“9.2 No Voice Group Company, nor, so far as the Seller is aware, any director, officer or employee of any Voice Group Company nor (in relation to the Voice Group Business) any member of the Seller’s Group or any director, officer or employee of any member of the Seller’s Group, is or has in the preceding 18 months, been subject to any non-routine investigation, review or enquiry […] in each case by a Governmental Authority in relation to the Voice Group Business nor, so far as the Seller is aware, is any such investigation, review, enquiry, proceedings or process pending or threatened.”
“… that, in each case, has or would have a material adverse impact on the operation of the Voice Group Business (taken as a whole).”
“10.3 So far as the Seller is aware, there are no circumstances which would reasonably be expected to give rise to any litigation, arbitration or alternative dispute resolution proceedings by or against any Voice Group Company wherein the value of the claim in such proceedings exceeds£500,000 .”
“5.1 The Seller is not liable in respect of a Seller Warranty Claim unless the Purchaser has given the Seller written notice of the Seller Warranty Claim (stating in reasonable detail the nature of the Seller Warranty Claim and, if practicable, the amount claimed), …: … (b) on or before the second anniversary of Completion …”
“The Court's approach to the construction of notices 25. The starting point for the construction of unilateral notices is the speech of Lord Steyn in Mannai Investment Co Ltd v. Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd[1997] AC 749 (a case concerning a tenant's notice exercising a break clause in a lease) at 767G, in which he made clear a cardinal principle of construction: “The question is not how the landlord understood the notices. The construction of the notices must be approached objectively. The issue is how a reasonable recipient would have understood the notices. And in considering this question the notices must be construed taking into account the relevant objective contextual scene.” “The question is not how the landlord understood the notices. The construction of the notices must be approached objectively. The issue is how a reasonable recipient would have understood the notices. And in considering this question the notices must be construed taking into account the relevant objective contextual scene.” 26. At p.775E, Lord Hoffmann said this: “When therefore, lawyers say that they are concerned, not with subjective meaning, but with the meaning of the language which the speaker has used, what they mean is that they are concerned with what he would objectively have been understood to mean. 27. In relation to what is admissible as the contextual scene or factual matrix, Lord Steyn added at 768B: “The real question is what evidence of surrounding circumstances may ultimately be allowed to influence the question of interpretation. That depends on what meanings the language read against the objective contextual scene will let in.” 28. Lord Hodge's more recent synthesis of the proper approach to the construction of contracts in Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Ltd[2017] UKSC 24 ;[2017] AC 1173 at [10], with which the other members of the Supreme Court agreed, is to like effect: “The court's task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their agreement.” 29. The reference to 'the parties' in this passage highlights a difference between a contract and a unilateral notice: in the latter case the court is not construing agreed words, it is construing words used by one party. Nevertheless, the approach to ascertaining meaning is similar: the words used in the24 March 2015 letter and the context in which it was written are both relevant. … 36. The final principle which emerges from the cases is that, although every notification provision is likely to turn on its own wording, see for example Ipsos SA v. Dentsu Aegis Network Ltd[2015] EWHC 1171 (Comm) and the cases referred to at [16], the purpose of notification in this type of contract is to make clear in sufficiently formal terms that a claim is being made against the vendors, see also Senate Electrical Wholesalers Ltd v. Alcatel Submarine Networks Ltd(formerly STC Submarine Systems Ltd) [1999] 2 Lloyds L.R 423, at [90]. 37. At [91] Stuart-Smith LJ went on to say: “It does not stop there. Certainty is a crucial foundation for commercial activity. Certainty is only achieved when the vendor is left in no reasonable doubt not only that a claim may be brought but of the particulars of the ground upon which the claim is to be based. The clause contemplates that the notice will be couched in terms which are sufficiently clear and unambiguous as to leave no such doubt and to leave no room for argument about the particulars of the complaint. Notice in writing is required in order to constitute the record which dispels the need for further argument and creates the certainty. Thus, there is merit in certainty and accordingly, in our judgment the point taken by the appellants is not a matter of mere technicality and it is not without merit. 38. Furthermore, as Cooke J observed in LaminatesAcquisition Co v. BTR Australia Limited[2003] EWHC 2540 (Comm) at [29] having referred to the speech of Lord Steyn in Mannai Investments (above) and the judgment of Stuart-Smith LJ in Senate Electrical: “Notice clauses of this kind are usually inserted for a purpose, to give some certainty to the party to be notified and a failure to observe their terms can rarely be dismissed as a technicality.”
“Thirdly, and as a result of the first two aspects, it would have served no commercial purpose to have set out in the 24 June letter the further limited and generic detail available. The purpose of a notice clause such as that in schedule 4 para 2(b) of the SPA is to enable the recipient to make such inquiries as it is able, and would wish, to make into the factual circumstances giving rise to the claim, with a view to gathering or preserving evidence; to assess so far as possible the merits of the claim; to participate in the tax investigation to the extent desirable or possible with a view to influencing the outcome; and to take into account the nature and scope of the claim in its future business dealings, whether by way of formal reserving or a more general assessment of the potential liability. As Mr Choo-Choy accepted, the additional detail available, if included in the 24 June letter, would not have advanced any of these purposes. I balk at a conclusion that the level of detail provided in a notice of this sort fell short of what was required as reasonable, that is to say was unreasonably deficient, when the additional level of detail said to have been required would not have furthered any of the commercial purposes for giving such a notice. What is reasonable takes its colour from the commercial purpose of the clause, and what businessmen in the position of the parties would treat as reasonable. Businessmen would not expect or require further detail which served no commercial purpose. That would be the antithesis of what was reasonable.”
“47. In breach of the warranty at paragraph 9.2 of Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the SPA, as regards the CFTC/FCA Matter the Voice Group Companies and/or members of the Seller’s Group, and as regards the ISL Director Investigation (referred to below) a director and/or officer and/or employee of the Voice Group Companies had within the 18 months prior to the giving of the Seller Warranties (i) at the date of the SPA (in respect of the ISL Director Investigation) and/or (ii) at the date of Completion (in respect of the CFTC/FCA Matter and/or the ISL Director Investigation) been subject to non-routine investigation, review or enquiry which could include the imposition of any risk mitigation or other remediation plans or requirements, disciplinary or enforcement proceedings or other formal process (whether judicial, quasi-judicial, of a regulatory, supervisory or enforcement nature or otherwise), by a Governmental Authority in relation to the Voice Group Business. In this regard, by the date of Completion: a. At least IGDL and, it is to be inferred, IEL, ICAP Energy LLC, ICAP Energy Limited, ICAP Capital Markets LLC were the subject of investigation or enquiry by the CFTC/FCA. b. The Frankfurt Prosecutor had commenced an investigation into the ISL Director in respect of his conduct concerning Rafael Roth (“the ISL Director Investigation”). 48. Each of the (i) CFTC/FCA Matter and (ii) the ISL Director Investigation was a non-routine investigation, review or enquiry (or a series of several such matters) and was liable to lead to the consequences specified in paragraph 9.2. This includes the consequences specified in paragraph 9.2 in the form in which that warranty was given at Completion (see paragraph 9 above). In support of its case that the CFTC/FCA Matter and the ISL Director Investigation was each a non-routine investigation, review or enquiry which may include the imposition of remediation plans or requirements or a disciplinary or enforcement proceeding or formal process “that, in each case, has or would have a material adverse impact on the operation of the Voice Group Business (taken as a whole)”, the [Purchaser] relies upon the facts and matters referred to in paragraphs 20 and 46a above.”
“There is no suggestion in the Notification that the Seller was aware of the director’s contraventions. In order for it to have made such a case, the Purchaser would have had to identify one of the individuals specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 23 to the SPA and it did not.”
“Insofar as liability under paragraph 9.2 was qualified by reference to the Seller’s awareness (i.e. in relation to investigation, review or enquiry into the conduct of directors and/or officers and/or employees of the Voice Group Companies and/or of members of the Seller’s Group which is not attributable to the relevant corporate entities), the [Purchaser]’s case will be that it is to be inferred that one or more of the relevant individuals identified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 23 to the SPA was so aware, to the extent that 21 such directors, officers, or employees were identified in the communications relating to the CFTC/FCA Matter and/or the ISL Director Investigation described above and/or were consulted by the Seller’s advisers in relation to the warranties given in the SPA. …”
“a. The Seller had been notified of the relevant regulatory activity long before the date of Completion. b. These were evidently serious matters. c. ICAP had self-reported to the FCA and the CFTC. d. Stuart Wexler and David Mazzuco (at the relevant time both of whom were senior in house counsel employed by the Seller and were directly involved in the negotiation of the SPA) were regularly copied on correspondence relating to the CFTC/FCA Matter. e. A document preservation notice in relation to the CFTC/FCA Matter had been circulated internally on10 February 2016 . f. David Ireland (at the relevant time the Head of Group Finance employed by the Seller, who is an individual identified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 23 of the SPA) was from at least 2011 copied on correspondence relating to legal proceedings, regulatory requests and investigations relating to alleged cum-ex trading by ISL with Rafael Roth and HVB. g. Duncan Wales (at the relevant time the General Counsel of ICAP plc), and Damian Morris (at the relevant time EMEA General Counsel of ICAP plc) oversaw the HMRC Production Order process (and were both directly involved in the negotiation of the SPA). Mr Wales had been personally involved in the authorisation of cum-ex trading. h. From December 2011 to October 2014, ISL was a party to civil litigation in Germany and England relating to matters arising from cum-ex trading. i. Given the size of the transaction, it is properly to be inferred that the Seller investigated (either itself or via its advisers investigating and reporting back to the identified individuals) with the appropriate departments and individuals within the Seller’s Group to ascertain what non-routine contact there had been with governmental authorities in the relevant period, that such investigations identified the contacts referred to herein and that such contacts were reported to or raised with the individuals identified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 23 of the SPA.”
“50. In breach of the warranty at paragraph 10.3 of Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the SPA, the Seller was aware that there were circumstances which would reasonably be expected to give rise to litigation, arbitration or alternative dispute resolution proceedings by or against any Voice Group Company wherein the value of the claim would exceed£500,000 . 51. The circumstances of the conduct relating to each of (i) swaps and interest rates which are the subject of the CFTC/FCA Matter (as at Completion) and (ii) the ISL Director Investigation (as at the date of the SPA and/or at Completion), particularly when coupled with the existence of regulatory investigations which were likely to bring those matters to light, were such that they would reasonably be expected to give rise to litigation including with (a) regulators/authorities, and/or (b) trading counterparties, and/or (c) clients and/or (d) other parties, in relation to any or all of (i) sanctions and penalties, and/or (ii) losses suffered and gains made and/or (iii) contribution or third party liabilities. In relation to cum-ex trading, litigation had already occurred involving HVB and RFE and it was reasonable to expect that other litigation against ISL would occur. Given the scale of the relevant conduct, it was highly likely that the amounts in dispute in such litigation would exceed£500,000 . 52. The foregoing paragraphs in relation to the relevant circumstances and the knowledge of relevant individuals named in the SPA are repeated.”
“59. It is also the case, as Mr. Smouha QC submitted, that the Tax Investigation Notification fails anywhere to state that any fine, penalty or other liability or sanction which had resulted or may result from any contravention of any applicable law or regulation has or would have a material adverse impact on the operation of the business of the Voice Group Companies taken as a whole. Unless that is so, there is no breach of the Seller Warranty in paragraph 9.1. I do not consider that it is sufficient to contend, as Mr. Handyside QC did, that the Seller should simply infer this important part of the warranty from the fact of the Tax Investigation Notification per se. If that were right, all that a purchaser would be required to do in order to satisfy paragraph 5.1 of Schedule 5, Part 1, would be to simply state in its Notification "I make a claim under 9.1". That the fine/penalty or other liability would have a material adverse impact on the operation of the Group is a necessary and important element of the nature of the claim under 9.1. Importantly, it tells the Seller that this is a very substantial claim for which it must make provision.”
“Moreover, the reason that it is not mentioned in the Tax Investigation Notification is, no doubt, precisely because the Purchaser is not yet making a Seller Warranty Claim in respect of paragraph 9.1; is not yet identifying any contravention of an applicable law or regulation by a Voice Group Company; and accordingly is unable as yet to put forward any case that such a contravention has or would have a material adverse impact on the operation of the business of the Voice Group Companies taken as a whole.”
“… these two paragraphs make clear that the investigation is continuing and no adverse finding against the Company has yet been made; and no contravention of any law or regulation is referred to. As a result the Purchaser makes no mention at all of any alleged material adverse impact on the operation of the business of the Voice Group Companies (taken as a whole) and it can only point to relatively trivial losses. Again, that is an important part of the notification requirement under paragraph 5 of Schedule 5, Part 1 which is missing from this Notification.”