“I spoke with F … who has been working with BC at the clinic for complex trauma. F was aware that BC wished to change her name but believed that this would be done through deed poll as previously there has been no mention of going to court for the name change. F spoke about how BC does not like speaking about sensitive issues but can understand why she does not want to keep her father’s name. F did not feel that she could comment on the name change but said that she thought using a preferred name for the time being and it would be best for BC to wait until she was eighteen to formally change her name.”
“The mother failed to prioritise BC’s welfare owing to the following: (a) allowed BC to share a bed with the father; (b) withdrew her consent for BC to have a forensic intimate assessment on [date in 2021]; (c) having confirmed her belief in her daughter’s allegations on [date in 2021] allowed the father to return to the family home on [date in 2022]. She allowed this to happen without informing the local authority and believed she could safeguard D; (d) failed to co-operate with either the local authority’s parenting assessment and Professor Beal’s psychological assessment.”
“There are no regulations governing the execution of deeds poll. The regulations only apply to the enrolment of such deeds poll, and the purpose of enrolment is only evidential and formal. A deed poll is just as effective or ineffective whether it is enrolled or not; the only point of enrolment is that it will provide unquestionable proof, if proof is required. No more. So that the deed poll in this case is not vitiated in any way by failure to comply with those enrolment regulations. It simply means that the deed cannot be enrolled.”
“(i) Where only one person has parental responsibility for a child (e.g. a surviving parent after the death of the other; or the mother of a non-marital child where there has been no order or agreement for parental responsibility) that person has the right and power lawfully to cause a change of surname without any other permission or consent. (iii) Where two or more people have parental responsibility for a child then one of those people can only lawfully cause a change of surname if all other people having parental responsibility consent or agree. Subject to (iii) below, there is no necessary requirement that that consent be in writing (although the practical effect of the Practice Direction of11th April 1994 is to require writing before enrolment of a deed poll). (iii) Where two or more people have parental responsibility for a child and either a residence order or a care order is in force, then one of those people can only lawfully cause a change of surname if all other people having parental responsibility consent in writing (ss. 13(1) or 33(7)). (iv) In any other situation an appropriate order of a court is required. I repeat that none of these conclusions relate to a much older child, in particular over the age of 16, where the consent of that child may (I stress “may”, for I have not considered the point) be both necessary and sufficient.”
“Change of child’s name or removal from jurisdiction. (1)Where a child arrangements order to which subsection (4) applies is in force with respect to a child, no person may— (a) cause the child to be known by a new surname … … without either the written consent of every person who has parental responsibility for the child or the leave of the court.” … (4) This subsection applies to a child arrangements order if the arrangements regulated by the order consist of, or include, arrangements which relate to either or both of the following— (a) with whom the child concerned is to live, and (b) when the child is to live with any person.”
“33(3) While a care order is in force with respect to a child, the local authority designated by the order shall— (a) have parental responsibility for the child; and (b) have the power (subject to the following provisions of this section) to determine the extent to which — (i) a parent, guardian or special guardian of the child; or (ii) a person who by virtue of section 4A has parental responsibility for the child, may meet his parental responsibility for him. (4) The authority may not exercise the power in subsection (3)(b) unless they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.”
“[The Judge] reviewed authorities in relation to change of surname over the last 35 years, although it seems that he was not referred to one of the latest decisions in this court. From those authorities he drew guidance which in my opinion simply did not stand transplanting into the ground that he surveyed. It may be that those authorities distracted him from the analysis which he would have carried out had he continued from his starting point, namely that there was no authority directly in point. … I do not think that the judge sufficiently identified the fact that K is clearly a Gillick competent child. Such an application clearly requires special consideration. … In determining an application by a Gillick competent child in the care of a local authority, the welfare principle must of course be paramount. However, in addition, the judge should give very careful consideration to the wishes, feelings, needs and objectives of the applicant. If he has the advantage of advice from a guardian ad litem who has had the opportunity to make a thorough investigation of the family dynamics, he should pay particular heed. Next, he must give searching scrutiny to the motives and stated objectives of the respondent. Here, the father’s stated objective was to maintain and restore his relationship with his daughter. It is hard to see how that objective would be advanced by requiring her to be cross-examined in the family proceedings, by requiring her attendance at the crown court trial and by opposing this appeal. The inconsistency must cast doubt upon the stated motive. Finally, the fresh evidence only reinforces my opinion that the application should have been granted on 29th July. The acquittal probably retards rather than advances the prospects of any contact between K and her father. K is now 15. The letter of 1st September is sad but determined in her rejection of her father. Her right to determine her surname without the leave of the court is likely to arrive before there has been a change sufficient to weigh in the scale which we balance.”
“i) BC can use her preferred name without needing to change it legally, and given her hesitancy in using her preferred name, changing her name legally at this stage would not be in her best interests; ii) There is a real risk that her relationship with her family will break down should she legally change her name; and iii) BC’s case is vastly different to the facts before the court in Re S.”