“1. Child A and Child B be permitted to have free and unsupervised conversations and contact with their legal representative Ms Broadley of Goodman Ray solicitors by way of using the following telephone number [deleted]. 2. Child A’s personal mobile telephone number alleged to have been disabled by the applicant father earlier today is to be returned to Child A in working condition to enable her to use it upon her return home. 3. There be no “lockdown” by way of locking Child B and Child A in their bedrooms.”
“This order was made at a hearing without notice to the respondent. The reason why the order was made without notice to the respondent was that the court accepted that, were the respondent given notice of this application, there is a significant risk that she would take steps to release the shares held by Atlas Peak Capital Partners 2 on her behalf and thereafter to sell these and/or transfer them or their sale proceeds to a location or locations unknown to the applicant and the court. The respondent has the right to apply to the court to vary or discharge the order.”
“My Lords, for that reason I would go further and announce loud and clear that the standard of proof in finding the facts necessary to establish the threshold under section 31(2) or the welfare considerations in section 1 of the 1989 Act is the simple balance of probabilities, neither more nor less. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.”
“The following principles apply to this finding of fact hearing: a. The burden of proof lies on the party that makes an allegation of fact and identifies the findings they invite the court to make. b. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. c. Findings must be based on evidence not suspicion or speculation - Lord Justice Munby in Re A (A child) (Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation)[2011] EWCA Civ 12 . d. The court must take into account all the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence – as Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President observed in Re T[2004] EWCA Civ 558 ,[2004] 2 FLR 838 . e. It is not uncommon for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress. The fact that a witness may have lied does not necessarily mean they are guilty of the matter alleged against them and the fact that the witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything: see R v Lucas[1981] QB 720 .” a. The burden of proof lies on the party that makes an allegation of fact and identifies the findings they invite the court to make. c. Findings must be based on evidence not suspicion or speculation - Lord Justice Munby in Re A (A child) (Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation)[2011] EWCA Civ 12 . d. The court must take into account all the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence – as Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President observed in Re T[2004] EWCA Civ 558 ,[2004] 2 FLR 838 . e. It is not uncommon for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress. The fact that a witness may have lied does not necessarily mean they are guilty of the matter alleged against them and the fact that the witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything: see R v Lucas[1981] QB 720 .”
“I have in mind the guidance given by Baker J (as he then was) in Re JS (A Minor)[2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam) and in particular at [43] his point 7: "Seventh, the evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in the hearing and the court is likely to place considerable weight on the evidence and the impression it forms of them (see Re W and another (Non-accidental injury) [2003] FCR 346)." 33. The reasoning of Baker J in Re JS (A Minor) was approved by the President in Re M (Fact-Finding Hearing: Injuries to Skull)[2013] 2 FLR 322 ,[2012] EWCA Civ 1710 at [30]. More recently, the courts have looked at the issue of what can, in broad terms, be identified as the fallibility of oral evidence. The issue of the extent to which a court should rely on the recollection of witnesses and the fallibility of human memory first arose in a commercial setting through observations made by Leggatt J (as he then was) in Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd and Another[2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) ('Gestmin') at [15] – [22], and more recently in Blue v Ashley[2017] EWHC 1928 (Comm) at [68] – [69]. 34. In the Gestmin case, at [22], Leggatt J expressed the view that the best approach for a judge to adopt in a commercial trial was to place little, if any, reliance on a witness's recollection of what was said in meetings and conversations; rather factual findings were to be based on inferences drawn from documentary evidence and known or probable facts. This was followed in Blue v Ashley, where Leggatt J at [70], having rehearsed his own earlier observations in Gestmin, approached evidence of a crucial conversation in a way that was "[m]indful of the weaknesses of evidence based on recollection". 35. The Court of Appeal considered both of these cases in Kogan v Martin and Others[2019] EWCA Civ 1645 ('Kogan'). This was a case where the judge at first instance had wrongly regarded Leggatt J's statements in Gestmin and Blue v Ashley as an "admonition" against placing any reliance at all on the recollections of witnesses. 36. The Court of Appeal in Kogan emphasised the need for a balanced approach to the significance of oral evidence regardless of jurisdiction. Although it was a copyright dispute between former partners, the judgment was a judgment of the court with wider implications. 37. In relation to the treatment of the evidence of the Claimant, the Court in Kogan said: "88. … We start by recalling that the judge read Leggatt J's statements in Gestmin v Credit Suisse and Blue v Ashley as an "admonition" against placing any reliance at all on the recollections of witnesses. We consider that to have been a serious error in the present case for a number of reasons. First, as has very recently been noted by HHJ Gore QC in CBX v North West Anglia NHS Trust [2019] 7 WLUK 57, Gestmin is not to be taken as laying down any general principle for the assessment of evidence. It is one of a line of distinguished judicial observations that emphasise the fallibility of human memory and the need to assess witness evidence in its proper place alongside contemporaneous documentary evidence and evidence upon which undoubted or probable reliance can be placed. Earlier statements of this kind are discussed by Lord Bingham in his well-known essay The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues (from The Business of Judging, Oxford 2000). But a proper awareness of the fallibility of memory does not relieve judges of the task of making findings of fact based upon all of the evidence. Heuristics or mental short cuts are no substitute for this essential judicial function. In particular, where a party's sworn evidence is disbelieved, the court must say why that is; it cannot simply ignore the evidence. […] 41. The court must, however, be mindful of the fallibility of memory and the pressures of giving evidence. The relative significance of oral and contemporaneous evidence will vary from case to case. What is important, as was highlighted in Kogan, is that the court assesses all the evidence in a manner suited to the case before it and does not inappropriately elevate one kind of evidence over another.”
“28. Of course in the present case, the issue concerned an alleged course of conduct spread across years. I do not accept that the Judge should have been driven by the dicta in the cases cited by the Appellants to exclude the impressions created by the manner in which B and C gave their evidence. In family cases at least, that would not only be unrealistic but, as I have said, may deprive a judge of valuable insights. There will be cases where the manner in which evidence is given about such personal matters will properly assume prominence. As Munby LJ said in Re A (A Child) (No. 2)[2011] EWCA Civ. 12 said at [104] in a passage described by the Judge as of considerable assistance in the present case: “Any judge who has had to conduct a fact-finding hearing such as this is likely to have had experience of a witness - as here a woman deposing to serious domestic violence and grave sexual abuse - whose evidence, although shot through with unreliability as to details, with gross exaggeration and even with lies, is nonetheless compelling and convincing as to the central core… Yet through all the lies, as experience teaches, one may nonetheless be left with a powerful conviction that on the essentials the witness is telling the truth, perhaps because of the way in which she gives her evidence, perhaps because of a number of small points which, although trivial in themselves, nonetheless suddenly illuminate the underlying realities.” 29. Still further, demeanour is likely to be of real importance when the court is assessing the recorded interviews or live evidence of children. Here, it is not only entitled but expected to consider the child’s demeanour as part of the process of assessing credibility, and the accumulated experience of listening to children’s accounts sensitises the decision-maker to the many indicators of sound and unsound allegations.”
“One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the "lie" is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”