HH v SS [2026] EWHC 1557 (Fam)

This judgment was delivered in open court. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.[2026] EWHC 1557 (Fam)Case No FA-2025-000414
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 19 June 2026
Before
MR JUSTICE PEEL
Between
HHAppellantSSRespondent
Imogen Pitts (instructed by Careys Law Limited) for AppellantThe Respondent in person for in personHearing Hearing dates: 18 and 19 June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 19 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE PEELPeel J :

Introduction

[1]These proceedings concern two children: a boy A, aged 9, and a girl B, aged 5. I shall refer to their father as F and their mother as M. Today is the hearing of an appeal by M against three decisions made by HHJ Greenfield at the conclusion of a fact-finding hearing on 14 November 2025. The appealed decisions are: a) The dismissal of M’s allegation that F attempted to strangle her in April 2023 (allegation 1(a) in the Scott Schedule prepared for the hearing) and the substituted finding that this was an occasion where the parents “used abusive language and violent behaviour towards each other and both of them suffered injuries”. b) The dismissal of M’s allegation that F assaulted M in August 2023 (allegation 1(c) in the Scott Schedule) and the substituted finding that the parents “were aggressive towards each other and were fighting each other”. c) The dismissal of M’s allegation that F was coercively controlling towards M by preventing her from studying, controlling her use of social media, preventing her from driving and checking her phone (allegations 3(e), 3(f), 3(g) and 3(h) in the Scott Schedule).[2]Permission to Appeal was sought on five grounds, and granted by Judd J on 23 February 2026. This is the substantive appeal. M was represented by Counsel. F appeared in person.[3]I have come to the conclusion that the appeal succeeds in respect of the first two decisions, namely the alleged strangulation in April 2023 and the alleged assault in August 2023, but fails in respect of the third.[4]I am not in a position to substitute my own findings on the April 2023 and August 2023 events, which will need to be remitted for rehearing. This is highly regrettable as the proceedings, which are already lengthy, will be delayed further before the welfare stage can take place. However, I am satisfied that the court when considering welfare will need a secure foundation on these two serious allegations.

Background

[5]F was born in Iran and M in Iraq. The parties met and commenced a relationship in 2016. They moved to the UK from Iraq in 2019. A was born in 2017 and B in 2021. Following an incident at the family home on 15 October 2023, the parties separated. F has had no direct contact with the children since that time.[6]The parties’ relationship seems to have taken a turn for the worse when, on F’s case, he discovered in February 2023 that M had been unfaithful. M denies infidelity, which the judge described as an “obsession” on the part of F. Thereafter, their relationship was characterised by volatility to which the children were exposed and as a result of which, as the judge found, they experienced emotional abuse.[7]On 27 March 2023, M reported to the police that she was the victim of controlling behaviour as F had stopped her from attending college. F made a police report on the same date alleging that M had smashed plates during an argument.[8]According to M, F slapped A on 8 April 2023. She made a report to the police to that effect. A subsequently repeated this allegation to the police.[9]On 11 April 2023, according to M, F attempted to strangle her, telling her she would “pay the price” for her infidelity and that he was going to take the children to Kurdistan. F denied that he attempted to strangle M, and alleged that she broke his phone, attempted to stab him and threw a glass panel at his car. According to him, M’s injuries were self-inflicted. When the police attended the family home, A told them that F tried to kill M. In an ABE interview by the police following the incident, A referred to “my dad going round my mum’s neck”. F was arrested and interviewed by police. The day after his police interview, F emailed the police to tell them that he had lied during his interview and that, among other things, M had not caused any mark to his leg as he had previously alleged.[10]F was bailed for three months with conditions not to contact M or the children. On 29 June 2023 an argument took place, during which F alleges that M physically and verbally abused him.[11]Police evidence records that on 20 July 2023, M told her social worker that F had threatened to kill her if she did not take the children on a flight to Kurdistan booked for 24 July 2023. He also threatened to take custody of the children and deny her contact with them. On 25 July 2023, M took a photograph of a “list of rules” with which he required her to comply (although the precise date on which she was given the list is not clear).[12]M alleges that F assaulted her again in August 2023. She states that he was drunk and that she ran outside barefoot, waiting for him to calm down before returning to sleep in the children’s rooms that night. M states that she found cameras installed in the bathroom and bedroom of the family home on 17 August 2023.[13]An incident took place at the London Science Museum on 1 October 2023 involving A. F alleges that M assaulted A on that occasion. M denies that allegation and alleges that F told A to say M hit him whilst he filmed him.[14]The final relevant incident occurred on 15 October 2023. M alleges she found F watching pornography and that an argument followed in which she (as she put it) “may have thrown the phone in disgust”. F alleges that M verbally and physically abused him on that occasion. Police attended the scene and M and the children were taken to a refuge. The parties have remained separated since that time.[15]Following their separation, M made reports to the police about F using her social media accounts to send messages to her friends and family, and to make posts about his allegations of her alleged infidelity.

Procedural History

[16]On 30 August 2024, F issued an application for a child arrangements order seeking contact with the children. In her response, M raised allegations of domestic abuse. CAFCASS recommended a fact-finding hearing and that there be no contact between F and the children in the interim. On 17 April 2025, DJ Nicholson directed a fact-finding hearing.[17]The pre-trial review took place on 9 September 2025. The order from the PTR recorded that a transcript of relevant parts of the police interviews of both F and A should be included in the bundle for the final hearing. By oversight, it appears that no transcript was in fact obtained.[18]The recorded police interviews (hereafter the “VRIs”) of A and F were provided to the parties and to the court office. On the first morning of the hearing, 11 November 2025, the judge told the parties that he had not received the VRIs, which were then forwarded to him. The judge then informed the parties that he had received the VRIs but had not watched them as there were no transcripts. Counsel for M, I am told, submitted that the VRIs were of vital importance and she intended to rely on them. It then seems to have been agreed that the parties’ representatives would take the court to specific parts of the VRIs during cross-examination and submissions by quoting excerpts rather than, for example, playing the relevant part of the interview on a large screen for all in the courtroom to see. It was the understanding of M’s counsel that the judge would view the relevant parts of the recordings. Counsel drew his attention in particular to the last 6 minutes of the VRI of A.[19]The fact-finding hearing proceeded over 4 days. M was represented by counsel throughout. F appeared in person with a QLR to cross examine M on his behalf. Both parties, who gave evidence, required the assistance of interpreters.[20]A composite Scott Schedule was produced for the fact-finding hearing and has been placed before me. M alleged against F(i) physical abuse (three specific instances, including one of F slapping A)),(ii) drinking excessively,(iii) verbal abuse/coercive control, and(iv) financial control and threats to remove the children from M’s care. F alleged against M (i) physical abuse (four specific instances), (ii) verbal abuse and (iii) one instance of physical abuse towards A.

The judgment below

[21]The judge, in an oral judgment delivered on the final day of the hearing, summarised the factual and procedural background. He set out in detail the legal approach to domestic abuse and coercive control, with reference to PD12J and relevant case law. He rightly observed that the evidence of the parties is “of the utmost importance” and that he was required to look at all the evidence, not just that which was formally set out in the Scott Schedule. His legal analysis was, in my judgment, impeccable.[22]The judge found M’s evidence to have been “unreliable and contradictory” and the father to have been “unconvincing”. These assessments of the parties were quintessentially a matter for the trial judge. In addition to the evidence of the parties, he had police disclosure (including the VRIs, but without transcripts), local authority disclosure and other relevant material.[23]The judge regarded the comment made by A to the police at the family home on 11 April 2023 that “my dad tried to kill my mum” to be unreliable, stating that the comment was made “under his mother’s instruction”, possibly as a translator for her, rather than based on his own experience as a witness.[24]Notably, in his judgment, the judge did not expressly refer to either VRI. He made no mention of the account of the April 2023 incident given by F in his interview. He referred to the fact that A did not repeat the allegation that F slapped him during his police interview, but no other part of what A said in the interview appears in the judgment, including his account of F holding M’s neck.[25]Having reviewed and evaluated the evidence, the judge reached the following conclusions which were recorded in the[26]The judge gave directions for the welfare disposal stage, including a s7 report. These direction were stayed by Judd J on the granting of permission to appeal.

Grounds of Appeal

[27]M appeals the findings referred to at paragraph 1 above. She advances five grounds: Ground 1 (relevant to (a)) ‘The learned judge failed to watch the Video Recorded Interview of the father which took place after the alleged strangulation in April 2023. As such, the learned judge failed to give any weight to the pivotal evidence relating to this allegation. The evidence was totally disregarded on the basis that there was no transcript of the interview within the bundle, despite neither party being ordered to obtain said transcript. This was wrong in law and resulted in a decision that was wrong in fact.’ Ground 2 (relevant to (a-c)) ‘In concluding that the mother’s account was ‘unreliable and contradictory’, the learned judge placed over-reliance on inconsistencies in the mother’s evidence. Conversely, the learned judge failed to comment on or place adequate weight on the inconsistencies within the father’s evidence. This was wrong in law and resulted in a decision that was wrong in fact.’ Ground 3 (relevant to (c)) ‘The learned judge failed to adequately explain how, having found that the father wrote a list of rules which the mother was required to follow, she was nevertheless not prevented from engaging in activities or subjected to control in ways explicitly set out in those rules. This was wrong in law and resulted in a decision that was wrong in fact.’ Ground 4 (relevant to (b)) ‘The learned judge failed to adequately reason how the finding was made that the mother was aggressive and fighting the father in August 2023 in circumstances where the father denied that there was any altercation between the parties and made no such allegations against the mother. This was a conclusion on the facts which was not open to the learned judge on the evidence. This was wrong in law and resulted in a decision that was wrong in fact. Ground 5 (relevant to (a-c)) ‘The learned judge failed to consider the countervailing factors appropriately or in any great depth. These included the marks to the mother’s neck, the neighbour having heard the mother screaming for help and the mother’s reports of abuse to the police. This was wrong in law and resulted in a decision which was wrong in fact.’[28]I will not address each and every ground specifically, as there is an overlap in respect of the various findings made by the judge and in respect of which M appeals.

The Law on Appeals

[29]An appeal operates by way of a review of the decision of the lower court: FPR 30.12(1). By FPR 30.12(3) an appeal may be allowed where either the decision was wrong or it was unjust for serious procedural or other irregularity.[30]The court may conclude a decision is wrong because of an error of law, because a conclusion was reached on the facts which was not open to the judge on the evidence, because the judge clearly failed to give due weight to some significant matter or clearly gave undue weight to some other matter, or because the judge exercised a discretion which “exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong”: G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] UKHL 13.[31]The appellate court should adopt a cautious approach before interfering with the findings of fact and exercise of evaluation of a lower court: Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5, at paras 114 to 115. Later, in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 Lewison LJ characterised the approach to an appeal on a pure question of fact as a “well-trodden path” signposted by the following principles:
“2. … i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong. ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him. v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable. vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
[32]In Re A (Appeal: Findings of Fact) [2025] EWHC 1279 (Fam), Hayden J observed that the principles set out in Volpi “…shield the findings of a first instance judge with a robust and durable armour, though not, ultimately, an impregnable one”.

The police interview transcripts

[33]Since the hearing before the judge, a transcript of the ABE interview with A has been made available. I have read it in full. I have not seen a transcript of the interview with F. During the hearing, I asked for the VRIs to be sent to me. I have viewed both, i.e the interview with F and the ABE interview with A.

Conclusions

[34]The judge undertook a careful evaluation of the evidence. He applied himself conscientiously to the case, obviously taking considerable care over it. I bear in mind the limited functions of an appeal court in reviewing findings of fact made at first instance, and the advantages available to the first instance judge of looking at the case in its totality, weighing up the evidence in the round, attaching added weight to those pieces of evidence which appear to be more significant, and collecting nuances and impressions in ways which are denied to the appellate court.[35]Nevertheless, in this instance I have come to the conclusion that the judge’s findings in respect of the following cannot stand: i) His rejection of M’s case that F attempted to strangle her in April 2023 (allegation 1(a) in the Scott Schedule); and ii) His rejection of M’s case that F assaulted her in August 2023 (allegation 1(c) in the Scott Schedule).[36]In respect of the 11 April 2023 strangulation allegation: i) The schedule to the judge’s order dated 14 November 2025 states at para 10 that:
“It is recorded that the court declined to watch the police interviews of [F] or [A] in the absence of transcripts of these interviews”
. The approach to VRIs will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, F’s VRI was undertaken on 12 April 2023, the day after the alleged strangulation, and A’s VRI was carried out on 11 May 2023. The strangulation allegation (said to haver take place on 11 April 2023) was arguably the most serious of all M’s allegations. It merited particular care and attention. It seems to me that the VRIs were essential evidence and needed to be viewed; not necessarily in their entirety, but at the very least by reference to particular sections as indicated by counsel. Ideally transcripts would have been available, but transcripts by themselves do not deliver the impression and presentation of the person being interviewed, and they require particular care where the interview is with a young child under ABE conditions. If the judge considered he could not or should not view the videos without the transcripts, he had the option (however unattractive) of adjourning the case to obtain the transcripts. The worst of all worlds was to not watch the videos even though counsel specifically made reference to excerpts of interview evidence in cross examination and submissions. To have watched both interviews in full would have taken just over 2 hours, but the viewing time of relevant extracts would have been much less, and, although a burden on the judge, this seems to me to have been a necessary exercise for him to have undertaken. ii) The order was drafted by counsel and sent to the judge for approval. It is possible that the judge overlooked para 10, and that he had in fact viewed the VRIs. If so, he made no reference in his judgment to A’s VRI and in particular what A said about the neck incident. He did not record, or analyse, A referring in the interview to “my dad going round my mum’s neck”. Nor does he refer to a subsequent exchange in which A answered a question “You said he grabbed her neck” by saying “Yes”. Later on, in answer to the question “Does your dad hurt your mum a lot”, A said “Yep”. I accept that on one view these latter responses may be thought to be as a result of leading questions, but there was no evaluation by the judge in his judgment of A’s ABE evidence, the circumstances in which it was given, its reliability and its consistency with M’s strangulation allegations. It seems to me that given the centrality and importance of the strangulation allegation, the judge should have undertaken a close analysis of the relevant parts of the interview with A, and how that evidence interacted with the other evidence before him. iii) The judge in his judgment made no mention of F’s VRI. If he did not view the VRI (as his order records), I am persuaded that it was a significant omission on the part of the judge, particularly as he was taken in cross examination to alleged inconsistencies between his interview evidence, and other given accounts. If he did view it, he did not weigh the contents in the balance. By way of example, in the VRI, F does not repeat his narrative statement allegations that on 11 April 2023, the day of the strangulation allegation, M threatened him with a knife and threw a glass object at his car. Another example is that F in his VRI said that M had hurt his leg, but in an email to the police the next day he withdrew that allegation. A third example is that F (I am told) said in oral evidence that he had placed M on her stomach to try and calm her down, which did not feature in his written evidence or the VRI. These apparent inconsistencies were not analysed by the judge. iv) There were marks to M’s neck, scratch marks on her arms and defensive scratches on F’s face, which the judge noted in his judgment and which, on the face of it, are consistent with M’s account, but he did not otherwise discuss or analyse this evidence. He does not appear to have attached material weight to the report from M’s neighbour to the police of having seen M “screaming for help”. Nor did he attach material weight to the evidence from the police who attended the scene that M told them F was trying to kill her, and that she was barely capable of forming speech. v) Given that the VRI was heavily relied upon by M, the comments made by Jackson LJ in Re B (A Child) (Placement[37]In respect of the August 2023 alleged assault: i) M made specific allegations against F of physical and verbal abuse. By contrast, in the Scott Schedule, F makes no mention of M assaulting him. Nevertheless, the judge found that “the parents were aggressive towards each other and were fighting each other”. ii) I accept that the judge was not precluded from making further or other factual findings, but as set out in Re A [2019] EWCA Civ 1947, a judge should exercise caution before doing so. The Court of Appeal quoted the following from Wall LJ’s judgment in Re G and B (Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 10 with approval:
“Furthermore, if the judge is, as it were, to go "off piste", and to make findings of fact which are not sought by the local authority or not contained in its Schedule, then he or she must be astute to ensure; (a) that any additional or different findings made are securely founded in the evidence; and (b) that the fairness of the fact finding process is not compromised.”
I acknowledge that these dicta were in the context of a public law case, but it seems to me that the principles apply similarly to private law fact-finding hearings. iii) It is unclear how and why the judge reached this conclusion: a) No explanation for this finding is given in the judgment, including an assessment of why F had not put it forward in the schedule. b) I am told that M was not asked about the incident in cross-examination, and that at some point F in his oral evidence said that “there was not a fight” in August 2023. c) It does not seem to have featured as a possible finding until it appeared in the judgment. d) If in fact F was responsible for strangulation, that would be a relevant piece of evidence (indicating propensity) when considering another alleged assault.[38]However, I am not persuaded that the judge erred in respect of 3(e), (f), (g) and (h) of the Scott Schedule.[39]These parts of the schedule fall under an overarching finding made by the judge of verbal abuse and coercive control, in respect of which he made certain specific findings (see paragraph 25 above) but rejected the findings sought at 3(e)-(h) of the Scott Schedule. Accordingly, the overall finding of coercive control is established in M’s favour. She seeks, however, to include these additional specific findings at 3(e)-(h) to buttress the overarching determination of coercive control.[40]The judge found that F created a list of rules, after he discovered her alleged infidelity, which he presented to M and made clear that he expected her to comply. The judge went on to say that it was “clearly … attempt by him to impose controlling behaviour… it cannot be anything else”. The judge was plainly satisfied that the fact of presenting a list of rules was in and of itself coercive and controlling and accordingly found it proven as sought by M at 3(d) on the Scott Schedule.[41]There were 14 rules. Four of them stated as follows:
“3. She must not use any social media and only use one app to communicate with her family which must be under my supervision; 10. We must set up one Apple ID for both of us. 13. She has no right to education in any way; 14. She must not think of getting a driving license ever again”
It is alleged by M at 3(e)-(h) of the Scott Schedule that F enforced these rules on her so that her independence was severely compromised.[42]Although the judge found that to present the list of rules, and demand compliance, was controlling, he went on to find that in fact M was not on the ground prevented from carrying out these activities. M appeals against this conclusion. She submits that it was irrational to find that presentation of the list was controlling, but that M was not in fact subject to such controls. I am not persuaded that the judge’s approach was irrational. On his findings, F created a set of rules, but M was in fact able to act regardless of the rules. The judge addressed each rule, and the alleged enforcement thereof by F as evidence of controlling behaviour. He found them not proved. He heard the parents give oral evidence and was uniquely placed to form an assessment of their evidence on those points. I consider it permissible, on the judge’s findings, to have concluded as he did. And I reiterate that the fact he did not find these specific allegations proved did not prevent him from finding other allegations proved, and concluding that F had been guilty of coercive and controlling behaviour during the relationship.

Conclusion

[43]I am satisfied that the judge erred in respect of the April 2023 strangulation allegation and the August 2023 assault allegation by(i) seemingly not viewing the VRIs,(ii) failing to take into account, or failing to weigh sufficiently in the balance, material evidence (including, but not limited to, the VRIs) and(iii) failing to explain adequately his reasons for reaching his conclusions on these events. The appeal is allowed in respect of these specific allegations (1(a) and (1(c) of the Scott Schedule).[44]I am not satisfied that the judge erred in not finding that F was coercively controlling M by preventing her from studying, controlling her use of social media, preventing her from driving and checking her phone (allegations 3(e), 3(f), 3(g) and 3(h) in the Scott Schedule. The appeal on these matters is dismissed.[45]On the April 2023 and August 2023 events alone, this will be remitted for a re-hearing before a different judge. Once the re-hearing is completed, the welfare stage may continue before HHJ Greenfield; there is no reason for the entire case to be re-allocated.[46]I emphasise that this judgment in no way indicates what should be the likely outcome on the rehearing. The judge conducting the re-hearing will have undertake a fresh evaluation. He/she will be able to draw upon evidence given to the court below, and the November 2025 judgment. It seems to me that it should be possible to reconsider the Apil 2023 and August 2023 allegations proportionately and reasonably efficiently.

order

1. Both children were exposed to emotional harm as a result of conflict between the parents. 2. On one occasion in April 2023, the parents used abusive language and violent behaviour towards each other and both of them suffered injuries. 3. On one occasion in August 2023, the parents were aggressive towards each other and were fighting each other. 4. The father subjected the mother to coercive and controlling behaviour during the relationship, the following of which are examples of that behaviour: i. The father was often verbally abusive towards the mother in front of the children, calling her a bad mother, worthless, a cheat and saying she did not deserve to be a mother; ii. The father created a list of rules which the mother had to comply with. 5. In April 2023 and on other occasions, the father threatened to take the children away from the mother. 6. On the basis of her admission, the mother physically assaulted the father and verbally abused him on 15th October 2023. Order: Adequacy of Reasons) [2002] EWCA Civ 407 [2022] 4 WLR 42 are relevant: “59. Judgments reflect the thinking of the individual judge and there is no room for dogma, but in my view a good judgment will in its own way, at some point and as concisely as possible… (7) evaluate the evidence as a whole, making clear why more or less weight is to be given to key features relied on by the parties.” vi) Strangulation is a very grave form of domestic abuse, frequently associated with high risk of serious injury. In my judgment, it required particular careful analysis. Ultimately, the judge(i) should have viewed the VRIs and(ii) if he did (contrary to what his order says), his judgment did not, in my view, sufficiently or at all weigh in the balance the contents of the VRIs, or other material evidence to which I have referred. In my judgment, his conclusion on this allegation cannot stand.