“Success Fee This is 100% of the basic charges, where the claim proceeds to 28 days after service of the defence; 50% if the case settles after proceedings are issued but before 28 days after the defence is served; or 25% if the case settles before proceedings are issued …”
“10. The success fee has been staged in order to take into account the risks at different stages of the litigation. If the case settles before proceedings are issued, Counsel will not have to accept a significant further risk or incur further costs on the client’s behalf and is thus willing to accept a significantly reduced fee. 11. If the case settles after proceedings issued but before 28 days after the defence is served more costs will have to be incurred including the settling of a reply if justification is pleaded and advising on disclosure and evidence. 12. If the case proceeds to 28 days after service of the defence then this is the most expensive part of an action. The success fee is therefore set at 100% if the case reaches this stage in order to compensate for this risk.”
“Jodie claims Matt’s mood took a disturbing turn off screen. He used to break and smash things all the time: he broke a door in my house, he threw my ipod against the wall, he threw my mobile phone out of the window, she recounts. The last straw was when he came charging at me and shoved me into a door. I fell onto the floor and he shook me, screaming in my face. The minute he walked away I called my dad who came around and threw Matt out.”
“…As you are aware, both parties are required by the Defamation Pre-Action Protocol to consider Alternative Dispute Resolution. One of the suggestions offered in the Protocol is a referral to the Press Complaints Commission (PCC). MGN would be happy to have this matter resolved fully and finally by the PCC. Please could you indicate whether you agree.”28 May 2008 : “… MGN would be happy to meet you with regard to settling this matter. However, I would be grateful if you would indicate what you would expect to achieve from this meeting. As previously indicated, MGN is satisfied that the words complained of are true….”29 May 2008 : “MGN is happy to meet with you to try and avoid litigation. If, however, you are intending to meet MGN with regard to negotiating the wording of an apology and the payment to your client of damages, then I do not believe any progress could be made…”
“The last straw was when he came charging at me and shoved me into a door. I fell onto the floor and he shook me, screaming in my face. The minute he walked away I called my dad who came round and threw Matt out.” 4. The words complained of referred to and would have been understood to have referred to the Claimant who was named elsewhere in the article and a photograph of whom with Ms Marsh appeared in the article above the caption “Jodie with ex Matt Peacock – their marriage only lasted a month”. 5. Further and/or alternatively, from on or about13 April 2008 , until it was removed on or about16 April 2008 , the Defendant published the defamatory words set out in paragraph 3 above on its website under the headline, “Jodie Marsh: Now I’ve got perfect boobs I’ll be at it like a maniac”
“(2) Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will – (a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue; and (b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party. (Factors which the court may take into account are set out in rule 44.5).”
“11.4 Where a party has entered into a funding arrangement the costs may, subject to rule 44.3B include an additional liability. 11.5 In deciding whether the costs claimed are reasonable and (on a standard basis) proportionate, the court will consider the amount of any additional liability separately from the base costs. … 11.7 When the court is considering the factors to be taken into account in assessing an additional liability, it will have regard to the facts and circumstances as they reasonably appear to the solicitor or counsel when the funding arrangement was entered into and at the time of any variation of the arrangement. 11.8(1) In deciding whether a percentage increase is reasonable relevant factors to be taken into account may include: (a) the risk that the circumstances in which the costs, fees or expenses will be payable might or might not occur …” (a) the risk that the circumstances in which the costs, fees or expenses will be payable might or might not occur …”
“Finally, we have benefited from reading the careful judgment of Judge Barnett in the Chester County Court, on9 May 2003 , in Cheshire County Council v Lea (unreported). Although what we have said about the law (and particularly about paragraph 11.8(2) of the Costs Practice Direction) must supercede what is said in that judgment, this represented a bold attempt to combat what Lord Hoffmann described as a ratchet effect in Callery v Gray (Nos 1 and 2)[2002] 1 WLR 2000 , para 32, leading to ever higher success fees. We end by reiterating that costs judges should be more willing to approve what appear to be high success fees in cases which have gone a long distance towards trial if the maker of the CFA has agreed that a much lower success fee should be payable if the claim settles at an early stage: see In re Claims Direct Test Cases[2003] 4 All ER 508 , paragraph 101, for an earlier exposition of this principle.”
“The logic behind a two-stage success fee is that, in calculating the success fee, it can properly be assumed that if, notwithstanding the compliance with the protocol, the other party is not prepared to settle, or is not prepared to settle upon reasonable terms, there is a serious defence [emphasis added]. By the end of the protocol period, both parties should have decided upon their positions …”
“21. In October 2001 the claimant’s solicitor would not have had access to the post-2001 evidence or other material cited in paragraphs 12-16 above. When deciding upon a success fee he had two choices. He could have taken the view that this claim would probably settle without fuss at a reasonably early stage, but he wished to protect himself against the risk that the claim might go the full distance and might eventually fail. In those circumstances he could select the two-stage success fee discussed by this court in Callery v Gray[2001] EWCA 1117 at [106] – [112],[2001] 1 WLR 2112 . In this situation he would be willing to restrict himself to a low success fee if the case settled within the protocol period – or within such other period, perhaps until the service of the defence, as he might choose – and to have the benefit of a high success fee for the cases that did not settle early. As things turned out, he would have benefited on the facts of this case if he had adopted this course: a high two-stage success fee would have been more readily defensible in a case which did not settle until proceedings were quite far advanced. 22. Alternatively, he could have selected, as he did in fact, a single-stage success fee, being a fee which he would seek to recover at the same level however quickly or slowly the claim was resolved. In those circumstances it would not be possible to justify so high a success fee.”
“Secondly, I do believe with all respect that Mr Justice Jack understated the effect on the question of reasonableness of the absence of a staged success fee approach when he said that his interpretation of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ku was “it may be harder for a solicitor to justify a high fee if he has not in an appropriate case entered into a two stage agreement”