“2 Interpretation “Organiser” means: (a) a trader who combines and sells or offers for sale, packages either directly or through another trader or together with another trader; (b) the trader who transmits the traveller’s data to another trader in accordance with paragraph 5(b)(v); … “Package” means a combination of at least two different types of travel services for the purpose of the same trip or holiday. “Package travel contract” means a contract on a package as a whole or, if the package is provided under separate contracts, all contracts covering the travel services included in the package. … “trader” means any person who is acting, including through any other person acting in their name or on their behalf for purposes relating to their trade, business, craft or profession in relation to contracts covered by these Regulations, whether acting in the capacity of organiser, retailer, trader facilitating a linked travel arrangement or as a travel service provider. “travel service” means: (a) the carriage of passengers; … “traveller” means any individual who is seeking to conclude a contract, or is entitled to travel on the basis of a contract concluded, within the scope of these Regulations; “unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances” means a situation – (a) beyond the control of the party who seeks to rely on such a situation for the purpose of regulation 12(7), 13(2)(b), 15(14) or (16), 16(4)(c) or 28(3)(b); and (b) the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures have been taken. 13 Termination of the package travel contract by the organiser (1) The provisions of this regulation are implied as a term in every package travel contract. (2) Paragraph (3) applies where:- (a) … (b) the organiser is prevented from performing the contract because of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances and notifies the traveller of the termination of the contract without undue delay before the start of the package. (3) The organiser – (a) may terminate the package travel contract and provide the traveller with a full refund of any payments made for the package; and (b) is not liable for additional compensation. 14 Refunds in the event of termination (1) The provisions of this regulation are implied as a term in every package travel contract. … (3) Any … (b) refund required pursuant to: … (ii) a termination under regulation 13(3) Must be made to the traveller without undue delay and in any event not later than 14 days after the package travel contract is terminated. … 29 Right of redress Where an organiser … (a) pays compensation, … the organiser … may seek redress from any third parties which contributed to the event triggering compensation, a price reduction or other obligations.”
“As package services are often complex combinations of travel services, including multiple services and various providers, a problem with the delivery of one service may affect the delivery of others. By making the organiser responsible for the whole package, this avoids the consumer having to deal with multiple parties if something goes wrong.”
“As Ms. Anderson QC rightly reminded me, the court must be careful before giving summary judgment on a claim. The correct approach on applications by defendants is, in my judgment, as follows: i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman[2001] 2 All ER 91 ; ii) A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel[2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]; iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”: Swain v Hillman; iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10]; v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5)[2001] EWCA Civ 550 ; vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd[2007] FSR 63 ; vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd[2007] EWCA Civ 725 .”
“(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order”
“As regards applications by defendants for reverse summary judgment, the central points to be derived from [the] cases are as follows: i. The burden of proof is on the defendant. ii. The court must consider whether the claimant has a ‘realistic’, as opposed to a ‘fanciful’, prospect of success. iii. The court should not conduct a mini-trial. Where there is a dispute on the facts, the court should assume that the claimant will be able to prove the facts it is alleging unless it is clear that there is no real substance to those allegations, as where they are contradicted by the documentary evidence. iv. If there is a short point of law, or construction, and the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, the court should grasp the nettle and decide it.”
“20. In the quest for what constitutes a “new” cause of action, i.e. a cause of action different from that already asserted, it is the essential factual allegations upon which the original and the proposed new or different claims are reliant which must be compared. … 21. The court is therefore concerned with the comparison of “the essential factual elements in a cause of action already pleaded with the essential factual elements in the cause of action as proposed” – see per David Richards J in HMRC v Begum[2010] EWHC 1799 (Ch) at paragraph 32. “A change in the essential features of the factual basis (rather than, say, giving further particulars of existing allegations) will introduce a new cause of action” – ibid, paragraph 30. 22. Where an amendment pleads a duty which differs from that pleaded in the original action, it will usually assert a new cause of action – …… where different facts are alleged to constitute a breach of an already pleaded duty, the courts have had more difficulty in deciding whether a new cause of action is pleaded. …The question to be resolved is therefore one of fact and degree. For my part I am not convinced that one needs to look further than for a change in the essential features of the factual basis relied upon, bearing in mind that the factual basis will include the facts out of which the duty is to be spelled as well as those which allegedly give rise to breach and damage.”
“Particulars of Claim are intended to define the claim being made. They are a formal document prepared for the purposes of legal proceedings and can be expected to identify with care and precision the case the claimant is putting forward. They must set out the essential allegations of fact on which the claimant relies and which he will seek to prove at trial but they should also state the nature of the case that is to be made in order to inform the defendant and the court of the basis on which it is said that the facts give rise to a right to the remedy being claimed.”
“[55]Courts and commentators have broken down the conceptual structure of a claim in unjust enrichment into four elements: (i) Has the Defendant been enriched (ii) Was the enrichment at the Claimant’s expense (iii) Was the enrichment unjust? (iv) Are there any defences? … [67]However, as demonstrated by Roxborough, invalidity of a relevant contract is not a necessary pre-requisite to a successful claim in unjust enrichment. That is not to say that claims in unjust enrichment must not respect contractual regimes and allocations of risk agreed between the parties. On the contrary, as explained by Professor Burrows in The Restatement (at 3(6)), an ‘often overlooked but crucial element of the unjust factors scheme is: ‘that an unjust factor does not normally override a legal obligation of the claimant to confer the benefit on the defendant. The existence of the legal obligation means that the unjust factor is nullified so that the enrichment at the claimant’s expense is not unjust. …”
“[30] In Fothergill at 278B Lord Wilberforce stated that the use of travaux préparatoires should be ‘cautious’ and only where two conditions are fulfilled: “… first that the material involved is public and accessible, and secondly, that the travaux préparatoires clearly and indisputably point to a definite legislative intention”
“… the travaux relevant to construction of a treaty do not include any intention of the actual draftsman who provided the text for the legislators to consider. One only goes to the travaux to find out what the legislators intended, not what someone else intended.”
“In cases where an organiser or, in accordance with Articles 15 or 18, a retailer pays compensation, grants price reduction or meets the other obligations incumbent on it under this Directive, no provision of this Directive or of national law may be interpreted as restricting its right to seek redress from any third parties which contributed to the event triggering compensation, price reduction or other obligations.”