“… there is a prominent strain of public policy hostile to forensic delay. The court will look critically at explanations for it; and, even irrespective of its effect upon the respondent, will be likely, by reason of it and subject to the potency of other factors, to reduce or even eliminate its provision for the applicant. Nevertheless it remains important to address its effect upon the respondent. In some cases … a respondent can show that he has assumed financial obligations or otherwise arranged his financial affairs in the belief that the applicant would make no claim against him and that he has done so in a way which, even if it were possible, it would not be reasonable for him to put into reverse.”
“It is not invading privilege to say that any of the lawyers in this case (past or current) advising on this factual matrix: (i) 3+ years on from (plainly, on its face) a full and final Russian consent order which left her with substantial assets (ii) Russian client who (iii) kept very substantial connections with Russia – including a$8.6 million property in Moscow, and (iv) had no enduring connection with London – and no property here, would have advised her that she must at the very least get rid of the Russian property before issuing, and solidify connections here by purchasing property in London asap after that.”
“In my judgment this interpretation of how matters should be approached for the purposes of the section 16 enquiry is unduly restrictive. I have already referred to the terms of section 16 of the 1984 Act and the approach commended by Lord Collins in Agbaje. Even if the terms of the agreement were fair in the light of the then prevailing circumstances, that fact, of itself, is not necessarily a bar to an effective Part III claim provided that the English court considers it “appropriate” in all the circumstances to make an order. The tension here (as so often) lies in the twin objectives of achieving finality in litigation and fairness of outcome in circumstances as they are found to be at the time an application is made. I have to stand back and survey all the circumstances of this case, including the particular factors listed in section 16. Having completed that survey, I am obliged to dismiss the application only in circumstances where I am not satisfied by the conclusion of the case that it would be appropriate to make an order. The financial benefit which the applicant has already received under the terms of the Russian agreement and order (and, by implication, the inherent fairness or unfairness of that order) will be directly relevant under section 16 (2)(d) and (e). The delay of over five years in bringing her application will also be relevant under section 16(2)(i). So too, on a holistic survey, is the availability in this jurisdiction of property in respect of which an order under section 17 could be made. That section, by specific reference, incorporatessection 24(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 pursuant to which the court has power under section 24(1)(c) to vary an ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlement made on them as parties to the marriage.”
“I do not accept that I am confined in terms to a consideration of what an English court would have done in 2009. In terms of my application of the law in this context, the Supreme Court has confirmed that the presence of either or both of ‘hardship’ or ‘injustice’ in any given case will be relevant considerations for the purposes of both section 16 and section 18 of the 1984 Act.”