“In my judgment, an order which would deprive the defendants of the opportunity of considering whether or not they shall make any disclosure is (in the words of Hoffmann J [in Lock v Beswick ]) an intrusive order, even if it is made on notice to the defendant. It is contrary to normal principles of justice, and can only be done when there is a paramount need to prevent a denial of justice to the claimant. The need to avoid such a denial of justice may be shown after the defendant has failed to comply with his disclosure obligations, having been given the opportunity to do so.”
“the general rule is that the disclosing party has to carry out the disclosure exercise itself, applying a relevance test as best it can. It is assumed in the first instance that it will do that bona fide. In most cases comfort can be taken (at least to a degree) by the fact that solicitors are involved, and they are better placed to assess relevance than the party (and not inclined to suppress a relevant but damaging document). If one party considers that the disclosing party has not carried out its obligations properly then the remedy is an order for specific disclosure which focuses the issue more sharply. That order is not generally an order which involves the receiving party itself conducting a search and assessment of a very large body of the disclosing party's documents in order to see what relevant documents might be found, though I accept that in theory such an order would be possible under the “any other order” head underCPR r31.5 (7). What is more likely to be ordered than that (if there is a problem which justifies it) is disclosure of a specified class of documents as a whole without any test for relevance being carried out by the disclosing party, though even then the disclosing party is the party which looks for that class in the first place.”
“confirmation as to the sources and repositories of documents and/or communications which that Defendant and/or the First Defendant has (or had) access to or use of, or which are (or have been) otherwise within the control of that Defendant and/or the First Defendant (within the meaning set out inPD51U , Appendix 1, paragraph 1.1), during the period 1996 to the present day, including both historic sources/ repositories and any sources/ repositories that have been available only subsequent to 2012. Such confirmation to address: i. all the potential sources of documents (such as phones, laptops, servers etc) listed in Question 2 of Section 2 of the DRD; and 12 ii. what email accounts, mobile phone numbers and/or other sources of electronic communication each Defendant has (or had) use of or access to, in the period since 1996 (including any such accounts or sources that are historic / no longer used). If such access is restricted or is not possible, an explanation to be provided as to why that is so.”
“I believe the facts stated to be true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against any person who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth”
“I believe the facts stated to be true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against any person who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth”
“I believe the facts stated to be true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against any person who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth”