TF v LG [2026] EWHC 1495 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 1495 (Fam)Case No FD26P00120
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 22/06/2026
Before
THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE JUDD
Between
TFApplicantLGRespondent
Paul Hepher (instructed by Watkins Solicitors) for ApplicantThe Respondent appeared in person for in personHearing Hearing dates: 11 th-12 th June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 22 nd June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE JUDDThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Introduction

[1]This is an application for a return order pursuant to the 1980 Hague Convention. It concerns a girl (C), who is 11 years old. The applicant is the father, the respondent the mother. Brief background[2]The parents and C are all Brazilian nationals. The parents married in Brazil in 2014. The marriage ran into difficulties and they separated when C was about four. In 2020, the mother travelled to England to see her sister. C remained living with her father. The mother has remained here ever since, although, as I shall refer to later, she has no right to remain and is now the subject of immigration proceedings.[3]The mother has said that her intention was always to have her children come to live with her here (she has an older son by a previous relationship as well as C) but that the Covid pandemic cut across those plans.[4]In 2022, the parties divorced in Brazil. By consent, they were granted joint custody of C, who remained living with her father. Events leading to these proceedings[5]In June 2025, C, accompanied by her older brother, travelled to England to see the mother. The mother says that there was an agreement that C would be coming to live with her permanently. The father says that this was only intended to be a visit and that C would be returning to Brazil thereafter.[6]Within two months of C’s arrival in England, the father issued proceedings in Brazil, obtaining a return order. He stated that he did this because he became concerned when he could not contact C and when the mother told him that she would not be returning to Brazil. These Hague proceedings were issued in February after the father said that efforts to agree a return failed. The issues[7]The father’s case is that the mother has wrongfully retained C in England and that I should make a return order accordingly.[8]The mother states that the father consented to C coming to live in England. She also states that C objects to a return and has reached an age and level of maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account her views. She invites me to exercise my discretion to refuse to make a return order. The proceedings[9]The mother was not able to secure funding to be legally represented for these proceedings and so appeared in person. She has had the assistance of a solicitor from the CALA scheme in the past and help with preparing documents. At this hearing, she was assisted by a Brazilian interpreter. The documents in the case had been translated for her in advance, save for the skeleton argument prepared by Mr. Hepher who represented the father which was emailed to her three days before the hearing. The mother told me that she was able to use a translation app to read documents on her phone (albeit the translation afforded by that is by no means perfect) but that she had not done so with this document. I therefore adjourned for 45 minutes so that the interpreter could read through the document with her. At the end of that period, the mother and interpreter told me that they had been able to go through it together.[10]Despite the fact that she was not represented, the mother was able to conduct her case with dignity and skill. I am satisfied she was able to put her case to me fully.[11]I heard oral evidence from the Cafcass Officer, Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick and also from the mother and father as to the issue of consent. I heard submissions from Mr. Hepher and also from the mother. The father’s evidence had to be taken by phone and then interpreted, because of problems with his technology. Nonetheless, I was able to hear him, and the interpreter, clearly (albeit sometimes the father overspoke, and had to be asked to wait to hear the question before speaking). The law[12]Article 3 of the 1980 Hague Convention provides that a removal or retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where it is in breach of rights of custody attributed (in this case) to a person under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention. Under Article 12, the court shall order the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 unless a period of one year has elapsed and the child is found to be settled in its new environment.[13]Under Article 13 the court is not bound to order the return of the child if the person who opposes the return establishes that the person or body with the care of the child had consented to, or subsequently acquiesced in, the removal or retention (Article 13a). The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account its views.[14]This is a summary of the provisions so far as they relate to this case. For the sake of brevity, I have not reproduced the Articles above word for word.[15]The establishment of any of these exceptions opens the way to the exercise of a discretion by the judge in which he or she may decide not to order the return of the child. Consent[16]Issues of consent fall to be considered under Article 13(a) rather than Article 3.[17]The principles to be applied when determining whether this exception applies were summarised by

Lord Justice Peter Jackson in Re G (Children) [2021] EWCA Civ 139, [2021] Fam 239, at paragraph 25:

“(1) The removing parent must prove consent to the civil standard. The inquiry is fact-specific and the ultimate question is: had the remaining parent clearly and unequivocally consented to the removal? (2) The presence or absence of consent must be viewed in the context of the common sense realities of family life and family breakdown, and not in the context of the law of contract. The court will focus on the reality of the family’s situation and consider all the circumstances in making its assessment. A primary focus is likely to be on the words and actions of the remaining parent. The words and actions of the removing parent may also be a significant indicator of whether that parent genuinely believed that consent had been given, and consequently an indicator of whether consent had in fact been given. (3) Consent must be clear and unequivocal but it does not have to be given in writing or in any particular terms. It may be manifested by words and/or inferred from conduct. (4) A person may consent with the gravest reservations, but that does not render the consent invalid if the evidence is otherwise sufficient to establish it. (5) Consent must be real in the sense that it relates to a removal in circumstances that are broadly within the contemplation of both parties. (6) Consent that would not have been given but for some material deception or misrepresentation on the part of the removing parent will not be valid. (7) Consent must be given before removal. Advance consent may be given to removal at some future but unspecified time or upon the happening of an event that can be objectively verified by both parties. To be valid, such consent must still be operative at the time of the removal. (8) Consent can be withdrawn at any time before the actual removal. The question will be whether, in the light of the words and/or conduct of the remaining parent, the previous consent remained operative or not. (9) The giving or withdrawing of consent by a remaining parent must have been made known by words and/or conduct to the removing parent. A consent or withdrawal of consent of which a removing parent is unaware cannot be effective.”
Acquiescence[18]In Re H (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] 1 AC 72, Lord Browne-Wilkinson set out the following applicable principles: “(1) For the purposes of Art 13 of the Convention, the question whether the wronged parent has ‘acquiesced’ in the removal or retention of the child depends upon his actual state of mind. As Neill LJ said in Re S (Minors) ‘the court is primarily concerned, not with the question of the other parent’s perception of the applicant’s conduct, but with the question whether the applicant acquiesced in fact’. (2) The subjective intention of the wronged parent is a question of fact for the trial judge to determine in all the circumstances of the case, the burden of proof being on the abducting parent. (3) The trial judge, in reaching his decision on that question of fact, will no doubt be inclined to attach more weight to the contemporaneous words and actions of the wronged parent than to his bare assertions in evidence of his intention. But that is a question of the weight to be attached to evidence and is not a question of law. (4) There is only one exception. Where the words or actions of the wronged parent clearly and unequivocally show and have led the other parent to believe that the wronged parent is not asserting or going to assert his right to the summary return of the child and are inconsistent with such return, justice requires that the wronged parent be held to have acquiesced”.[19]Lord Browne-Wilkinson also suggested that judges should be slow to infer an intention to acquiesce from attempts by the wronged parent to effect a reconciliation or to reach an agreed voluntary return of the abducted child.[20]In the case of Re W (Abduction: Acquiescence: Children’s Objections)[2010] EWHC 332, Black J (as she then was) concluded that a father had not acquiesced in circumstances where he had travelled to the UK and remained there for a few months attempting to salvage his relationship, during which he had lived with the mother and children for a time. In Re G (Abduction: Withdrawal of Proceedings, Acquiescence and Habitual Residence) [2007] EWHC 2807, the Court of Appeal held that the withdrawal of a first set of proceedings under the Hague Convention did not amount in law to equivalent of an adjudication, or species of waiver or estoppel preventing the taking of fresh proceedings after an abortive attempt at reconciliation. It should be noted that in that particular case, the order recording the withdrawal proceedings had specifically recorded that the father did not acquiesce in the wrongful retention of the child by the mother.[21]Acquiescence is not a continuing state of affairs; the person who acquiesces cannot subsequently change their mind. Once given, consent cannot be withdrawn; Re L-S (Abduction: Custody Agreement: Acquiescence) [2017] EWCA Civ 2177. Child’s objections[22]The leading case with respect to child objections remains Re M (Republic of Ireland)(Child’s Objections)(Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015] EWCA Civ 26; [2016] Fam 1, where Black LJ (as she then was) stated as follows:
“the gateway stage is confined to a straightforward and fairly robust examination of whether the simple terms of the Convention are satisfied in that the child objects to being returned and has attained a degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views. Sub-tests and technicalities of all sorts should be avoided. The following factors apply: (a) Whether a child objects to being returned is a matter of fact, as is her age; (b) There is no fixed age below which the child’s objections will not be taken into account, albeit the younger a child is the less likely it is that she will have the maturity which makes it appropriate to do so; (c) The child’s views have to amount to an objection, and anything less than that (for example, a preference) will not do; (d) Further, the objection must be to being returned to the country of the child’s habitual residence, not to living with a particular parent, albeit there may be cases where those factors are so inextricably linked that they cannot be separated.”

The following factors apply:

[23]These principles were considered more recently by MacDonald J in G v L [2025] EWHC 3340. The exercise of discretion[24]If one of the exceptions is established, then the judge has a discretion to refuse to order a return. In Re M[2007] UKHL 55, the House of Lords considered the exercise of discretion in relation to an application for a summary return. In her judgment, Lady Hale emphasised that the discretion is at large and there is no exhaustive list of factors. The court should have regard to welfare considerations so far as it is possible to take account of them on the limited evidence available. The court must give weight to Convention considerations and at all times bear in mind that the Convention only works, in general, if children who have been wrongfully removed or retained from their country of habitual residence are returned promptly. The court will have to consider the nature and strengths of the child’s objections, the extent to which they are authentically their own or the product of the influence of the abducting parent and the extent to which they coincide with, or are at odds with, other considerations which are relevant to the child’s welfare. There is no requirement to establish exceptionality; policy considerations will be balanced against other factors relating to any defence established and welfare considerations.[25]More recently, Moylan LJ considered the exercise of the discretion in relation to a 15 year old boy in the case of Re P (A Child)(Abduction: Child’s Objections)[2024] EWCA Civ 1569. At paragraph 64, he stated that: “It is well-established, as referred to below, that the range of considerations relevant to the exercise by the court of its discretion, whether to make summary return order when a child objects to returning, is very wide. It is also clear that the child’s views are not determinative nor do the other factors ‘revolve only around the child’s objections’: Re M [2016], at [71]. In this respect I agree with Mr. Hames’ submission that the manner in which the judge undertook the required balancing exercise was flawed in that he essentially considered whether there was any reason not to give effect to C’s views rather than balancing the factors for and against the making of a summary return order including C’s views as one element in that exercise. The judge was wrong to consider that C’s views were ‘the magnetic factor’ (my emphasis) and his analysis of other key factors, C’s welfare interests and the 1980 policy considerations, was flawed”.[26]He also referred to the judgment of Black LJ in Re M[2016] EWCA Civ, where she made clear that it must be borne in mind that the 1980 Convention only works if, in general, children who have been wrongfully retained or removed from their country of habitual residence are returned, and returned promptly. This factor should also weigh in the balance in any determination as to whether the discretion to refuse to order a return should be exercised. The evidence Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick[27]Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick prepared a detailed report and gave oral evidence to me. She met C at the Cafcass offices in London. She found C to be quiet and polite. She did not speak much English and they had to rely heavily on the interpreter. C told her that she was not happy that her father wanted her to return to Brazil, but in discussion she said that he was very nice, funny and that he teases her. She speaks to him every Saturday and they laugh a lot. She spoke lovingly of her paternal grandmother who she stayed with at weekends in Brazil. She described having a big family and having lots of friends, although she said she did not enjoy school. C also described her mother as very nice and that she really likes spending time with her. She said she thought she was going to be staying in England when she came over here, and that she had said goodbye to her school friends. She really wanted to be with her mother, and her father knew this.[28]C told the officer that she would ‘not like it a lot’ if the judge ordered a return. She said it was not fun in Brazil, and ‘cooler and nicer’ in England. She said that her mother is nicer than her father because she spends more time with her, gives her lots of gifts and cheers her up. She said she would be very happy if the judge said she could remain in England because she could remain with her mother. She believes the education is better here and she is looking forward to getting a kitten.[29]The evidence from the school is that C is very withdrawn and displays little emotion. She does not seem to be integrating with her peers. There had been a referral by them to Children’s Services due to concerns that C was being left alone overnight. An after-hours social worker had visited and found her alone. Subsequently, on 8th May 2026, police had been seen at the home early in the morning and a member of staff went over to the home (which is right opposite the school) and found C there alone, frightened and shaken. Three immigration officers had forced their way into the home and she had been found hiding in the bathroom. When the mother was contacted, she was some distance away and did not return until 10.30am.[30]Children’s Services informed Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick that the mother is on immigration bail and will be required to attend the police station regularly. She has no immigration status and no right to work.[31]Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick expressed concerns about the level of support the mother had, and the fact that she appeared to have left C alone even after Children’s Services had become involved for that very reason.[32]She said that C had the maturity typical of her age. She did not appear to be acting protectively towards her mother, and her wish to remain with her was genuine. The mother[33]The mother gave evidence through an interpreter. She also filed a detailed statement and had prepared a formal written answer. She told me that her residence status in this country (and that of C) is irregular and that she is hoping to speak to a solicitor (who she has identified) about this.[34]She said that she had moved from London (where she had lived in a house of multiple occupation) to a home in a rural area for C’s benefit. She contacted the school in September after C arrived, and C started in October 2025.[35]She denied leaving C overnight, and said that she had been found alone by the police because a friend of hers who was supposed to be looking after her had become unwell.[36]She said that the father had consented to C coming to England to live, and that it was not just for a holiday. They had had many conversations in the months preceding the trip when they discussed it. The mother said that the teaching in England was better and that she would have a better future. She pointed to messages passing between them and voice notes left by the father (which have been professionally translated and transcribed for this hearing) in which he spoke of telling C that she could come and live in England, and was discussing arrangements for her to visit Brazil in the event of a move. At one point, she challenged him not to go back on his agreement, and there is a transcribed voice note in which the father stated that he would only back out if she started to ‘do his head in’. In that voice note, he referred to C coming back if she was not happy and she could not cope with staying there.[37]The father had picked up C’s passports and tickets and, she said, was fully aware that C only had a one-way ticket. She explained that the permission to travel referred only to dates between 22nd June and 30th August because C did not have a right to live in England and had to be presented to the authorities as being a tourist (albeit later, in answer to some questions from me at the end of the proceedings, she referred to the father not knowing about her own irregular immigration status). She believed that the father had begun proceedings in Brazil because he could not contact C directly (because she had lost her phone) and did not want to speak to her on the mother’s device.[38]The mother said that C had brought two large hold bags and a backpack with her when she came. She also used some of her brother’s baggage allowance.[39]Challenged by Mr. Hepher about various messages that passed between herself and the father during the course of the autumn of last year (2025) in which there were discussions about C returning to Brazil, she did not really give a clear answer. She said that whilst there were no messages in which she challenged him to the effect that, on her case, he had agreed to C coming here to live, she said that this had happened in verbal conversations. The father[40]The father has filed two statements in addition to the conventional one from his solicitor at the start of the proceedings. He said that he and the mother had had discussions about C coming to live in England, but that while he had strongly considered this, he had never agreed it. In his view, the visit in the summer of 2025 was just that. In the event that C did want to live there, she would have to return to Brazil for everything to be agreed and planned. She would not live there permanently without a formal conversation and plan.[41]The mother had prepared a number of questions for the father. Most unrepresented litigants find it very difficult to focus on the core issues, but the mother’s questions were very well judged. They were all relevant and I did not think she left anything out. She particularly asked him about the messages and voice notes which she had produced and annexed to her statement. She asserted dates for the voice notes in her questions although there are no dates on the notes themselves. The father answered her questions by saying that he was considering C living in England but that, if that happened, there would have to be formalities which he had not done or agreed to. He said that he had told C that she was going to England now, and the question of whether she should stay was a matter which should be discussed later. He said the conversations he had with her and the mother were about letting C go to visit. He said that the conversations about living in England included discussions about the mother paying for C to visit Brazil but that was not something that had been decided. He said that the mother had put ideas into C’s head about living here, hence what C said to the Cafcass officer.[42]The father said that he had never travelled internationally himself or bought any plane tickets. The mother told him that the return part of the ticket would be printed later, and that C would not be allowed into the country without a return ticket. He believed that.[43]When C had gone, and he started to speak of her returning he had been blocked by the mother and did not speak to C for several weeks. Submissions[44]On behalf of the father, Mr. Hepher states that it is clear that C was habitually resident in Brazil at the time that she was wrongfully retained, the date of which he identifies as being 7th August when she sent a message to him saying that C would not be coming back. He stated that whilst the mother obviously harboured a desire that C would remain in England permanently when she came, there was no meeting of minds between the parties. The father had been open to C coming here to live but that he had not given his permission for that at any time before she left or after.[45]Mr. Hepher states that the odd, undated voice notes are not evidence of clear and unequivocal consent as is required, merely musings of the father thinking about C spending time in England. Mr. Hepher points out that the document giving authorisation to travel for a limited period is inconsistent with the father having given any such agreement, as was his behaviour in applying to the Brazilian court within such a short period of time.[46]Further, the messages that passed between the parents between October 2025 and January 2026 show that the mother knew that she had to return C. He says that she vacillated and then ultimately refused.[47]Mr. Hepher states that C’s wish to remain in England amounts to a preference rather than an objection. Further, he states that she is not of an age or degree of maturity at which the court should take account of her views. He says that she is swayed by being promised a kitten and that her views are based upon childish impressions rather than having a solid foundation.[48]In the event that I was to find either or both of the exceptions proved, Mr. Hepher invites me not to exercise my discretion to refuse to order a return, based on a number of matters including the fact that C has not appeared to integrate well, that the mother’s immigration position is very uncertain, that she has lived in Brazil all her life and has a good relationship with her father and family there, and the objects of the Convention itself.[49]The mother invited me to find that the evidence firmly demonstrates that the father agreed to C coming to live in England. She says that this is apparent from the messages and voice notes, what C said to Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick, the fact that so many people came to say goodbye to her at the airport, the luggage she brought and her own behaviour in finding a suitable home for them to live in prior to her arrival.[50]She said that C is happier at school now than she was at the time of Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick’s enquiries, and that she (the mother) has got support from friends to help with childcare when she is working. She hopes she will be able to stay in England, and that staying here will give C the chance of a better future. Findings Consent[51]There is a range of evidence in support of the mother’s case that the father consented to C coming to live in England, the most notable of which are probably the voice notes in which he said that he had told C that he would let her live here, and where he said he would not back out of this unless she (presumably the mother) ‘did [his] head in’. This note goes on to record the father saying that C could go to England but come back if she was not happy. There is also a different short note which relates to what school she would attend although that is very unclear.[52]The other evidence is from C herself and what she told Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick, the fanfare in which C left Brazil and the luggage she took when she left.[53]Having said that, all the messages and voice notes provided appear to show different things at different times. They are not complete, and the voice notes in particular are devoid of context so that I do not know what has been said before or after. Further, there is clear evidence which militates against the father having consented to a permanent move, including the authorisation to travel, the messages from the mother on 7th August saying that C would not be returning, and the father’s swift recourse to the Brazilian court.[54]It is clear that consent does not need to be in writing, and that the court may infer it from the surrounding evidence and behaviour of the parents.[55]Having carefully considered all the evidence I have heard and read, I find that at the time that C travelled to England on 22nd June, the father had not given his consent to her going there for more than a holiday. In my judgement, a permanent move was something that had been discussed between the parents (and with C), but although there were times they were close to an agreement, they never did actually agree. A permanent move was very much a possibility if C enjoyed her time with her mother, evinced a wish to stay and there was agreement about her being able to travel back regularly to Brazil to see her father there. It was not more than a possibility, however. I accept the father’s evidence that he fully believed that C had a return ticket and that she would come back to Brazil unless there was any subsequent agreement between him and the mother to the contrary. He certainly did not think he had entered into an agreement before she left and he did not enter into any agreement afterwards.[56]For her part, I have no doubt that the mother had an aspiration that C’s stay in England could be converted to a permanent one without much (if any) opposition from the father, but I do not accept she actually believed the father had consented. She had made her plans and hoped he would consent once C had arrived, but it did not go further than that.[57]It follows, therefore, that this exception is not made out on the facts of this case.[58]Although I have set out the relevant law above, on the facts of this case there is no evidence that the father acquiesced to C remaining here after she had arrived, and I do not intend to deal with that issue any further. Child’s objections[59]It is clear from the evidence before me that C genuinely wishes to remain living with her mother. Unless, or until, her mother is deported, she associates living with her mother with living in England. Even though the evidence from the school seems to show a withdrawn and somewhat isolated girl, she herself perceives England as being ‘cooler and better’ than Brazil. C told Ms. Cull-Fitzpatrick that she was unhappy with her father for seeking her return and that she, in turn, would not like it if I so ordered.[60]In my judgement, C is expressing a preference to stay in England with her mother, not an objection, in Convention terms, to a return to Brazil. At 11, I do think she has achieved an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of her views, but those views do not have the quality of an objection. They are grounded more in her wish to stay here with her mother rather than anything adverse about going back, and do not have the degree of vehemence or strength of feeling about being made to go back that would be necessary for this to meet the criteria of Article 13a.[61]It, therefore, follows that this exception also does not apply. Pursuant to Article 12, the court is therefore bound to make a summary return order. Discretion[62]Despite my findings above, and for the sake of completeness, I intend to set out what would be my decision in the event that either of the exceptions did apply and I was called upon to exercise a discretion in this case. Even if I had concluded that the father consented to the removal and/or that C objected to a return, I would still make a return order.[63]There are a variety of factors which lead me to this conclusion. The mother is an overstayer and has no right to remain in this country. By extension, the same applies to C. Immigration officers raided the mother’s house when C was there, which caused her great distress. The mother is on bail and has to report to the police station. She says she has identified a solicitor to help her but it does seem to be a lot of uncertainty about what will happen. This is not likely to be helpful to C, and places her in a situation whereby she could be deported at some point in the future along with her mother. In the meantime, the mother is not able to work – although it appears that she does – and relies on support to care for C from friends. This has not always been reliable. C’s situation in this country is, therefore, precarious.[64]Although the mother says that C is happier at school now, having changed classes, the school has described her as being withdrawn. She has not integrated well yet, and does not engage in extra-curricular activities. She does not speak much English yet. By contrast, she has lived all of her life in Brazil and is used to being cared for by her father and seeing other relatives. Whilst she was cross with her father for seeking her return, she appears to have a good relationship with him and is obviously close to her grandmother. She does not seem to have enjoyed school much there either, but she clearly has lots of friends.[65]Having not seen her mother in person for so many years of her childhood, I do not doubt that C will find it hard to leave her and go back, for the mother says that she will not return too. Nonetheless, C would be returning to a loving family and all that is familiar to her. I hope in time, once the mother’s aspiration to stay in England has been resolved in one way or another, C will once again be able to spend time with her, or even live with her, if that is what the parties agree or the Brazilian court decides.[66]Even without taking into account the objectives of the Convention, the case for a return order is very strong and in C’s best interests. In the event that I had found that the father had consented to the move in advance of the trip, the objectives of the Convention would hold less weight than they might in other cases, but the other factors in favour of a return are compelling. Decision[67]In all the circumstances, therefore, I will make an order for summary return.[68]I am very pleased that the father has agreed that C should be able to complete the school term before returning to Brazil. I hope that they will be able to agree a suitable date thereafter and the arrangements for C’s travel back. The father has agreed to pay for her ticket, but arrangements will have to be made for her safe return, whether that is with a relative or friend, or suitable arrangements with the relevant airline. If needed, I will adjudicate on this.[69]I know that the mother will be distressed by my decision, as I do not doubt that she loves and misses her daughter very much. She has represented herself very well in these proceedings, and I want to thank her for the way she has conducted herself before me.[70]I will order that this judgment should be translated into Portuguese for the parties to be able to read and understand it. This applies particularly to the mother as she is not represented. I hope that she may be able to get some advice about it from a representative from the CALA scheme should she so wish.