“Article (2): [i] At the request of the First Party, the Second Party appointed Arthur Anderson and Winnie Miri Baashan as chartered accountants to jointly determine the actual value of Gadawel Al-Khaleej International Company [i.e. Jadawel] and its assets. The report of the aforementioned accountants was issued on28/09/1997 AD, including the company's evaluation and its statement of financial flow, attached to this contract (Attachment No. (1), which is complementary to it. The report showed that the actual value of this company and its assets is between 1,400,000,000 (one thousand four hundred million Saudi riyals) to 1,550,000,000 (one thousand five hundred and fifty million Saudi riyals). The First Party has been informed of that assessment. The two parties agreed that the First Party will pay the Second Party a total amount of 600,000,000 (six hundred million) Saudi riyals in exchange for the First Party's ownership of 50% (fifty percent) of the shares of Gadawel Al-Khaleej International Company. [ii] The Second Party has prepared a report showing the financial flow of Ajwa RMTI Limited prepared in September 1997 attached to this contract (Attachment No. 2), which is considered complementary to it. The two parties agreed that the First Party will pay the Second Party a total amount of 400,000,000 (four hundred million)Saudi riyals in exchange for the First Party's ownership of 50% (fifty percent) of the shares of Ajwa RMTI Limited. Article (3): Based on the above, the two parties agreed that the First Party will buy 50% (fifty percent) of the ownership of the Second Party in both companies - with their rights and obligations in accordance with the above-mentioned reports so that the First Party is not responsible for any of the obligations that are not mentioned in these reports - for a total amount of 1,000,000,000 (one thousand million) Saudi riyals distributed as follows: [i] An amount of 600,000,000 (six hundred million) Saudi riyals in return for the First Party's ownership of 50% (fifty percent) of the shares of Jadawel Al-Khaleej International Company, of which 550,000,000 (five hundred and fifty million) Saudi riyals shall be paid in accordance with paragraphs (c) and(d) of Article (4) below, and an amount of 50,000,000 (fifty million) Saudi riyals shall be paid to the Second Party as part of the amount mentioned in paragraph (a) of Article (4) below. [ii] An amount of 400,000,000 (four hundred million) Saudi riyals in return for the First Party's ownership of 50% (fifty percent) of the shares of Ajwa RMTI Limited, of which an amount of 150,000,000 (one hundred and fifty million) Saudi riyals shall be deposited in the current account of this company through which the company's registered capital shall be increased to 200,000,000 (two hundred million) Saudi riyals as stated in paragraph (b) of Article(4) below, and an amount of 250,000,000 (two hundred and fifty) million Saudi riyals shall be paid to the Second Party, which is part of the amount mentioned in paragraph (a) of Article(4) below. Article (4): Since the total value of the sale of the shares of the two companies is an amount of 1,000,000,000 (one thousand million) Saudi riyals, the First Party has committed to the Second Party to pay it as follows: A. Advance payment of SAR 300,000,000 (Three Hundred Million) to be paid by the First Party to the Second Party upon signing this Contract by certified cheque. B. An amount of 150,000,000 (one hundred and fifty million) Saudi riyals to be deposited by the First Party in the current account of Ajwa RMTI Limited with the Saudi British Bank no later than Saturday,15/11/1997 AD, conditional on raising its capital to two hundred million Saudi riyals and notifying the bank of the completion of raising the capital by law. C. An amount of 150,000,000 (one hundred and fifty) million Saudi riyals to be deposited by the First Party in the current account of Jadawel Al-Khaleej International Company with the Saudi British Bank no later than Saturday,22/11/1997 AD, conditional on raising its capital to two hundred million Saudi riyals and notifying the bank of the completion of raising the capital by law. D. An amount of 400,000,000 (four hundred million) Saudi riyals, the First Party shall either issue a certified check or provide bank guarantees with a net value of four hundred million riyals - at the discretion of the First Party. The said check or guarantees shall be deposited in a joint legal Murabaha account in the name of Dr. Talal Amin Ghazawi and Dr. Mohammed bin Saad Al-Rasheed as trustees of the amount, and the Murabaha shall be at their discretion, no later than Tuesday,30/12/1997 AD. … … Article (7): The parties agreed to approve the cash flow report prepared by Arthur Anderson and Winnie Miri Baashan attached to this contract for Jadawel Al-Khaleej International Company. The Second Party undertook to bear the responsibility of managing the company and the expenses of its main offices through the company (JJ W) and within the limits of the allocation stipulated as a management fee in the said financial flow report, and to exert all the efforts to achieve the financial results shown in the said report. The First Party committed to make an effort to provide the necessary support to the company and lease its residential complexes. Article (8): The two parties agreed to approve the financial flow report of Ajwa RMTI Limited attached to this contract. The Second Party committed to manage the company and the expenses of its main offices through RMTI International within the limits of the allocation stipulated as a management fee in the said financial flow report, to make an effort to achieve the financial results shown in the said report, and to strive to achieve the financial results contained in the said report. The First Party committed to make an effort to provide the necessary support to the company.”
“In accordance with your instructions, we have completed our valuation advisory report of Gulf Jadawel International Company (GJI) to provide an indicative range of the fair market value of the Company as a whole. We were not engaged to make specific purchase or sale recommendations. Our work was designed solely for your internal purposes. The usage of this report is restricted to the addressee and should not be relied upon by any third party. Fair market value is the price at which an entity would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of all relevant facts as of September 28, 1997. The valuation process included an analysis of financial and other data provided to us, discussions with management concerning the prospects and operating performance of the Company and an analysis of economic and financial market conditions prevailing as of the valuation date. We have received the financial data and all related assumptions, provided to us by the Management and others without verification as accurately reflecting the historical and projected financial position and operating results of the Company. Based on our investigation and analyses discussed in the attached report, we believe that the fair market value of the Company to be in the SR 1,400 to SR 1,550 million range, provided the Company is able to achieve the projected occupancy levels and rental rates set out in the attached report. In advising you on this valuation, we understand that our report will be solely for your information. This valuation advisory report has been prepared solely for the purpose of your internal use and we do not accept any responsibilities to other parties that become aware of the existence and/ or contents of this report. This report has been based on data made available to us as of the date of this report. We have no responsibility to update our report with respect to any circumstances, and information that becomes available after that date. Whereas such information may have a significant effect on the data and assumptions supporting our valuation advice, these factors should be taken into consideration by the parties involved in considering the fair market value of the business for the purpose described above. This valuation report is subject to the attached Statement of General Assumptions and Limiting Conditions.”
“Q. …Could you describe why and how the Dorrat Jadawel and Jadawel City compounds came to be leased by the Ministry of Defense or other government agency? A. Pure speculation on my part. It would be because the funding issues -- again, peripheral funding issues within the US government caused a change of the lessee. Q. Okay. So what funding issues are you referring to? A. There -- there was a funding shortfall, as I remember, in the FMS cases, and the government pushed back on leasing houses. And so the ministries and the Kingdom decided to get together, however it was done, and elected to assume the responsibility of leasing. Because the governments in Saudi Arabia still had responsibility to provide housing and support to FMS contractors and to government contractors.” *** “Q. Do you recall roughly the time period that you were involved with the two compounds that the US government was paying the leases? A. So the US government funded the leases through contractors, and I went to Saudi in '83, and that practice had started in '81. And it went from '81 until it stopped in '99 or 2000, whenever that break changed. Q. Okay. And then after either 1991 or 2000, depending on when exactly that happened, it was the Saudi government that was funding the lease payments? A. That is -- clarification. The Saudis always funded the lease payments. Okay. Even when the US government was paying them. Because I think I mentioned earlier, it was non-appropriated money, which meant the Saudis paid it into FMS cases. The US Air Force who managed those cases then paid those bills on behalf of and for the government of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom. When it transitioned, the US government was cut out, and the Saudi government paid them direct.” *** “Q. Did you discuss the potential consequences to Jadawel's cash flow with those individuals including Sheikh Mohamed or the other person you mentioned, Mohamed Ramady? A. I would have discussed them, I'm sure, with Mohamed Issa (phonetic), probably with Ramady. And maybe with several other people in the organization about what would we do, yes, and -- and is there any way to influence the US government's decision. Those would have been the types of high-level conversations we would have had. … Q. And what were you hoping to influence them to do? A. We were hoping to get them to change their mind, you know. Q. And why was it important to for them to change their mind? A. Because it's the way we've always done things in the past. And frankly, the government guarantee from the US government for payment was pretty solid when you went to a bank. Q. What did Sheikh Mohamed tell you regarding the financial difficulties that Jadawel would experience if the US government did not change its mind? MR. MAJOR: Objection. Foundation. THE WITNESS: I don't think he ever mentioned that we would have, you know, significant financial difficulties. He always mentioned that there would be -- we'd have to find another -- another customer and knowing that the Saudi government still had responsibility for provide house -- providing housing, it was assumed by me that that would be going to the [Saudi] government direct.” *** “Q. Hi, Mr. Britt. Before we were -- went onto a break, you were discussing some of the cash flow issues that would have arisen for Jadawel if new lessees were not found. Can you describe whether Jadawel was experiencing financial difficulties aside from these issues with the leases at that point in time? MR. MAJOR: Objection. Foundation. Speculation. THE WITNESS: I would say at that point in time, no, because we were fully leased, and we'd been paid.”
“Q. And if the US government was going to withdraw from funding of the lease compounds, the two that we were discussing before, Dorrat Jadawel and Jadawel City, how would that situation change? MR. MAJOR: Objection. Foundation. Speculation. THE WITNESS: I think as I mentioned earlier, it would have hurt cash flow. Like any business, not just Jadawel, but any business that loses its source of revenue would have to find another way to use their assets. BY MR. WEISS: Q. And you were chief operating officer of Jadawel at this time, right, Mr. Britt? A. That's correct. Q. What would the loss of this cash flow from the two compounds have done to Jadawel's operations and financial position if new lessees were not found? A. Well, like I said, finances was not my thing, but the assumption would be it would have been a negative impact, right. You're looking at the loss of total revenue stream. Q. How large was the revenue stream that Jadawel received from the two compounds in relation to the rest of its revenue stream? Like, what percentage of revenue were derived from these two compounds? MR. ECK: Let me just interpose an objection as to time, if that is a difference. THE WITNESS: Pure guesswork, a hundred percent speculation, probably 95 percent, 94 percent.”
“MR. NEWMAN: And they were originally leased through something called a Foreign Military Sales program, where the US government essentially paves the way for military contractors to have housing for themselves and their families while working overseas. THE COURT: Was the US paying directly for this? MR. NEWMAN: What happened was that the Saudi government was paying the US and the US was paying Jadawel, but it was a cost plus arrangement, so there was a 7 percent bump up and so eventually, the Saudi government came to Jadawel, my client, and said why don't we just do a direct lease, because it will be a lot easier and plus we won't have to pay the 7 percent and our client was agnostic on the issue because they will get their lease payments regardless. It really didn't matter.”
“Preamble: Whereas the above two parties have previously concluded a contract between them on10/11/1997 AD that arranges rights and obligations between them according to the annex (Attachment No. 1). Whereas, the above two parties decided to terminate this contract and make the necessary clearance between them by transferring the share and investment of the First Party [Prince Abdulaziz] in full to the Second Party [Sheikh Mohamed] in exchange for the amount of money indicated in this agreement. This amount is also a complete and final liquidation of all current and future rights and claims of the First Party with the Second Party. The Second Party further acknowledges that this agreement is also a liquidation of its rights to and that it has no present or future demands on the First Party in accordance with the following clauses: - First: The above preamble and Attachment No. 1 shall be deemed an integral part of this Contract and shall be complementary and construed to its provisions. Second: By signing this agreement, the commercial relationship established between the two parties under the contract dated10/11/1997 AD ends (Attachment No. 1) Third: The Parties have agreed that the Second Party shall pay to the First Party an amount of 937.5 million riyals, equivalent to US$250 million in consideration for the transfer of the First Party's share and investment to the Second Party as a comprehensive and final release between the said Parties so that US$150 million will be paid on17 July 2001 and the amount of US$100 million to be paid during the month of October 2001. Fourth: The amount referred to in Clause (iii) above shall be paid to the account number [the Royal Account] at the bank of ____________ in the city of Geneva to (MR. Walter Gallon). Fifth: The Second Party acknowledges that if any future obligations of the aforementioned contract arise, it shall be bound by them alone and may not be referred to the First Party. Once the First Party receives the amount described in clause (iii) above, the First Party shall have received all its current and future rights towards the Second Party, and the Second Party shall be exempted from any financial claims in the future, whether from him personally or from his legal heirs, regarding any claim or rights in relation to this contract.”
“In mid-2001 there were discussions between our client and you and your brother about a plan to create an Arabic language 24-hour news broadcaster to compete with Al Jazeera. In August /September 2001, you both made a request to our client in earnest for initial funding through a loan of$30 million for this purpose. During December 2001 Sheikh Majid contacted our client by telephone at his London office requesting immediate funding by a personal loan of$30 million . As currently advised, this conversation occurred during late December 2001. Our client agreed to provide the requested loan for$30,000,000 and asked for details and particulars of where to transfer the· money. Soon thereafter a fax transmission was sent to our client by a Mr Ali, who we are instructed was then the Financial Controller of the ARA Group. Upon receipt of this fax, our client gave immediate Instructions to his bank in London to effect the transfer. Due to the high volume of year-end transactions, the instructions were not sent until3 January 2002 For your information, we attach a copy of our client's bank instruction: dated3 January 2002 . You will note that the bank client reference states “Sheikh Walid and Majed Al Ibrahim”
“15 I decided to approach Arthur Andersen given that they were one of the "Big Five" at that time and I knew one of the local partners, Faisal Al Sayrafi. I told Sh. Mohamed that I was doing this and said that the valuers may contact him or his team for further information. I made clear to Sh. Mohamed that this deal had to be seen as an arm's length transaction and therefore be justifiable on the figures. 16 I asked Osman Ali, who was in charge of my investments at my private office to instruct Arthur Andersen and I believe he also worked on this with his father Firasat Chowdry. In this regard, I have been shown [a] copy of valuation of Jadawel International Company prepared by Saba Abul Khair & Co (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu), which appears to have been sent to me by Firasat Al Chowdry ... However, my clear recollection is that it was Arthur Andersen that we approached, as that is where Faisal Sayrafi was at that time. 17 Arthur Andersen's findings were delivered by way of a presentation - together with a copy of their report - at a meeting at Prince Abdulaziz's palace. I remember that Mr Al-Otaishan, Osman Ali, Firasat Chowdry, Sh. Mohamed and myself were all present at that meeting. My solicitors have searched for this valuation report, including speaking with the relevant member of my private office and attempting to contact Firasat Chowdry and Deloitte (into which Arthur Andersen in the Middle East was merged after its collapse). Unfortunately, these searches and enquiries have not identified the valuation report from Arthur Andersen. 18 From what I recall, Arthur Andersen's valuation of Jadawel was only 400 million Riyals; not the 2.4 or 2.8 billion Riyals that Sh. Mohamed had suggested. This appeared to come as a surprise to Sh. Mohamed, who argued that the valuation misunderstood certain issues and had failed to take into account certain elements and the potential value of the compounds, once they were let. There was then a lengthy discussion in which Sh. Mohamed argued, albeit calmly, with Arthur Andersen's valuation. However, by the end of the meeting, I recall that Sh. Mohamed had accepted that his valuation was not going to be agreed and that I would, therefore, have to discuss the significantly different position with Prince Abdulaziz.” vii) By the time of his fifth witness statement, Sheikh Majid had been shown a copy of the Partnership Contract, which refers to a valuation by Arthur Andersen having been attached to it. Sheikh Majid said that, having considered the matter again, it seemed to him that the Saba valuation must have been the valuation of Jadawel “that we instructed”
“A. I did -- I did provide the services between Mr Al Jaber and Prince Abdulaziz. Q. The service is now between Prince Abdulaziz and Sheikh Al Jaber; is that what you are saying? A. Yes. Yes, I was coordinating between the two. Q. Between the two of them; yes? A. Yes. Q. Where does the Ministry of Finance come in relation to the dealings between Sheikh Mohamed and Prince Abdulaziz? A. Well, Sheikh Mohamed would tell me about, like, update me and give me the obstacles that he faces with whichever, I mean, ministry. I deliver to Prince Abdulaziz and come back with a direction.” (Day 7/146/1-14) “A. I was brought to this -- to this investment from Prince Abdulaziz to evaluate the company. I did evaluate the company. Then I recommended to Prince Abdulaziz that he should be out. And this is what happened. And I was coordinating between Mr Al Jaber and Prince Abdulaziz in concluding this -- in concluding these leases.” (Day 7/147/17-24) “Q. In relation to the advisory services which you allege that you were providing for Sheikh Mohamed; were you talking to Prince Abdulaziz or to the ministries, or both? A. I was talking to Prince Abdulaziz. I take whatever Sheikh Mohamed is conveying on his difficulties with the two ministries. I conveyed the message to Prince Abdulaziz and came back to Sheikh Mohamed with a direction. Q. I see. So then, you are saying that you didn't speak to the ministries at all; is that right? A. There was one occasion where I did speak to one of the ministers. … Q. A minister? Yes. A. There was an occasion when I did speak to one of the ministers, yes. Q. Well, let's investigate that a little further. In relation to the Ministry of Defence, there was only one minister, wasn't there, Prince Sultan? Prince Abdulaziz's uncle. A. Yes. Q. Was he the person that you say you spoke to? A. Yes. Q. Why would you be speaking to the uncle of Prince Abdulaziz yourself, when Prince Abdulaziz could himself do that more conveniently? After all, it was his uncle, wasn't it? A. Actually, there was one occasion when Prince Sultan was visiting his brother, the late King Fahd, and that was a frequent visit that he usually does. And on his way out, I walked him up to his car and I delivered a message to him; it was a reminder message from Prince Abdulaziz when Prince Abdulaziz was out of the country. Q. So it was a reminder message to the Prince, to Prince Sultan; that is the only occasion? … A. Yes.” (Day 8/3/7-24 – 4/11-22) Q. Between the two of them; yes? Q. Was he the person that you say you spoke to? … A. Yes.”
“Q. ….Now, that is a completely different picture, isn't it, from what you are telling the court now? Do you agree A. That is exactly what I am telling the court. Q. … You haven't told us about any contact with any official at all, have you, today? You have just told us about contact with a minister? A. That was the contact with the minister. There were contacts with the officials. I really cannot recall names right now, but there would have been the people that are working with Prince Abdulaziz, the government employees that works with Prince Abdulaziz. … A. They are working with Prince Abdulaziz in his office. … Q. Why would you [] be contacting an official in Prince Abdulaziz's office with a view to ensuring that -- or preventing delays occurring in Sheikh Mohamed's negotiation of the leases himself with the Ministry of Defence? It doesn't make any sense, does it? A. It does. I do send them, sometimes, papers regarding Jadawel. Sometimes after I finish with Prince Abdulaziz I deliver to them messages from Prince Abdulaziz regarding the same issue. Q. Let's just go on a little bit further: "Without that level of communication, I am sure the delays in Sheikh Mohamed negotiating the leases with MODA would have been much longer." You were not discussing with officials at MODA at all, were you? A. No, that wasn't officials of MODA. … Aside of the occasion that I talked about. Q. You go on: "The negotiations with MODA themselves, much more difficult." So your discussions, if you had any, with officials in the private office of Prince Abdulaziz had nothing whatsoever to do with MODA, did it? A. That was to deliver messages from either Prince Abdulaziz or from Mr Al Jaber to Prince Abdulaziz. … Q. Let me see if I have it correct. You had no contact with officials at MODA at all, first of all; do you agree? A. I agree. … Aside of the [inaudible] that I talked about. Q. The only contact that you had with any minister was this one single occasion -- which you now recall for the first time, I suggest -- with Prince Sultan. A. Correct. Q. And that was the only occasion when you had a discussion with any minister at all? A. Yes. Q. Right. What you were doing there was passing on a reminder; is that right? A. A reminder message from Prince Abdulaziz, yes. Q. A reminder from the Prince to his uncle? A. Correct. Q. Yes. How was Sheikh Mohamed being helped by simply you reminding the defence minister of something his nephew had said to him? A. Sheikh Mohamed was helped through Prince Abdulaziz. That was the help he has got, and through myself, to put the whole thing on a fast track for Sheikh Mohamed. And time was clearly important for Sheikh Mohamed -- because his company was going down. Q. … What you were doing was in fact acting -- in the one instance that you are able to identify, you were acting as a messenger for Prince Abdulaziz, weren't you? A. I was passing the messages on a fast track for Sheikh Mohamed, otherwise it would have been -- it would have took him a very long time to lease those compounds. Because Prince Abdulaziz was a very busy person, there was no way for Sheikh Mohamed to reach out to him that fast. Q. So whatever that message was that you were reminding Prince Sultan, the minister, about, it was something that had been initiated by Prince Abdulaziz towards his uncle previously? A. Correct. Q. Correct. You'd had no hand in that earlier message at all? A. No, Q. No. Your role, therefore, was really nothing more, I suggest, than the small role of being a messenger from Prince Abdulaziz to his uncle as a reminder? A. That incident, yes. Q. Yes. Well, you haven't told us of any other, and you told us that was the only occasion when you spoke to any minister; do you agree? A. Yes, I agree. Aside from Prince Abdulaziz, I agree.” (Day 8/5/12-10/5) "Without that level of communication, I am sure the delays in Sheikh Mohamed negotiating the leases with MODA would have been much longer." "The negotiations with MODA themselves, much more difficult." Q. Right. What you were doing there was passing on a reminder; is that right? Q. A reminder from the Prince to his uncle? Q. Correct. You'd had no hand in that earlier message at all? A. Yes, I agree. Aside from Prince Abdulaziz, I agree.”
“42 … As a result of these proceedings, I have been made aware that Sh. Waleed was an authorised signatory on behalf of Durango, from around 2002. I do not recall this arrangement being put in place but it would not be unusual for me to ask my brother to act in this type of role. At that time documents usually needed to be signed in person, rather than electronically, and therefore, it was often convenient to have an additional signatory. The fact that Sh. Waleed was an authorised signatory did not mean that he had any interest in, or knowledge of, funds in Durango' s bank account and he did not. 43 I also understand that documents show that Sh. Waleed was a director of Durango from 2014, more than 10 years after the relevant payment was made. Again, I have no recollection of this but it is perfectly possible that I asked Sh. Waleed to be a director at some point. However, I do not believe this means he would have had any interest in funds held in Durango' s bank account. I was the beneficial owner of the company.”
“Q. Again, what I suggest to you is that the account that was being used, 370, was one which was being generally available, or made available, as family money between you and your brother Walid, for the discharge of whatever liabilities either of you had. It didn't matter to you, it was all family money; do you agree? A. Not true. That account is mine -- is a personal account. I do transfer amounts there to be invested, and some of them could have been for some of my brothers. And I do transfer them there, and from there they are invested. And that is one of the investment accounts.”
“Q. … by the time we come to mid-2001, Jadawel was actually doing rather well. Do you agree? You had obtained -- A. Yes. Yes, I agree. Q. So this was rather a bad moment then, from the point of view of your nephew, to end the partnership and simply settle for the figures set out in the settlement agreement. A. The settlement agreement was done in 1998, so my nephew would not go back and say: no, I am not going to settle now because we didn't write. …”
“Financial institutions should, in relation to politically exposed persons, in addition to performing normal due diligence measures: a) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person. b) Obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with such customers. c) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds. d) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship”
“The agreement of the exit was a bond agreed between the two parties without anybody knows. For me, my Lord, at the signing of full securitisation with four banks on December, I have to put my hand being under oath that I am the owner 100 per cent and there are no high political person a partner with me. That agreement was between me and the Prince, Majid and anybody on earth knows about that. Prince was not seek to exit, I am the one who has convinced him.”
“ I feel great regret at addressing this transaction as it delves into my private business affairs with HRH Prince Abdulaziz , who, so far as I am concerned, has nothing whatsoever· to do with this commercial claim. I believe strongly that such matters should never have been raised by Sheikh Majid, as a means of supporting of his false defence. However, in light of Sheikh's Majid's evidence, I have been left with no choice. Followin9 advice from my lawyers, however, I believe that I must address these false allegations, but I wish to let it be known that I would never have disclosed any confidential information relating to HRH Prince Abdulaziz if f had not been forced to do so by the Defendants. I have the profoundest respect for the Prince and have kept our business dealings confidential for the last 25 years.”
“Q. Wouldn't you have considered it important to have such an agreement written down and signed by each of you? Or agreed? A. No. No, because I didn't think, at that time, that Sheikh Mohamed would upset Prince Abdulaziz because he has done a lot for him, and he wouldn't sacrifice the relationship because of$30 million compared to what he is going to get. And this is what happened.”
“in the account provided by Sheikh Majid in his third witness statement, he was initially entirely unaware of Ajwa. He sought to cure this by his late fifth witness statement on19 April 2023 by saying “I do recall Ajwa. However, when I discussed the investment with Prince Abdulaziz the focus was on Jadawel” [H/1/4]. That understanding is at odds with the Partnership Agreement itself, which made clear that the first tranche of 300 million Saudi Riyal was allocated 50 million Saudi Riyal to Jadawel, and 250 million Saudi Riyal to Ajwa: Articles 3 and 4, Partnership Agreement.”
“I asked Osman Ali, who was in charge of my investments at my private office to instruct Arthur Andersen and I believe he also worked on this with his father Firasat Chowdry. In this regard, I have been shown copy of valuation of Jadawel International Company prepared by Saba Abul Khair & Co (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu), which appears to have been sent to me by Firasat Al Chowdry ... However, my clear recollection is that it was Arthur Andersen that we approached, as that is where Faisal Sayrafi was at that time. ”
“60-90 minutes well-prepared, well-researched, and pre recorded episodes on "Strategic Topics" pertaining to issues of prime interest and importance to Arab political and economic decision makers as well as opinion makers and intellectuals, discussing political, social or intellectual issues that affect the lives of the Arabs. the guests have to be well known vip's, political/economic/intellectual leadership and personalities, as well as respected experts and opinion makers. These special episodes can be pre-recorded in Beirut OR in any other suitable location in the Arab world, Europe or the USA.”
“The total capital of the project is initially estimated at US$ 300 million , with US$ 100 million to be committed at first and the remaining to be phased in as needed. The estimated payback period is over 5 years. The Arabic partners intend to pay 100% of the capital required, while the foreign partner provides technical/expertise support to the channel. Currently, the key participants/partners with firm commitments are MBC and the Future T.V. at 50 – 50 each, with potential other names as Najjeb Seewaris that has also indicated interest in the project. Other partners would be allowed a maximum of 49%. MBC share of capital would include the location if it is to be located in London. The new channel will be independent from the existing MBC, however with the possibility to share back-office support. Location will be in either Dubai Medial [sic: Media] City or London in the old MBC location. London will be perceived as more independent at first. An added value in locating in London is that the MBC offices has a license, which was obtained before the current licensing laws were established, to up-link to satellites from the city. Otherwise, the location has to be outside the city. This would give importance to the News Channel of being in the middle of an important decision making capital in the world. …” (The reference to “the Future T.V.” is understood to be to Mr Rafic Al Hariri’s Lebanese television station “Future Television”.) The minutes continued: “FTH [Financial Transaction House i.e. Faisal Al Sayrafi] to help search for a CEO. The name of the News Channel to be (ARABS, FREEDOM, THE NATION, OPENESS, etc.). Mission: To promote Democracy to the new generation in the Arab World. To be seen as a pure Arabic Channel, to be credible and appeal to Arabic Masses. Start date is targeted for September 2002.”
“Alarabiya: a new project presentation”
“MBC, as the founding shareholder, will contribute certain assets to Al Arabiya and will retain thirty percent (30%) of the shares. The remaining capital will be contributed by a select group of no more than ten (10) investors from the Middle East over the course of the next five years.”
“ARA and AHG Financings ARA intends to contribute$30 million in cash to the Company with respect to the Company’s start-up and initial operations. With respect to the Company’s potential subsequent funding requirements, ARA intends to enter into a Commitment to contribute up to an additional$30 million in cash. In consideration for ARA’s payment of$30 million , it is intended that the Company will allot and issue to ARA 300,000 Class A Shares at an acquisition price of$100 per share. In the event the Company makes any demand under ARA’s Commitment, the Company will allot and issue further Class A Shares to ARA at the price of$100 per share. AHG intends to form a new company in its group of affiliated companies that would contribute$30 million in cash to the Company with respect to the Company’s start-up and initial operations. With respect to the Company’s potential subsequent funding requirements, AHG intends that its new company will enter into a Commitment to contribute an additional$30 million in cash. In consideration for the new AHG company’s payment of$30 million , it is intended that the Company will allot and issue to such new AHG company 300,000 Class B Shares at an acquisition price of$100 per share. In the event the Company makes any demand under AHG’s Commitment, the Company will allot and issue further Class B Shares to AHG at the price of$100 per share. It is intended that the ARA and AHG financings be closed on or before March 15, 2003. … With respect to the Company’s start-up and initial operations, the Company intends to raise up to$90 million from strategic investors through the private placement of up to 900,000 Class C Shares at an acquisition price per share of$100 . …”
“We have a VIP, Shaikh [sic] Muhammad Bin Issa, coming to see AL Arabiya within the next 15 minutes. Cld you pl [sic] ensure that all of you are available on the 3rd floor in the conference room ASAP. …”
“* Introduction of all parties Agenda: Al Arabiya News Channel * Sh. Moh’d member of BOD. [Board of Directors] active role * launch date of channel appearance of channel [? unclear] conditions to becoming member”
“STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Please pass the attached documents to Sheikh Mohammed Bin Issa Al-Jaber. …Message mailed on behalf of Mr. Faisal Al-Sayrafi” …Message mailed on behalf of Mr. Faisal Al-Sayrafi”
“w/i 1yr”, “int. rate”, “min payment -$5m ”
“Please find herewith the annual Debit Notes in respect to AGI Loans/Advances paid to Al Arabiya during the years 2003 to 2009 which totals to US$ 291,000,000 … As you are aware, AGI have already reconciled these amounts with Al Arabiya (AA). …”
“During December 2001, I recall very clearly that I received a number of telephone calls from the Defendants about me making a loan to them for their Al Arabiya project. The tone of urgency in these calls and requests seemed to intensify over the period, culminating in calls from Sheikh Walid followed by a call from Sheikh Majid that I received in my office on Wigmore Street in late December 2001. Although I do not remember the exact day, it was I believe in the last week of December. I had the clear impression at the time that, and from the outset, that although they acted together, Sheikh Walid took the lead in substantive discussions, whereas his brother Sheikh Majid, dealt with follow up and points of detail. It was plain that their calls were made on behalf of both of them. The purpose of Sheikh Majid’s call was to stress urgency and to request that I now make an immediate loan of US$30 million to both the Defendants for their 24-hour news channel project. I agreed to lend them this money, and requested that the Defendants send to me the banking details for the remittance of the funds.”
“… The discussions that I had with Sheikh Walid on behalf of the Defendants about investing in Al-Arabiya spanned a number of months, over the course of which we spoke both in person and over the telephone. The initial discussions were conducted at a number of face-to-face meetings in London and once in Paris and subsequent discussions took place over the telephone. In these discussions, Sheikh Walid sought to persuade me to invest in the Defendants’ enterprise and I frequently expressed my interest in so doing but, even by October 2001, I was still entertaining the notion of establishing my own news channel rather than investing in their business. It was not until the telephone call in December 2001, which I received at my offices on Wigmore Street, that his proposal for a loan was accepted and, from my perspective, the loan agreement was finally concluded. …”
“I explained in paragraph 33 of my first statement, how during December 2001, I received telephone calls from the Defendants concerning their requests for a loan. Majid called me in December 2001 while I was in London. He said that Walid was following up on when I was going to send them the money. I asked for their account details, and he said that Mr Ali would send those details to me.”
“Q. But in 2009, you didn't make any attempt to call in the loan, despite considering it appropriate to do so, yes? A. You know, you have to give the chance, you have to give this, you call the loan, you go to the court -- it is not an easy decision. Q. Why didn't you just ask for it back? A. Sorry? Q. Why didn't you just ask for it back? A. I think I asked on a nice way through a friend, through my lawyer in Riyadh, so yes. Q. Are suggesting, Sheikh Mohamed, that in 2009 you made any attempt to call in the loan? A. I make what? Q. Are you suggesting that in 2009 you asked Sheikh Walid or Sheikh Majid for the return of the loan? A. I don't remember the date exactly but I think I start from that times, or after little, I think about to ask the -- they was already doing well and I felt they don't need the money anymore. Q. The first time you asked for the loan back -- and we will come to it -- was in 2015, wasn't it? A. That when I made official demand through the court. Q. You have made no reference in any communications with Sheikh Walid or Sheikh Majid prior to 2015 to this loan or its repayment, have you? A. It was all on a friendly basis through friends, through -- yes, it is not official. Q. And, Sheikh Mohamed, at no time in this litigation in any of your ten witness statements and affidavits have you ever suggested that you attempted to call in this loan prior to 2015, have you? A. I don't remember that but, you know, I just -- Q. In fact, in this particular witness statement – it happens to be your second -- you are at pains to explain why you say you didn't ask for the money back, because you say you didn't know what documents existed. A. I don't remember what you say here. Q. You are making it up, aren't you, Sheikh Mohamed? You have never suggested that at any time prior to 2015 you asked for this money -- A. I don't made up anything. I was just, you know, a generous man, tried to work with trust and confident on the people I had tried to help them.”
“Q. I just want to explore; do you say this is the first time since 2002 that you have raised this loan with the defendants? A. Not I raised this loan. It was a lot of times in – you know, just on a friendly talk, but this -- first – may be the first time to put that through a lawyers. Q. So it is your evidence to this court that prior to 2015, you had asked for the money back; is that right? A. You know, on a friendly basis, yes. Q. When? A. I don't remember date, but it was in -- a several time I talk to friend of both of us and I, you know – this is -- this matter on our culture, you don't go immediately to litigate. Q. But roughly when? A. I remember it start from 2009 and onward. You know, that times, maybe. Q. So, in 2009, did you speak to Sheikh Walid about it? A. You know, our culture, you don't speak direct about calling a loan or -- you know, just on a friendly basis you remind him through a friend, through something like that. Q. You speak to one of his people, you say? A. Not his people. You know, common friend. Q. Who was it? A. I will not tell. Q. I am afraid you have to, Sheikh Mohamed, because it could be rather important for this case that you -- A. No, it is not important. Q. Who do you say you made a request to, to recall this loan, in or around 2009? A. You know, somebody -- it is a lawyer, by the way. And I don't want -- no, I don't know if he allows me to disclose his name. Q. We lawyers don't have such power, Sheikh Mohamed. You are on oath before the court here, in England, and I am asking you -- A. I don't know that. I been asking friendly. He talk to him or he don't talk to him. I ask him just to remind him.”
“Then the share sale itself was handled on your behalf by your brother Majid and his private office? A. That is not unusual.”
“This was an attempt by FTH to lower the risk, and it did not work, so we stopped the process, and Hariri the only one who came in at that time. Then we stop the whole thing, and we had family contribute and support the beginning of Al Arabiya, with the help of King Fahd and the government at that time.”
“12. The idea was to pitch the idea not to ordinary investors but to strategic, political level, investors across the MENA region. I was not directly involved in any presentations to potential investors, but as I understood it, the aim was to further the political balance of the proposed pan-Arab channel. 13. I do recall there were numerous meetings with regional media companies or the relevant ministers in charge of media from Arab countries, including from: 13.1. Lebanon (which was the Al Hariri family); 13.2. Yemen; 13.3. Kuwait; 13.4. Egypt; and 13. 5. Bahrain. 14. As far as I was aware, the only one of these that was really active as a potential investor was Al Hariri from Lebanon. …”
“Q. Let's look at the family. It had funding in the form of loan, didn't it? That is the 200-odd million loans we see in the annual accounts of MBC, which we looked at on Thursday. A. Of course, it will be informed loans if you are sending the money from Saudi to London, otherwise you would be paying taxes, more taxes in London for -- of its capital only. This is done by our finance department. Q. I see. So the money was always being lent as a tax efficient way of funding the company? A. Yes, of course.”
“If they are marketing to get investors, maybe they have invited him, maybe”, or that perhaps Sheikh Mohamed just wanted to “understand the new channel, if he wants to advertise on it”
“A. I remember he came as a guest of MBC. Assad was the -- Assad originally played two roles. He was the CEO of AMS, which was our advertising arm, and COO MBC, as such, as Sheikh Mohamed was coming in, we wanted to show him respect, show him our stars. Everybody wanted to come in and see MBC, like going to CNN or BBC. MBC had relocated to the United Arab Emirates and everyone wanted to see the stars, you know, the news anchors. And we showed him respect by having him meet up with the people of the channel that we were doing. Q. Were you aware that he was one of the people who was being wooed by Sheikh Walid and his brother, Majid, to invest further in MBC? A. No, I was not. … A. At that time, I think I was not working with Sheikh Walid. I was working with Assad Abu Al Jadail, which is the chief operating office. Q. So you wouldn't really know the circumstances in which Sheikh Mohamed was actually being invited? A. No. … If we look at who there was; these are all senior managers, weren't they? A. These are all managers who are involved in the production, editing, and engineers, HR, and administration. Q. Yes. Did you know by then that he was a very wealthy man? A. I mean, we called him "Sheikh". We paid respect -- a lot of people turned up to MBC, but it was like a very last minute invitation that we had the notification that he is coming over. Rally the troops, show him who we are, and do a small presentation, if need be. Q. Had you been told that he had assisted in providing some initial financing for Al Arabiya? A. No. No. I was -- that was never ever mentioned at all. … A. … He asked question, if an investor -- firstly, we presented, my Lord, the concept of Al Arabiya. What are we doing, what is the purpose of Al Arabiya, like we did to many other VIPs who turned up. Okay, His Royal Highness, Abdul Al Qasayer, minister of foreign affairs, so we do the same thing. But not to the same level of His Highness Abdullah.”
“Q. When you say "he knew"; you don't know, do you? You were not standing next to him when these were paid, were you? A. I was standing next to him when he was signing them and he was asking questions about them, yes. Q. I see.”
“The source of the funding was therefore just a case of piecing together whatever was available from the family wealth. There does not appear to be any significance to the precise source of the funds. It might as well have been from any of the other family accounts. There was certainly no need specifically to identify the$30m from Sheikh Mohamed held in Account 370 (to the extent it had not already been put on an investment to seek to minimise Zakat) and move that particular sum across to Sub Account 8 Al Arabiya.”
“For your information, we attach a copy of our client's bank instruction: dated3 January 2002 . You will note that the bank client reference states “Sheikh Walid and Majed Al Ibrahim”
“Dear John, Re: MBI US Dollar Account with HSBC Republic Geneva Please transfer the sum of US$30 , 000, 000 (US Dollars Thirty Million Only). Value Date: January 4th 2002 Bank Client Reference: Sheikh Walid and Majed Al Ibrahim Bank: Credit Suisse Bank Address: Geneva Swift Code: CRESCHZZ 12A Bank Account No: [account number stated] Reference: Durango Management Limited Thanking you for your assistance. Yours sincerely, [signature] Mohamed bin Issa al Jaber”
“35. Later, a fax arrived from a Mr Ali, who I understood to be the Financial Controller of the MBC Group. I recall that the fax had a large "MBC" logo on it. I and my companies had some dealings with the Defendants in relation to media advertising (about which I will expand further below), so I or my staff would have known who Mr Ali was, and his connection to [Sheikh Walid]. 36. The fax served as the basis for the completion of instructions to my bank, HSBC Republic in London on3 January 2002 for a transfer from my personal bank account [exhibiting the File Copy Transfer Instruction]. This payment instruction was prepared by the MBI Group's Chief Financial Officer, Mr Richard Brook, and signed by me. It clearly states as the client reference of the receiving bank was "Sheikh Walid and Sheikh Majed (sic)". This was some months after 9/11 and, as a result, banks were very sensitive about the transfer of large cash sums, and it had been made very clear to me by my bankers that it was necessary to give the names of the beneficiaries, and not just the name of a private company. It was for this reason that the instructions to my bank specifically stated the recipient beneficiaries to be Sheikh Walid and Sheikh Majid, the two Defendants. 37. I remember at this period that Mr Brook and I were finalising a number of large payments, which we were trying to complete before the end of the year, although in the end this transfer was only finalized on3 January 2002 . I remember that on that day my bank account manager, Mr John Collier-Wright from HSBC, came to meet me at our offices and wish me well for the New Year.”
“11. Given the importance of the transfers being instructed that day and the time of year, Mr Collier-Wright came to our offices to meet Sheikh Mohamed and wish him a Happy New Year and to ensure that all transfer instructions were properly completed and signed before taking them with him back to the bank in St James’s Street to execute that same day. 12. I later recorded the transfer in my computer records and subsequently checked the details against the bank statement to ensure that funds had been remitted as instructed and debited to Sheikh Mohamed’s account accordingly.”
“As part of this, I revisited with Sheikh Mohamed various transactions, particularly those with which I had been involved in my previous period of employment. The payment instruction that I had prepared for the loan [i.e. the File Copy Transfer Instruction] was then discovered in one of my old filing cabinets and I discussed it with Sheikh Mohamed. (The fax from Mr Ali with the payment details provided by the Defendants was not in the file, and further searches have so far failed to locate it.)”
“12. I prepared what I recall to be an identical bank transfer at the request of Sheikh Mohamed in late 2014 or early 2015 (the “Bank Transfer Instruction"). I cannot be more precise about the date, but I recall that it was beginning to get dark outside by mid-afternoon, and therefore I believe that it was December 2014. On the day in question, following my return from lunch Sheikh Mohamed summoned me to his office. As was usual in my dealings with Sheikh Mohamed, I met with him only very briefly. We did not engage in conversation and our meeting was limited simply to his instructions. Upon my arrival at his office, Sheikh Mohamed showed me a black plastic ring binder which contained various bank transfer instruction letters and a spreadsheet listing each of the transfers. I cannot remember precisely, but I think on looking back that the bank transfer letters were from about 2000 to 2004. To the best of my recollection, the document exhibited to Mr Brook's statement was not in the file. Sheikh Mohamed pointed to the line on the spreadsheet listing showing the US$30 million transfer and instructed me to produce the Bank Transfer, adding that the format must look exactly like other transfer instructions in the file. 13. Bank transfer letters generally were commonplace at MB1 because the payments system required these letters to be produced for all payments. It was part of my role - shared with one other person in the office - to prepare these letters, which were then kept in both hard and soft copy, though not in any particularly organised way until about 2012. Therefore, by the time I was asked to prepare the Bank Transfer Instruction, the bank transfer letters from 2002 were not available to me in the office. I recall that I produced the Bank Transfer Instruction from a blank document, manually typing out a copy of the layout on a work computer in another transfer addressed to Mr John Collier-Wright of HSBC Republic contained in the file. I cannot now remember where I saved it, but I think I probably saved it to my user folder on the network. That would have been my usual practice. I no longer have access to the document itself, either in electronic or physical format. 14. To the best of my recollection, the details for the Bank Transfer Instruction were brought to me by one of Sheikh Mohamed’s assistants (which could have been any one of three people) in the form of a hand-written note, shortly after Sheikh Mohamed had asked me to prepare the Bank Transfer Instruction. 1 do not recall what happened to the note, but 1 imagine that 1 would have left it on my desk with other papers, as was my habit at the time. I do not have a copy now. 15. In order to finalise production of the Bank Transfer Instruction it was necessary to print it on MBI International & Partners Inc. (“MBI International”) headed notepaper. I went to the legal department and obtained the necessary paper. When I first printed out a copy, I checked the details and noticed that the registered office was Wigmore Street, but, in 2002, the company’s registered address was at St James’ Place. Accordingly, I then contacted the company’s web designer, Mr David Edmonds, by telephone. Mr Edmonds was an internal employee of MBI who dealt not only with web design but also with the production of headed paper. I requested that he supply me with six sheets of MBI International headed paper with the address of the registered office changed to 2 St James’ Place, and he agreed to do so. The paper was produced and delivered by him personally. 1 printed two copies of the Bank Transfer Instruction and gave them to Sheikh Mohamed.”
“a. There is no "Payee” or “Beneficiary” line, which I would usually expect to see. Instead, there is a "Bank Client Reference" which is not something I have seen before. It seemed, however, to refer to the payee. I remember that I was puzzled about this because it refers to both Sheikh Walid and Sheikh Majid. Usually, one would only see one name in the Payee field unless it referred to a joint account. I assumed at the time was that Sheikhs Walid and Majid were brothers, but it seemed odd to me that they should hold a bank account together. b. The bank account from which the payment was to be made does not appear anywhere on the Bank Transfer Instruction. Usually, the header would contain the account number. A mere description does not suffice since (for obvious reasons) the bank is very keen to ensure that no mistakes or miscommunications occur. c. The order in which the Bank Transfer Instruction is set out is unusual. I would usually set this out differently, but I had to follow the example provided to me at the time. d. I was surprised to be producing a document using MBI International letterhead (a BVI entity) given that the company was in liquidation and had been since October 2010.”
“As a result, the fax number in the header on the Bank Transfer Instruction is the number that appeared on MBI's official headed paper in 2014, when I created the document; it is not the fax number that appeared on the official pre-printed headed paper used in 2002, which was the number shown on all four of the 2002 Transfer Instructions (including one such transfer which is dated10 January 2002 - a mere seven days after the date appearing on the face of the Bank Transfer Instruction).”
“I then asked Mr Brook about the case against the Al Ibrahim brothers that I had seen in the invoices. Mr Brook told me that the brothers were Kuwaiti traders who had a dispute with Sheikh Mohamed. He did not elaborate further. The conversation concluded with me saying that I hoped Sheikh Mohamed was not using the document that I had produced for him the year before (the Bank Transfer Instruction). I did not know whether Mr Brook was aware of the existence of that document, but Mr Brook did not react to the comment and left the office.”
“I remember in particular that the transfer, albeit made to Durango, was being made in respect of a loan to the Defendants, Sheikh Walid bin Ibrahim Al Ibrahim and Sheikh Majid bin Ibrahim Al Ibrahim. I am familiar with that family, and their names stood out. Between 1979-1985 I lived variously in Riyadh, Bahrain, Amman, and Cairo. I was employed in finance by Arthur Andersen and the Al Ibrahim family was well known as a prominent Saudi business family. When I returned to England in January 1985, I took a position with Saudi International Bank in London, where I was involved in corporate finance. I worked for that bank for five years. Thus when Sheikh Mohamed referred to the Defendants, I recognised their names instantly, both from my time in Saudi Arabia, and from my prior employment with Saudi International Bank.”
“Dear John, Re: MBI International US Dollar Account with HSBC Republic Geneva Please transfer the sum of US$30,000,000 (US Dollars Thirty Million) Value date: January 4th 2002 Bank Client Reference: Durango Management Limited Bank: Credit Suisse Bank, Private Banking. Bank Address: PO Box 1211, Geneva 70 Switzerland SWIFT CODE: CRESCHZZ12A Bank Account No: [account number stated] (USD A/c) I would appreciate your sending a copy of the transfer to me by Fax to +44 […] 4486.Thanking you for your assistance. Yours sincerely, [signature] Mohamed bin Issa al Jaber” (I have in this judgment redacted parts of bank account and fax numbers in the interests of privacy.) Re: MBI International US Dollar Account with HSBC Republic Geneva Please transfer the sum of US$30,000,000 (US Dollars Thirty Million) Value date: January 4th 2002 Bank Client Reference: Durango Management Limited Bank Address: PO Box 1211, Geneva 70 Switzerland SWIFT CODE: CRESCHZZ12A Bank Account No: [account number stated] (USD A/c) [signature] Mohamed bin Issa al Jaber”
“5. I mentioned in my first witness statement that this large transfer occurred just some months after 9-11 and that Banks at that time were on high alert and underwent a higher level of due diligence for US Dollar transactions in particular. My recollection is that the Bank blocked the first transfer and asked for a further instruction which clearly showed the names of the beneficial owners. The Bank's reason for this was that the company was an offshore company in the Bahamas and the shareholders of the company were not shown and proper Know Your Client ("KYC") checks could not be carried out. The Bank wanted to be clear on who the beneficial owner was and asked for a second signed transfer instruction. The second transfer instruction was subsequently found in our files. The Bank cannot produce all its documents as it does not keep a full record after 10 years. This transaction is now 20 years old, and the Bank may have destroyed its records. It is my experience that from that time to this day, there is no way that any bank would transfer US$30 million - or even US$1 million - to an offshore company or account without knowledge of and Due diligence on the beneficial owners of the account. 6. I understand that the Defendants also argue that the File Copy is a forgery, and they refer to various minor differences in the font and wording of the document, as well as the different fax number on the letterhead. The probable explanation is that the second transfer instruction was prepared by someone else at my office whereas the first was prepared by Richard Brook. Mr Brook's office was on the 4th floor, whereas the second transfer was sent from the second floor where my office was located. In those days we had at least one fax on each floor of the building and there were no strict controls over the use of these fax numbers in letters. As a result of the allegations made by the defendants my solicitors instructed a search of our electronic archives for the fax number ending -0996 and the search results revealed a number of emails and an internal directory showing that number was in use at least in the period 2002-2006 by a number of employees. Accordingly, Mr Russell Lawrence is wrong when he suggests that this number was not in use in 2002. He would have no direct knowledge of such facts since he joined the company over 10 years later. 7. I cannot now recall who in my office prepared the second transfer instruction. It could have been anyone, there were at least five to six people, if not more, working from the second floor where my office is located. 8. I do not know Mr Lawrence personally. I do not know the reason why he has given evidence in these proceedings. I recall that he was recruited by and worked closely with a dishonest solicitor Mr Amjad Salfiti who was formerly my in-house legal counsel. Sadly, I have been let down by a number of former employees who worked under Mr Salfiti. Mr Salfiti and other employees were caught receiving secret commissions to companies they owned or family members. After they were sacked, they have spent the last few years attempting to undermine me in various legal proceedings. ”
“HSBC was informed of the same both orally and in writing, namely: (i) the beneficiaries were orally identified to Mr Collier-Wright at a meeting at the offices of MBI; and (ii) the same information was recorded in a further signed version of the bank instruction, which identified the “Bank Client Reference” to be “Sheikh Walid and Majed Al Ibrahim.”
“You know, again, my native language is Arabic. Now, between “will be blocked”, or “be block” that, for us, it has the same meaning if we translate it to Arabic.”
“So when did your bankers make that very clear to you? A. The same day. The same day. You know, today, when you send the transfer and the bank, the KYC of the bank, they don't -- they block it or they stop it, they will ask a questions, and it will be for a question. And their question was: where is the beneficial owner? This company, it is an offshore, it has no tracing to know who own it.”
“A. … What I recall, the bank has stop -- when the transfer -- when we sent without ultimate beneficiary, and he requests that we have to send both the beneficial -- the ultimate beneficiary, for them to execute this transfer. We sent the other one immediately after. Q. It is your evidence to this court, when you wrote this document you recalled all that, but you mentioned none of it? A. No, if I don't mention all -- I don't know. I don't remember. But this is what the fact is. Now, you bring me -- you bring flash in my memory, and this is what happened.””
“I call Osman Ali, who send me the bank details. I say: who is the beneficial owner?”
“10. I maintain that I was told at the time by Sheikh Mohamed that the Defendants were the beneficiaries of the USD$30 million payment and that the Bank needed to know the names of the beneficiaries due to heightened due diligence in the period following the events of September 11 2001. 11. I have also seen a bank statement from HSBC confirming that the name of the account from which the US$30 million was sent was "M.B.I. International Inc.". I realise I have previously stated in my second witness statement that the US$30 million came from Sheikh Mohameds personal account. I realise now having seen the bank statement and transfer instruction that the money came from the bank account with that name. However I am clear that Sheikh Mohamed was for all purposes the Bank's client since all instructions in relation to that account emanated from him, and the Bank complied only with his instructions which had to be signed by him and confirmed by him orally over the telephone or in person to an officer of the bank.”
“Paragraph 43 of Sheikh Majid's skeleton argument suggests, inter alia, that there should be some corporate record of the loan because "the money was coming out of MBI's dollar account” …. However, the name of the account "MBI US Dollar Account" in fact refers to the personal US dollar account of Sheikh Mohamed, those being his initials: Mohamed Bin Issa, and not to the corporate entity MBI. As I have said at paragraph 10 of my First Statement, I prepared the letter of instruction for the payment of US$30 million to come from Sheikh Mohamed's personal account.”
“A. Immediately, yes, I did. I can't say I -- to put some perspective on that, I had -- prior to being dismissed, I had worked a Bank Holiday and two weekends at the Sheikh's request, so I was on my third consecutive week. I was feeling tired and I wasn't in the best of tempers at the time, so ... And that didn't help my temper, my mood at all.” iii) Mr Lawrence wanted revenge, and was happy to be a ‘witness for hire’ to do so, and had somebody (unnamed, though Sheikh Mohamed infers it was Mr Salfiti), to make enquiries and contact Sheikh Majid’s solicitors. “Q. It seems all very mysterious, doesn't it? A. I am a very mysterious man.”
“I don’t know any more about it. I am not really that interested”. viii) Mr Lawrence’s 2019 draft witness statement said he did not recall what had happened to the handwritten note given to him with the details to insert into the File Copy Transfer Instruction, but “but I imagine that I would have thrown it into the waste paper basket …”
“MR JUSTICE HENSHAW: You say you cannot remember precisely, but you think they were from about 2000 to 2004. A. Yes. MR JUSTICE HENSHAW: Just so I am clear about it: you are saying that Sheikh Mohamed didn't give you -- lend you that file or give you any of those transfers to copy from? A. No. He just gave me a file full of transfers, which I think covered the period 2000 to 2004. MR JUSTICE HENSHAW: So, in paragraph 13, you say: "By the time I was asked to prepare the bank transfer instruction [about four lines down] the bank transfer letters from 2002 were not available to me in the office." You say you copied the lay out from another transfer addressed to John Collier-Wright, contained in the file. I just want to be clear about what file it is you are referring to there, whether it was -- A. It is still the black plastic binder. MR JUSTICE HENSHAW: Right. A. There were no documents from 2002 on -- left on our floor. MR JUSTICE HENSHAW: Right. So do you mean that the file which Sheikh Mohamed showed you, you didn't take that away with you? A. Yes, I did take that with me. MR JUSTICE HENSHAW: You did take it with you, right. You are saying that was the file from which you copied something to prepare the transfer you prepared. A. Yes.”
“When my children were at school in Saudi Arabia, I saw them only during the school holidays, when they would normally come home to England. In any event, my children were living at home in England in the late 1990s and were only at school in Saudi Arabia for four years, until around 2004, after which time they came back to England. For my part, I lived in England throughout.”
“In 2001-2002 I was living in Kent and worked at the office in Wigmore Street. Sheikh Mohamed had a house in Winnington Road, Hampstead, and I would estimate that he spent on average circa 10 days a month living in London. The balance of his time would be spent travelling between his offices and homes in Paris, Vienna and the Algarve, with occasional trips to Saudi Arabia. His children were educated in England, and he had a driver in London called Ugo, who had been with Sheikh Mohamed since his daughters were born and who used to drive him to work every day when he was in London. Generally, he came to work in a gold Jaguar XJ v12, and sometimes in his Rolls Royce.”
“Q. Are you able to help us at all with the number of days of the year in that period, when you moved in, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002? Approximately how many days -- A. You know, I used to go there after 1999. From 1999 to 2009, 10 years. I count it one day and I mention it on my proceed[ings] in New York. I think, if I remember. But the total was six months on this 10 years. Q. Six months over the 10 years? A. On the 10 years. I was busy with Europe, travelling, try to sort the Middle East issues.”
“Not only -- do you think that Hanbali sat there and wrote a treatise and analysed it or any of them? They sat in the mosque and they actually -- they're anecdotes, I told you, and people recorded what they remembered from these stories and therefore you get so much contradiction. But when you have a verse in the Quran that's very clear, then you actually have the thing.”
“First: Strengthening and affirming the creditor's right to what the debtor's owes them in terms of money using reliable means- such as written instruments and testimony - to prevent the debtor from denying it, reminding him when he forgets, and preventing him from claiming less than the debt, or preventing the creditor from claiming more than the debt, or its maturity or the expiry of the term, etc. so that if a dispute or disagreement occurs between debtors, this documentation shall be considered a means to prove the disputed debt before the courts. Second: Establishing and solidifying the creditor's right to what the debtor owes in terms of money, so that when the debtor refuses to pay - for any reason whatsoever - he can collect his debt from a third person who guarantees the debtor with his money, or from a financial property to which the creditor's right is related and is a subject to debt repayment.”
“It does not discuss whether writing is obligatory or recommended. It only talks about the mean[s], the weight of evidence …”
“[Q] A man invested his wife's money with his own money, and she was almost satisfied. His wife was asking him to register a share in her favour in the property in proportion to her money to ensure that her money is not inherited by the heirs after her husband’s death, but her husband used to say to her: This money -i.e., both his money and her money will be transferred to you and your children after my death. He died before registering a share in her favour in proportion to her money, so will he be accountable (before God) for that? What should the heirs have to do with this issue?” “[A] If the husband has money for his wife, he should write it down, and clarify that in an official document to be handed over to her after his death, and this must be clarified during his lifetime to acquit himself of the obligation laid on him (before Allah). If he dies without evidencing that [in an official document], the heirs must pay her share from the estate, like the rest of creditors, if this is proven by evidence, or they allow her to do so, and believe in her words, if they are adult and legally competent.”
“One of the main arguments that was made by the defendant was that there was no written agency agreement. So if you go to the reasoning of this case, it says - - you conclude that the court has concluded this based on the outward circumstances. So the point I’m trying to make is that, although the theory of apparent authority is not there in Saudi Arabia, but from these cases and from the reasoning of the court, you can tell that the court can find such actual authority from these circumstances, outward circumstances, of the case.”
“Q. What I’m going to suggest to you is that vicarious liability is not a concept so far as contract is concerned which is recognised in Saudi law. It’s all to do with contractual authority or not. Do you agree? A. When he exceeds his authority and permits crime by taking the money and running away with it, you departed from the realm of contracts. You are now in the realm of torts. And in this situation he is asking for the money or the materials which were actually used by or misappropriated by the employees and so he is liable for them because he gave them authority in the first place to order and, two, to withdraw money.”
“A [fodooli / fudhuli] also applies if he continues to contract in the name of the principal after the expiry of the power of attorney, in which case he will be considered a fudhuli in all the acts performed after the expiry of the power of attorney. Sometimes a fudhuli is not originally an attorney but may perform a legal act for the benefit of the employer or pay a tax imposed on the employer, to avoid administrative attachment against the employer’s property.”
“An uncommissioned agent (Fodooli) is a person who discharges in the absence of any need or urgency the affairs of others without being an agent or having a right to do so by virtue of Shari’ah”
“(i) Statutory law 4.33. There is no general or single codified or statutory law in Saudi that provides for a limitation period for claims. However, there are several statutes that expressly provide for limitation periods that the Saudi government has enacted. For example: … 4.34. The Commercial law of 1931 Decree No. M32 Article 429, which applied to those engaging in commerce had a statute of limitations of three years for obligations not evidenced in writing unless acknowledged. This provision was repealed in 2018. 4.35. The Civil Procedure Law for proceedings before the Board of Grievances (Ministerial Resolution No. 190 of 1989) also fixes a general time frame of 5 years, calculated from the moment of coming into existence of a right to file an administrative claim before the Board. The Board, for many decades, acted as a commercial court in disputes not assigned to the semi-judicial committees, but no longer does so since the establishment of the commercial courts in 2020: ... 4.36. Under the Board of the Grievance procedural law Decision 190 of 1409 as repealed by Law M 3 of 1435, if there were any commercial dealings between the parties, then any dispute between them would have been subject to the Board of Grievance jurisdiction (because it would be considered a commercial dispute). If so, the statute of limitations for a claim, even if the agreement was in writing, would be five years. 4.37. The Commercial Court law M 93 of 1441 (8th of April 2020) codified the trend in courts and established a 5-year statute of limitation as of the day the right arose. see Article 2418. (ii) Sharia law 4.38. Apart from the above specific statutory provisions, and as a matter of Sharia Law, rights do not extinguish by the passage of time but the ability to litigate them can become barred, if a person does not pursue a claim for a right for a long period of time, without any justification or impediment. This is due to the evidentiary problems that the passage of time places on witness testimony which constitutes the highest credible source of evidence in Sharia Law. Whereas a delay in bringing a claim for an alleged right for an extended period, without justification or impediment, is taken as a clear indication to the judge that there was no such right because if there was a right, a claim for it should have been pursued, as people should be diligent in pursuing their rights. 4.39. The period required to amount to a forfeiture of litigating a right is at the judge’s discretion based on the facts of the case. However, the Board of Grievance limitation of 5 years indicates what would be considered a reasonable time in this context, especially for commercial dealings amongst businesspeople. 4.40. These are supposed to be courts of equity (to use a Western expression), so discretion depends on the circumstances. The claimant will have to have an acceptable justification for not advancing his claim earlier and for allowing doubt or “Gharar” to arise. (b) The principles applicable to loan agreements … 4.42. In terms of the significance of delay, the judge would look at the facts and inquire as to why there was a delay in bringing an action to ask for repayment or restitution of the amount transferred. Additionally, the judge would inquire from the defendants as to what other purpose was for the amount transferred. Once the judge collects the information, the judge may order restitution under an unjust enrichment theory if a delay in claiming is justifiable for some reason. 4.43. However, if the delay is not justifiable and is for an extended period (beyond the periods I have set out at paragraphs 4.33 to 4.39 above) then that will mean the claimant will have caused a delay that prejudices the court’s ability to assess the evidence. This is contrary to the principles of Sharia that I have explained, such that allowing the claimant to enforce the alleged right may be contrary to those principles and what is, in effect, public policy. 4.44. This is a matter of the court’s discretion. However, when there is a long and unexplained delay in asserting a right, the court may deem the alleged right unenforceable. In a commercial context, the longer the delay beyond the 5-year period outlined above (and for an oral contract, beyond the 3-year period in force before 2018), the more likely a court will consider that the right is unenforceable for the policy reasons I have given. A delay or more than ten years on a claim under an oral contract would be particularly difficult to justify, and so such a claim is particularly likely to be held unenforceable.”
“71. Judicial Principle No. 2153 issued by the Supreme Judicial Authority of the Supreme Judicial Council prescribes that: “the length of time does not extinguish a right.”