X, Y, Z, Re (Children) (Summary Return to Nigeria) [2025] EWHC 1587 (Fam)

[2025] EWHC 1587 (Fam)Case No GU24P07400
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 25/06/2025
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MCKENDRICK
Between
CDApplicantEFRespondentRe X, Y, Z ((Children) Summary Return to Nigeria)
Onyoja Momoh (instructed by Duncan Lewis) for ApplicantJo Ecob (instructed by DMH Stallard) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 4 and 5 June 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 25.06.25 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

McKendrick J:

[1]These proceedings concern the welfare of three children: X, a boy aged 8; and Y and Z, two twin girls, aged 5. The Applicant is the children’s mother, and the Respondent is the children’s father. The family are dual British and Nigerian Nationals. The children lived all their lives in Nigeria until the Applicant brought them to England and Wales on 1 July 2024. The sole issue with which I am concerned is whether or not to make an order for the summary return of the children to Nigeria. I have determined to make a conditional summary return order and set out my reasons for doing so below.[2]The parties are agreed the children’s welfare is my paramount consideration and despite the variety of applications made, the parties agree they are asking the court to determine the summary return issue through the court’s inherent jurisdiction. My task is neatly summarised by Cobb J (with the agreement of Peter Jackson and Stuart-Smith LJJ) in Re O (Summary Return: Non-Convention Country) [2025] EWCA Civ 660 at paragraph 54: “An application for a summary return of a child to a non-Hague Convention country under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is to be determined simply and straightforwardly by what is in the child's best interests (Re J at [18], [25], [28], [29] and [32]). On an application of this kind, a judge must undertake: "…a swift, realistic and unsentimental assessment of the best interests of the child, leading, in proper cases, to the prompt return of the child to his or her own country, but not the sacrifice of the child's welfare to some other principle of law". Ormrod LJ in Re R (Minors) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1981) 2 FLR 416, at 425. The requirement for the Judge to undertake this "swift and unsentimental decision", rooted firmly in welfare, was reinforced by Baroness Hale in her speech in Re J at [31] and [41].” "…a swift, realistic and unsentimental assessment of the best interests of the child, leading, in proper cases, to the prompt return of the child to his or her own country, but not the sacrifice of the child's welfare to some other principle of law". Ormrod LJ in Re R (Minors) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1981) 2 FLR 416, at 425.[3]As this is a summary jurisdiction, I set out briefly the evidence and only the main points advanced by the parties for and against the summary return of the children. The Evidence The Applicant’s

The Evidence

[4]In her first witness statement the Applicant explains that she and the Respondent met in Lagos in 2012 and began a relationship shortly thereafter. They began cohabiting in September 2015 and married in October 2015. They lived in Abuja. X was born in the United Kingdom in January 2017. Y and Z were born in Dubai in November 2019. The reasons for the children being born overseas appears to relate to the parents’ decision to access healthcare outside Nigeria. The Applicant alleges the Respondent was unsupportive and used derogatory language towards her during her pregnancies and around this time.[5]She informed the Respondent the relationship was over in September 2023. She states this was because of the domestic abuse he perpetrated towards her. Her evidence is that the Respondent was uncaring when she was in hospital and pregnant. That he grabbed X’s hand on an occasion in March 2022 and then kept X from her for two days. She says he locked himself in their bedroom, denying her access to the room in October 2023. After the relationship ended, the Applicant left Abuja and moved to Lagos. She says she was fearful and did not the tell the Respondent of her plan. She says the Respondent then used connections to have a warrant issued for her arrest and her bank accounts were frozen. She says the Respondent stopped paying for health insurance and school fees.[6]She notes she became aware the Respondent had sought and obtained an ex parte order preventing her removing the children on 27 November 2023. She notes the injunction was set aside at an on notice hearing on 17 January 2024. She says she tried to call the Respondent around this time to agree arrangements for the children’s welfare, but he showed no interest. She became fearful for her safety and says she received calls from unknown persons threatening her and threatening to abduct her children. She believes these threats were made by persons on behalf of the Respondent. She says she believes her car was being followed. Her evidence is that she was living in “constant state of fear”. In May 2024 she says the children’s school called her and informed her the Respondent had come to their school and spoken with X. For these reasons she fled to the United Kingdom with the children on 1 July 2024. On 6 December 2024 she made an application for a child arrangements order for the children to live with her in England and for a prohibited steps order that they be prevented from being removed from the jurisdiction of England Wales by the Respondent.[7]In her second witness statement she denies there was any order made by the Nigerian courts preventing her removing the children from that jurisdiction. She states the Nigerian courts ordered only supervised contact between the children and the Respondent. She repeats her allegations that the Respondent and his family used their power to freeze her accounts and suggests there was improper police involvement assisting the Respondent. She repeats her allegations of domestic abuse.[8]She states the father was not a ‘hands on’ father. She says that she employed both a nanny and a housekeeper when she lived in Nigeria and she was fully involved parenting the children.[9]She says the children have flourished since arriving in England. X is doing well academically, has friends and plays rugby. The twin girls are doing well and have many friends and enjoy play dates. She describes her residence in Lagos as a spacious four-bedroom house and points out the Respondent could have come there to bond with the children but refused to do so. She criticises him for missing birthdays and Christmas.[10]She says the Nigerian courts have been slow and inefficient, often adjourning the ongoing proceedings. She is concerned about the enforceability of orders. She states she consulted the British High Commission for assistance.[11]She described her roots in England. She says she was born and educated here and has a support network. I understand she has a brother in England. She says the children have avoided the “turmoil” of Nigeria.[12]She states she filed a “human rights” application in January 2024 to defend herself from the Respondent’s harassment. This was discontinued in November 2024 because she was in England.[13]She states she believes the children are habitually resident in England. She references GP and dentist appointments. She explains their involvement in church. She states the move was always intended to be a permanent one to England.[14]I permitted limited cross-examination of the Applicant. She explained school fees were always paid by bank transfer and the Respondent had failed to pay the school fees for the children in 2024. She explained she was extremely afraid for her safety. She remained steadfast to her understanding that the January 2024 order required contact between the father and the children to be supervised. She agreed she went with the children from the family home to Lagos in November 2023 without informing the Respondent and then withheld the address. She was afraid he would send people after her. It was put to her that in reality she contacted the British High Commission in Abuja not because of domestic abuse but because she was fearful of the consequences of abducting the children. She denied this. She accepted her father-in-law gave her money to carry out interior design work, but was evasive about these arrangements. She stated she was in receipt of benefits in England and accepted she had run a business in Nigeria.

The Respondent’s

[15]The Respondent father denies the allegations of domestic abuse and states he was supportive of his wife during and after pregnancies. He feared the Applicant would remove the children from his care without consulting him in late 2023 and so sought the equivalent of a prohibited steps order, without notice to her, which he obtained. He exhibits messages in which she states what a great husband and father he is. He denies the March 2022 allegations about X and the October 2023 allegation about him attending a virtual board meeting.[16]His evidence is that when he returned to the family home in November 2023, it was empty and the Applicant had removed the children without consulting him. On 26 November 2023 they met to discuss the children and he made clear that they should live with him but she was free to make her own arrangements. He sought an order from the Nigerian courts to prevent the Applicant removing the children from his care. His evidence is that she had gone with the children to an unknown location and he did not know where they were. Therefore, he involved the police to find his children. His evidence is that the police of their own motion in furtherance of finding the children froze her bank accounts and issued a warrant for her arrest. His ex parte order was set aside in January 2024 and the court ordered that the children live with the Applicant. The court ordered the Applicant to provide the address where she and the children were living. She provided the address in Abuja, which was an apartment near their school in February 2024. His evidence was that he tried to see the children but the Applicant would only let him see them in her own home. He feared she would make further false allegations against him and so did not agree to her supervising contact between him and then children in her home. He accepts he saw X at school in May 2024.[17]The Respondent was unaware the children had been removed from Nigeria and he was asking for contact with them in October and November 2024.[18]His evidence is that the children were settled in Nigeria. They lived in a five-bedroom property. They attended the same school from nursery to primary. The twins were in their first year of primary and X was in his third year. They had many friends. “Their entire family support system remains in Nigeria”. Their paternal grandparents and maternal adopted grandparents are in Nigeria. Their aunt, uncles and cousins are there. They had rarely left Nigeria except for a few holidays. He states the children are not habitually resident in England and Wales.[19]He provides an opinion from a Nigerian Professor of law and practising barrister, who sets out the protective measures to be implemented for the children’s return. He sets out the protection afforded through the Nigerian Child Rights Act which broadly mirrors the orders available in English courts for children’s welfare. He sets out the Nigerian Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015 which provides for orders against harassment and intimidation.[20]I permitted limited cross-examination of the Respondent. He told me the children’s school informed him they can return and the fees issue can be resolved. He explained the children had health insurance in Nigeria. He denied the children had previously regularly come to the UK. He accepted he had a cousin in the UK and a daughter at university in England. He said the Nigerian police froze the Applicant’s accounts to seek to locate the children after they were removed from his care. He clarified that he only found out the children had left Nigeria and were in the UK in November 2024.

Mr Oba Nsugbe KC

[21]Mr Nsugbe is the single joint expert on Nigeria law. His report is helpful and clear. He summarises the Nigerian proceedings which took place from November 2023. He states the Nigerian 2015 legislation is the equivalent of the UK Domestic Abuse Act 2021. He summarises its effect. He also summarises the 2003 Act, pointing out the many orders that can be made protecting children in their best interests.[22]He states that:
“In very general terms the reliability and enforceability of protective orders will be more efficient and reliable in England and Wales than in Nigeria.”
But he notes the Nigeria domestic abuse legislation provides for an automatic power of arrest on the issuance of a protective order. He concludes making clear that: a. Protective orders can be obtained in Abuja State; b. Orders of the English courts, save adoption, are not enforceable; c. Some protection will be offered in Nigeria through court orders depending on the particular circumstances of the case.

The CAFCASS Family Court Adviser

[23]There is a helpful report from Ms Huntingdon dated 4 June 2025. She sets out the background to the dispute. She met the Respondent online. She met the Applicant in person. She met the children in person at the Cafcass Office on 19 May 2025.[24]She describes that the girls remember Nigeria and they spoke of their house where they lived with ‘mummy and daddy’ and attending school and carpet time there. They recalled positive things about their life in Nigeria and ‘fun places’. “Neither girl could think of a worst thing about Nigeria”. X referred to the house he shared with his parents and siblings in Nigeria. He preferred his UK school because he could go swimming there. “He could not think of anything when asked about the best and worst aspects of Nigeria”. The twins spoke of doing fun things with the Respondent and of him “being kind to them”. The twins wanted “daddy to visit their house and Z wanted him to stay with them more often.” Ms Huntingdon explains they have little understanding of why they came to the UK. They had a “very limited understanding” of the issue of their return to Nigeria. “They both expressed positive sentiments in respect of a return to Nigeria….[Y] said that she would be happy because it’s a hot place and [Z] said she would also be happy because she likes Nigeria.” Both expressed that they were “ok” to leave England. She noted X was reticent. He struggled to describe his mother. His father’s presence in the former family home was limited, but when he was at home it was fun. “X said that he gets on well with daddy, whereas he is “in the middle with mummy.” He was unable to tell her the best thing about his mother but the best thing about his father was that “he listens to me”. X describes himself as being very happy on the day he saw his father at school in 2024. X had little understanding of his move to the UK. At first X said that he would not want to live in Nigeria but could not say why. When this was revisited, he said “he would not care if the judge decided that he should return”. He said there was nothing that would worry him in the event of a return to Nigeria. He told me in a little letter that he wants to be rich and to live in a mansion in California.[25]Ms Huntingdon notes the children have little understanding of the complexity of the issues the court faces. She notes it is beyond her remit to determine what happened between the parents but she has not “identified the highest risk behaviours” given the Applicant’s account. She notes the impact on the Applicant. Taken at their highest, the Applicant’s reported behaviours “would not be considered to be a barrier to coming to safe arrangements for contact post separation”. She notes some of the Respondent’s post separation behaviours raise concerns. This is a reference to the ex parte order and the police involvement when the children were unilaterally removed from his care.[26]She states that if what is said by the Applicant is true, this presents a significant risk factor of the children being used as part of coercive behaviours and he could seek to separate them from the mother. She notes the Applicant did obtain an order granting her custody of the children but raises issues about enforcement.[27]She states that the Applicant has “indicated she would feel unable to return to Nigeria with the children if this was directed by the court, although I am mindful that if this was to become a reality of the children’s circumstances, [the Applicant] may reconsider her position.”[28]She states: “If the court is satisfied with the parents’ evidence and finds on balance that there are no risks, or that the risks identified as posed by the father could be mitigated against the lack of judicial support and enforcement of any orders granted in the UK and in the absence of support services for protect the children, then a return order for all three children to Nigeria could be contemplated.” (sic)[29]She raised concerns about progressing contact between the children and the father without determination of the “contested issues”.[30]I permitted both parties’ counsel to ask limited questions of Ms Huntingdon. She was challenged by Ms Ecob on her cautious approach to interim contact. She accepted professional supervision would deal with some safeguarding issues. She stated that Nigeria would be relatively familiar for them if returned. She accepted given their ages a year in the UK was significant for them.

The Law

[31]The law is this area is well established. The children’s welfare is my paramount consideration. This is clearly set out by Lady Hale giving the decision in Re J (A Child) (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights) [2005] UKHL 40; [2006] 1 AC 80. She held as follows: i. “… any court which is determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a child has had a statutory duty to regard the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration” [18]; ii. “There is no warrant, either in statute or authority, for the principles of The Hague Convention to be extended to countries which are not parties to it” [22]; iii. “…in all non-Convention cases, the courts have consistently held that they must act in accordance with the welfare of the individual child. If they do decide to return the child, that is because it is in his best interests to do so, not because the welfare principle has been superseded by some other consideration.” [25]; iv. “… the court does have power, in accordance with the welfare principle, to order the immediate return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction without conducting a full investigation of the merits. In a series of cases during the 1960s, these came to be known as 'kidnapping' cases.” [26]; v. “Summary return should not be the automatic reaction to any and every unauthorised taking or keeping a child from his home country. On the other hand, summary return may very well be in the best interests of the individual child” [28]; vi. “… focus has to be on the individual child in the particular circumstances of the case” [29]; vii. “… the judge may find it convenient to start from the proposition that it is likely to be better for a child to return to his home country for any disputes about his future to be decided there. A case against his doing so has to be made. But the weight to be given to that proposition will vary enormously from case to case. What may be best for him in the long run may be different from what will be best for him in the short run. It should not be assumed, in this or any other case, that allowing a child to remain here while his future is decided here inevitably means that he will remain here for ever” [32]; viii. “One important variable … is the degree of connection of the child with each country. This is not to apply what has become the technical concept of habitual residence, but to ask in a common sense way with which country the child has the closer connection. What is his 'home' country? Factors such as his nationality, where he has lived for most of his life, his first language, his race or ethnicity, his religion, his culture, and his education so far will all come into this” [33]; ix. “Another closely related factor will be the length of time he has spent in each country. Uprooting a child from one environment and bringing him to a completely unfamiliar one, especially if this has been done clandestinely, may well not be in his best interests” [34]; x. “A child may be deeply unhappy about being recruited to one side in a parental battle. But if he is already familiar with this country, has been here for some time without objection, it may be less disruptive for him to remain a little while longer while his medium and longer term future is decide than it would be to return.” [34] xi. “In a case where the choice lies between deciding the question here or deciding it in a foreign country, differences between the legal systems cannot be irrelevant. But their relevance will depend upon the facts of the individual case. If there is a genuine issue between the parents as to whether it is in the best interests of the child to live in this country or elsewhere, it must be relevant whether that issue is capable of being tried in the courts of the country to which he is to be returned” [39]; xii. “The effect of the decision upon the child's primary carer must also be relevant, although again not decisive.” [40][32]Lord Wilson further considered the correct approach of the trial judge in a non-Hague case in Re NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC 49; [2020] AC 665. He set out questions that the first instance judge should “at least give some consideration to” at paragraphs 56 – 63. Cobb J helpfully summarised these at paragraph 38 of J v J (Return to Non-Hague Convention Country) [2021] EWHC 2412 (Fam) as follows:
“i) The court needs to consider whether the evidence before it is sufficiently up to date to enable it then to make the summary order ([56]); ii) The court ought to consider the evidence and decide what if any findings it should make in order for the court to justify the summary order (esp. in relation to the child's habitual residence) ([57]); iii) In order sufficiently to identify what the child's welfare required for the purposes of a summary order, an inquiry should be conducted into any or all of the aspects of welfare specified in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act; a decision has to be taken on the individual facts as to how extensive that inquiry should be ([58]); iv) In a case where domestic abuse is alleged, the court should consider whether in the light of Practice Direction 12J, an inquiry should be conducted into the disputed allegations made by one party of domestic abuse and, if so, how extensive that inquiry should be ([59]); v) The court should consider whether it would be right to determine the summary return on the basis of welfare without at least rudimentary evidence about basic living arrangements for the child and carer ([60]); vi) The court should consider whether it would benefit from oral evidence ([61]) and if so to what extent; vii) The court should consider whether to obtain a Cafcass report ([62]): "and, if so, upon what aspects and to what extent"; viii) The court should consider whether it needs to make a comparison of the respective judicial systems in the competing countries – having regard to the speed with which the courts will be able to resolve matters, and whether there is an effective relocation jurisdiction in the other court ([63]).”
[33]It is also necessary to consider Re A and B (Children) (Summary Return: Non-Convention State) [2022] EWCA Civ 1664. The Court of Appeal endorsed the approach taken by Poole J at first instance, in a case about assessing future risk of harm in an application involving a non-Hague country. Moylan LJ (with the agreement of Peter Jackson and Warby LJJ) set out the following:
“81. I first deal with the submission that the judge's decision was flawed because, as part of his analysis, when considering "the risks to the children in the context of a return to E", he adopted the Re E approach to the assessment of those risks. In my view, the judge was entitled to use this approach. He was, as Peter Jackson LJ observed during the hearing, doing no more than evaluating the evidence to consider the maximum level of risk. He could have done this as part of his analysis without referring to Re E and no objection could have been taken.”
[34]Moylan LJ concluded:
"In summary, the court's decision is a welfare determination and must give paramount consideration to the welfare of each child as required by section 1(1) of the CA 1989. The court has to decide the extent to which it needs to investigate the facts of the case, including by holding a fact-finding hearing, in order properly to determine what order is in a child's best interests. The court needs to consider all relevant factors, including PD 12J, when determining whether a summary determination is sufficient and what order to make."
[35]As set out above, Cobb J affirmed this approach recently in Re O. Furthermore, it is not necessary to get overly involved in questions of habitual residence.[36]I have also reminded myself of Practice Direction 12J of the Family Procedure Rules in respect of domestic abuse.

Analysis

[37]Given the Applicant issued an application for a child arrangements order and a specific issue order and the Respondent had issued applications for a Children Act 1989 order and an inherent jurisdiction return order, I carefully clarified the issues at the outset. Both counsel were unambiguously clear that this court had jurisdiction and that the sole issue was whether to make a return order or not, pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction. It was accepted I need not determine the children’s habitual residence at the date of the various applications or at the date of the hearing.[38]At the conclusion of the hearing I ordered there should be supervised video call contact between the Respondent and the children and that two days later there should be a two hour lunch meeting between the Respondent and the children, supported by an independent social worker. I have seen a note of this. It went well. The children ran to their father and hugged him. They had a happy lunch and no issues arose from the ISW’s report.[39]The Respondent’s succinct submission is that the children have the closest connection with Nigeria, where they have been brought up. Orders were made before the Nigerian courts setting out their custody arrangements between the parties. The Applicant should not be permitted to benefit from the improper removal of the children from their home. The Applicant submits the children are now settled and happy and their welfare dictates they should remain here. The Applicant is fearful of returning and does not consider there are adequate protective measures. I have read the opening and closing notes of each counsel carefully.[40]The parties agreed that fact finding of the allegations of domestic abuse need not be determined prior to the determination of the summary return. I agree. I adopt the approach set out by Moylan LJ in A and B. I will take the mother’s allegations at their highest and consider whether this places the three children at risk of harm if returned to Nigeria.[41]Adopting this approach and conducting some assessment of the allegations of domestic abuse and coercive controlling behaviour, but without conducting fact finding, the following points are material to the future risk of harm to the children in Nigeria. First, the Nigerian courts have been seized with these proceedings and they apply a very similar child welfare and domestic abuse legislative scheme. Aside from the initial, possibly overly enthusiastic ex parte order (how often ex parte orders are not the way to begin litigation) the Nigerian courts have made, if I may say so, entirely appropriate orders. The courts determined the children should live with their mother and spend time with their father. The court required the Applicant to disclose the children’s address. An order was made the children should not leave the jurisdiction.[42]Furthermore, I note the Applicant appeared content with this and invited the Respondent into her new home to see the children. She wished to supervise this, contrary to the terms of the order. Her efforts in the witness box to place a spin on various Nigerian court orders were not impressive. She has chosen to disobey those orders. Furthermore, I note from the agreed evidence, the Respondent and his parents were aware for many months in 2024 where the children were being educated. However, there are no allegations they tried to remove the children from school or interfere in the Applicant’s life when collecting or dropping off the children. Furthermore, it is part of the Applicant’s case that the Respondent demonstrated insufficient interest in the children in 2024 and missed birthdays etc. When assessing all this, in the knowledge that orders can be made and be largely enforced by the Nigerian courts and authorities, I do not assess the children to be at risk of harm if returned. I do not assess the Applicant to be at risk of harm which would impact on the children. The agreed facts and the protective schemes offered through Nigerian court orders will manage those risks. The allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour are at the lower end of the scale. The relationship between the parties is over. The conflict that has arisen is over the custody of the children. The Respondent sought to regulate this by way of court orders. The Applicant has adopted an unreal interpretation of those orders to make unilateral decisions for the children. Therefore, taking allegations at their highest there is only very limited risk of emotional harm to the children. This can be ameliorated by protective measures. Ideally this would be by way of an order from the Nigerian courts. I will return this below.[43]Having considered the Cafcass evidence and the ISW report of the contact, it is clear that the children need both parents in their lives. This is what the Nigerian courts ordered. If the children remain in England, they will see very little of their father. The Applicant told Ms Huntingdon she would not return to Nigeria. However, she has not said that in her written or oral evidence to the court. I do not assess her as likely to abandon her children, should a return order be made. My assessment of her written and oral evidence is that she is an intelligent, resourceful and very capable woman. She took the decision to end the relation in 2023 and she navigated the post-relationship issues and brought up the children as she has wanted. The nature of custody and contact in Nigeria are issues that can be litigated there, subject to Nigeria’s legislative scheme which places the best interests of the children at the heart of decision making. If the Applicant wishes to relocate to another country, there is no expert evidence before this court, that the Nigerian court cannot grant a relocation order. It is best a Nigerian judge in a Nigerian court considers that issue. There may have been adjournments of the Nigerian proceedings but that also happens in this jurisdiction, too.[44]The Applicant, in opposition to the Nigerian order, insisted she would supervise contact in 2024. As a result, the children were denied time with their father. This has caused them emotional harm. The abrupt departure from Nigeria to England was, in my judgement, emotionally harmful to the children. They were harmed when taken from their country, their home, their wider families and friends, their culture, their school and their background, by being brought to the UK. They were housed in hotels and then moved to a new home. They had to fit into an alien country. They had to start again in new schools. All this is harmful to them. Their father did not know where they were until November 2024.[45]Notwithstanding the facts that the eldest child was born in the United Kingdom and all three children are British citizens, it is clear the country with which these children have the closest connection is Nigeria. They were brought up there and lived there all their lives until they were removed by the Applicant in July. The fact they have lived in the United Kingdom for nearly a year by the time of this judgment does not alter this fact. The children were brought up by the parents and have wider Nigerian family. They went to school in Nigeria. Culturally, Nigeria is home. These are Nigerian children and were the subject of proceedings before the Nigerian courts.[46]I fully accept they have enjoyed a year of life in England and Wales and have done well at school. I accept they have had their medical and dental needs met. They have gone to church and they have friends. However, they were doing well in Nigeria. They had a wide extended family. They had been at the same schools. X had been at the school for his nursery and was in the third year of his primary. His sisters followed him at this school. Whilst it is disruptive for them to be returned, they are young and resilient and the end of the summer term is a good time for them to return. Whilst I do not apply the principles of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, I consider it appropriate to take into account the fact their abrupt removal from Nigeria was contrary to the orders of those courts and that permitting the Applicant to benefit from their relatively settled position here is not principled.[47]I place limited weight on the wishes and feelings of the children as reported by Cafcass. They have little understanding of the issues with the summary return. However, I do place weight on the fact they have positive views of Nigeria and the Respondent. I place weight on the fact the only negative with a return to Nigeria was X’s preference to be able to swim at school in England. They are young, but it would be wrong to discount entirely their ascertainable wishes and feelings.[48]Their educational and health needs can be met either in England or Nigeria. After some unfortunate equivocation, the father has made clear the resources are in place for them to return to their former school. Health insurance is arranged in Nigeria.[49]Ultimately, these are Nigerian children who grew up in that country with their parents and their broader family. That is their background and their identity. Contrary to court orders, the Applicant removed them abruptly from this life. Despite the fact, they have now been here for nearly a year, in my judgement, having regard to their welfare as my paramount consideration, a summary return to permit the Nigerian courts to determine matters is in their best interests.[50]I will make a conditional return order. I have formed the view that the allegations made result in the risk of only limited emotional harm. Possibly more harmful to the children is the non-compliance with the orders from the Nigerian court. Nonetheless, there is some time to ensure an adequate protective framework to manage the limited risks. I take the view the appropriate time to return the children to Nigeria is over the summer holiday after they have completed their summer term at school. That provides a window of opportunity for undertakings and/or orders to be made before the Nigerian courts, which remain seized of litigation between these parties.[51]The parties, led by the Respondent, are to seek an order before the Nigerian courts, which is enforceable, providing maintenance which will cover the children’s educational, health and other expenses. He should also give an undertaking or agree to be bound by an order not to intimidate, harass or pester the Applicant, albeit he denies ever having done so. He should also avoid being present at the airport when the Applicant and children return. With these measures in place, a return to Nigeria, to their home, for the children can take place after the end of their current school term in late July 2025. Should there be a lack of clarity or a dispute about the terms of any order in the extant Nigerian proceedings, I shall list this matter for a review hearing before the end of this term, reserved to be heard by me. I will consider at that review hearing if necessary whether undertakings alone in this jurisdiction would be sufficient, should there be difficulties before the Nigerian courts, which I consider unlikely.[52]I ask counsel to draft an order to give effect to this decision.