) The separation of the child from the abducting parent can establish the required grave risk. (4) When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk. (5) In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination. (6) That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whether the allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do. (7) If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk. (8) In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there. (9) In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance. (10) As has been made clear by the Practice Guidance on "Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings" issued by the President of the Family Division on 13 March 2018, the question of specific protective measures must be addressed at the earliest opportunity, including by obtaining information as to the protective measures that are available, or could be put in place, to meet the alleged identified risks.”
Mr Bennett also identified dicta from Sir Andrew McFarlane P and UTJ Mandalia in Re HR (Parallel Child Abduction and Asylum Proceedings) [2024] EWHC 1626 (Fam) at [25] that a judge was not bound to take the allegations at their highest and consider whether the proposed protective measures are sufficient to ameliorate that risk, if the evidence before the court enabled him or her confidently to discount the possibility that that the allegations give rise to an Art. 13(b) risk.

Child Objections

[16]Again, I draw primarily on Ms Chaudhry’s summary of the law in relation to this issue which is taken from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re M (Children) (Abduction: Child’s Objections) [2015] EWCA Civ 26; [2016] Fam 1. The summary is as follows:a. Whether or not a child objects to return is a question of fact (Re M at [35]);b. The child’s views must amount to an objection and anything less will not do [39];c. The child’s objection must be to the country of habitual residence rather than returning to particular circumstances although there may be difficulty in separating out the two types of objection [42];d. Objections are not determinative [46];e. The gateway stage is confined to a straightforward and fairly robust examination of whether the simple terms of the Convention are satisfied in that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views. Sub-tests and technicality of all sorts should be avoided [69].[17]If the gateway test is met, then the Court’s discretion is at large.

(v) onwards]:

“v) There is a relatively low threshold requirement in relation to the objections defence, the obligation on the court is to 'take account' of the child's views, nothing more. vi) At the discretion stage there is no exhaustive list of factors to be considered. vii) The court should have regard to welfare considerations, in so far as it is possible to take a view about them on the limited evidence available. viii) The court must give weight to Convention considerations and at all times bear in mind that the Convention only works if, in general, children who have been wrongfully retained or removed from their country of habitual residence are returned, and returned promptly. ix) The court may have to consider the nature and strength of the child's objections, the extent to which they are authentically the child's own or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or are at odds with other considerations which are relevant to the child's welfare, as well as the general Convention. x) In applying these tests, the court is enjoined by the Court of Appeal not to adopt an over prescriptive, over intellectualised approach to the 'gateway' stage and not to adopt an over engineered approach to the 'discretion' stage.”
Discussion -

Art 13(b)

[18]Both counsel made their submissions on the Art 13(b) defence before dealing with the child objections defence. I propose to follow the same order in this judgment.[19]On behalf of the mother, Ms Chaudhry raises a lengthy catalogue of allegations against the father. These include allegations of sexual assault on the mother, including rape; allegations of physical abuse up to and beyond the date of the parties’ separation, verbal abuse, controlling and coercive behaviour; exposing the mother to a video of a sexual assault of a child; (unsuccessfully) attempting to strand the mother and children in Iraq in 2016; removing the children from the mother’s care without her agreement or consent; instructing third parties to attend the mother’s house to threaten and pressure her to withdraw a police complaint; communicating with the children as a further way to continue his controlling and coercive behaviour; raising unfounded allegations against the mother to social services and the police; physical and verbal abuse of the children; stalking and placing the mother and children under surveillance; sexual abuse of N; and threats to members of the mother’s family.[20]Although I do not have any medical evidence as to the mental health of either the mother or children, Ms Chaudhry also sought to raise this as a further issue for consideration in relation to Art 13(b). The mother’s evidence is that the elder child, M has expressed fears about returning to Ireland. M has expressed the view both within the refuge and to Ms Callaghan that she would kill herself if she had to return to Ireland. Consideration was given to M receiving trauma therapy, however, this was not considered to be advisable until after a decision as to whether the children should return to Ireland has been taken as it would be “emotionally unsafe for the children to start the therapeutic path and then be abruptly removed from it”.[21]The mother’s allegations are largely denied by the father, who has accused the mother of fabricating and exaggerating events. He points to the concerns of the Irish Child and Family Agency (recorded in a letter provided for the purposes of these proceedings dated 25 November 2025):
“The concerns held by the Agency are the children are being emotionally abused by and emotionally neglected by their mother. The Agency believes that [the mother] has exposed the children to the discord in her relationship with [the father] and has prevented them from having a relationship with him. The children are also socially isolated in her care. The removal of the children from Ireland has compounded these concerns”
. The father denies knowingly breaching any Irish court orders. The mother has in the past obtained a number of Protective Orders, which I understand to be a form of interim or ex parte relief. However, no orders have been made against the father either by consent or after a contested inter partes hearing. The father accepts being arrested on one occasion for a breach of Protective Order, but his case is that the order had not been served on him and he was not aware of its restrictions. He was released and no further action was taken against him in respect of that order.[22]The father points to specific aspects of the evidence from the Irish proceedings as supporting his position. These include:a. A reference in the social work report dated 17 February 2025 that the mother would not give permission for the social worker to work with the children pending the determination of the application for a supervision order.b. The elder child, M reported witnessing an incident when the father sexually abused the younger child, N. However, M’s Child Specialist Interview (equivalent to an ABE interview in this jurisdiction) with the Gardai was inconsistent with the account given to the social worker. The younger child, N, who is said to have been the victim of this abuse was not supported by the mother to attend a Child Specialist Interview. These matters meant that neither the Gardai nor the social work department could ground the sexual abuse allegation. The criminal investigation has been closed with no action being taken against the father.c. The social worker has reported that the children have referenced past incidents of physical and verbal abuse by the mother, and the father has disclosed videos and recordings of the mother shouting at the children.d. The social worker has expressed concern that the children’s engagement with her felt performative and staged in their interactions. This is a view in which Ms Callaghan subsequently concurred. The social worker considered that the children appeared pressured to present a specific picture to her and were being exposed to adult information by their mother.e. The social worker in her subsequent report of July 2025 has raised concerns about the language used by the children. She referred to N providing her with a piece of paper “as evidence” and records that a Garda officer had also raised concern about M’s language in her specialist interview.f. The children’s school in Ireland raised concerns that the mother had previously made false allegations against the school, and the mother has accused the Irish social work team of lying and threatening her and of screaming at the children.g. Ultimately, in her July 2025 report, although the social worker recorded that the children did not wish to meet their father, or the social worker, she was concerned that she still had been unable to ascertain the children’s voice.h. A subsequent report in October 2025 refers to a meeting that took place in August 2025 between the children’s guardian ad litem and social worker and staff at the refuge where the children are currently staying. The refuge staff dismissed the concerns of the Irish professionals that the children were at risk of emotional abuse.i. The report of the Irish Guardian ad litem prepared in July 2025 refers to the younger child, N, reporting that she had a good relationship with her father and expressed a wish to spend more time with him. However, her account of the contact session held on 21 July 2025 refers to both children refusing to speak to their father. She refers to them as being comfortable in the room during the session itself but becoming dysregulated and upset on its conclusion. Both children expressed concern that they would be forced to live with their father or that the social worker would place them in care. M questioned why he was seeking to become involved in their life while her younger sister N stated “all men are sh**ts, they are all the same”. The guardian’s assessment included the following:
“[The children’s] presentation is of significant concern. They present as closed off to the possibility of contact/support from their father, in addition to counselling support and social work support. [M] in particular, has very closed views and [N] appears to fall in line with same. Indicators of emotional neglect are present, given the children’s interviews with the Guardian, most notable in respect of [M’s] awareness of Court hearing dates…”
[23]It is evident from the above that this is an extremely complex case, involving serious allegations and counter-allegations. Although both private and public law proceedings are currently on foot before the Irish courts, there has not yet been any form of fact-finding hearing, and all of these allegations are essentially untested.[24]For the father, Mr Bennett relies on the points that I have set out above and the general tenor of the reports within the Irish proceedings which have raised the question of whether the children are the subject of emotional abuse and neglect by the mother, and on that basis invites me to conclude that I can confidently discount the allegations made by the mother against the father, and thus dismiss her Article 13(b) defence. I do not consider that it is open to me to approach the case in this manner. The mother and the children have made numerous and extremely serious allegations against the father. These allegations may be true as the mother claims. Equally the father may be right that they have been fabricated or exaggerated. I am simply not in a position within these summary proceedings to decide the matter one way or another, and these matters will have be resolved by whichever court takes charge of determining the welfare of the children. In my view the evidential conflict that exists in this case is far removed from the type of case where the court could be justified in confidently discounting the allegations. Accordingly, I must therefore consider both the concrete situation that the children would face on a return and the protective measures proposed by the father to meet the potential risk.[25]Taking the allegations of abuse that have been raised by the mother at their highest, there is a risk to the mother and children of this pattern of abuse being continued if the father were to have contact with them outside any contact arrangements that are put in place by the Irish court. Both the Irish guardian ad litem and Ms Callaghan have opined that the father should not have any unsupervised contact with the children until a fact finding exercise has taken place in relation to the mother’s and children’s allegations. There is no suggestion that they should live with the father on their return. The proposal is that they will be returning with the mother to wholly separate accommodation.[26]The extent to which the father has previously sought to have contact with the children outside the Irish court process is disputed; for example, the mother alleges that there was an incident when the father sought to “surprise” N at an event at a mosque in March 2025. The father accepts that he met N on that occasion but says that the surprise was arranged by a friend. However, I consider that the risk of such events can be addressed by the father not being provided with the address of the mother and children and by appropriate undertakings (capable of being recognised and enforced in Ireland under the 1996 Hague Convention) being given by the father as to his conduct.[27]The father has offered the following protective measures and soft landing provisions:a. paying for the mother’s and children’s travel to Ireland;b. not attending the port or airport on their return;c. not seeking to have any contact with the children unless or until permitted by the Irish courts;d. seeking to restore the private law proceedings to court at the earliest opportunity;e. to the extent it is necessary for him to do so (as opposed to the Irish Child and Family Agency), seeking to restore the public law proceedings so that there is a hearing within one week of the children’s return in Ireland; andf. complying fully with any requirements imposed on him by Irish Child and Family Agency or the children’s guardian ad litem.[28]It will be noted that the father’s proposals do not extend to the provision of funds for the maintenance and accommodation of the mother and children following a return. The father is of very modest means and is reliant on state benefits in Ireland. He is therefore unable to offer much by way of financial assistance. However, following an exchange that I had with Mr Bennett in the course of his submissions, the father has indicated that he could borrow funds in order to offer €250 per night for three nights initial accommodation for the mother and children (that is to say €750 in total).[29]I have also been provided with further information from various sources. In summary:a. ICACU have advised that both social housing and welfare benefits are available in Ireland, although to their knowledge it is not possible to apply for these from outside Ireland.b. The relevant Irish local authority has advised that individuals presenting as homeless would need to provide proof that they have previously resided in the relevant area for five years and other documents. Accommodation would be assessed on a case by case basis.c. An Irish refuge charity has indicated that they would need to carry out a risk assessment to see if the mother and children qualified for a place in one of their refuges. However, they indicated that if satisfied that they do, they may be able to hold a place for 24 hours before arrival if flights have been confirmed.d. A legal aid solicitor acting for the father in Ireland has indicated that the public law proceedings could be relisted within one week of the children’s return to Ireland.e. The Irish Child and Family Agency has provided a support plan if the children return to Ireland. This encompasses the following: i) The children to engage with therapeutic assessment and any recommended therapeutic services; ii) A referral to be made for Intensive Home Support Service; iii) A referral to be made to Migrant Family Support Service; iv) The children to be engaged in extracurricular activities in the community; v) The Social Work Department would support the mother with any housing or schooling application where applicable.[30]I consider that the risks alleged to be posed to the mother and children by the father can be ameliorated by the proposed protective measures. The mother and children can be placed in accommodation to which the father does not know the address. This protection can be reinforced by an undertaking by that father not to make contact with the mother or children, and a further undertaking not to instruct or encourage any other person to make contact with the mother or children on his behalf; undertakings that can be recognised in Ireland under the 1996 Hague Convention. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the Irish courts and authorities who are already engaged with the welfare of this family would be in a position to provide appropriate protection to the mother and children.[31]I am also satisfied from the above, that there is a broad range of support that will be available to the mother and children in the event that they return to Ireland and that suitable accommodation is likely to be made available for them.[32]I recognise that at present specific accommodation has not been identified, although that is not unusual at the stage when a return order is made under the 1980 Convention. It may be possible for the mother to arrange accommodation in advance of a return, particularly with the assistance of the Irish Child and Family Agency. Even if accommodation has not been arranged in advance of a return, the situation of the mother and children is already known to the Irish authorities, and I am satisfied that they will be in a position to assist them very shortly after their return. The €750 offered by the father should provide the mother and children with the means of obtaining immediate emergency accommodation for a short period should accommodation not be provided in advance. Overall, I am satisfied that the public services that will be available to the mother and children in Ireland on a return, coupled with the limited financial provision offered by the father is sufficient to address the risk that the mother and children could find themselves homeless.[33]As I have already explained Ms Chaudhry’s Art 13(b) defence is not confined to the future risks alleged to be posed by the father. She relies also on the alleged impact that the past abuse has had on the children. She has referred me to the mother’s witness statement which alleges that there were significant changes in N’s behaviour following the alleged sexual abuse by the father. N has told the staff at the refuge that she did not feel listened to in Ireland and has experienced disturbed sleep, nightmares and distress when thinking about her father. M has disclosed that a return to Ireland makes her feel suicidal. The children have seen a trauma therapist in England although I am told that therapy cannot start until the issue of whether the children should return to Ireland has been addressed. Additionally, the mother herself complains of experiencing nightmares and panic as a result of the trauma that she has experienced.[34]This is not a case where permission has been sought to rely on medical evidence as to the effect on either the mother or children of a return. In the absence of such evidence, I do not consider that I am in a position to find that the effect of a return on either the mother or children would be so severe that it would present a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the children. I take extremely seriously M’s statement that a return to Ireland would make her suicidal. Ms Callaghan considered that M may have said this to emphasise the strength of her views, although the risk that it is genuinely meant cannot be ruled out. However, the support plan that is put forward by the Irish Child and Family Agency provides for the children to engage with a therapeutic assessment and any recommended therapeutic services on a return. I consider that the engagement of the Child and Family Agency and the availability and provision of the proposed services is sufficient to address such risks as arise on the evidence before me. However, I consider that it is important that the Irish Child and Family Agency is provided with a copy of this judgment and other papers in the case, including Ms Callaghan’s report in advance of any return taking place, so it is fully aware of the position and of the issues and risks that any proposed therapeutic intervention will need to address.[35]I have also considered, carefully and separately, whether a forced return to Ireland in the face of the views expressed by the children would place them in an intolerable situation for the purposes of Art 13(b). Both are strongly objecting to a return, M in particular. However, they will be returning to the country in which they have spent virtually their entire lives. They are very familiar with Ireland and its school system and will still be living with their mother. The return will of course be a significant disruption for them; I have seen evidence that they have made friends and are doing well at their current schools in England. That said, I do not consider that a return to a country and school system with which they are both entirely familiar, in circumstances where they will continue to live with their mother, will have access to support and therapeutic services and will have no contact with their father save to the extent that such contact is ordered by the Irish court, can be said to be intolerable.[36]Although I have dealt with the various strands of the mother’s Art 13(b) defence individually in this judgment, I make clear that I have also considered them cumulatively.

Discussion – Child Objections

(b) Discussion – Child Objections

[37]The mother also relies on the child objections defence. Both M and N have told Ms Callaghan that they do not wish to return to Ireland and, as I have already indicated, M has said that she feels so strongly about this issue that she would be suicidal if returned. Ms Callaghan prepared a careful report for the court. Her view was that both children were of sufficient age and maturity for their views, wishes and feelings to be considered. She continued:
“… however, it is difficult to put an absolute measure against the strength of their feelings in circumstances where they are saying that they have suffered serious abuse from their father. They have clearly aligned themselves to their mother’s position in respect of remaining in England and this may also be a result of the abuse that they have suffered.”
She noted that the children’s Irish guardian ad litem had found that the children “are capable of forming their own views, regarding their current circumstances, pertaining to access arrangements, however, there appears to be a sense of performance regarding the children’s presentation, both presented as very eager to please and specific in their delivery of certain narratives.” Ms Callaghan commented that she shared the guardian’s opinion in this regard and noted that the children’s views of their father had deteriorated significantly in the few months since they had been interviewed by the guardian.[38]For the father Mr Bennett has sought to argue that the gateway is not passed in this case, because it is not possible to discern the children’s own wishes and views. He relied on the view of the Irish social worker in her July 2025 report that she felt that she had been unable to ascertain the children’s own voice and upon comments by Ms Callaghan indicating her concerns in that regard too. However, I am unable to accept his argument that the gateway has not been passed. I am satisfied from Ms Callaghan’s report that both children are of an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views and that both children are expressing clear objections to returning to Ireland. I consider that their views are likely to have been influenced by the mother’s own position However, I am satisfied, given their ages and the clarity with which they have expressed their views that I should find the low threshold of the child objections exception has been passed in this case and that the discretion to refuse a return on this ground arises.[39]Turning then to the exercise of that discretion, I am required to take into account a number of matters. I will deal first with the policy of the 1980 Convention. As Baroness Hale observed in Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55 at [42]:
“In Convention cases, however, there are general policy considerations which may be weighed against the interests of the child in the individual case. These policy considerations include, not only the swift return of abducted children, but also comity between the Contracting States and respect for one another's judicial processes. Furthermore, the Convention is there, not only to secure the prompt return of abducted children, but also to deter abduction in the first place. The message should go out to potential abductors that there are no safe havens among the Contracting States.”
[40]In my judgment this is a case where the policy considerations of the 1980 Convention point powerfully in favour of a return. These are Irish children, who until they were brought to England by their mother last July had lived the entirety of their lives in Ireland. They are the subject of ongoing public and private law proceedings in Ireland. They are the subject of an Irish supervision order, and they have an allocated social worker and a guardian ad litem appointed in Ireland to represent their interests in the public law proceedings taking place in that jurisdiction. Any welfare investigation (wherever it takes place) will involve investigation of the parties’ very serious allegations and cross-allegations (to the extent that these are relevant to the welfare of the children). This means that disclosure and co-operation is likely to be required from the Irish Gardai and authorities, meaning the Irish courts are clearly better placed to determine those allegations.[41]This is a “hot pursuit” case. The proceedings have been brought promptly; the removal took place on 24 July and the application was issued on 16 September 2025. The removal of the children to England took place in breach of an order of the Irish court and in her evidence to this court the mother has admitted that she removed the children because she feared that the Irish supervision order would be extended.[42]I consider that all of these matters point strongly towards a return. The need for comity and respect for the Irish judicial process means that I should be very reluctant to allow the mother to manipulate and frustrate the ongoing Irish proceedings by permitting the children to remain in this jurisdiction.[43]Against this, I must balance the strong, almost vehement, views that are being expressed by the children and, in particular, M. I am deeply troubled that M should go so far as to say that she will kill herself if returned to Ireland. Whilst I note Ms Callaghan’s oral evidence that M may have said this to emphasise the power and strength of her objection to a return, the risk that it is sincerely meant cannot be ruled out, and as I have already held, it is important that the authorities in Ireland are fully aware of this matter in advance of any return.[44]In considering the weight to be attached to the children’s views, I have considered the extent to which they have been influenced by the mother. I am satisfied that this is a case where the children have been subjected to influence in that regard. I take into account, in particular, in reaching this conclusion the comment of the Irish social worker that she did not consider that she had been able to discern the children’s own voice, the views of both the Irish guardian and Ms Callaghan that there was a performative element to the children’s presentation and the troubling comment of N, recorded in the Irish guardian ad litem’s report about men. These matters, and the evidence more widely, leads me to the conclusion that the children have been exposed to adult matters and to information about the ongoing legal proceedings by the mother. However, although I am satisfied that the mother influenced the children’s views, I do not wholly discount them. I have no doubt that these children do not wish to return to Ireland, and that an order that they should be so returned will be distressing to them. It is a factor that I must take into account.[45]Ms Chaudhry sought to argue that in child objections cases the court would very rarely return children of M and N’s age in the face of such objections. I cannot accept this argument. It is not the law. The views of any child who has reached an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views, must be taken into account. However, they are not determinative of the issue. As Baroness Hale observed in Re M (supra) at [46]:
“…courts increasingly consider it appropriate to take account of a child's views. Taking account does not mean that those views are always determinative or even presumptively so. Once the discretion comes into play, the court may have to consider the nature and strength of the child's objections, the extent to which they are "authentically her own" or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or are at odds with other considerations which are relevant to her welfare, as well as the general Convention considerations referred to earlier. The older the child, the greater the weight that her objections are likely to carry. But that is far from saying that the child's objections should only prevail in the most exceptional circumstances.”
[46]I have also taken into account the other points that were raised by Ms Chaudhry. The fact that the children are safe and have adapted well to their current life in England, and are doing well at school; the concerns that she has raised about the situation that they would face on a return to Ireland; and her argument that a forced return to Ireland against the children’s wishes would be unlikely to assist in repairing or restoring the children’s relationship with their father.[47]Ms Chaudhry in her skeleton argument also sought to argue that the English courts were better placed than those of the Irish courts to determine the children’s welfare. I do not accept this is the case. Virtually all relevant third party disclosure within the welfare proceedings would be in the hands of the Irish Gardai and authorities. Unlike the Irish court, the English court would have no jurisdiction to order the disclosure of these documents. More generally, these are Irish children and I have no doubt that the Irish courts are best placed to decide issues of their welfare.[48]In reaching my decision, I have considered all of these matters carefully. I have concluded that I should order the return of the children to Ireland notwithstanding their objections. I consider that the policy reasons for ordering a return in this case are extremely powerful. The Irish courts are already seized of proceedings relating to these children, and indeed the mother has accepted that she removed the children to England to avoid an extension of the supervision order by the Irish courts. Judicial comity and respect for the Irish process means that I consider that I should make an order for the return of these children to Ireland. In reaching this conclusion I make clear that I have fully taken into account the clear wishes that are being expressed by these children and the other welfare matters identified by Ms Chaudhry. However, I do not consider that these factors outweigh the clear and powerful policy reasons why a return must be ordered in this case.

Conclusions

[49]I will therefore order the return of the children to Ireland. Mr Bennett was seeking an order that the children be returned within 7 days on the basis that the existing Irish supervision order expires on 22 February and that next week will also be half term and a convenient moment for the children to move schools. This seems to me to be unnecessarily hasty. I consider that steps will need to be taken to inform the Irish authorities of this decision, of the information gathered within these proceedings, and of the children’s forthcoming return, and that arrangements will need to be made to explore appropriate accommodation for the mother and children. I will hear further submissions from counsel on the date to be included in the return order and any additional provisions, such as requests to the Irish authorities to provide assistance in the provision of accommodation, that need to be included within the return order.[50]A final procedural point. The order of Lieven J of 20 November 2025 limited both parties’ witness statements to 15 pages of A4, double spaced, font size 12. This order has been breached by both parties. The mother’s witness statement was 29 pages and 88 paragraphs. The father’s statement in reply (albeit in a larger font) ran to 55 pages and 160 paragraphs. At the same time that he filed his statement, the father issued a C2 application seeking permission to file a longer statement in response, on the basis that he needed to reply to the mother’s lengthy statement, although this application was never determined by the court. The parties’ actions meant that at the final hearing I was presented with a fait accompli; two witness statements, both considerably in excess of the limit that had been set by court order. This should not happen. Where the court sets a page limit on the length of a witness statement it must be observed, like any other court order. If a party considers that the page limit is insufficient to set out the relevant evidential matters for the court, then an application for an extension should be made as soon as possible. That did not happen in this case.