Crossroads Corporate Finance (UK) LLP v Ontario Management Limited & Ors [2025] EWHC 1011 (Comm)

[2025] EWHC 1011 (Comm)

Case No LM-2022-000277

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

LONDON CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)

Venue The Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Building, Fetter Lane

Date Monday, 10 March 2025

London EC4A 1NL

Before

MR SIMON TINKLER

(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

Between

CROSSROADS CORPORATE FINANCE (UK) LLPClaimant

ONTARIO MANAGEMENT LIMITEDDefendant

FRANCOIS DENIS MARIE LEGRAINDefendant

HELMUT FRANZ MORENTDefendant

MR S PAUL appeared for Claimant

MR T JENNS appeared for Third Defendant

for The First and Second Defendants did not appear and were not represented

JUDGMENT

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[1]THE DEPUTY JUDGE: I have had opportunity to consider the papers, some of which I had had the opportunity to read ahead of time and also the submissions you both very ably made on Friday.

[2]The claimant is a corporate finance advisor based in England and Wales. Its claim is that the three defendants did not pay a fee to which it was entitled. The claim is brought in contract, on the basis of unjust enrichment, breach of confidence and by way of unlawful means conspiracy.

[3]There are three defendants. The first two defendants are an English company and an individual. They have both validly been served with the claim. Indeed, pleadings concluded almost 12 months ago. The third defendant is an individual residing in Germany and his position is the subject of this application.

[4]On 2 May 2023 this court gave permission at a without notice hearing for the claim to be served on the third defendant outside the jurisdiction. The third defendant challenges that decision on the grounds that full and frank disclosure was not given to the court at the hearing. At the same hearing the time for that service, which would have expired on 9 June 2023, was extended by 6 months. The third defendant challenges the decision to extend the time for service on the grounds that full and frank disclosure was not given to the court at the hearing and also on the grounds that the decision itself was wrong.

[5]The claim was filed with the Foreign Process Section at the Royal Courts of Justice (“FPS”) on 8 August 2023. There were significant delays within the FPS and also in effecting service in Germany. The claimant was given permission on 8 November 2023 at a hearing without notice for time for service to be extended by a further six months. The third defendant challenges that decision as he says the decision was wrong.

[6]As service had still not been effected, further permission to extend the time for service was given on 13 May 2024. That decision is not challenged in itself, but if either of the two previous extensions were wrongly granted then the third extension would fall away.

[7]Service was finally effected by the German authorities in November 2024 some 15 months after the claim was filed at the FPS.

The application to set aside the substantive decisions

[8]I turn first to the application to set aside the substantive decisions to extend the time for service.

Law

[9]It is common ground that this is a re-hearing of the applications to extend the period of time for service. It is not a review of those decisions. That is because each of the decisions were made on a without notice basis.

[10]The principles for considering whether the extension of time should have been granted were summarised by Carr LJ (as she was then) in ST v BAI (SA) (t/a Brittany Ferries)

[2022] EWCA Civ 1037

at paragraph 62 as follows:

“62. For ease of reference, I summarise the relevant general principles as follows: i) The defendant has a right to be sued (if at all) by means of originating process issued within the statutory period of limitation and served within the period of its initial validity of service. It follows that a departure from this starting point needs to be justified; ii) The reason for the inability to serve within time is a highly material factor. The better the reason, the more likely it is that an extension will be granted. Incompetence or oversight by the claimant or waiting some other development (such as funding) may not amount to a good reason. Further, what may be a sufficient reason for an extension of time for service of particulars of claim is not necessarily a sufficient reason for an extension for service of the claim form; iii) Where there is no good reason for the need for an extension, the court still retains a discretion to grant an extension of time but is not likely to do so; iv) Whether the limitation period has or may have expired since the commencement of proceedings is an important consideration. If a limitation defence will or may be prejudiced by the granting of an extension of time, the claimant should have to show at the very least that they have taken reasonable steps (but not all reasonable steps) to serve within time; v) The discretionary power to extend time prospectively must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective.”

[11]I also note paragraph 63 of ST v BAI in which Carr LJ further explained :

“In the present context, however, the phrase [exceptional circumstances] should not be taken to mean any more than its literal sense, namely “out of the ordinary”

. It means, as identified for example in Hoddinnott at [52], that the actual or potential expiry of a limitation defence is a factor of considerable importance. The factors in favour of an extension of time will have to be, either separately or cumulatively, out of the ordinary.”

[12]There are number of other authorities to which I was referred. I will address those at the relevant points. I am, however, mindful of the Carr LJ’s observation at paragraph 65 of ST v BAI:

“Finally, and self-evidently, the result of an application under CPR 7.6(2) in each case will be highly fact-specific. A comparison with the outcome on the facts of other cases is unlikely to be instructive”

[13]The task for the court in such applications is further explained in paragraph 69. It is:

“essentially first to evaluate the reason, and then to put that reason into a wider context, which requires consideration of the overriding objective and the balance of hardship to the parties”

Facts

[14]There are relatively few facts that are relevant for this application. They relate mainly to the proceedings and to the correspondence between the parties. The underlying facts of the claim themselves did not really bring much to bear on the application. I will set out the facts, to the extent relevant, when considering the points to which they relate.

Arguments

[15]I turn now to the principal arguments that were advanced.

[16]The third defendant says that at least some of the claims against him would be outside the limitation period if the time for service is not extended. He says this applies to the claim for breach of contract, and also possibly the other elements of the claim. That is, he says, the single most powerful reason why time for service should not be extended; he has a right for the claim to be barred for being out of time and he should not be denied that right.

[17]The third defendant also says that the claimant did not take reasonable steps to serve its claim. He says that the proceedings themselves were issued in December 2022, some five and a half years after the start of the relevant limitation period and up to 8 to 10 years after some of the initial events that are raised in this case. He says that the claimant then waited a further 3 months before taking steps to seek permission to serve outside the jurisdiction and did not bring the application for permission to extend the period to do so until some 4 months after the proceedings had been issued. It says there is no reasonable ground for these delays or for the claimant’s failure to move things forward more quickly. It should have issued the application for permission to serve out when the claim was issued and that no extension of time would then have been needed.

[18]The claimant, on the other hand, says it has taken reasonable steps to serve the claim. It acknowledges that it has not taken all possible steps and that some of the avenues it pursued were not, with hindsight, ones that were relevant. It says it issued proceedings over 4 months before the end of the relevant limitation period. It says it applied halfway through the six month service period for permission to serve outside the jurisdiction and subsequently to extend the period for service. It also, in essence, invited the court to infer that any earlier application to extend the time for service may have been premature, and it was certainly reasonable to wait some time before issuing it.

[19]The claimant says that it applied for alternative service, albeit unsuccessfully, indicating an awareness of the need to try as many routes as possible to bring the proceedings formally to the attention of the third defendant. It also invited the third defendant’s solicitors to accept service. They considered this request for around a month before saying they would not accept service at which point the claimant immediately asked for the extension of time for service.

[20]The claimant acknowledges that the limitation point is important. It accepts that there are some parts of the claim to which the third defendant “likely has an arguable limitation defence” if permission to extend the period is refused and a new claim is required. It says, however, that some elements of the claim are clearly not precluded on grounds of limitation. It says, on that basis, there will inevitably be claims that continue against the third defendant whatever the decision today and the requirement to serve a new claim will add nothing but delay to those matters. The claimant also points out that there are two other defendants who have been properly served and in relation to which proceedings cannot move forward until the matter with the third defendant is resolved; the delay hangs over them and the claimant.

[21]The claimant says that, during the period between the first and second applications, it entered into correspondence with the defendant's solicitors. In that correspondence the claimant was again seeking consent to serve the claim via the third defendant’s solicitors. The solicitors replied that they would consider the matter, although it seems that the claimant did not actually receive that reply at the time. The claimant says that this hope that service could be effected via the solicitors was a reason for it not making the application to the FPS until August 2023.

[22]The claimant also points to the fact that it took some 15 months as a matter of fact for the German authorities to serve the proceedings on the third defendant. I note that that was factually the case, but I also note that at the time the application was heard, namely May 2023, it was not known how long it would take to serve proceedings in Germany and certainly nobody knew that it would take 15 months. The most that was known is that it would take at least two months for the FPS to process the application and that whilst pre-Brexit it took the German authorities some two months to serve proceedings, at that stage it was unknown how long it would take the German authorities to serve proceedings.

[23]On 19 May 2023, prior to the expiry of the initial period for service of the claim, a copy of the claim form was provided to the third defendant's solicitors. They had previously received significant pre-action correspondence setting out the matters in the claim, but were therefore specifically aware of the details of the claim before the end of the initial period for service of the claim on 9 June 2023.

Findings

[24]Returning to paragraph 62 of ST v BAI, the defendant has the right to be sued within the initial statutory period of limitation and served within the period of its validity of service. The departure from that starting point needs to be justified. In this case, the period of initial validity of service extended to 9 June 2023.

[25]At the hearing before HHJ Pelling KC there were several reasons put forward for the need to extend time for service and for the delay in not having served the claim already. Those included issues relating to ATE policies and in perfecting the Particulars of Claim. Those aspects were not pursued before me. As this is a re-hearing, I did not take those factors into consideration. That left the only reason for the application as being the need to serve in Germany, and the delays that were anticipated in doing that.

[26]The reason for the inability to serve within time is a highly material factor. I was referred during argument to a number of authorities. Those authorities illustrate how the courts have considered the facts in different situations, but save where explicitly set out in my judgment, do not set down binding legal principles that apply to the facts in this case. Within these are a number of situations where the question of extending time for service related to service within the jurisdiction. That is of course much more likely on the facts to be within the direct control of the claimant.

[27]This is, however, a case of service outside the jurisdiction. The third defendant had exercised his legitimate right not to permit its solicitors to receive service within the jurisdiction. The claimant had not been successful with an application for alternative service. At that stage, therefore, the only way in which the defendant could be served was through the FPS and through service in Germany. The claimant had no control over the timescale for that to occur. The information before the court in May 2023 was that it would take at least two months for the FPS to process the application and a period that was uncertain but that, by inference, was likely to be in excess of two months in order to effect service. In other words, the combined FPS and German position meant that the service could not be affected within the initial period before 9 June 2023. That, in my judgment, constitutes a good reason for not being able to serve. It is, as is identified in Cecil & Others v Bayat & Others

[2011] 1 WLR 3086

at [49], a difficulty in effecting service. At that stage there was nothing the claimant could do to expedite or arrange service; it could not take matters into its own hands. There are, of course, other factors that are raised that may be relevant as to whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant the application but for the purposes of the first test, whether there is a good reason, in my judgment, there is.

[28]This brings me to paragraph 62(iv) of ST v BAI. That says in terms:

"Whether the limitation period has or may have expired since the commencement of proceedings is an important consideration. If a limitation will or may be prejudiced by the granting of an extension of time, the claimant should have to show at the very least that they have taken reasonable steps (but not all reasonable steps) to serve within time."

This question relates to the steps taken to serve the claim within time. If the claimant has not taken reasonable steps, then the limitation point becomes determinative. The requirement is to take reasonable steps. It is not a requirement to take all reasonable steps, which would be the case for a retrospective application for an extension under CPR 7.6 (3).

[29]The claimant issued proceedings on 9 December 2022. On 9 March 2023 it issued an application to serve out of the jurisdiction. If that application were successful then the period would end on 9 June 2023. The application was not dealt with on the papers. This was because the judge assessing it concluded, and the claimant accepts, that there were defects in the application. It was also because the court made an error in analysing whether the other defendants had been served by right or by consent. Although it was not clear whether the court would have decided the matter on the papers without that error, the error seemed to have added to the cumulative reasons why the court did not make a decision on the papers. The application was not heard until 2 May 2023. This delay seems to have been due to the court listing processes. The delay by the court’s decision to have an oral hearing rather than review the matters again on the papers was therefore not made by the claimant but was, however, caused in part or possibly almost entirely by it.

[30]The only evidence before the court as to what happened in the period between 9 December 2022 and 9 March 2023 is an email of 18 January 2023 that passed between the claimant and the third defendant. In it there appears to be an attempt put forward by the claimant to make a proposal of some sort to the defendant in order to try and resolve the matters without the claim proceeding. In other words, some sort of negotiation. Those are the steps that, generally speaking, the court seeks to encourage. It is a reasonable step for the claimant to have tried to resolve matters without resorting to litigation in the period even after the issue of claim but before service. Those steps did not, however, preclude the claimant taking steps in parallel to seek permission for, and extend the time for, service outside the jurisdiction. This attempt to negotiate is not, in my judgment, a bad reason for the claimant waiting a short while from issue of the claim form before making its applications for service, but neither does it, on its own, resolve matters conclusively in the claimant’s favour.

[31]The claimant attempted to engage with the solicitors for the third defendant to obtain agreement for service on them in the jurisdiction, which would have resulted in quicker service on the third defendant. The solicitors had not been contacted by the claimant for a significant period of time before receiving this request and therefore understandably did not immediately agree or disagree to it. They indicated they would seek instructions. Whilst there can be criticism of the period taken by the claimant to contact the third defendant’s solicitors, it was, in my judgment, reasonable to seek their permission to serve them as that would expedite the process for all parties. There is, on the other hand, no criticism of the third defendant's solicitors or the defendant for ultimately deciding not to accept that service. The solicitors declined service on behalf of the third defendant towards the end of April, a month after the request was made. The claimant then applied for the extension of time. Again, the claimant could have applied earlier for the extension, but in this period the third defendant was not sitting on its hands – it was actively considering whether to accept service. It was not unreasonable for the claimant to await the response on that decision.

[32]In summary, the claimant attempted to engage with the solicitors for the third defendant, it attempted to seek alternative service, it attempted in the intervening period between the issue of proceedings and service of claim to negotiate with the defendant outside of the legal process, and it issued its application some period of time after the issue of the claim form but not at the very last minute.

[33]The third defendant said that the claimant should have issued its application to serve out of the jurisdiction in December 2022 when the claim form was issued. He says that if the claimant done so then no application for an extension would ever have been needed. There was, however, no evidence that if the claim had been sent immediately to the FPS in December 2022 that it would have been served in Germany by June 2023. It is known is that in April 2023 it was believed that it would take at least two months for the FPS to process the claim, and that the time in Germany was likely to exceed two months for service. It is also known that as a matter of fact it took fifteen months to serve the claim. I am not satisfied that it is likely, let alone certain, that if the claimant had applied in December 2022 to serve out the of the jurisdiction that no extension would have been needed. If the claimant had applied to extend the time period at that stage, then the third defendant may well have argued that the application was premature and was incurring unnecessary costs. I cannot today decide on the merits of that argument but it would not have been an unreasonable position for the third defendant to have taken. It seems to me that it was not unreasonable therefore for the claimant to wait before issuing its application, and three months is within the range of reasonable periods to have taken, bearing in mind that the period for service was six months in total.

[34]This is not a situation where the claimant has left its issue of proceedings until the very last minute and followed that by the issue of an application at the very last minute, as for example was the case in Hastroodi v Hancock

[2004] EWCA Civ 65

(a case which involved service within the jurisdiction). The timescales when looked at overall do, in my judgment, support the view that it was a set of reasonable steps taken by the claimant. On balance, I find that it did take reasonable steps to serve within time. The threshold in paragraph 62(iv) of ST v BAI is met.

[35]I note, although it does not affect my decision, that the last moment for issuing the claim from a limitation point of view was April 2023. If it had issued its claim then and applied for permission to serve out then the time period for service would have been until October 2023. If this is right, then the claimant would find itself in a worse position today if I refuse the application than if it had delayed issue of the claim until the last minute.

[36]The conclusion in paragraph 34 takes me to the position where I need to calibrate the factors in favour of granting the extension and the factors that weigh against granting the extension.

[37]There is prejudice to the third defendant in relation to limitation. The defendant will be deprived of the opportunity to refute the contractual claim on the basis of the expiry of the limitation period. That is a significant matter. There was a suggestion that the third defendant may seek to challenge other aspects of the claim on the grounds of limitation. The claimant accepted that there might be arguments on some other grounds but submitted that there was no basis whatsoever for a limitation defence for the breach of confidence claim. In his skeleton argument, the third defendant put it that he had “at least, an arguable limitation defence”, but did not seem to dispute at the hearing that there was no limitation defence to the breach of confidence claim. It seems to me, without having had the benefit of full argument and evidence, that there is likely to a serious issue to be tried between the claimant and the third defendant in relation to at least some of the claim, notwithstanding that there might be some arguments on limitation.

[38]If the matter were to lie there, then my judgment would be that, on balance, the application to set aside the permission to extend should be refused. The hardship to the claimant, given the reasons for the delay which are outside its control, would outweigh the loss to the defendant of the limitation defence on, in all likelihood, part of the claim against him.

[39]There are, however, other factors that tip the scales more firmly in the claimant’s favour. In particular, the position of the other two defendants will be adversely affected by any decision not to extend time. There will be the need to issue a new claim which will be served on the third defendant because the non-contractual claims against the third defendant are still extant, or certainly very arguably extant. I have no current information on the delays at the FPS and in Germany but even on evidence before the court the period from now to service will be somewhere between four and 15 months, and more likely towards the higher end of that range. That is a material delay to proceedings which have already been in abeyance since summer 2024. The first and second defendants have a right for claims against them to be resolved. The claimant also has a right to have its claims against these defendants resolved without undue delay as well as a right to be able to pursue the third defendant for the claims that are not time-barred (noting that the third defendant argues that some of the delay is the claimant’s own fault).

[40]The third defendant has been aware of the detail of the claim against him since May 2023, well before the end of the initial time for service so is not prejudiced in his ability to prepare his defence by extending the time for service. That was identified in Hoddinott & Others v Persimmon Homes (Wessex) Ltd

[2008] 1 WLR 806

as being “an important factor relevant to the exercise of discretion”.

[41]The third defendant is also heavily involved in the underlying factual circumstances of this case.

[42]Finally, the claimant asserted that the claim was strong. This was denied by the third defendant. I did not attach weight either way to this assertion because the stronger the claim, the more important it is that a limitation defence be allowed to be put forward.

[43]For those reasons, in addition to the reasons in paragraph 38 above, my judgment is that application that permission to extend the period of time for service from 9 June for 6 months, should be granted. The factors cumulatively are out of the ordinary, and in particular it is out of the ordinary that a claimant is unable to serve a claim within the normal period for service because of what are currently extremely long delays in the FPS and German system. The order made on 2 May 2023 is therefore not set aside. I note for completeness that I reject the third defendant’s arguments that the application was so defective in compliance with the CPR that it should be rejected. In my judgment, the claimant adequately identified the material points in the applications and submissions in relation to all the applications.

[44]I turn to the second application in November 2023 to extend the time for service. A number of the points raised by the third defendant are identical in relation to the application to set aside the 2 May 2023 order. I have already rejected those. The point that is different is that by the time of the November 2023 application, the FPS had been provided with a copy of the claim form for service. That was however only in August 2023 some three months after the hearing on 2 May 2023 granting the initial extension.

[45]There was significant criticism of that delay by the third defendant. It was not, however, a delay that prejudiced the third defendant’s ability to prepare for the claim; he had been provided with a copy of the actual claim form and particulars of claim in May 2023. On close examination, it seems the delay was in part or possibly entirely caused by the ongoing correspondence between the claimant's solicitors and the third defendant's solicitors, in which the claimant was still trying to persuade the third defendant's solicitors to accept service and therefore expedite the process. I repeat that the third defendant had absolutely no obligation to agree to that request, but this was not a case that the third defendant's solicitors were sitting on their hands. They were considering the matter and as late as 30 June 2023 were prepared to consider accepting service. The claimant was, in my view, entitled to take the possibility of service being made through the third defendant’s solicitors into consideration when analysing the right time to make the filing with the FPS. They were correct to say that the explanation was that they had not had a “positive response” to their requests; they had been seeking a response but did not have one and ultimately filed the claim at the FPS as they had not received a positive response.

[46]It is clear to me that in November 2023 it would have been appropriate to extend the time for service. This is for the same reason as the May 2023 application and because I do not consider the three-month delay from May to August is sufficient to justify refusal of the request for extension. Indeed, it would not be a good precedent if correspondence between solicitors to move matters forward more quickly was subsequently used adversely – this would disincentivise people attempting to be more efficient. I would therefore not set aside the extension granted in November 2023.

[47]The third application to extend is also the subject of the application to set aside but I think it is agreed between the parties that if both the first and the second applications were successful, then the third would automatically be so. I agree with that analysis and therefore the third application to extend would have been granted by me on the same terms as done originally.

Failure to give full and frank disclosure

[48]I turn to the application to set aside the two orders on the basis that the disclosure that was given to HHJ Pelling KC was not full and frank. The legal principles relating to full and fair disclosure were summarised by Carr J (as she was then) in [7(vi)] of Tugushev v Vitaly Orlovand others (No. 2)

[2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm)

. They were not disputed by the parties.

[49]The principle that is most relevant to this case is that the matters put before the judge need to be full and frank but “there will be degrees of relevance, and a due sense of proportion must be kept” [paragraph 7(vi)]. The claimant did not have to cover every single point that could possibly be raised, nor did it need to draw the judge’s specific attention to the underlying documents that supported every contention made.

Permission to serve outside the jurisdiction

[50]The third defendant argued that the court was not sufficiently informed about a defence that the third defendant might raise. The third defendant says that the claimant did not identify to HHJ Pelling specific emails that showed that the claim could be against persons other than the third defendant. The skeleton argument from the claimant before HHJ Pelling included, however, specific lines that alerted HHJ Pelling to the fact that the third defendant may argue that “any fee payable to the claimant would have only been payable by [third party] and (b) any claim should be against [third party]”. In my judgment that is plainly sufficient in this case to alert the judge to the issue and flag the arguments that might be raised. In a hearing such as the one before HHJ Pelling it is not a matter of going into every matter that could be addressed at trial. It is giving the judge at the without notice hearing sufficient information to form a view as to whether the threshold for his decision is likely to be crossed. In my judgment, it plainly was.

[51]I do not consider the third defendant raises any meaningful question about the claimant having failed to be full and frank at the hearing to a degree that brings into question the granting of permission to serve outside the jurisdiction.

Extension of time for service

[52]The third defendant raised three reasons why permission to extend the time for service should be set aside for failure to be full and frank at that part of the without notice hearing.

[53]The first reason was that the claimant failed to disclose the 18 January 2023 email referred to in paragraph 30 above. At the hearing on 2 May 2023 the claimant asserted that proceeding without the third defendant was like “Hamlet without the prince”. The third defendant said that the email fundamentally undermined this crucial assertion. In my judgment, the email indicates that the claimant was seeking to settle with the third defendant and inviting the third defendant then to provide evidence in the claim. That actually emphasises the centrality of the third defendant to the matters in dispute. Plainly, if a party settles a claim against them then they cease to be involved but it does not follow generally, or in this case, that it means that a person was not centrally involved in the case. I reject this ground of criticism.

[54]The second reason was that there was a misrepresentation in the application that this was a “final attempt” to persuade his solicitors to accept service. It was, on the evidence drawn to the court’s attention, a first attempt to contact them about accepting service. It was accepted at the hearing before me that the sentence was plainly wrong. By the time of the hearing before HHJ Pelling, however, the position of the third defendant’s solicitors was a less material matter. By that time the third defendant’s solicitors had confirmed they would not accept service. HHJ Pelling was told that. HHJ Pelling may have been influenced by a belief that the third defendant’s solicitors had been slow to reply, but he was not taken to any evidence to show this, nor was he told this at the hearing. The critical factor in his mind was the fact that service could not be effected in Germany within the timescale. In addition, he placed weight on the fact that the third defendant’s solicitors had engaged materially during the pre-action period on the substantive issues, not that they had been engaged in discussion on service. Although the wording is clearly wrong and may have created an impression that influenced him, I am not satisfied that this one phrase in the entire application was sufficiently material to cast doubt on the overall full and frank disclosure obligation.

[55]The third reason was that there was no specific attempt to draw the judge's attention to the principle that a defendant is under no obligation to assist the claimant by his solicitor accepting service. HHJ Pelling KC is a very experienced judge, used to dealing with applications for service out on multiple bases, and I am sure he was aware of that principle without it needing to be specifically flagged. In any event, that point had become irrelevant by the time of the hearing because the defendant had declined to accept service through its solicitors. Any failure to mention this point is not, in my judgment, material enough to cast any doubt on whether disclosure was full and frank.

[56]It seems to me therefore that there is no basis on which either of those orders should be set aside on the basis that there was a failure to give full and frank disclosure.

[57]Accordingly, the third defendant's application fails. The order to grant permission to serve out and the order to extend the period for service overseas remain effective. (After further submissions)

[58]The test for permission to appeal is that there is a real prospect of success. In this case, the Court of Appeal would be treating this as a review rather than a re-hearing; in other words, whether the decision made by the court was one that was reasonably open to it.

[59]There are points of law raised by Mr Jenns, but they really go to the weight to be attached to factors which were put before this court. I weighed those factors in line with those authorities and balanced the scales accordingly. I found that the scales come down on the side of the claimant. I do not consider that an appeal on the basis that this was not a decision reasonably open to me would have a real prospect of success. I do not grant permission to appeal. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk