“The majority of the Directors are contracted by Waldorf Energy Partners Limited and paid by Waldorf Production UK Plc (formerly Waldorf Production UK Limited) for consultancy services including carrying out management for the Waldorf Energy Partners Group as a whole. Two directors are contracted and paid by Waldorf Production UK for services including carrying out management for the Waldorf Energy Partners Group as a whole. The total remuneration paid by the group in respect of the directors of this Company amounts to$5,681 k in the current period (2020:$575k ). The Directors do not believe it practical to apportion their remuneration between their services as directors of the Company and as directors of other group companies.”
“I have since transferred my entire shareholding to my children’s partnership entity. While I do not have documents to hand to show this because of the complex nature of our family tax arrangements, and the fact that I am no longer an owner or director of any Eden Roses entity, I will continue to try and procure documents which evidence this and will produce them once I am able to.”
“The order is designed to prevent injustice to a successful claimant by preserving assets and funds and guarding so far as possible against the risk that they will be disposed of or dissipated before a judgment is satisfied so as to render ineffective the claimant's attempts to recover what is due to him”. ii) The enforcement principle was restated by Rimer LJ in Lakatamia Shipping Co v Su[2014] EWCA Civ 636 , [46]: “The point of freezing orders is to restrain dealings by the defendant with assets which, if judgment is obtained, will be available to satisfy the judgment. It is obvious, therefore, that the assets targeted by such an order are assets that belong beneficially to the defendant, since only such assets will be so available. Thus assets held by the defendant as a trustee for others will not, in the absence of words expressly extending the order to them, be caught by the order.” iii) Perhaps the purest formulation of the enforcement principle is to be found in the judgment of Sir John Chadwick sitting as a judge of the Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands in Algosaibi v Saad Investments Company Ltd (CICA 1 of 2010), [32]-[33]: “It is necessary to keep in mind the basis upon which a court exercises the Mareva jurisdiction. It is to ensure that the effective enforcement of its judgment (when obtained) is not frustrated by the dissipation of assets which would be available to the claimant in satisfaction of that judgment. It is trite law that the jurisdiction is not exercised in order to provide the claimant with a security for his claim which he may otherwise have. But, as it seems to me, it is equally plain, as a matter of principle, that the jurisdiction is not exercised in order to give the claimant recourse to assets which would not otherwise be available to satisfy the judgment which he may obtain. The court needs to be satisfied of two matters before granting Mareva relief. First, that there is good reason to suppose that the assets in relation to which a freezing order is imposed would become available to satisfy the judgment which the claimant seeks; and, second, that there is good reason to suppose that, absent such relief, there is a real risk that those assets will be dissipated or otherwise put beyond the reach of the claimant. The fact that the potential judgment debtor (the CAD) has substantial control over assets which are held by a party against whom no cause of action is alleged (the NCAD) — say, because the NCAD can be expected to act in accordance with the wishes or directions of the CAD (whether or not it could be compelled to do so) — is likely to be of critical importance in relation to the question whether there is a real risk that the assets will be dissipated or otherwise put beyond the reach of the claimant. But, as it seems to me, the existence of substantial control is not, of itself, enough to meet the first of the two requirements just mentioned. It is not enough that the CAD could, if it chose, cause the assets held by the NCAD to be used to satisfy the judgment. It is necessary that the court be satisfied that there is good reason to suppose either (i) that the CAD can be compelled (through some process of enforcement) to cause the assets held by the NCAD to be used for that purpose; or (ii) that there is some other process of enforcement by which the claimant can obtain recourse to the assets held by the NCAD.”
“It is trite law that a company's assets so held do not belong beneficially to their shareholders, not even to a shareholder in the position of the first defendant who is, for all practical purposes, the sole owner of the companies. This was explained, by reference to high authority, by the majority of the Court of Appeal in Prest v Prest to which Burton J was referred, but which, when he came to para 16, he overlooked. He preferred the heretical view that because the sole owner of a company is in a position to control the destiny of its assets, the company's assets are his assets within the meaning of paragraph 3 of the order. That is wrong. The owner is of course able to control the destiny of the company's assets. But that does not make them his assets; and paragraph 3 is concerned only with assets which are his assets.” iii) However, in an appropriate case a court can make an order preventing dissipation of assts of a company as a means of preserving the value of the respondent’s shareholding (and thereby preserving the value of the respondent’s assets against which enforcement might be levied, just as a freezer prevents the encumbrance of the respondent’s assts for the same reason). An order of this kind (in the form of a notification injunction) was made in Lakatamia Shipping Company v Su. iv) There has been discussion of whether the decisions that control of a company does not give control of its assets within the terms of the standard freezing order are wholly consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Ablyazov that the respondent’s power to drawdown on a loan and apply it for whatever purposes he saw fit gave the respondent control over the assets of the lender (e.g. Grant and Mumford, [28-120] and FM Capital Partners Ltd v Marino[2018] EWHC 2889 (Comm) , [51]). There is a point of distinction between the unfettered power enjoyed by the respondent in Ablyazov, and the powers enjoyed by de jure or de facto directors of a company to act in its best interests, and, in addition, Ablyazov did not raise the concern that the distinct nature of corporate personality is not being respected. v) In FM Capital Partners Ltd v Marino[2018] EWHC 2889 (Comm) , [53], Peter Macdonald-Eggers KC held that the Supreme Court's decision was not inconsistent with and had not overruled the conclusions in Group Seven and Lakatamia “that the mere fact that the respondent was the sole shareholder and director of a company did not mean that the respondent had ‘control’ over the company's assets for the purposes of the extended definition, because any decision taken by the respondent as to the disposition of or dealing with the company's assets was not taken by the respondent in his or her own right, but was taken in his or her capacity as an organ or agent of the company.” vi) The Privy Council has referred to the decisions in FM Partners and Lakatamia with apparent approval in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd[2023] AC 389 , [110]. vii) In Group Seven Ltd, [80], Hildyard J referred to the position where “the respondent has or is likely to have assets in a non-trading body corporate which he wholly owns and controls, which do not have any active business, and which are in truth no more than pockets or wallets of that respondent,” suggesting that in such cases “an extension to the ordinary form of order may be justified.”
“The flaw in the ‘power equals property’ approach is that it ignores the fundamental principle that the only entity with the power to deal with assets held by it is the company. Those who control its affairs—even if the control is in a single individual—act merely as the company's agents. Their agency will include the authority to procure an exercise by the company of its dispositive powers in respect of its property, but those powers are still exclusively the company's own: they are not the agents' powers.”