C (A Child: Relocation to Sweden), Re [2026] EWHC 2013 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 2013 (Fam)

Case NoFD25P00661

Date 30/07/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

Before

MR JUSTICE POOLE

The Applicant

The Respondent

Re C (A Child: Relocation to Sweden)

Hearing Hearing dates: 6-7 July 2026

Julia Gasparro (acting Pro Bono, instructed by Dawon Cornwell) for the Applicant

Niamh Wilkie ((instructed by RWK Goodman) for the Respondent

JUDGMENT

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Introduction

[1]The applicant is the mother (“MC”) and the respondent the father (“FC”) of a nine-year-old girl (“C”). Both parties have Swedish nationality. C was born in Sweden and, upon the separation of her parents prior to her birth, she lived there with her mother whilst FC lived in England. In January 2025, pursuant to an arrangement between the parties, C came to live with FC in England. As it happens, her half-brother, D, was by then also living with FC under a separate arrangement with D’s mother who also lived in Sweden. The arrangement and relations between the parties broke down over the course of 2025, culminating in an application by MC for the summary return of C to Sweden under the Hague Convention 1980. In March 2026, I refused that application, finding that(i) the agreement for C to live in England had been unclear but it had been expected that she would remain here for at least a year.;

(ii) FC was in repudiatory breach of the agreement from 1 July 2025 by preventing contact between MC and C (contact resuming only after the court’s intervention in November 2025); but that

(iii) by that date, C was habitually resident in England.

[2]MC now applies to relocate C to live with her again in Sweden. FC opposes the application. They have both given evidence before me as has Emma Huntington, Family Court Adviser from Cafcass, who had the advantage of having already reported in the Hague proceedings.

[3]Whereas the court could not and did not make a full welfare assessment within the Hague proceedings, it must do so now on this relocation application. As discussed below, the principles to be applied are very different as between the two applications. Furthermore, time and circumstances have moved on since March 2026, and since December 2025 when Ms Huntington first met C. She has met her again in June 2026 and C’s stated wishes and feelings have evolved. Whilst there is no ideal solution and there are some uncertainties about C’s living arrangements were she now to return to Sweden, for the reasons set out in this judgment I have concluded that it is in C’s best interests to relocate to Sweden to live with her mother there.

Background and Evidence of the Parties

[4]My judgment on MC’s application for summary return under the Hague Convention 1980 has not been published and so I set out some more detailed background again in this written judgment. MC was born in Jamaica but relocated to Sweden as a child. FC is of African heritage but was born in Sweden. He is seven years older than MC. They met in Sweden in 2014 and started a relationship. MC became pregnant with C in or around September 2016. During the pregnancy, FC left Sweden to live in England and the relationship ended. C was born in mid-2017. Between her birth and January 2025, forms of contact between FC and C took place including indirect contact and some face-to-face contact when MC brought C to England. The extent of the contact is disputed.

[5]FC has a long list of criminal convictions in Sweden and in England. He told me in evidence that in Sweden he had become involved with a criminal gang but that he promised his dying father that he would make changes to his life and that was a reason behind his relocation to England. His convictions include multiple convictions for theft and drug offences, two robberies, attempted robbery, assault and attempted extortion in 2006 for which he was sentenced to youth custody for 18 months, robbery in 2011 for which he received a one year prison sentence, aggravated assault for which he received a six month sentence, four offences against the person, five firearms or offensive weapons offences, and drink driving.

[6]Since moving to England, FC has been convicted of two offences of battery and one of criminal damage (2020) for which he was sentenced to a total of 112 days in prison, and possession of cannabis/cannabis resin (2018) for which he received a conditional discharge.

[7]FC now lives in England with C and D. He has another child by a third mother who lives in Sweden. He has a girlfriend who lives in England, but not currently with FC. She has a daughter of her own who is a little older than C, and she is pregnant. That child will be FC’s fourth child with four different mothers. FC’s current home is a one-bedroom flat. I understand that he has a cousin who lives there also. The children use the bed and FC and his cousin sleep in the living area. FC is hopeful of securing larger, local authority accommodation in the near future. He has settled status in England. I have evidence that C has been granted pre-settled status. FC maintains that she now has settled status, but I have not seen proof of that.

[8]MC has provided photographs of her apartment in Sweden and of C living there, participating in school events, and enjoying activities. MC says that her apartment in Sweden is rented by her but under arrangements in that country which give her full security of tenure. The apartment has two bedrooms. The school C attended in Sweden prior to 2025 is a short walk away and she would be able to return there but FC’s consent is currently required to enrol her, and he has not given that consent. MC has a partner and is approximately five months pregnant with their child. She was reluctant to share information about the identity of her boyfriend with FC because she fears he will contact and harass him. She was prepared to give a name to the court. No safeguarding enquiries have been made of that man, but MC assured the court that he has no criminal convictions.

[9]C was born in Sweden and lived her whole life there in the care of her mother until January 2025. She encountered some bullying and racism at a previous school but the best evidence I have is that she did not have any such problems at the school she was attending prior to moving to England to live with FC. She had a network of friends. On C starting school in England in early 2025, FC raised concerns with the school about her being bullied by other children. The school records show that he raised these concerns in forceful terms and that staff found his manner to be intimidating. He accepted to me that he could have handled matters better, but he was anxious for his daughter’s welfare.

[10]Ms Huntington has reported that C is achieving at age related expectations at school, presents well and interacts well with peers and has friends. She is described by the school as a happy, bubbly child. MC describes her as adventurous and fearless. She is a Swedish national and speaks both Swedish and English fluently although Swedish is her first language.

[11]I have previously found that C came to England to live with FC on 1 January 2025 pursuant to an agreement between the parties, that the stay was intended to be temporary but prolonged (for at least a year), but that there was no clarity as to when or how the period of the stay would end. I found that it was a fundamental element of the agreement that MC would have frequent contact with C, but that FC stopped that in or around early July 2025 and, by doing so, was in repudiatory breach of the agreement such that the retention of C in England became wrongful from 1 July 2025. By then, MC was wanting C to be returned to her, but FC refused to allow that to happen.

[12]The reasons MC had placed C with FC in England were(i) she was intending on undertaking a course of studies to further her career in business and

(ii) she wanted to support C to have a relationship with FC which had been tenuous up to that point. The combination of those factors caused her to believe that C would benefit from a prolonged stay in England with her father whilst MC completed her course. Although the course was due to begin in September 2025, FC advised that it was necessary for C to start school in England in January 2025. Whether he misled MC or not, she is an intelligent and resourceful woman and she appears to have readily agreed to the arrangement, thereby prolonging C’s planned stay in England by several months. Whilst the arrangement strikes me as unwise and did not necessarily reflect C’s best interests, both parents considered it to be good for her and for them.

[13]MC had reservations about FC’s care of C from an early stage after her move to England. She started to contact the English school and other authorities with her concerns and FC reacted by stopping contact. MC had no face-to-face contact with C from the end of June until early December 2025 when the court in the Hague proceedings ordered contact. M effectively moved to England and has spent most of her time here over the past year. She changed her participation in her course to fully remote, but she still has to work on it – it is due to conclude in August 2026. She has to begin a professional internship very soon which should provide her with a pathway to stable employment as an accounting consultant. She now sees C regularly including overnight. MC has to return to Sweden intermittently to see to her apartment and other affairs. She will have to return for her internship. She also returns for ante-natal visits and that need is likely to increase over the coming months. She wishes to give birth in Sweden where her partner lives and to establish a career there, using her studies and qualifications.

[14]Before the complete cessation of contact from the beginning of July 2025, relations between MC and FC had become very strained. On one occasion on 12 June 2025, when MC sought to have face to face contact with C, a row broke out between the parents at a train station in London, causing a bystander to raise concerns with the authorities, in particular about FC’s behaviour.

[15]In November and December 2025, the school records show that MC was seeking to see C at school, which caused difficulties for the school, and FC was objecting to MC seeing C. He told the school that he had obtained a non-molestation order against her which prevented her from seeing C. That was not the case. In his oral evidence at this hearing, he said that the school had become confused because he was referring to an injunction against D’s mother, but the note does not read that way at all. It is clear that it is a record about C and her parents. I found his attempts to explain away the school records of his behaviour and untruthful assertions in later 2025 to be unreliable. His account was inconsistent with contemporaneous records made with apparent care by independent professionals.

[16]C did not have a close relationship with D when they both lived in Sweden. By what I must assume was a coincidence, D came to live with FC not that long before C did the same. MC says that she and D’s mother, who is also now applying to relocate D to live with her in Sweden, have been in regular contact since early 2025 due to their mutual concerns about FC and his care of their children, and have agreed that if C and D were both returned to England, they would keep in much more frequent contact including on overnight stays. FC’s eldest child, a boy, is aged 11 and lives in Sweden. MC says that she would ensure that C had contact with him upon her return.

[17]FC says that he would travel to Sweden to see C if she relocated there. MC would be prepared to bring C to England.

[18]MC has no wish to move to England or to become a British citizen. She has lived in Sweden for many years, worked there, studied there and has a partner there with whom she is soon to have a child. She wishes to build a career there for which she has engaged in long studies.

[19]FC does not want to move back to Sweden. He is settled here. He proposes that C remain living with him and D in England, retains her place at her current school and has frequent time with MC both here and in Sweden.

[20]C has a grandfather, aunts and cousins living in Sweden and has a particularly close bond with an aunt who is, in fact, of a similar age to C. It does not appear that, other than FC’s cousin who resides with him and C and D, there are extended family members living in England who are involved in C’s life. She does, however, live with D and has formed an attachment to him as a result.

[21]MC was an impressive witness. She remained calm under cross-examination and was courteous and measured throughout her evidence. She was challenged with evidence from the Swedish tax authorities which, on its face, might have indicated that she had or intended to move house in Sweden, far from her present address. If so, she would have seriously misled the court. However, she explained that she had changed her registered address so that her friend could sign for a delivery of her health card for use in England (she might need NHS services if anything happened during her pregnancy). I was fully satisfied with her explanation. I found her evidence to be internally consistent and consistent with other evidence available to the court.

[22]FC was much more evasive, and he was provoked by questioning and by MC’s position. He did not lose his temper in court, but he showed a simmering discontent. He has a history of shouting at and intimidating others. He was commendably frank about that and told the court that he had undertaken a course to try to improve that aspect of his behaviour. MC might have reservations about his ability to care for C, and the school has raised some concerns about C’s presentation on occasions, but generally the evidence is that he is attentive to her needs and that she is well presented at school (albeit more recently with MC’s additional input). FC was far from clear about his immigration status here in England and was not fully open about his criminal convictions in the UK. I find that he had not been straightforward with C’s school about non-molestation orders, and that he sought to stop contact between MC and C by misleading the school about the effect of court orders. His attempt to persuade the court that others had made errors in recording what he had said was not convincing. Most worryingly, he had stopped contact between C and MC for a number of months in 2025. He may have felt provoked by MC raising concerns about his parenting with others, but by stopping contact he did not prioritise C’s welfare.

Evidence of Ms Huntington

[23]Ms Huntington is an experienced Family Court Adviser who has had the advantage of seeing C twice – initially in December 2025 for the purposes of a report within the Hague Convention 1980 proceedings, and then in June 2026 in the current proceedings. I found her evidence to be well-informed, balanced and focused on C’s best interests. She advised that whereas in December 2025, C had expressed herself carefully by inviting the Judge (me) to make the right decision, rather than advocating for a particular outcome herself, she was more forthright at their second meeting. C’s letter to me this time is unequivocal – she would like to go home to her mother. Ms Huntington described C as “a polite, confident, intelligent and charismatic child, who appeared to hold a positive view of herself.” She noted, “It was my experience of [C] on this occasion of meeting her that she appeared uninhibited in conveying her views, wishes and feelings and shared an unambiguous perspective, whereas in my previous meeting with her she had been more cautious in how she expressed her views.”

[24]C told Ms Huntington that initially she had only expected to remain in England for one year (I previously found that she had not initially known for how long she was going to remain in England). She wanted to return to Sweden to live with her mother. She said that “she still wishes to return to her mother’s care in Sweden, because her father “screams and is really rude sometimes””. She spoke positively of Sweden, of her home and school there, of family members there, and of MC’s partner whom she had known for a long time.

[25]C said that she got on well with D but that he can be annoying (which is not an unusual response by a nine-year-old when asked about a younger sibling). Ms Huntington reported:

“With her magic wand, she would go back in time to when she was not in England, stating that she had not wanted to come here, but that nobody had listened. So, she would go back in time and say it louder. When I wondered aloud whether [C] felt that it had been a good opportunity to spend time and get to know her father, [C] displayed ambivalence and reminded me of father shouting at her. She said that it had been a good opportunity to become more advanced in her learning, noting that she was two academic years ahead than she would be in Sweden, but anticipating that Year 5 would become harder and stating that she did not want to stay here for that long.”

Legal Framework

[26]I can do no better than refer to the summary of the relevant law provided by Cobb LJ in Re O (Domestic Abuse: International Relocation)

[2025] EWCA Civ 888

at paras. 80 to 87: “80. An application for permanent leave to remove, brought either under section 8 or section 13(1)(b) CA 1989, is a private law application in respect of which the indisputable "and only authentic" test is that set out in section 1(1) CA 1989; the child's welfare is paramount, and the evaluation of where the child's interests truly lie is to be determined (even if not statutorily required in a section 13(1)(b) application) having regard to the 'welfare checklist' in section 1(3) CA 1989: see Black LJ in K v K(International Relocation: Shared Care Arrangement)

[2011] EWCA Civ 793

[2012] Fam 134

('K v K') at [141], Munby LJ in Re F (Relocation)

[2012] EWCA Civ 1364

[2013] 1 FLR 645

at [37]/[61] ('Re F [2012]') and Ryder LJ in Re F [2015] at [3].81. There is no presumption in favour of the applicant parent in a case which is governed by section 1 CA 1989. The circumstances in which these difficult decisions are made vary infinitely and the judge in each case must be free to weigh up the individual factors, and make whatever decision he or she considers to be in the best interests of the child (see, in particular, Moore-Bick LJ and Black LJ in K v K at [86] and [134] respectively).

82. While section 1(2A) CA 1989 (which requires the court to consider with care the involvement of both parents in the life of the child as a component of 'furthering' the child's overall welfare), does not formally apply to an application under section 13 CA 1989, there is no doubt that its provision generally heightens the court's scrutiny of the proposed arrangements on an application for permanent international relocation. Notably, and of relevance to the instant appeal, section 1(2A) CA 1989 expressly requires the court to consider whether a "contrary" picture is "shown", which would indicate that involvement of each parent in the child's life (in the manner proposed or at all) will not in fact "further the child's welfare".

83. The fundamentals of the approach outlined above were settled beyond question in the judgments of this court in K v K in 2011. Over the following few years, the issue was discussed again and confirmed by this court in Re F [2012], Re F [2015], and then in Re C (Internal Relocation). For over a decade, there has been no, or no material, judicial annotation of this straightforward approach. As it happens, this approach now accords fully (in a way which it did not at the time of its creation) with the principles of the Washington Declaration on International Family Relocation (2010) to which the courts of England and Wales, through Thorpe LJ, subscribed fifteen years ago.

84. Borrowing the philosophy from other areas of child law (see for instance Re B-S (Children) (Adoption

[27]FC has a troubling forensic history. Notwithstanding his evidence that he promised his dying father to make a change, he has had convictions since arriving in England. However, I accept that he has had none for over five years and that I have no evidence of continuing drug use or criminality. MC has no convictions and I have no concerns about her taking drugs despite that possibility having been raised by FC in the written evidence (but not in his oral evidence at court).

[28]The arrangement for C to stay with FC in England was not one that, in my view, served her best interests but it was always intended to be temporary. No-one disputes that. Even on FC’s account, it was planned that C would return to Sweden by the beginning of 2027, i.e. after two years. In fact, if all had gone to plan, I am sure it would have been by September 2026 once MC had completed her studies.

[29]MC wished to end the arrangement after concerns about FC’s care of C and reduction in contact with MC. He responded by stopping contact altogether. Relations between them have become fraught. Whilst I refused a summary return under the Hague Convention 1980, the fact remains that FC expected that she would return even after spending a prolonged period in England. He was content for her to do so. It is difficult for him to argue with any conviction that it would be harmful to C to return to live in Sweden given that he had previously agreed to that. I am not at all clear as to what has changed since January 2025 such that he could credibly argue now that it would be unsafe or a risk to C to return to her mother’s care in Sweden. He told me that in or around August 2025 he felt that M’s behaviour toward him was disrespectful and that her confrontational approach was having an adverse effect on C. Of course, by then he had stopped contact between MC and C.

[30]I reject any suggestion that MC was guilty of harassment of, or threats against, FC in 2025. She was concerned about C’s welfare in his care. Her concerns may have become disproportionate, but FC kept information from MC and ultimately chose to curtail her time with C. It is unsurprising therefore that she tried to do everything she could to re-establish contact. She should not have turned up unannounced at C’s school, but she was, by then, desperate. Even if FC felt provoked, his actions in stopping contact were contrary to C’s best interests.

[31]C has made her wishes and feelings known in clear terms in her recent meeting with Ms Huntington. I discount the suggestion that she has been manipulated by MC to say what she said to Ms Huntington. She has had even more chance of exposure to FC’s views of MC and of where C should live than to MC’s views. MC struck me as a mother who would not seek to manipulate her child in the way FC suggests. It may have suited her own purposes to place C with FC for a prolonged period in England, but it also showed trust in him and there can be no suggestion that at that time she had manipulated C to distrust or dislike her father – the reverse is true.

[32]I take C’s views and wishes and feelings as being authentically hers. I treat her as being of an age and having sufficient maturity that her wishes and feelings should be given significant weight. She has spent a long time now in England, but she wants to return to Sweden. She has developed that view or articulated it more clearly over time but, as set out above, circumstances have changed, allowing her to express herself in the way she has done. Her views are now unequivocal.

[33]C’s home circumstances in England are not ideal. She lives with one other child, D, FC, and another adult in a one-bedroom flat. There might be a change in accommodation, but I cannot yet know when that might happen or what the accommodation and location will be like. In Sweden I can be confident that upon return C would live with MC at the apartment she previously lived in before her move to England. However, there is a possibility of a later move, in particular after MC gives birth as is planned later this year.

[34]Indeed, there is uncertainty as to C’s living arrangements whether she relocates to Sweden or stays in England. Both parents are in long-term relationships and FC’s partner is expecting their child just as MC is expecting a child with her partner. I do not know much at all about their respective partners save that FC’s partner already has a child. C says that she knows MC’s partner and was positive about him.

[35]In my view the loose arrangement between MC and FC about C coming to England and staying with C was not conducive to C’s best interests and contributed to confusion and dispute between her parents, which has adversely affected C. A much shorter and/or clearly defined stay in England would have better served her interests. However, she appears to be a resilient girl, and I do not believe that another change, returning to Sweden, will be harmful to her. Indeed, it is a change she wants and looks forward to. She would return to familiar places and people, and she would manage the losses that a change of location would cause, coping well.

[36]C will enter into a pre-pubescent stage and then puberty before too long. She would benefit from living with her mother during those years because, in my judgment, she will be more attuned to her particular needs. Her heritage is of significance and there have been some issues with alleged racism at schools both in England and Sweden. Either parent can meet her needs arising out of her heritage. She has, however, a deeper connection with Sweden than England. She lived there all her life from birth until January 2025. She speaks the languages of both countries without difficulty, but Swedish is her first language. She has more extended family in Sweden than in England.

[37]C’s particular circumstances include that she is living with her half-brother in England. She has been able to establish a relationship with him due to living with her father. It would be a loss to her to move away from the home in which he is living. On the other hand, it is possible that he will move to Sweden in the future.

[38]MC is very capable of meeting C’s practical and emotional needs. FC has shown himself generally capable of meeting C’s day to day needs but I am bound to note some concerns expressed by C’s school about C’s attendance and, on occasion, her presentation when attending school. Nevertheless, C is doing well at school under his care (albeit now with significant support from MC). I have some hesitation about MC’s decision-making when intending to transfer C to FC’s care for such a long period – I doubt that that was in C’s best interests – but otherwise it is clear that she has a close and loving bond with C and is able to prioritise her welfare, as she has done by moving to England for prolonged periods this year and changing to fully remote attendance on her course. One concern about FC is his temper. There are several examples in the evidence of his having lost his temper with others, and of intimidating adults when he has done so. C too has commented on him shouting at her. I have to take that into account when considering his ability to meet her emotional needs. He occasionally acts impetuously in a way that is not conducive to C’s welfare.

[39]If C moves to Sweden, she will spend much less time with FC. Likewise, if she remains in England, MC will have to move back to Sweden, and C will lose out on her time with her mother. The court can mitigate the detriments to C from moving to Sweden with orders about time with her father. Similarly, orders could be made to ensure she spent time with her mother were she to remain in England. FC says he can travel to and from Sweden and would do so were C to relocate there. MC would not be able to stay for long periods in England as she has done over the last few months. But she would be able to visit. However, FC did stop contact in the summer of 2025 and that is a significant concern were C to remain living with him. It is fair to note that contact has been re-established under court supervision but, upon the court’s involvement receding, any future stresses in relations between MC and FC might result in him responding as he has done in the past, namely by restricting C’s contact with her mother. I am concerned that he would not encourage contact between C and her mother over the longer term.

[40]When considering C’s best interests and the welfare checklist, whilst there are some factors which might suggest she should remain in England – continuity, her progress at school, her relationship with D – there are others which point towards her interests lying with a return to Sweden – her deeper connection with Sweden, her wider family there, her home accommodation. I am concerned about her unsuitable home accommodation here in England, and about FC’s history of shouting at her and losing his temper repeatedly. On the other hand, MC’s decision to leave C with FC for a long period did not prioritise C’s welfare at the time.

[41]I have sought to scrutinise and evaluate the competing plans for C. I take into account the uncertainties as to whether MC will continue to live at her present address, in particular whether she will choose to live with her partner after the birth of the child she is carrying. There are similar uncertainties in relation to where C would live, and with whom, were she to remain in England. The fact is that if a court permits relocation abroad, it cannot control all arrangements for the child thereafter. A parent may well form a new relationship or develop one that has already begun at the time of the court’s decision. Circumstances will rarely remain unchanged throughout a child’s lifetime, in particular when their parents have separated. I acknowledge the lack of firm information about the parents’ respective partners, the pregnancies that will affect C whichever parent she lives with, and the uncertainties about future accommodation. Nevertheless, I accept as truthful, MC’s assertion to the court that she would, if permitted to return to Sweden with C, live with her at their old address upon return. That will not be forever, but that will be their home on return.

[42]Due to past conduct, I have reservations about FC’s willingness to facilitate and encourage C’s time with MC were C to remain in his care in England. I do not have the same concerns about MC facilitating and encouraging C to spend time with FC, although her anxiety about him retaining C in England would have to be addressed. Both parties would be able to travel abroad to spend time with C.

[43]C’s own very clear wishes and feelings weigh the balance firmly in favour of permitting relocation to Sweden. They are clear, authentically her own, and she is of an age and maturity such that they must be given significant weight. She very clearly wishes to return to her mother’s care. This can only happen if relocation is permitted because MC is not able to stay in England permanently, nor does she wish to do so. She has very good reasons to wish to return to Sweden to live. Furthermore, my assessment of MC and FC gives me confidence that MC will better meet C’s needs in the medium and long-term and that C’s deeper connection with Sweden than with England, where she was always intended to remain for a limited period, also supports the decision to permit relocation. There are concerns, deriving from FC’s criminal past, his losses of temper and treatment of others, his shouting at C, his curtailment of contact in 2025, and his evasion when giving evidence to this court, that he will not be able to meet C’s emotional needs to the same level as MC would. Relocation is supported by Ms Huntington as being in C’s best interests.

[44]In my judgment it would be detrimental to C’s emotional wellbeing to override her clearly stated wish to live with her mother. Indeed, given her clearly stated views and given that FC always envisaged C returning to Sweden this year, I struggle to understand why, if he truly wished to prioritise her welfare, he has not agreed to C returning to Sweden to live with her mother.

[45]C has lived with MC as her main carer, in Sweden, for most of her life. The visit to England, whilst it was always going to be prolonged, was intended to be for a temporary period only. C always expected to return to live in her home country of Sweden. She has a home there, extended family there, a school there, and she will live with her mother again, as she had done all her life until coming to England to visit her father. She wants to live with MC, not to stay with FC. MC lives in Sweden and has very good reasons not to wish to move to England to live. Arrangements can be made for C to spend time with FC whilst she lives with MC in Sweden. I have no doubt that her best interests lie in living with MC in Sweden and that the relocation should take place in the very near future so that she can re-establish herself there in good time for the new school year. I shall allow MC’s application to relocate with C to Sweden.

[46]The parties are encouraged to agree arrangements for C to spend time with FC in Sweden initially and then, when she is firmly re-established there, in England also. In the absence of agreement, directions will be required for the making of welfare decisions about child arrangements.

Order

Leave to Oppose)

[2013] EWCA Civ 1146

[2014] 1 WLR 563

, and Re G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation)

[2013] EWCA Civ 965

), it is now widely accepted to be important for a judge determining a relocation application to undertake "a global, holistic evaluation" of each of the options available for the child's future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child's welfare. In reality, this is "no more than shorthand for the overall, comprehensive analysis of a child's welfare seen as a whole, having regard in particular to the circumstances set out in the relevant welfare checklist (CA 1989, s 1(3))" (see Ryder LJ in Re F [2015] at [30] and McFarlane LJ in Re F [2015] at [49]/[50]). 85. One area where there is less clarity is whether, and if so how, the court should apply a proportionality evaluation in the determination of an application for permanent international relocation. Earlier judgments of this court have suggested marginally different approaches. In Re F [2015] Ryder LJ stated that a step as significant as international relocation "requires that the parents' plans be scrutinised and evaluated by reference to the proportionality of the same" (see [31]). He later referred to the "proportionality cross-check" (ibid. at [41]). That said, he separately observed in the same judgment (ibid. at [32]) that the ordinary balancing exercise: "… will inevitably focus on the welfare analysis of each of the realistic options and may amount to no more than an acknowledgement that one option is better than the other and that the preferred option represents a proportionate interference in the

Art 8 European Convention

rights of those involved." (Emphasis by underlining added). 86. In Re C (Internal relocation), Black LJ expressed the view that the welfare principles enshrined in domestic law (i.e., section 1(1) and 1(3) of the CA 1989) were entirely compatible with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and observed that international or internal relocation cases were approached in a way which was "broadly in line with what is expected by the European court" ([60] ibid.). Thus, at [61] (ibid.), picking up Ryder LJ's terminology (see §85 above), she rejected counsel's submission that the welfare evaluation should then be "subjected to a cross-check by considering whether such interference with the Article 8 rights of the parties as it involves is proportionate." She added (again at [61]): "If the cross-check produced the same result as the welfare analysis, it would be unproblematic but not very useful except as reassurance. If it produced a different result, that result could only have an impact on the outcome of the case if the provisions of section 1 of the 1989 Act were to be ignored. I am afraid that there also seems to me to be a real danger of the parties and the court getting so tangled up in the strands of the two separate exercises that they lose sight of what really matters for the child. All in all, therefore, in my view, matters should be approached as an analysis of the best interests of the child, whether the relocation is internal or external. Given the potential for the impact of the decision on the parents to affect the child as well, this necessarily involves a careful examination of the parents' wishes and their interests". 87. In his judgment delivered in the same case (i.e., Re C (Internal Relocation)) Vos LJ at [84] reinforced the point, observing that the 'left behind' parent will always be able, in some measure, to pray in aid their

Article 8 ECHR

rights necessitating a consideration of the proportionality of any proposed interference with those rights; he added that "that consideration should be an essential part of the balancing exercise itself and should not be undertaken separately so as to disrupt a joined up decision-making process". Analysis and Conclusions