VW and XY (Children: Return Order to Romania), Re [2025] EWHC 3377 (Fam)

IMPORTANT NOTICEThis judgment was delivered in private. Any published version of the judgment must strictly preserve the anonymity of the child and members of their family. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.[2025] EWHC 3377 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Between
The MotherApplicantThe FatherRespondentMani Singh Basi (counsel) for Applicant Mother,instructed by Christina Theodorou of Hopkin Murray Beskine, SolicitorsThe Respondent Father, a litigant in person for in person
THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND CUSTODY ACT 1985
(INCORPORATING THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION)
THE CHILDREN: VW (aged 11) and XY (aged 6)
Re VW and XY (Children: Return Order to Romania)JUDGMENTNicholas Stonor KC sitting as a Deputy High Court JudgeHearing Hearing dates: 18 and 19 December 2025Judgment handed down: 19 December 2025
[1]By an application dated 17 September 2025, the children’s mother (M) seeks a return order to Romania in relation to her children, VW, a boy aged 11, and XY, a girl aged 6. The children have been living in the UK with their father (F) since 22 July 2025. The children and their parents are Romanian nationals.[2]M’s application is brought under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 incorporating the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘the Convention’).[3]Whilst F has advanced various purported defences to M’s application, his position at final hearing appeared to shift at times to one whereby, whilst he was not conceding the application, he was not actively opposing it. In fairness to F, a litigant in person, I have continued to approach the case on the basis that the application is opposed. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that this is an egregious example of child abduction and that the children should be returned to Romania swiftly.[4]M and F married in 2013 in Romania. M had been widowed and had two children by her first marriage (who are now adults). VW was born in Romania in 2013. Between 2015 and 2017, M, F and VW (and his two half-brothers) lived in the UK before returning to Romania. XY was born in Romania in 2019.[5]M and F separated in April 2022. M makes allegations against F of domestic abuse including manipulative behaviours. Those allegations are denied by F.[6]Following the parents’ separation, M continued to be the primary carer for VW and XY. F complains that M was obstructive in relation to contact between the children and himself, which M disputes.[7]In or around April 2024, F moved to the UK. In July 2024, F petitioned for divorce in Romania. In his petition, F acknowledged that the children lived with M in Romania and that she was their primary carer, and he asserted that parental authority should be exercised jointly.[8]In April 2025, F contacted M suggesting a reconciliation. He said he would withdraw his divorce petition. He asked M to obtain passports for the children with a view to the family spending time together on holiday in the UK.[9]In June and July 2025, F visited Romania and the family spent time together there.[10]On 22 July 2025, M, F and the children travelled to the UK for a holiday. F accepts that this was planned on the understanding that it would be a temporary visit. Shortly after their arrival, some sort of argument ensued. F instructed M that she should return to Romania and that the children would remain with him in the UK. F secured hotel accommodation for M separate from him and the children, and he bought her a return flight to Romania leaving on 24 July 2025. F refused to allow the children to see M before her departure. M did not contact authorities in the UK. She says that she did not want the Police to become involved because that would have been upsetting for the children, and that in any event, she was hoping that F would voluntarily return the children to Romania.[11]On 29 July 2025, M contacted the Ministry of Justice in Romania in order to seek the return of the children to her care. After liaison between the Central Authorities, M’s application was duly issued on 17 September 2025.[12]F told me that he had always intended to return the children to Romania but had extended their temporary stay in the UK because he wanted to spend more time with them. He could not offer any credible explanation for why he had not in fact returned the children. Nor could he explain why he had proceeded to enrol XY in a school in the UK.[13]VW was not enrolled in school and has received no formal education since he has been living with F. On VW’s own account, he helps F with household chores and otherwise spends time reading and online gaming.[14]On 22 September 2025, M’s application was served on F who indicated that he and the children were in fact living some three hours’ drive away from the address where M had thought they were living. F had not told M about their new address.[15]Free-standing port alert orders and case management directions were made at hearings on 22 September 2025 and 06 October 2025. The Cafcass High Court Team were directed to prepare a report in relation to VW’s wishes and feelings, and his maturity. Ms Callaghan, Family Court Adviser, was appointed. She met with VW on 05 November 2025 at the Cafcass office, and her report is dated 13 November 2025.[16]M asserts that since 22 July 2025, F has made proposals which have variously involved M coming to live with him in the UK, or one or both of the children returning to Romania to live with M. F either denies making these proposals at all, or denies making them in the way described by M. This Hearing[17]The matter was listed before me with a time estimate of two days.[18]The court bundle ran to 191 pages and included statements from both parties. In addition, I was provided with documentation from the children’s school, sent via the Central Authorities, which suggested that the children may lose their current school places in Romania due to lack of attendance.[19]M was represented by Mr Basi, counsel, who prepared a detailed and helpful position statement. I am grateful to him and his instructing solicitors for the careful manner in which this case has been prepared and presented. M was in attendance and the strain of recent events, and of these proceedings, was plain to see.[20]As already mentioned, F is a litigant in person. On 16 December 2025, F prepared a further statement which included his response to Ms Callaghan’s report. F is plainly an intelligent man. He addressed the court in a calm and measured manner.[21]Both parents had the assistance of separate court-appointed interpreters to whom I am grateful.[22]At the outset of the hearing, F applied for permission to admit into evidence a thirty second extract from an audio recording in which he said M could be heard advising the children that after considering the situation she wanted them to live with F. F told me that he recorded all of M’s conversations with the children and that he had not told M that he was recording her. F said that he could not recall exactly when this particular audio recording had been made. F’s application was opposed by M.[23]Applying the Overriding Objective in FPR 2010, rule 1.1, I considered the following points to be relevant:(1) The extract was likely to be of negligible evidential value: even if M had said that she wanted the children to live with F, I could not sensibly attach weight to those comments in circumstances where (a) the comments would need to be seen in their proper context which would likely require the admission of all of the recordings; (b) even then, the comments would need to be seen in the broader context of M’s disputed allegations of domestic abuse including manipulative behaviours.(2) This is a summary process and it would not be appropriate to embark on a fuller exploration of the body of the audio recordings and/or the allegations of domestic abuse.(3) This application was made at the commencement of the final hearing but (a) it could have been made much earlier and (b) there had been no previous suggestion from F that he was contemplating making such an application.[24]I refused F’s preliminary application. Legal Framework 4.1. Wrongful Removal[25]The relevant parts of the Convention are as follows:

Article 3

[31]The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where - a). it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; andb) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.[33]The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.

Article 5

[34]For the purposes of this Convention - a). "rights of custody" shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence;b) "rights of access" shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence.[26]Pursuant to FPR 2010, Practice Direction 12F – International Child Abduction, para 2.2: “rights of custody” are ‘interpreted very widely (see paragraph 2.16 below)’. Para 2.16 provides: “‘Rights of custody’ includes rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence. . . .”.[27]The relevant date for assessing whether a removal or retention is in fact wrongful is the date of the alleged removal or retention (Re M (Children) (Habitual Residence: 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention) [2020] EWCA Civ 1105, per Moylan LJ at para 68).[28]The burden of proving a wrongful removal or retention rests with the applicant (here, M). However, issues of consent do of course pertain to both Article 3 (was the removal or retention wrongful?) and Article 13(a) (has the defence of ‘consent’ been established?). As explained by Ward LJ in Re P (A Child) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [2004] EWCA Civ 971 (at [33]) (and endorsed by Peter Jackson LJ in Re G (Abduction: Consent / Discretion) [2021] EWCA Civ 139 at [15]), where there is a prima facie wrongful removal, issues of consent are to be addressed under Article 13(a) and the burden of proving consent rests with the respondent (here, F). 4.2. Articles 12 and 13[29]The relevant parts read as follows:

Article 12

[41]Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. . . .

Article 13

[42]Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that - a). the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; . . .[44]The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.[45]In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child's habitual residence. 4.3. Consent[30]The correct approach was helpfully explained by Peter Jackson LJ in Re G (Abduction: Consent / Discretion) [2021] EWCA Civ 139: “25. The position can be summarised in this way:(1) The removing parent must prove consent to the civil standard. The inquiry is fact-specific and the ultimate question is: had the remaining parent clearly and unequivocally consented to the removal?(2) The presence or absence of consent must be viewed in the context of the common sense realities of family life and family breakdown, and not in the context of the law of contract. The court will focus on the reality of the family’s situation and consider all the circumstances in making its assessment. A primary focus is likely to be on the words and actions of the remaining parent. The words and actions of the removing parent may also be a significant indicator of whether that parent genuinely believed that consent had been given, and consequently an indicator of whether consent had in fact been given.(3) Consent must be clear and unequivocal but it does not have to be given in writing or in any particular terms. It may be manifested by words and/or inferred from conduct.(4) A person may consent with the gravest reservations, but that does not render the consent invalid if the evidence is otherwise sufficient to establish it.(5) Consent must be real in the sense that it relates to a removal in circumstances that are broadly within the contemplation of both parties.(6) Consent that would not have been given but for some material deception or misrepresentation on the part of the removing parent will not be valid.(7) Consent must be given before removal. Advance consent may be given to removal at some future but unspecified time or upon the happening of an event that can be objectively verified by both parties. To be valid, such consent must still be operative at the time of the removal.(8) Consent can be withdrawn at any time before the actual removal. The question will be whether, in the light of the words and/or conduct of the remaining parent, the previous consent remained operative or not.(9) The giving or withdrawing of consent by a remaining parent must have been made known by words and/or conduct to the removing parent. A consent or withdrawal of consent of which a removing parent is unaware cannot be effective.[26]All of these matters are well-established, with the exception of the last point, which did not arise for consideration in the reported cases. As to that, there are compelling reasons why the removing parent must be aware of whether or not consent exists. The first is that as a matter of ordinary language the word ‘consent’ denotes the giving of permission to another person to do something. For the permission to be meaningful, it must be made known. This natural reading is reinforced by the fact that consent appears in the Convention as a verb (“avait consenti/had consented”): what is required is an act or actions and not just an internal state of mind. But it is at the practical level that the need for communication is most obvious. Parties make important decisions based on the understanding that they have a consent to relocate on which they can safely rely. It would make a mockery of the Convention if the permission on which the removing parent had depended could be subsequently invalidated by an undisclosed change of heart on the part of the other parent, particularly as the result for the children would then be a mandatory return. Such an arbitrary consequence would be flatly contrary to the Convention’s purpose of protecting children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal, and it would also be manifestly unfair to the removing parent and the children.” 4.4. Article 13(2): Child Objections[31]The leading authority is the Court of Appeal decision in Re M (Republic of Ireland)(Child's Objections)(Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015] EWCA Civ 26, and the applicable principles were summarised by Williams J in Q & V (1980 Hague Convention and Inherent Jurisdiction Summary Return) [2019] EWHC 490(at [50]):
“i) The gateway stage should be confined to a straightforward and fairly robust examination of whether the simple terms of the Convention are satisfied in that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views. ii) Whether a child objects is a question of fact. The child's views have to amount to an objection before Article 13 will be satisfied. An objection in this context is to be contrasted with a preference or wish. iii) The objections of the child are not determinative of the outcome but rather give rise to a discretion. Once that discretion arises, the discretion is at large. The child's views are one factor to take into account at the discretion stage. iv) There is a relatively low threshold requirement in relation to the objections defence, the obligation on the court is to 'take account' of the child's views, nothing more. v) At the discretion stage there is no exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The court should have regard to welfare considerations, in so far as it is possible to take a view about them on the limited evidence available. The court must give weight to Convention considerations and at all times bear in mind that the Convention only works if, in general, children who have been wrongfully retained or removed from their country of habitual residence are returned, and returned promptly. vi) Once the discretion comes into play, the court may have to consider the nature and strength of the child's objections, the extent to which they are authentically the child's own or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or at odds with other considerations which are relevant to the child's welfare, as well as the general Convention considerations (Re M [2007] 1 AC 619).”
[32]In C v M (A Child) (Abduction: Representation of Child Party) [2023] EWCA Civ 1449 at para 76, Moylan LJ said: Finally, I set out passages from Lady Hale’s speech in Re M Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55 in which she made a number of observations about the breadth of the discretion which arises under the 1980 Convention when a child objects to returning:
“[43] My Lords, in cases where a discretion arises from the terms of the Convention itself, it seems to me that the discretion is at large. The court is entitled to take into account the various aspects of the Convention policy, alongside the circumstances which gave the court a discretion in the first place and the wider considerations of the child’s rights and welfare”; and “[46] In child’s objections cases, the range of considerations may be even wider than those in the other exceptions. The exception itself is brought into play when only two conditions are met: first, that the child herself objects to being returned and second, that she has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of her views. These days, and especially in the light of article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, courts increasingly consider it appropriate to take account of a child’s views. Taking account does not mean that those views are always determinative or even presumptively so. Once the discretion comes into play, the court may have to consider the nature and strength of the child’s objections, the extent to which they are “authentically her own” or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or are at odds with other considerations which are relevant to her welfare, as well as the general Convention considerations referred to earlier. The older the child, the greater the weight that her objections are likely to carry. But that is far from saying that the child’s objections should only prevail in the most exceptional circumstances.”
Discussion 5.1. Wrongful Removal / Retention[33]In his first statement, F referenced the fact that the children had lived in different towns in Romania and asserted:
“Therefore, there was no stable or continuous habitual residence in Romania, a key condition for applying the Hague Convention”
. This clearly reflects a misunderstanding of the concept of habitual residence. I do of course make allowance for the fact that F is a litigant in person.[34]At the hearing, F conceded that, as at 22 July 2025, the children were habitually resident in Romania. No other conclusion could be reached in circumstances where the children, who are Romanian nationals, have lived all their lives in Romania (apart from, in VW’s case, the period between 2015 and 2017), were being educated in Romania, enjoyed spending time with their half-brothers and other family members in Romania, and in every other aspect of life were fully integrated in Romania.[35]As at 22 July 2025, M was the children’s primary carer and was clearly exercising her rights of custody. In his written evidence, and during the hearing, F emphasised that he too had rights of custody and that there was no order in place which restricted his capacity to act unilaterally. That of course is no justification, whether under the Convention or by reference to plain common sense, for a parent to remove or retain their child in another country without the consent of their primary carer.[36]I am satisfied that when F retained the children on 22 July 2025, this was a wrongful retention for the purposes of the Convention, subject to the issue of consent. 5.2. Consent[37]F has sought to rely on the fact that M had agreed to the children coming to the UK as justification for him retaining them here. There is no merit in that argument in circumstances where M had of course agreed to a temporary visit only.[38]F has further sought to rely on the fact that M did not contact the authorities in the UK as evidence of her consenting to F’s retention of the children. M has provided a credible explanation for why she did not contact the authorities: she did not want to cause upset for the children, and she was hoping that F would return the children voluntarily. M then contacted the Romanian authorities within days of her returning on 24 July 2025. Mindful of the guidance in Re G (Abduction: Consent / Discretion) [2021] EWCA Civ 139 (see para 30 above), there is no evidence whatsoever of M having consented to the retention of the children, and the evidence points unswervingly towards the conclusion that she did not consent.[39]I am satisfied that F has failed to discharge the burden of proving that M consented to the wrongful retention of the children. 5.3. Child Objections[40]When Ms Callaghan asked VW what decision he would like

the judge to make about him returning to Romania or staying in England, he said:

“well, I would say it is better for me to stay here, I feel safe here. . . .”
. Ms Callaghan explored what VW meant by “safe”: VW did not provide any detailed explanation of why he felt safer in England; he did not talk about feeling that he was in danger when living in Romania. Ms Callaghan speculated that he could have meant that he felt “safer emotionally rather than physically” and that his comments about feeling safe and being able to talk to his father in England “may be linked to previous uncertainty over spending time arrangements after his parents separated”. VW told Ms Callaghan that he would like M to come to England and live with him, XY and F – “for us to live together, like before”. VW confirmed that he missed M and his half-brothers. When Ms Callaghan asked how he would feel if

the judge said he had to return to Romania, VW said:

“I am neither happy nor sad, what will happen, will happen”
. There was nothing that VW specifically wanted to say to the judge, and he did not wish to write a letter.[41]Ms Callaghan considered that:
“[VW] seemed to be quite ambivalent in respect of his views about returning to Romania”
. She quite properly observed: “It is a matter for the court as to whether [VW]’s views regarding a return to Romania amount to an objection”.[42]In terms of VW’s maturity, Ms Callaghan wrote: “29. I would assess [VW]’s maturity to be in line with his chronological age as it was evident that he understood what I was saying to him and the concept of the court proceedings and the issue that the court had to make a decision about. To an extent [VW] was guarded in what he said, however I had a sense that he was feeling uncomfortable being caught in the middle of conflict between his parents. I did not get a sense that [VW] was able to comprehend the reality of secondary school and the language difficulties he may face as he appears to have had limited opportunities since being in England, and he believes that his sister is coping well with school.[30]I would advise that [VW]’s level of maturity needs to be considered within the context of his family situation, which includes his parents’ separation and subsequent move to sharing a home with extended family in Romania . . ..”[43]F challenged Ms Callaghan about her use of the word ‘ambivalence’, referencing how VW had said that it would be better for him to stay in England. Ms Callaghan explained that she had used that word after taking into account all of VW’s comments to her and she could not think of another word which would more fairly reflect her assessment of VW’s wishes and feelings.[44]I accept the written and oral evidence of Ms Callaghan, who is an experienced family court adviser and was conspicuously measured and fair.[45]Has the gateway test been met? As case law makes clear (see para 31 above), an objection is something more than a preference or a wish. I accept Ms Callaghan’s descriptor of “ambivalence” and am not at all convinced that VW does in fact object to a return to Romania.[46]However, the gateway test is set relatively low. And I am mindful that VW is approaching adolescence and, as described by Ms , has maturity in line with his chronological age. If I were to accept that the gateway test is met, I would then have to consider whether I should exercise my discretion not to make a return order. In doing so, the weight to be attached to VW’s views would be limited by(1) the fact that he clearly feels caught in the middle of a conflict between his parents who he loves;(2) he does not have a realistic appreciation of the implications for him of remaining in England; and(3) quite frankly, his world has been turned upside down because of his father’s actions on 22 July 2025. Broader welfare considerations, including the importance for VW of his family relationships in Romania and his education there, pull strongly in favour of a return order. Similarly, considerations of the policy underpinning the Convention pull strongly in favour of a return order.[47]Thus, whether or not the gateway test is met, the result is the same: I am not satisfied that the ‘child objections’ defence has been established.[48]For the reasons set out above, I make a return order to Romania.[49]I have no doubt that both parents love their children. I have no doubt that the children want to spend time with each of their parents.[50]It is right that I record that, in my judgment, the retention of the children by F on 22 July 2025 was inexcusable. On my summary appraisal of the evidence, F’s actions appear to have been driven entirely by self-interest, with no regard whatsoever to the welfare interests of his children. It is difficult to imagine just how distressing and unsettling the past almost five months must have been for VW and XY. Responsibility for the hurt and harm done lies with F and F alone.[51]I urge F to focus now on re-building trust in his relationships with M and the children. F can begin that process by facilitating the return of the children to Romania in accordance with the order I will make, and doing so in a manner which minimises further distress for the children.[52]The return order must be implemented swiftly. I direct that F should hand the children over to M at 1100 on Saturday 20 December 2025 at a meeting point which will be inserted into my order. I further direct that F should not accompany the children and M on their return to Romania. If F wishes to return to Romania, he must travel separately from M and the children.[53]It will be for the court in Romania to determine any issues relating to the children’s future care arrangements. I permit disclosure of this judgment and of the case papers, including Ms Callaghan’s report, to the Romanian courts and any Romanian authorities who may be concerned for the children’s welfare.