‘We were aware that Ms T only dated men of black African or Caribbean ethnicity and became concerned. We raised this in a telephone conversation with Ms T. She confirmed she had a sexual relationship with a man during the period in which we were trying to conceive. Ms T explained this was around the time of our last home inseminations, in June 2022. Ms T has never told us who this man is’
‘Thank you for sending me the order of the court, and the statement that is referred to. I will not be attending the hearing on Thursday3rd April 2025 as I have no objections or matters to raise. I am happy for the court to make a final order in my absence.’
‘… Plus she said that sometimes the sperm don't always get up high enough using a syringe because it's not "propelled" like sex if you get the idea lol ??’
“[100] One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the ‘lie’ is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”
“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.”
“[25] Similarly, close attention must be paid to the true significance of lies deplorable, are significant only to the extent that they affect the welfare of the child, and in particular to the extent that they undermine systems of protection designed to keep the child safe. However, as noted by Macur LJ in Re Y (A Child)[2013] EWCA Civ 1337 , they cannot be allowed to hijack the case. See also Sir James Munby P in Re A (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings)[2015] EWFC 11 ,[2016] 1 FLR 1 , at para [12]: ‘The second fundamentally important point is the need to link the facts relied upon by the local authority with its case on threshold, the need to demonstrate why, as the local authority asserts, facts A + B + C justify the conclusion that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, significant harm of types X, Y or Z. Sometimes the linkage will be obvious, as where the facts proved establish physical harm. But the linkage may be very much less obvious where the allegation is only that the child is at risk of suffering emotional harm or, as in the present case, at risk of suffering neglect. In the present case, as we shall see, an important element of the local authority’s case was that the father “lacks honesty with professionals”, “minimises matters of importance” and “is immature and lacks insight of issues of importance”
“… participants in informal arrangements have to judge all risks for themselves. They may not be in a good position to do so”